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**Chief Executives Board  
for Coordination**CEB/2010/HLCM/20  
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**HIGH-LEVEL COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT (HLCM)**Twentieth Session  
Washington D.C., IMF, 27-28 September 2010**INTER-AGENCY SECURITY MANAGEMENT NETWORK MEETING****(13<sup>th</sup> session, Vienna, 22 to 25 June 2010)****I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the United Nations Office in Vienna from 22 to 25 June 2010. A list of participants is attached at Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members is attached at Annex B. This was the 13<sup>th</sup> session of the IASMN since its first meeting in Vienna in 2000.
2. The IASMN members wish to express their gratitude to UNOV for hosting the meeting and to Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Director-General of the United Nations Office in Vienna (UNOV) for opening the meeting.

**II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING****A. Report of the IASMN Steering Group**

3. The Report of the IASMN Steering Group was provided to the members of the IASMN for their information.

**B. Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)**

4. The IASMN was informed that the work of the UN Working Group on Mercenaries, established in 2005 to focus on the gap in the protection of human rights between legitimate forces of law and order and outsourced unregulated military contractors, as well as efforts led by the Swiss Government and the ICRC since 2006 to address rules and good practices relating to PMSCs operating in armed conflict would be concluded in the fall of 2010, likely resulting in a framework within which the UN could engage with legitimate PMSCs. If the use of PMSCs is deemed to be acceptable, it can be expected that PMSCs will approach the UN to offer their services.

5. The IASMN was also informed that the UN Secretariat's Policy Committee intends to convene a thematic meeting on the issue of private security companies (PSCs) in the first quarter of 2011, for which DSS had been requested to take the lead.

6. As such, and to inform its deliberations on this issue, the IASMN was provided with a DSS-DPKO Non-Paper on the use by the UN-system of PMSCs, the DPKO Survey of Missions using PSCs, extracts from the premises vulnerability questionnaire on the type of guard forces used and additional reports in connection with the work undertaken by the Swiss Government/ICRC PMSC group and the Working Group on Mercenaries.

7. The Chair informed the meeting that where operations called for this, there may be a need to consider the use of PSCs and PSMCs, but that in light of both the General Assembly resolutions on the criteria for the outsourcing of security, (A/RES/55/232 and A/RES/59/289), a priority order for considering the use of these companies needs to be established, i.e. first, it was necessary to look at what support the Host Country may provide, then at what the UN may provide, then at what Member States may provide and, as a last resort, what PSCs/PMSCs may provide. At the same time, it was clear that great numbers of PSCs/PMSCs could not be employed and certainly not on a long term basis. Therefore, what needed to be examined was the use of these companies on a short term basis.

8. The IASMN considered that there could be certain circumstances where the UN may need to employ PSCs/PMSCs as a last resort and that there should be criteria and a process in place for doing so, but without giving the impression that as soon as the UN does not have the capacity, the UNSMS immediately turns to using those companies. Furthermore, it was noted that the General Assembly had specified in its resolutions, A/RES/55/232 and A/RES/59/289 that activities (e.g. security contract services) that could compromise the security and safety of delegations, staff and visitors may not be considered for outsourcing. Therefore, the option of using PSCs/PMSCs must be thoroughly examined.

9. Concern was also expressed that if the UN is sent into operations that are so precarious as to call for the use of PSCs/PMSCs, then it should be incumbent on the UN to provide the requisite protection and to question if indeed whether the UN should be there under such circumstances. The Staff Federations expressed similar concerns, and questioned why, if the UN was willing to pay for PSCs/PMSCs, would it not be willing to recruit its own personnel for this purpose, for example, a rapid reaction force that the UN may control. It reiterated similar concerns in questioning the viability of operating in an environment that may be deemed unsafe, even for UN security personnel.

10. Recognizing that the issue of contracting PSCs and PMSCs also raises political, human rights, ethical, reputational and moral issues, and that this issue goes beyond addressing only security concerns, the IASMN determined that the involvement of non-security actors in the consideration of their use was needed. It was emphasized that the UN needed to be prepared to deal with any criticism in the event that the use of such companies resulted in tragic consequences. The suggestion was also made that perhaps this issue did not merit policy decisions, but instead was related to procurement, and that the IASMN should not be discussing PSCs/PMSCs at all, but rather the specifics of developing policies, for example, on the use of force.

11. While acknowledging the concerns expressed, the Chair added that PSCs were already operating in some locations and that using such companies to support ways in which the UN could continue its operations when no other options were available, was congruent with the 'how to stay'

paradigm endorsed by the CEB. Additionally, he acknowledged that if this route is chosen, there cannot be situations where PSCs/PSMCs are not held accountable and have impunity, or where the impression of impunity is conveyed. While he would ensure that the concerns expressed at this meeting are highlighted at the political level, with the Policy Committee and if necessary, at the level of the General Assembly, he recognized that the IASMN had an important role to play in determining the principles behind the use of PSCs and PMSCs. Regarding use of force policies, the Chair informed the meeting that a year ago, DSS had looked at the use of deadly force policy by UN security officers and found that this differed among duty stations. Efforts were therefore underway to produce a new policy on this subject.

12. In the context of the discussions, the IASMN also noted that not only was there a lack of policies on the use of PSCs and PMSCs, but that there was also a lack of policies on close protection, including standardized training criteria for close protection officers. Concerns were expressed that the absence of standards and protocols could be driving very poor standards. It was noted that in some cases, close protection was provided by DSS' Security and Safety Services, while in others, by DPKO and that DSS has developed and implemented both a close protection policy and training standards for close protection officers.<sup>1</sup> Further guidance will be forthcoming from DSS.<sup>2</sup>

13. Due to time constraints and the complexity of the issue, the IASMN recognized that it would not be able to agree on a policy regarding the use of PSCs and PMSCs at this meeting and that the IASMN Working Group on PSCs, the membership of which was agreed upon at the IASMN Steering Group's meeting in Brindisi, would need to be convened as soon as possible in order that the views of the IASMN could be reflected in the impending Policy Committee meeting on this issue. The discussions at this meeting nevertheless did serve to identify the following elements to be considered in the working group's deliberations:

- the lack of proper state regulations on the use of international PSCs;
- the need to establish criteria, standards and a mechanism for evaluation for the use of PSCs and PSMCs, including how to contact and manage the performance of such companies and handle accountability issues;
- the types of procurement policies that would be needed;
- the importance of distinguishing PSCs and PSMCs, (as this would impact on the rules of engagement, e.g. whether they are armed);
- the need to adopt a code of conduct;
- what specific security functions may be outsourced (core vs. non core);
- the specific training that should be provided to these companies before deployment to the field;
- an examination of local situations on the ground and which organizations are already employing PSCs or PMSCs;
- a review of whether host countries would insist on certain persons/companies being hired and
- whether the issue of close protection should be given urgent priority.

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<sup>1</sup> The Close Protection Training Course conducted by DSS and the PGS of Romania has defined training standards. This course has been implemented.

<sup>2</sup> Such guidance was issued during the third week of August 2010.

## **Recommendations:**

14. The IASMN recommended that its Working Group on Private Security Companies (PSCs), the membership of which was confirmed by the Steering Group at its meeting in June 2010, be convened as soon as possible to produce a paper for both the USG, DSS and the IASMN on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) which would also serve to inform any future meetings of the UN Secretariat's Policy Committee on this issue.

15. As guidance for the working group deliberations, the IASMN recommended that international PSCs be used by the UN based upon an SRA and only as a last resort, i.e. when other options such as host country support, international forces, national forces of another country and/or local private security capacity are either not available or do not have either the capacity or the will to provide necessary security support for the UN. The WG report should address guidelines on coordination with host country authorities, what security functions should/should not be outsourced, standard criteria for incorporation into the procurement process, ethics, code of conduct, rules of engagement, what should/should not be outsourced, why this protection is needed, what UN specific training is required and other areas to be determined by the WG.

16. Furthermore, the IASMN acknowledged that the use of international PSCs generates serious concern and unresolved questions regarding mandates, programme criticality, liability and the image and reputation of the organizations employing them.

## **C. Security Information Management Systems Report**

17. The IASMN was provided with a report on the existing key DSS security management information systems that have been launched and are under development, including the UN Security Managers Information Network portal, the ISECT 3 system and the proposed Common Security Incident Reporting (CSIRS) framework.

18. Much of the discussion focused on that portion of the UNSMIN website that would report on the security level for a given area as further clarification was sought on how this system would function.

19. It was reported that the security level, when approved by the Designated Official, after consultation with the Security Management Team would be automatically updated in the travel advisory, thus eliminating the need to communicate separately any changes to Headquarters. It was also reported that as the phase system ceases to exist, the link between the security phase in effect in an area and the need for a security clearance will also disappear. Although, as a reference point, it had originally been proposed that under the SLS, security clearances begin at security level 3 and above, it was confirmed that to support the delinking of the security level (which represents the 'threat') from the security clearance (which may be considered a 'mitigating measure'), an additional ISECT feature could be incorporated to be provided to Designated Officials and Security Advisors.

20. This new feature would serve to delegate the decision regarding "automatic" or "manual" processing or clearance to the security management structure in country. The processing method (manual vs. automatic) would no longer be tied to a particular security level, thus offering the SMT additional flexibility. In addition, this new feature could streamline the current practice which entails either submitting a Security Clearance or Travel Notification into one single submission for all

‘official’ travel, which would eliminate the current confusion for staff.<sup>3</sup> It would simply require that all official UN travel be submitted into the system. At the same time, staff would still be encouraged to also use the system for personal travel.

21. To further simplify matters, it was proposed to the IASMN that ISECT be renamed ‘TRIPS’ (“Travel Information Procedure System”) which would better describe a new process for monitoring the movement of UN personnel, both in country and globally.

22. The IASMN questioned whether it was not complicating matters by requesting manual input and it was suggested that this be left to the DO, in consultation with the other members of the SMT, to decide. Further clarification was also sought on the type of framework that is being set up. With the imminent implementation of the SLS, there was particular concern about how to handle SLS levels above 2 and how to circumvent technical problems, especially in the case of urgent missions. Other views supported the delinking of the SLS level from security clearances, with the suggestion made that this be reflected in the new UNSMS Policy Manual. It was also asked if the current profiles that exist in ISECT would be moved to the new system.

23. DSS confirmed that under the SLS, countries would be split up into ‘SLS’ areas, each with their own profile. Furthermore, almost all profiles from ISECT 2 would be migrated to ISECT 3. Relying on the PeopleSoft Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) System to migrate data will apparently not work, so this would need to be done mechanically.

24. The IASMN was pleased with the online MOSS evaluation form on UNSMIN. The IASMN noted that with SIRS, at present, there is no access to incident reports which may be needed in case there is a claim under Appendix D. Additional concerns were expressed by the representative of the Medical Directors Network regarding the reporting of MOSS compliance, i.e. whether this would be a multilingual site and how overlaps in reporting needs would be handled, i.e. reports on ‘near misses’ in the field of occupational health and safety which would need to be reported from both a security and a medical perspective. Although information on ‘near misses’ might be entered in SIRS, presently there was no way of ensuring that the medical directors receive this information.

### **Recommendations:**

25. The IASMN took note of the information presented by UNDSS on UNSMIN, ISECT 3 and the proposed framework for a Common Security Incident Reporting (CSIRS) and appreciated the progress achieved in all areas.

26. The IASMN endorsed the concept that ISECT be used as the universal travel notification tool for all official UN travel rather than serving only as a tool for security clearances. As such, the IASMN recommended that consideration be given to renaming ISECT to TRIP (Travel Information Procedure System) to reflect the new function of this tool.

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<sup>3</sup> It is to be noted that ISECT is currently used to record movements of staff, i.e. where there is no phase in effect, the system automatically acknowledges the traveler’s presence on behalf of the DO (i.e. serves as a ‘travel notification’). Where there is travel to an area where a phase is in effect, an internationally recruited staff member currently manually reviews the request with a view to granting, denying or returning the request for further information.

27. The IASMN also supported, where feasible, the linking of ISECT to individual Agency, Fund, Programme and Organization (AFPO) ERP and Travel Authorization systems similar to what has been done with DPKO and what is under consideration by WHO, to avoid double inputs into the system. DSS is currently consulting with Umoja<sup>4</sup>, UNDP, IMF, World Bank Group, IFAD, ILO, and FAO to develop appropriate interfaces with their respective systems.

#### **D. DFS Benchmark Validation of the Security Occupational Group Key Outputs**

28. The report of the IASMN meeting in Nairobi recommended that DFS/DPKO provide its complete benchmarking validation report on the security occupational group to DSS in order that the department may consider incorporating the findings and content of the report in the planned departmental HR review project. The report was provided to DSS in March 2010. The key outputs determined as a result of that report were presented to the IASMN a) to take note in order that DPKO/DFS could inform the ACABQ that this had been done and b) to consider the impact the results of this review would have on DSS-administered security posts.

29. The IASMN was informed that following its benchmark validation, DFS/DPKO had reclassified certain posts in April 2010, in accordance with UN and common system standards and intended to submit the reclassifications in their upcoming mission budget submission for 2011- 2012. Most of those for whom reclassifications had been recommended were DFS/DPKO mission-appointed staff and as such, their grades could be adjusted by DFS.

30. It was reported that the benchmark validation and classification revealed that out of approximately 70 DSS professional level posts in 15 missions, there were 7 CSAs in 6 missions where the grades of the existing posts should be reclassified from the P5 to the D1 level and a further two cases where the posts should be upgraded from the P4 to P5 level. However, any scheme to align the grades of those posts to the findings of the review would require the concurrence of both DSS and endorsement of the IASMN as these were cost-shared posts.

31. To support the conclusions reached and the above proposal, DFS/DPKO provided further details about the purpose of the study, the methodology employed and the conclusions reached. It was recalled that the purpose of the benchmark study was to ensure that the security occupational group conforms to the requirements of specific field operations and/or specifications within defined operating conditions. Accordingly, 29 field operations led and/ or supported by DPA, DPKO and DFS as of December 2009 were examined. In parallel, critical security functions required by field operations were identified, data was collected from a variety of sources and a field operations survey was conducted to establish a comprehensive and relevant set of data.

32. The data set included the types of field operations and governance, security clients based on the numbers of international and national staff and eligible dependants, the number of UN military and police personnel types (international professional and field service, national, commercial; the numbers of security staff performing critical functions which did not include AFPO security officers), the numbers of operating locations and security phase levels. The analysis of the data identified four field operation models; small, medium, large and very large, based upon the numbers of security clients. Multiple statistical analyses were performed to determine constant and variable factors that affect the

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<sup>4</sup> Umoja is the new enterprise resource planning system encompassing over 200 locations in over 100 countries and spanning four functional areas – Finance, Supply Chain, Human Resources and Central Support Services.

security component within field operations, and the results of the analysis were used to determine the findings and recommendations to support critical functions, structure, grade levels, etc.

33. Furthermore, during the benchmark validation, certain key factors emerged as being essential for the definition and validation of the general security structure, namely, the size of the clientele<sup>5</sup>, the range of critical functions, the complexity of those functions, the number of locations requiring security support and presence, and the operational tempo of the security component. In addition, security occupational group benchmarking factors took into account the operating environment, host country security capacity, the presence of the UN or other international military and police formed units, the use of commercial guard services, the requirement for protection services and constraints on security resources.

34. While some similarities emerged between UN security critical functions and those of other organizations, e.g. military police, the study confirmed that the UN was unique in that it was the only entity that deals with a broader range of clients, i.e. mission and agency staff, international and national staff and eligible dependents, and individual military and UN police.

35. In addition, the study found that security staffing ranges from a single officer to over a thousand officers (e.g. UNMIS) and while functions are variable, the only constant was the management function, even if vested in a single person. It was also reported that the size of the location impacted on the requirement for management skills and the need for security middle management. (Protective services and the guard function were major variables affecting security staff numbers). It was also found that in large and very large field operations, there was a linear relationship between the total number of security clients and security staff if protective services and guards were extracted from the total number of security staff.

36. Overall, the benchmark validation proved to be a valuable management tool, yielding major conclusions such as the need to base the operational model on security clientele, maintain protective services and guards as a separate entity, and reflect supervisory responsibilities in the grades of security staff, as well as provide defined career paths for all levels of security personnel (professional, field service and national). It was found that the requisite competencies (e.g. UN, technical and behavioural) should be further developed and reflected in job profiles, recruiting processes, and training programs. Furthermore, to manage the career of security professionals, it would be important for the profiles of DFS security staff to match those of DSS staff to encourage mobility across the organization.

37. The IASMN sought further clarification on the definition of the term 'clients', e.g. whether the inclusion of national dependents should also form part of the client base and why military and police were counted in the client base, as they would be the recipients of limited security support. DPKO/DFS replied that for national staff dependents, it provides relocation as well as a warden system and that the only time military and police were considered as clients was when it comes to issuing passes and identification. DPKO/DFS further cited a fundamental problem in the UNSMS that was revealed in this study, i.e. that there were two models on the ground - the country team model, which entails a large number of countries and a small number of clients; and the field operations model (not led by DSS) which covers fewer countries but comprises a larger number of clients. Country teams,

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<sup>5</sup> Clientele were defined as those personnel within a mission to whom the UNSMS was applicable. For selected security critical functions (e.g. pass and identification), the clientele could include elements not under the UNSMS (e.g. police and military units).

such as those in Pakistan fell out of those two models and it was hoped that DSS would conduct its own study for a pure Country Team model as part of the DSS HR review.

38. It was noted that, especially for DPA led missions, factors such as the complexity and sensitivity of the mission was just as important as the size of the model in determining job classifications. DPKO/DFS responded that in the case of the Chief of Security such as in the former IIC, where you have a smaller number of clients, the classification process does indeed take into account the complexities of such posts that require a certain profile.

39. The Chair thanked DPKO/DFS for this study which would serve as a good basis of comparison with DSS positions. While the principle was supported that people need to be functioning at the grade commensurate with their type and degree of work, it was noted that many of the missions were time limited and as such, this presented quite a different scenario from that facing DSS. It was proposed that although there were a number of DSS administered posts that may warrant upgrading, this be tackled in DSS' budget submission, but only following its departmental HR review, whereby it could be considered in a larger context. The Chair requested therefore that DFS not address independently the reclassification of DSS-administered posts with ACABQ and to await the work that needs to be concluded by DSS.

40. In the context of the discussions, it was also noted by DPKO/DFS that it had not yet been clearly determined where the key function of field safety rests. The representative of the Medical Directors' Network reaffirmed that the MDN should take the lead on occupational health and safety, as endorsed by the IASMN at its meeting in Nairobi in February 2010. It was agreed that the IASMN should take the lead on fire safety.

### **Recommendation:**

41. The IASMN thanked DPKO/DFS for sharing its Benchmark Validation of the Security Occupational Group and in so doing, requested that DSS, taking into account its own HR Study Project, move forward in a holistic manner and consider the results of this study and the reclassification of DSS posts, with a view to presenting a common approach in the next budget cycle.

### **E. National Security Staff Screening and Vetting Policy**

42. The IASMN was informed that the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) had requested that the UN Secretariat develop a policy for screening and verification before hiring local security personnel which would include, inter alia, background checks on any criminal and human rights violations of the candidates, as well as links to security companies. As a result, DPKO-DFS have been working with OHCHR to develop a policy to ensure that individuals accused of having committed human rights violations were not deployed to UN peacekeeping operations.

43. Currently, DPA-DPKO-DFS employ approximately 3,200 national security staff in 29 field operations. Screening is conducted by the field operation's security staff at the local level and in coordination with host government authorities. However, screening for human rights violations for local staff does not occur. In addition, DPA-DPKO-DFS utilize approximately 5,000 local, commercial company security guards who are normally screened by the providing company.



44. Taking into account existing UN policies and DFS guidance on reference checks for recruitment and staffing, DPKO-DFS were currently undertaking a scoping study of possible policy options, best practices and international standards for the screening of national staff involved in security functions and in this respect, presented a draft policy it had developed to the IASMN for its consideration.

45. In considering the draft policy, quite an extensive debate ensued that raised a number of key and complex questions with respect to the establishment of any policy on vetting for criminal and human rights violations, e.g. what categories of offences should be screened for, what sources of expertise can be relied upon to conduct the vetting, what action should be taken in respect of serving personnel, and what resources would be required to support a vetting process. OLA recommended that a policy be developed system-wide to apply to all security officers on the basis of the particular nature of their function to avoid discrimination and expose the Organization to liability. Others cited the need not to limit such a policy only to security personnel but that it should be extended to those who performed other functions for which compromise might seriously harm the Organization, for example, financial and procurement functions.

46. In the end, the IASMN questioned whether it was in fact even the appropriate forum in which to consider such an issue and concluded that a vetting policy of this nature would likely have a significant impact on the UN system as it entailed, among other issues, political and human resource implications.

**Recommendations:**

47. Considering that vetting is a major issue, the IASMN recommends that it be brought to the attention of the HLCM with a view to engaging all relevant UN system parties in the formulation of necessary policies.

**F. Independent Panel on Safety and Security (IPSS) Report Recommendation Inventory Matrix**

48. At its May 2010 meeting in Brindisi, the IASMN Steering Group recommended that DSS provide a status update on the IPSS Report (Brahimi) recommendations at the next regular session of the IASMN. Accordingly, the matrix of 83 recommendations that had been prepared by the IASMN at its July 2008 session was reviewed, with DSS providing status updates on each of the 83 recommendations that indicated whether these had been completed, are ongoing or should not be supported.

49. It was noted that specific measures to be taken in respect of those recommendations relating to national staff were yet to be included in the updated matrix. Although extensive work had been done by the HR Network on producing information brochures on security-related entitlements and benefits, it was noted that these had not yet been distributed to staff at large, in part due to the fact that the brochures still remained to be made 'organization-specific' and in part because changes in the UNSMS, such as the new SLS would need to be reflected in the brochures. While the latter could be done by DSS, the IASMN members were encouraged to ensure that their respective HR managers make the brochures organization-specific and distribute them to staff at large.

50. Also citing the recommendations pertaining to national staff, FICSA expressed concern about whether progress would be achieved on those recommendations, particularly with respect to improving

both the security measures, as well as security-related entitlements for national staff and requested that IASMN advocate strongly to the HLCM to progress this issue.

51. It was also recalled that the HLCM had established a Steering Committee under its auspices to identify high priority recommendations from the Brahimi Report for immediate actions. Subsequently, two Operational Working Groups were established by the Standing Committee which examined areas for review and provided detailed actions for implementation that were subsequently endorsed by the HLCM and the CEB. As such, the IASMN was informed that it was the intention of the Chair of the HLCM Steering Committee to recommend at HLCM's Fall September 2010 session that the Steering Committee was formally dissolved and that any remaining work be completed by the appropriate HLCM bodies, such as the HRN, the FBN and the IASMN.

52. Lastly, the IASMN noted that while very rapid progress had been made in implementing many of the Brahimi recommendations over the last two years, the time had now come to consider how to move forward into effectively a 'post-Brahimi' stage. Therefore, thought needs to be given to how to fill any policy gaps that remain and how to strategically tackle the normative framework of the UNSMS over the next two years. As such, the IASMN reaffirmed that as this effort would need to consider many cross-cutting issues; it should not be limited to review by only those in the security sphere, but should include those from other functional areas and disciplines in the UN system.

### **Recommendations:**

53. The IASMN, in reviewing the inventory matrix of recommendations emanating from the IPSS Report, noted the progress made, recommended that a number of recommendations in the matrix be updated to more accurately reflect actions to date, and provided guidance as to which recommendations required no further action.

54. The IASMN also noted that the concerns raised by the IPSS about the security of locally recruited personnel remain and looks forward to receiving the report of the HR Network on this issue which will be presented to the HLCM 2010 fall session.

55. There was agreement that, in this post-IPSS (Brahimi) phase, the IASMN must initiate a forward looking strategic approach to identify the gaps in the UNSMS and take appropriate action at the earliest possible time. In this respect, the IASMN requested that DSS prepare a post-IPSS (Brahimi) report that would examine gaps in the UNSMS and outline the way ahead for the next several years. The report would be presented at the spring 2011 session of the IASMN.

56. The IASMN reaffirmed that security is a cross-cutting issue that continues to require collaboration and cooperation across many functional areas of the UN system.

### **G. Security Level System (SLS) Update**

#### **Training and Roll-Out**

57. The IASMN was provided with an update of the schedule for the global implementation of the SLS. This included the training schedule for 8 Regional Workshops that were organized by DSS' Division of Regional Operations (DRO) and 10 Security Management Teams identified by DRO as high priority to receive the training. In addition, the meeting was informed that SLS training materials

had been installed on the UNSMIN web-site for use in appropriate training modules and that a web-based development platform was open to all security officers to use for orientation training on the system.

58. IASMN was further informed that a system had been set up whereby all security officers would complete security threat assessments (STAs) and arrive at a security level, to be validated by DRO and then presented to the DO and SMT for approval in advance of the 1 January 2011 implementation date for the SLS, i.e. by 1 October 2010. This would help determine whether the SLS could be implemented before 1 January 2011.

### **Security Management Decision Making and the Security Level System (SLS)**

59. In order to clearly explain the security management decision making process in view of the introduction of the SLS, DSS had prepared an information note for presentation to the HLCM at its fall 2010 session which emphasized that the SLS is intended to provide a valuable tool to the security professional to determine threats that would feed into the SRA. DSS clarified that the SLS is only a step in the security risk assessment (SRA) process and that it is the SRA that would reflect the identification of a specific threat and determine if the risk was low, in which case not a great deal of mitigation would be required; if the SRA determined that the risk was high, then there would be greater mitigation measures required. It was only with the information contained in the SRA that decisions may be made on appropriate mitigation measures and on what residual risks remains.

60. While the IASMN was impressed with DSS' work to roll out the new system, it requested that the draft paper for HLCM be further revised to ensure that, in view of the impending abolishment of the security phase system, it was clear in all aspects, including on the role of the Executive Group on Security (EGS), and by whom and how security decisions will be made, including those on relocation and evacuation. While it was recognized that the paper could not reflect one simple and standardized solution for every scenario and would need to take account of differing levels of knowledge persons had about the SLS, several suggestions were made as to what else needed to be included in a revised paper, e.g. a short explanation on program criticality and a reference to non-civilian structures, (in this respect DPKO/DFS' views would be sought). It was also suggested that a list of FAQs be produced to provide further clarifications.

61. Furthermore, it was also stressed that the paper should make clear that one advantage of moving away from the security phase system that automatically triggers security-related decisions was moving to a system that would no longer 'lock' those vested with decision-making authority in the UNSMS into having to make only certain types of decisions. This would allow for greater flexibility to be exercised in the types of decisions made which would ultimately rest on the information contained in the Security Risk Assessment for a given location.

62. The representative of the Medical Directors' Network pointed out that emergency response capability was a very big concern especially in light of the 'how to stay' paradigm and suggested that this should somehow be reflected in the paper to HLCM. He noted that staff are placed in a totally different situation in areas where risk or threat levels rise because of inadequate medical emergency response capability.

63. Consideration of the draft paper for HLCM led into further questioning about how decisions would be made on issues such as relocation and evacuation once the security phase system is abolished.

It was emphasized that it would be important to highlight in the paper that the same decision making structure that was currently in place under the security phase system, would remain unchanged even when the SLS was fully implemented. Essentially, it would still come down to decisions being made by the DO, informed by the SMT and supported by the USG, DSS on behalf of the Secretary-General. Such decisions would not be overruled unless there was a drastic disagreement in which case security focal points may be consulted or, if needed, an EGS may be convened.

64. The Chair pointed out that what was still needed was a ‘shopping basket’ of possible mitigation measures and that DSS would work on developing a basket of mitigation measures and best practices over the next two months, bringing into it a wide variety of experiences. The suggestion was made that in time, consideration might be given to developing area and country-specific mitigation measures.

65. The HR Network also informed the meeting of its concerns with respect to the abolishment of the security phase system and while a paper to HLCM would serve to clarify certain issues, there were still outstanding concerns, such as how to handle the designation of non-family duty stations, (a designation that at present is automatically given for any duty station in Phase III and above). As such, work was underway through an HRN task force to examine more closely this and other HR-related areas that may be impacted by the abolishment of the security phase system. The HRN also wished to know what is being done to minimize the differences between SMTs when decisions were taken on various mitigating factors such as relocation and evacuation.

### **Travel Advisories**

66. Modifications to the Travel Advisory which presently indicates the security phase were also discussed. DSS confirmed that as of 1 January 2011, the security phase will no longer be indicated in the travel advisory, but rather a security level will be indicated instead and the Department will seek the easiest way of reflecting this in travel advisories so as not to cause confusion. It was suggested that perhaps the travel advisory could include a narrative description of the reasons why certain mitigating measures such as relocation or evacuation would be taken. DSS also confirmed that the country teams/missions would be responsible for updating the travel advisories, and that the updating could be done in ‘real time’, rather than on a weekly basis, which was the case at present.

67. It was debated whether the travel advisory should be updated to reflect SLS levels on a weekly or ‘real time’ basis and if a description of the threat should be included, especially as there was still a lack of understanding of how the SLS levels would be used. It was also pointed out that security mitigation measures were not predictable and therefore any system to provide this information may not work as described. The Chair confirmed that there was still further work to be done regarding the specifics to be included in the travel advisory, e.g. should it include area by area clarifications of the security level and a descriptive narrative on mitigating measures. Considering that the SLS would allow for greater granularity in the decision making process, he emphasized that greater explanations may be required.

### **Communications**

68. Concerns were also expressed as to how information on the decision-making process with the introduction of the SLS would be disseminated to the field. It was pointed out that although there had been agreement at the 12<sup>th</sup> session of the IASMN in Nairobi to work together to promote the SLS, there were some field personnel who were not yet aware of the system. It was therefore important for SMTs

to have the minimum training on the SLS provided as well as available standardized promotional materials that could be disseminated to field offices, especially for those not yet aware of the new system. It was also proposed that all SMTs include an agenda item on the SLS as soon as possible to ensure the provision of timely information about the new system.

69. It was deemed that the provision of materials on the SLS should not be limited to the SMT but should also reach a wider audience, including Member States. While some IASMN members had already done so, others were reminded that they had a responsibility to brief and train their senior management, as well as their respective HR managers on the SLS. The possibility of DSS dispatching a team to train senior management teams at HQ locations was also raised. DSS confirmed that it had already trained a cross-section of senior management in New York.

### **Security Cells**

70. The discussions led into a short debate about the composition of security cells among duty stations, with some indicating that security cells did not always recognize the SFP aspect, while others cited the fact that in some locations, the SFP chaired the security cells and still others claiming that if SFPs form part of the security cells, they no longer remain as security cells anymore. The Chair clarified that there was a difference between the composition of the security cell and that of the SMT in that security cells were normally composed primarily of administrative staff or agency-specific security officers whereas the SMT, which operates at a higher level, was normally composed of a mixture of senior security and administrative managers. It was pointed out that in Geneva there was no SMT, but rather a different system of security cell, i.e. an advisory group that included all the Geneva-based SFPs. The IASMN was also informed of another structure known as the Operations Management Committee of the UN Country Team where administrative (operations) professionals normally meet and where, for example, security or other common services budgets needed to be reviewed and approved.

### **Recommendations:**

71. The IASMN reiterates its support for the schedule of the global implementation of the new SLS for the UN system.

72. The IASMN requests DSS to revise its 'Security Management Decision Making and the SLS' submission to HLCM to provide greater clarity on the SLS and to produce a list of 'Frequently Asked Questions' on the SLS.

73. To ensure that proper information about the promulgation of this system is disseminated, the IASMN further recommends that all SMTs include the SLS as an agenda item and that IASMN members apprise their respective senior management of the new system as soon as possible.

### **H. DSS Human Resources Review Project**

74. The IASMN was provided with an update on the status of its current comprehensive analysis of human resources requirements in the security occupational group, to include such areas as the identification, recruitment, deployment, retention, development and career planning of personnel (uniformed services, security professionals and management) at Headquarters and the field. The study, which was currently being undertaken by a consultant employed by DSS, will include a review of best practices, both from within and outside the UN system, and the formulation of a business plan to

address deficiencies associated with the existing system. In the context of this review, the consultant will research and evaluate human resources practices in the private sector security industry and identify ways in which best practices can be introduced within the UN system. The resulting report will serve as the basis for specific proposals that DSS will make to the IASMN and/or the HR Network. Eventually, the study's conclusions and proposals may be incorporated in the Department's next programme budget for consideration by the General Assembly.

75. The IASMN was requested to take note of this update and had the opportunity during this meeting to address any concerns or questions about the study directly to the consultant employed for this purpose. At the outset, the consultant informed participants that in the context of the study, he had visited three field locations - Uganda, Kenya and the DRC.

76. Although quite a number of questions were aimed at ascertaining how far the consultant had progressed in this work and what the possible results of the study could reveal, the IASMN was informed by that it was still too early to pronounce even any tentative findings at this time, although it was acknowledged that the heavy requirements of each AFPO does impact very heavily on the study. It was also reported that the competencies required for security personnel as they stood now were weighted towards administrative staff and it was questioned whether a security officer really needed to know the business of the AFPO it was working for. The IASMN deemed that not only was it important for a security officer to know the business of the AFPO it was working for as that affects the work they do and how they do it, but it was also surprised that the issue of how AFPOs functioned was once more being raised, as it was thought that this very issue would be factored into DSS' HR review.

77. Comments on the HR study made by IASMN members ranged those relating to the observation that security staff often seemed to be the most undervalued staff in the UNSMS, to questioning why the recruitment process took so long, especially when moving staff from the AFPOs to the UN Secretariat. DSS explained why the recruitment process in the UN Secretariat was so lengthy, and suggested that perhaps one way to get past this was to allow the USG, DSS full delegation to hire his own people. Another way to address recruitment issues would be by allowing DSS to have its own HR setup and conduct its own recruitment, rather than continue to pay UNDP for this service. The IASMN was informed that DSS had changed the profile of the kind of people it was seeking to recruit in the field as security professionals and that for the latest round of vacancies that had been approved by the General Assembly; there had been approximately 10,000 candidates. The Department was presently working to make the recruitment process serious and professional by conducting technical, language tests and background checks. The Chair cautioned that we need to be careful that those candidates from the AFPOs who come to work in the Secretariat do not lose their benefits or face receiving reduced benefits

78. DSS' consultant could not understand why there was such a separation between DSS and AFP security personnel as he surely saw an overlap in some areas. As such, he questioned whether all security personnel in the field, from both the AFPOs and DSS, were all doing the same thing or whether there were differences to justify their presence there. He believed that there should be a way of having one security setup and having one security 'organization'. In this regard, it was pointed out that AFPOs were fiercely protective of their own business as they have their own governing bodies who expect specific attention to their programmes and not the general one afforded for many AFPOs and that the vision proposed by DSS' consultant was closer to a 'private sector' approach than one befitting the UN system. It was mentioned that this approach had been addressed before but that it was not considered feasible.

79. The lack of career development for security professionals was cited, including obstacles to mobility which made it difficult for security officers and advisers to move from one organization to another. It was suggested that perhaps one way of addressing this could be through having a pool of security officers and advisers that could rotate from one organization to another. It was also stated that a closer look at nationally recruited security staff, e.g. radio operators, drivers, local security assistants, may be required and that while there can be some flexibility with international staff, this was not the case with national staff. Another suggestion put forth to address the mobility of international staff related to the use of secondments and reimbursable loans that could be worked out on a rotation basis. In this regard, CCISUA noted that in 2004, it had presented a proposal to HLCM that only one entity existed in the UN system that employs and trains security personnel, which arose of the reported frustrations from security officers who had been blocked from progressing in their careers.

80. The IASMN was informed that OCHA was piloting a project with OHRM to run a roster-based recruitment system which would obviate the need for vacancy announcements. National staff were an important concern for OCHA and it was pointed out that the appointment of a candidate having passed the National Competitive Examination (NCE) to the P2 level was an impediment to moving national staff to the professional level. DPKO/DFS informed the IASMN that a training needs assessment had been conducted in the area of investigations and it was found that UN job profiles that existed for investigators did not equate with what was required, which raised the question of whether the UN was hiring the right persons for those types of jobs.

81. DSS reported that it was its aim to achieve seamless mobility between Headquarters and field locations and between AFPOs and that this can only be done through a managed reassignment program, as already practiced in DSS. There was however a reluctance of many to move from Headquarters to the field. If a reassignment programme was properly managed, where one knew that there would be a rotation back to Headquarters after a certain number of years, this would alleviate the experience. At the same time, persons would benefit greatly by becoming more rounded professionals. Rather than having secondments and reimbursable loans, a managed reassignment program would be more advantageous because it would not be contingent on having to keep liens on posts open which only serve to impede permanent recruitment against a post. However, it was noted that the availability of fewer family duty stations was an impediment to a managed reassignment program.

82. DSS also confirmed to the IASMN that it cannot take over security for all the AFPOs because Member States do not wish to have the overall responsibility for the security budget. What needed to be explored therefore was the possibility of DSS taking over the recruitment for security professionals. A compromise solution would be for DSS to carry out the pre-screening, provide the credentials, etc. and make the DSS roster available, thus providing AFPOs with a security pre-screening process. Another proposal was for the setting up of a hybrid system whereby there could be a roster in place to be used for filling urgent security requirements and another for those coming in for a second career

83. DSS' consultant expressed some concerns about the idea of rosters in that they tend to be very short-term and that often they are not mutually exclusive among the AFPOs. Therefore, one needs to change the idea of a roster as it stands for the moment. While DPKO/DFS agreed that redundant rosters were a problem, there was no such problem with the mutual sharing of rosters between DPKO/DFS and DSS.

84. The availability of family duty stations was once again cited as a problem to managed reassignment, especially for DPKO/DFS which had a very small number of duty stations, e.g. when the mission in Chad closes, DPKO will have an estimated 100 security officers unemployed with nowhere to redeploy them. Therefore, false impressions were often promulgated by citing managed reassignment programs and instead, there should be a need to focus on training and enhancing people's careers, rather than managing in order to manage expectations. Caution was expressed regarding grade levels and the fact that some personnel would not fulfill the requisite criteria to become a DSS or Agency Security Officer.

85. It was noted that while DSS does well in security training, it did not fare well in specialized and management training and a cost effective means should be found to brief and familiarize DSS' FSCOs and SAs with the work of the AFPOs in order that they may be more effective on the ground.

86. WHO stressed the importance of looking at how we were managing the security environment, pointing out that at present, there was a very bureaucratic structure in place. It was noted that DSS was not being managed from the vantage point of service delivery, but rather as a police organization. If security was viewed as having hierarchical reporting lines, then there is a risk that you only end up with the sort of person who wishes to work in that type of structure and this did not reflect the reality of Country Teams. It was added that while someone may have the security background, this would not always reflect the ability to work in different environments. The latter would need to be reflected for DSS to change, particularly at the field level.

87. The IASMN noted additional issues impeding further progress including the fact that while contractual reform could help to some degree with mobility issues, there was still the issue of 'external vs. internal' candidates to overcome, the fact that staff looked to leave a hardship duty station after a certain time, and that AFPOs and DSS were still competing to recruit the same persons. While acknowledging that some improvements had been made over the years, it was recognized that a different mindset was needed to overcome the obstacles cited.

88. The HR Network informed the IASMN of the work being done to harmonize business practices, from the HR perspective. As part of this review, the HRN, through a consultant employed for this purpose, was examining barriers to inter-agency mobility, grading, performance, and contractual arrangements, as well as a review of the staff rules and regulations of the different AFPOs.

### **Recommendations:**

89. The IASMN welcomed the progress report on the DSS Human Resources Study and the opportunity to interact with the consultant employed for this purpose, and looks forward to further discussions within the IASMN once the Study is completed and the report circulated.

### **I. Budgetary Matters**

90. The IASMN was requested to take note of the provisional budget performance report for jointly financed activities (JFA) for the first five months of 2010 and to discuss any additional requirements that need to be brought to the attention of the HLCM at its upcoming meeting in September 2010 that relate to the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013. With respect to the latter, the IASMN was also informed that DSS is currently in the process of identifying any additional requirements and will bring them to the attention of the IASMN within the next two months.



91. Concerns were expressed at the outset that the budget provided by DSS was not providing sufficient details, as agreed at the 12<sup>th</sup> session of the IASMN in Nairobi wherein the IASMN requested that it would like to see the same level of detail for the JFA as that provided for the total budget. This was vital especially in the current economic climate. DSS confirmed that the 'lines' given in the performance report were exactly the same categories as those presented to the General Assembly and also noted that while a cost breakdown by activity basis is desirable, it was also a very complex task as many parts of DSS contribute to one activity. Nevertheless, the IASMN indicated that it wished to have the jointly funded portions highlighted and requested additional details of the budget appropriation which had not been provided.

92. DSS also reported that it was currently preparing its 2012/2013 budget, which presents the opportunity for a general discussion on this issue with AFPs and DPKO about what needs strengthening. Noting the lack of timely consultation with the IASMN on the management review and the 2010/2011 budget which was due to the arrival of a new USG, DSS late in the budget cycle, it was confirmed that the draft budget for 2012/2013 would be circulated to IASMN members prior to its submission to the UN Controller. DSS also reported that, as of now, it did not see any significant growth or increase in the budget for 2012-2013, although there may be issues arising from the HR study which could support the reclassification of some posts and additional funding for training.

93. The IASMN noted that not all budget cycles coincide among organizations and that some organizations had already submitted their budgets for 2012-2013. In addition, the IASMN raised concerns about how to better utilize resources in a more efficient way. It was recognized that to do so would require new approaches in addressing budgetary issues, for both the AFPs, as well as DSS. One way could be by regularly addressing the use of resources prior to every discussion on budgetary issues.

94. The representative of the WFP Budget Office on behalf of the WFP Chair of the Finance and Budget Network Working Group on Safety and Security Costs (FBN WG) took this opportunity to provide IASMN members with an update on the work of this group which arose out of recognition of the fact that security costs were quickly rising and some distortions were occurring which was making it difficult for AFPs to fund costs. She confirmed that the remit of the WG included a study for a harmonized approach to include safety and security-related resources in programme costs; reviewing the cost sharing formula for the budget of the UN; reviewing the 2010/2011 budgetary requirements for DSS; making proposals for the biennium budget; carrying out an analysis of the cost component of this budget subject to cost sharing and reviewing any financial implications linked to the new SLS, including training costs.

95. It was reported that the underlying principles for the FBN WG are 'no program without security'. Those benefitting from security services should pay for those services, and security cost charges should have sufficient transparency to ensure effective resourcing. It was confirmed that the WG was not seeking to change the bottom line for DSS funding; it does not intend to make operational recommendations nor does it wish to change the predictability of DSS funding and second guess DSS decisions. A survey had been sent to most organizations on funding, reporting accounting, and HR issues. The Group liaised with DSS on more detailed information on operations by unit and developed an issues catalogue. The WG will decide on next steps based on the information collected to date.

96. To determine how expenditure was matched with operational plans, the representative of the WFP Budget Office on behalf of the WFP Chair of the FBN WG sought further clarification on how the budget compared to planning needs, i.e. how do critical incidents such as those in Haiti and Kyrgyzstan correspond to DSS planning figures. It was stressed that it was important to assess the level, use and impact of funding on DSS needs and how extra budgetary resources were used to offset needs. To better understand the process by which the next biennial budget will be decided, she also requested a more detailed account of the items to be included in the biennial budget e.g. information on staff vacancy levels.

97. The IASMN agreed that links with the FBN WG needed to be strengthened, from both the budgetary and operational perspective. It was also suggested that other models that existed in the UN system for cost-sharing be studied, such as that currently used for jointly financing UNAIDS.

98. DSS confirmed that extra budgetary resources were very minimal, with little remaining from the grant Japan had provided for IT purposes. The rest of the XB resources (from the USA, Greece and Monaco) were earmarked exclusively for the 'Saving Lives Together' (SLT) initiative. With respect to staff vacancy levels in DSS, it was confirmed that the department is now reviewing 10,000 applications to ensure that the right people are hired. About 25% of those positions have been filled so far and this should reach 75% by 1 September. It was hoped that the remaining vacancies would be filled by the end of the year.

99. Addressing the larger picture, the Chair informed the meeting that while DSS' budget was \$250 million, including approximately \$200 million for jointly funded activities, this represented a part of the larger approximately \$800 million to \$1 billion that was spent on security, which includes the shared budgets at duty stations. He added that those figures represented only the overhead costs for enabling UN operations. Acknowledging that there were still many unanswered questions and that both the IASMN, as well as Member States had a right to know how and on what this money was spent, he reminded the IASMN that we were in a 'zero growth' budget environment. Therefore, there are long term fiscal problems where many Member States are scrutinizing contributions and hence, there was less likelihood that we would receive funding increases. This made it that much more important to ensure that we use the resources we have correctly, as one cannot operate, especially in high risk environments without the requisite budget.

100. The Chair offered to discuss budgetary issues on behalf of the AFPs, if needed, to reinforce their security budgets, emphasizing that it was important to speak with one voice on this issue. Additionally, if there was a need for DSS to show a common coordinated approach towards the budget, that can be done as well. He cited the difficulties encountered in pushing DSS' budget through the last session of the General Assembly and added that although he had in mind a number of grade increases that would impact on the jointly financed budget, he assured the IASMN that a large increase would not be acceptable. He believes that any increase would be limited to addressing some of DSS' positions that were not properly graded, particularly for some CSAs, and that, while more Security Information Operation Centres (SIOCs) were not necessarily needed (as the additional allocation received last year would likely pay great dividends), there could be a need for 4 or 5 additional analysts to be placed worldwide. Stressing once more the need for a consultative process, he requested the IASMN to bring their priorities to his attention.

101. It was noted that it was important to distinguish between a zero growth and zero nominal growth budget, as the latter may be the basis for arguing a decrease in the budget. It was also noted that

what was missing in the reporting process was the relationship between the four sources of security funding, i.e. the regular budget, the jointly-financed account, cost-shared accounts at the country level and money expended by individual AFPOs. It would be important to review how those relationships may be optimized. It was also pointed out that while it was easy to mobilize funds after tragedies, such as those in Iraq and Algiers, rather than it being a question of zero or zero nominal growth, what really needed to be considered was how much money may realistically be obtained and how resources we already have can be better allocated.

102. The representative of the WFP Budget Office on behalf of the WFP Chair of the FBN WG noted the overlap between the current discussions and what the FBN WG was discussing and further requested details on how DSS staff were deployed which would help the WG to understand where the needs could conceivably be. Clearer information was also needed from DSS on the timeline for the process. DSS confirmed that this information can be provided and that the Department had established an IT platform that supported the creation of a duty station profile that could show, for example, how many personnel there were in each location, the types of operations, and the number of security officers, etc. This data can be made available in the fall and would help to determine if we have the right proportions of security officers and resources against the number of personnel in a given location.

### **Recommendations:**

103. The IASMN decided that budgetary matters will be a standing item on the agenda of all IASMN meetings, and that the same level of detail as that provided to legislative bodies be provided, with the jointly financed portions of the budget appropriately highlighted.

104. Noting that programming and budget cycles differ among partners in the UNSMS and to facilitate the AFPOs in planning for their respective budget cycles, the IASMN welcomes the development by DSS of a broad work plan that projects anticipated needs over several years.

105. The IASMN took note of the working group of the Finance and Budget Network (FBN) of the HLCM and looks forward to receiving progress reports on the work of this group. In this respect IASMN members are requested to verify that their respective SFP participates in this group to ensure that the security element is properly linked with the FBN.

### **J. Standard Country Cost-Shared Security Budget**

106. At its February 2010 meeting in Nairobi, the IASMN noted that there was a steady increase in security cost-shared budgets at the country level. It was further noted that there was no standard format and that the proposed budgets lack specific explanations for the proposed items. This resulted in many questions being raised regarding the budget. The IASMN requested therefore that a standard format for the security cost-shared budget with explanations for each item requested be established, and that a process for coordinating country security cost-shared budgets also be established to provide AFPO SFPs an opportunity to review and comment on appropriate country level security cost-shared budgets. In addition, this process should be timed to allow all AFPOs to integrate valid requests into their respective budgeting processes.

107. To meet the above requirements, DSS proposed a standardized format, as well as a specific submission process that identifies the key players and timelines, which the IASMN was asked to endorse. In addition, the IASMN was asked to consider increasing to \$150,000 from \$100,000 the

ceiling for the amount of the security cost shared budgets that could be approved without coordination with the AFPOs.

108. Questions on specifics of the standardized form were raised and addressed, although the principal focus of the discussion was on the need to obtain accurate headcount figures, the need to set a deadline for submitting the local cost shared budget, and the need to identify common costs with a view to determining if these would be retained at the country or global level.

109. It was confirmed that the FBN WG deliberations would review the JFA costs and cost types in detail. DSS will prepare a paper on this issue, examine what the costs are and determine whether to keep certain costs at the country level or move these to the global level. If it is decided to move these to the global level, then this would need to be reflected in DSS' next budget submission. The IASMN also requested that the FBN WG on safety and security costs review the attribution of MOSS costs at the country level with respect to DSS participating in these costs.

### **Recommendations:**

110. The IASMN endorsed the proposed standard format for the country level security cost-shared budget with a view to reviewing this format in future IASMN meetings. In the interim, the IASMN asked that DSS review the existing Operational Guidelines on this issue and ensure that CSAs/SAs present timely submissions and in so doing, not exceed the budgetary limits specified. It was proposed that the budget be circulated in country by 1 October, with billing issued on 15 November and payments to UNDP received no later than 1 March.

111. IASMN recommends that the cost shared formula be uniformly applied in that the same criteria used to determine the staffing figures provided at the country level by individual AFPOs be applied in determining the AFPO staffing figures that are annually reported to the CEB for the purpose of the global census.

112. The IASMN requests DSS to examine the country security cost-shared budget with a view to identifying common costs and whether these should be maintained at the country or at the global level (i.e. at the level of UNDSS' cost-shared budget). Any final determination will take account of the final deliberations of the FBN Working Group.

113. The IASMN agreed that security cost-shared budgets at or below \$150,000 could be approved by DSS without coordination with the AFPOs, but that the AFPOs nevertheless be provided with copies of the DSS HQ approved budgets. All budgets over this amount would require coordination with the AFPO SFPs.

### **K. Emergency Funding for the Safety and Security of United Nations Staff and Premises in High Risk Environments**

114. The IASMN was presented with a revision of a document that provided a summary of the current additional security requirements for Pakistan, following the aftermath of the attack against UN staff and premises in October 2009 and were requested to review and approve the current request.

115. It was reiterated to the IASMN that after the attacks on Pakistan WFP HQ, there was a push for a higher level of emergency funding for security. Although the Secretary General and the General Assembly pushed the idea, it was derailed at the last moment. Originally, it was envisaged that some

\$60 to \$70 million in emergency funding was needed to address security issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For Afghanistan, UNAMA ended up including all security enhancements in its budget. However, Pakistan presented a different scenario. For one thing, funding for training was a major concern. SSAFE training had been provided to international employees but not to national staff. Hence the solution, albeit slower, was to try to provide for training in-country for national staff, resulting in a much smaller budget request for Pakistan - a total of \$7.7 million dollars, to cover this training, as well as costs for facilities protection and security on the ground, as the biggest threat came from IEDs on the road.

116. An extensive discussion ensued about the contents of the budget request for Pakistan. It was felt that the paper was not very clear on both the level and the nature of the threat in Pakistan, and the IASMN would have wished to see a more structured presentation. It was also pointed out that there had already been an investment in armoured vehicles and other enhanced mitigation measures following the incidents in 2009. In addition, some AFPOs already had their own training teams in place. The need to re-examine how close protection was conducted was also cited as there were objections raised to cost-sharing close protection at the local level.

117. The Chair raised the issue of the lack of coordination between those security forces protecting our 200 facilities there and stressed the importance of examining training for the guards, who were already ill prepared, low paid and underperforming. It was important to determine how best to address those needs especially as the history of attacks in Pakistan was complex and this demanded an examination of vulnerabilities more closely. If more funds could not be obtained for training, then DSS would continue to use the 'train the trainer' approach. For close protection services, he acknowledged that there was a need to change the way this is done, especially in Pakistan.

118. CCISUA expressed concern that giving second best training (i.e. through a 'train the trainers' approach) to national staff sent the wrong message. However, some AFPOs confirmed that there had in fact been a great deal of training conducted for national staff, including on first aid and assistance for families, as well as a great deal that had been done in country to help both national staff and their eligible dependents.

119. While not amenable to approving the request for emergency funding for Pakistan, the IASMN recognized that there was a need to move forward and discuss emergency funding in a coordinated way, not only for Pakistan but for other duty stations as well. One suggestion was made for building in a contingency element for this purpose at the beginning of a budget cycle. However, the Chair advised against using the word contingency and instead proposed that DSS use portions of its own budget for an emergency, as well as some of the Secretary-General's contingency money, but that approval was needed for the concept.

120. Citing a failure of the system to recognize 'emergencies, the Chair suggested that in view of the fact that the UN system is increasingly being asked to operate in critical threat countries, including in active conflict zones, a way needs to be found to holistically address this issue. The first step in doing so would be to seek IASMN agreement on at least the concept that it will cost more to operate in these critical threat countries than it does to operate in other countries. Security programs cost money and one cannot operate in these places without additional resources. IASMN backing was therefore vital – for the concept and for advocating for the funding, both with program managers and with Member States. Furthermore, support for this concept would support the CEB paradigm of finding a way to stay, no program without security, no security without resources.

121. Before agreement was reached on the concept, it was noted that emergency planning should have started from the bottom up, not the top down as it is now. Having noted this, it was also recognized that to operate in high risk environments entailed quite substantial costs, the details of which cannot be ironed out very easily. Agreement was reached that there should be one holistic plan for all critical locations even if situations fluctuate and that in considering any plans, the image of the UN should also be considered.

122. The modalities for a financial model to support such a concept were also debated, with suggestions made for different means for funding emergency situations, including the CAP and Flash Appeal Process, as well as revolving funds such as the CERF. DSS offered to flesh out the concept for emergency funding.

123. Turning to the security gap project in Afghanistan, the IASMN was informed that \$7.5 million is forthcoming from the Japanese Government, to be funded through the UNDP election project. In the interim, DSS would make available for review the paper on Afghanistan to the AFPO having the largest presence in the country.

124. Before concluding this discussion, the IASMN was also informed of the current talks underway with the USA regarding plans for protecting the UN in Iraq once the US Department of Defense completes its drawdown. The IASMN cited the need to assess how much it costs for the UN system to continue its presence in Iraq and it was asked what other options could be looked at for funding this, e.g. how much funding donors would be willing to contribute for specific funding from projects. It was noted that the Country Team should not be allowed to be in constant discussion about this and that AFPOs on the ground needed to commit the cost before moving. Furthermore, there was a perceived lack of communication and coordination on this at the HQ level, and therefore it was suggested that perhaps a smaller group of interested AFPOs could come together to examine this issue.

### **Recommendations:**

125. The IASMN reviewed the request submitted by DSS for emergency funding for Pakistan and while it did not approve the request as submitted, the IASMN overwhelmingly endorsed the concept that it will cost more to operate in critical high-risk environments and as such, requested that DSS examine similar emergency situations (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) with a view to proposing mechanisms that could support the scaling up of security operations at any time. The FBN WG on Safety and Security Costs will brief the IASMN on suggestions for the most suitable financial model (e.g. a CERF for security), should ideas regarding funding mechanisms arise during the course of their work.

### **L. UNSMS Policy Manual (SPM)**

126. At its 12th session in Nairobi in February 2010, the IASMN approved the title “UNSMS Policy Manual” (SPM) to replace the current Field Security Handbook (FSH) and approved the Table of Contents and the development schedule for the new SPM, with the understanding that additions could be made during this process as required.

127. At this session, the IASMN was asked to endorse the modality proposed for the transition from the FSH to the SPM which entailed an electronic bridging approach through its recently launched UN

Security Managers Information Network (UNSMIN) web-site ([www.unsmin.un.org](http://www.unsmin.un.org)) that enables the user to have access to the most current security policy while still being able to access those portions of the FSH which have not yet been updated and/or transitioned to the new SPM. This same process would also be employed with the Security Operations Manual to provide detailed “how to” instructions on the various topics in the SPM.

**Recommendations:**

128. To enable security officers and officials easy access to the evolving security policies of the UNSMS, the IASMN endorsed using the UNSMIN website as an electronic “bridge” to transition the UN system from the Field Security Handbook to the new Security Policy Manual in an organized and coherent manner.

**M. UN Premises Safety and Security Policy**

129. At the 19<sup>th</sup> Session of HLCM, the USG, DSS informed the Committee about the ongoing work on the UN Estate Safety and Security Policy, which would apply to some 14,000 UN premises around the world. The Committee took note of the development of the draft Estate Safety and Security policy and the ongoing work on the database of all UN facilities and requested that consideration be given to replacing ‘Estate’ by ‘Premises’, that a full report be provided to its 20<sup>th</sup> fall session and that the UNDG Task Force on Common Premises be consulted before the finalization of the report.

130. The IASMN was informed that appropriate changes from ‘estate’ to ‘premises’ had been made to the draft policy, and were also provided with a revised definition of UN premises, which was coordinated with the Office of Legal Affairs. In addition, appropriate coordination with the UNDG Task Force on Common Premises had been initiated and a copy of the current draft provided to the Task Force.

131. The IASMN was also informed that the results of the Premises Vulnerability Questionnaire (PVQ) exercise, which so far saw some 4,833 questionnaires entered into the system, will be completed by mid-July 2010. DSS will start reviewing and analyzing this information with a view to factoring in any salient information into the Premises Policy, as appropriate. The final draft will then be sent electronically to all IASMN members for review and comment, as well as to the UNDG Task Force on Common Premises before submission to the 20<sup>th</sup> Session of the HLCM.

132. The Chair stressed that at the very least guidelines, if not standards were needed for facilities built for the UN and that this study was vital in ascertaining what their function is, how many personnel were located in each; and whether they were stand alone residences. He added that we would be remiss if we did not, at a minimum, indicate what the best practices were but that this was possible only when we have a handle on exactly what we have. He confirmed that DSS will revert with a specific report that identifies the most vulnerable premises, for the most people in the most vulnerable locations.

133. While taking note of the update on the PVQ, some concerns were expressed about how DSS would ensure the confidentiality of the data while at the same time being able to inform the participants in the results of the survey, to which the IASMN was assured that the confidentiality of the data would be maintained and that any disclosure may be handled through the coding of results.

## **Recommendations:**

134. The IASMN welcomed the update on the Premises Vulnerability Questionnaire (PVQ) exercise, noting that it would be completed by mid-July 2010 and that salient information would be extracted and factored into the UN Premises Safety and Security Policy. The revised policy will be circulated to all IASMN members for review and comment, as well as to the UNDG Task Force on Common Premises before submission to the 20<sup>th</sup> Session of the HLCM which will be held in late September 2010.

## **N. Critical Incident Stress Management**

135. The IASMN were asked to consider a detailed inventory of Critical Incident Stress Counselors as well as UN system staff counselors, and a plan for coordinating those resources.

136. At the outset, concern was expressed regarding the infrequency with which the IASMN Critical Incident Stress Management Working Group was meeting, noting that it had held its last meeting in 2008. For the Representative of the Medical Directors' Network, the document presented to the IASMN did not sufficiently address planning and coordination with the medical services. In addition, greater clarity was requested with respect to the term 'counsellor', particularly as it pertained to long-term follow-up and what professional umbrella the counsellors were working under. Professional liaison with internal or external care providers also needed to be addressed. One prime concern of the MDN was the development of PTSD into longer-term medical illness, especially as the medical services saw a sick leave component in this. It was reported that approximately 80% of those with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) would get better on their own, but that 20% would not. The MDN did not see evidence of follow-up and tracking here which made it difficult to do what they would wish to do to mitigate the effects of PTSD in the long run.

137. The representative from the MDN also called for the need to define what was meant by 'success' in the context of the report presented. He noted that while there had been an excellent peer support system on the ground in Haiti, the surge capacity in terms of counsellors able to deploy quickly enough and for long enough had not been satisfactory. WHO supported that there needed to be a more critical perspective on this issue. Defining mission success by the ability to intervene was not sufficient, but rather success should be measured in the medium and in the long-term. Guidelines on mental health and psychological support in emergency settings needed to be taken into account.

138. UNFPA expressed appreciation for the services provided by CISMU, especially with respect to the training offered to peer services which had contributed to a culture of awareness. Further information was needed however on the criteria for establishing the number of counsellors and how those needs may be formulated into a common budget, rather than as a MOSS requirement.

139. It was agreed that a more thorough review of medical support issues was needed as well as a review of whether CISMU indeed should continue to belong in the security environment or come under the umbrella of another department in the UN Secretariat.

140. In addition, the IASMN noted that more policy-oriented debate was needed regarding the oversight exercised on stress counsellors, e.g. what are their roles, attributes, qualifications and administrative responses. There were some concerns expressed about counsellors advising staff on issues outside their purview, for example on such issues as when to take leave. Concerns were also



cited as to who 'de-stresses' the counsellors. As such, the IASMN recognized the need for the medical services to be involved in these issues.

141. DSS acknowledged that it needed to work closely with the Director of the Medical Services Division in the UN Secretariat and explained that initially, the intent of placing CISMU in DSS was to be able to provide rapid response in a crisis. Long-term care after an incident was not the intention of the Unit. He agreed that if the IASMN strongly believed that CISMU belonged in the medical community, then that judgement would be left to the IASMN, but also reminded the IASMN that the USG, DSS reserved the right to make that decision as CISMU was currently part of DSS. In any case, there is a need to develop a strategy for moving forward on this. The MDN agreed to work together with the IASMN to streamline this issue and better define medical and long-term stress counselling.

### **Recommendations:**

142. The IASMN noted the detailed inventory of Critical Incident Stress Counselors and UN system staff counselors and deferred further discussion on critical incident stress management until its spring 2011 session. It was noted that there is a need to promote greater collaboration between stress counselors and the UN medical services and to better define staff tracking and psycho-social follow up, in coordination with the Medical Directors' Group.

143. In the interim however, the IASMN encouraged the continuing positive cooperation between CISMU and AFPO counselors.

### **O. Compliance Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (CEMU) - 2009 Summary Report**

144. For information, the IASMN was provided with an overview of CEMU activities during 2009 and a summary of the substantive results from the Compliance Evaluation Process. Furthermore, the IASMN was also informed that the implementation of the automated MOSS Self Assessment Programme is pending the completion and introduction of the Compliance Information Management System (CIMS).

145. The IASMN wished to know whether a compliance tool would be developed. And in discussing the issue of compliance and what this actually entailed, it was clear that some wished to see increased consultation with headquarters before compliance missions were conducted and before reports post-mission were finalized as basic errors and mistakes could be amended before the reports were issued. This would provide scope for AFPOs to ensure implementation where needed as long as issues are followed up with headquarters and their respective SFPs, with DSS assistance. It was noted that some AFPOs relied heavily on DSS as they did not have personnel in the field who could implement what was mandated by a compliance mission.

146. The value in consulting with the headquarters of the respective AFPOs was acknowledged, not only in that it would help eliminate a great deal of steps in the process, but also in that it could leverage the access those at headquarters had to Permanent Missions of Host Countries to ensure that objectives for improving compliance could be discussed pre-mission. As a result, compliance missions could become more of an 'assistance' visit rather than an inspection.

147. At a time when the UNSMS is in the midst of major changes, DSS acknowledged that this was a useful suggestion. However, it might be the case that while only some locations might be in need of assistance missions, there may be others that are in need of direct inspection services.

148. DSS clarified that CEMU had originally been constructed to build compliance standards, conduct inspections in the field, evaluate and then leave. It was recognized that the role of CEMU could be more valuable if it was more assistance oriented. It could still carry out inspections, but the vast majority of its missions should focus on assistance, i.e. on having a compliance team or part of the team on the ground assisting with putting solutions in place. It was noted, for example, that in peacekeeping missions which are spread out, it would be very useful for CEMU to work with the security staff in assisting them to develop/fix vulnerabilities before they leave, which would also act as a risk mitigation measure.

### **Recommendations:**

149. The IASMN recognized the importance and usefulness of compliance missions and agreed that the concept of compliance should be maintained; however, the general view was that it would be of great benefit for compliance missions to now transition to provide greater assistance in correcting deficiencies while in the country. An approach that not only encompasses the 'identification of deficiencies', but the 'action to 'correct deficiencies during the mission', and 'the identification of those outstanding actions that require additional time to address' would provide greater assistance and value to the SMT and the security operations in the country.

150. In addition, it was recommended that draft evaluation reports should be shared with AFPO SFPs in order that they correct inaccuracies found in the report before it reaches final publication, and that DSS develop a self-assessment tool that could be distributed to AFPOs before the evaluation mission to afford the opportunity to correct deficiencies before an evaluation is conducted.

### **P. Isect Policy and Review of Travel Notification Requirement**

151. During the presentation of the USG, DSS to the 19<sup>th</sup> Session of the HLCM in Turin, Italy, 22-23 February 2010, the FAO and ILO representatives expressed their belief that it was not necessary for UN personnel to provide a Travel Notification for official travel to areas that did not have a security phase declared, and requested that the IASMN review the requirement. FAO had pointed out that HLCM had previously endorsed ISECT travel notification to duty stations not in a security phase in the event of an emergency.

152. It was recalled that at its meeting in Paris in January 2009, the IASMN, having taken note of past crisis such as natural disasters, attacks of hotels and pandemic planning, had endorsed expanding the ISECT to include not just countries/locations with a Security Phase in effect, but all countries/locations to which staff travel on official business, including official home leave or other entitlement travel where the cost of travel is absorbed by organizations of the UN System and recommended that for personal travel, UN personnel be encouraged to use ISECT.

153. Furthermore, the Chair informed the IASMN that the usefulness of ISECT had been explained at the HLCM meeting in Torino, where it had been pointed out that in a crisis, it took a combination of staff lists and travel clearances to determine who was there. Had all official travel been entered into the system, this would have obviated the need for that labour intensive work. He believes that if the UN is paying for official travel then the UN has a right to say that this must be entered into ISECT. This was

not about asking staff to enter details of personal travel. Hence, the IASMN was requested to consider reiterating its previous recommendation on requiring travel notifications for those areas where a security clearance is not required.

154. ILO pointed out that ISECT as it is now applies a procedure and clarified that the reservation expressed by ILO at the Torino HLCM meeting was not about tracking itself, which should be encouraged, but rather the manner in which it is done. He acknowledged that this could be simplified in ISECT 3. In view of the impending abolishment of the security phase system and the introduction of the SLS, there needed to be care exercised about reference to security levels so as not to fall back into linking security levels with security clearances. This should be delinked when the SLS is implemented and in effect, all that is needed is to simply state that all official travel requires notification and ways must be found to update the database with a view to simplifying it. The Chief, FSSU confirmed that ISECT 3 will provide to staff an automatic response indicating whether the travel notification would be treated as a security clearance or a notification.

155. During the discussions, it was pointed out that some senior officials who travel did not see any benefit in lodging notification on ISECT when travelling to low risk areas, so there was a need to make the benefit of official travel notification clear. It was also cited that this issue was actually about addressing a 'security culture' with staff members and in this regard, SFPs should work with their representatives in HLCM to explain certain security issues, including ISECT. It was believed that if there was coordination on this issue, there would be no further questions.

156. CCISUA supported that travel notifications be mandatory regardless of whether a security clearance would be required or not and that staff at large needed to be made aware of this.

### **Recommendations:**

157. The IASMN welcomed the more user-friendly interface proposed for ISECT 3 and, taking into account the focus on security risk management for all duty stations, of which staff tracking is an integral part, once again recommended that all official travel must be recorded in ISECT. Please refer to the detailed discussion in the section dealing with Security Information Systems Report (CRP 4).

### **Q. Safety and Security Service Update**

158. The IASMN was provided for information with a report on the activities of the Security and Safety Services of DSS and requested to participate and/or contribute to any or all of the following initiatives described in the report:

- (1) Review of Investigation Procedures and Investigations Manual
- (2) Close Protection Operations
- (3) UN Revised Use of Force Policy and a Weapons Manual
- (4) Security & Safety Access Control System and ID cards Standardization
- (5) Establishment of Canine Units
- (6) Guidelines for External Conferences and Events and
- (7) Improving Fire Safety in the Field.

159. Before the individual elements of the report were considered the IASMN was informed that consideration was being given to expanding the membership of UNSSNET to include other uniformed

services outside the already existing 10 services in the Network, e.g. the uniformed services of the Tribunal in Cambodia and perhaps the uniformed services in FAO and UNESCO.

### **(1) Review of Investigation Procedures and Investigations Manual,**

160. Several aspects of the investigative function were discussed including the types of investigations, the degrees of seriousness of the alleged wrongdoing, and the misuse of security officers in investigations. It was also pointed out that at present there was no prohibition for an individual to perform a particular function in connection with an investigation sanctioned by management.

161. CCISUA requested standardization on investigation procedures for internal purposes, while the Office of Legal Affairs believed that the real issue to be addressed was what to do with the findings of an investigation as it was not yet clear whether investigative reports regarding, for example, thefts and accusations should be referred to local authorities. It was questioned by DPKO/DFS whether investigations should belong in security, considering that most investigations stemmed from administrative requirements, although some were very serious. It was also asked whether the IASMN wished to consider this question at this time and added that currently, there were several investigative training programmes under development.

162. The IASMN was informed that UNSSNET had decided that it would be working on a manual to conduct investigations and it was suggested that once a draft manual on investigations was produced, this would be considered by the office of the administration of justice, as well as by the staff representatives.

163. During the discussions, the difference between investigation and fact-finding were noted, with the suggestion made that investigations required its own special unit. The meeting was also informed that in UNRWA, one person handles investigations for 30,000 staff and that this issue is tied in with the administration of justice. As such, it was suggested that perhaps this issue needs to be brought to the attention of HLCM.

### **(2) Close Protection Operations**

164. It was reported to the IASMN that there already exists a pilot course on close protection in Romania that may provide a standardized pre qualification regime. In addition, DSS had previously approached a number of Member States for cost estimates to deliver a close protection program, as opposed to outsourcing this which would cost some 300% more. The capabilities of Member States, as well as the costs were important factors to consider which is why Romania was chosen for the pilot course, with the General Assembly approving funds for this purpose. The discussions revealed that in one case, close protection services were contracted out, while in another AFPO, the Host Country provides gratis close protection services and in this regard, it was asked whether this would be an option for any of the AFPOs.

165. It was debated whether close protection should be based on police protection, rather than on a military based philosophy, with the former deemed more appropriate for the UN.

### **(3) UN Revised Use of Force Policy and a Weapons Manual**

166. It was reported that the draft policy being developed was to be presented to the USG and OLA for discussion, after which it would be presented to the IASMN for endorsement. It was the intention that this policy would apply to all in the UN who are authorized to carry a weapon.

### **(4) Security & Safety Access Control System and ID cards Standardization**

167. The IASMN took note of the report on this issue and it was recommended that IASMN continue to be engaged in this issue.

#### **Recommendations:**

168. The IASMN took note of the Report of DHSSS activities, in particular the information provided on the Security and Safety Access Control System and ID Cards Standardization, the Establishment of Canine Units, the Guidelines for External Conferences and Events and Improving Fire Safety in the field.

169. The IASMN expressed its interest in the development of common UN Fire Prevention Standards, as well as Road and Driving Safety Standards and requested that it remain apprised of the work spearheaded by WFP, DFS and DSS in these areas.

170. The IASMN requested follow up action with respect to the following elements of the report:

Review of Investigation Procedures and Investigations Manual The IASMN noted that further work needed to be conducted to produce a manual on investigations and in view of its potential impact on the activities of CSAs/SAs and on single agency security services, requested that this item be considered at its next regular session.

Close Protection Operations The IASMN recommended that close protection for Goodwill Ambassadors be discussed at the weekly teleconferences with those AFPOs for which this is relevant.

UN Revised Use of Force Policy and a Weapons Manual The IASMN noted the progress made and requested that the draft Use of Force Policy be reviewed at the next meeting of the IASMN.

### **R. Women Security Awareness Training**

171. Following on from the report submitted to the IASMN during its February 2010 Session, WFP presented to the IASMN a final report on the design, development and piloting of a UN System-wide Women Security Awareness Training (WSAT) in order to seek endorsement of the WSAT programme for system-wide use.

172. The IASMN was informed that the study that led to the design of the WSAT program had concluded that generic SAT programmes were not necessarily gender equal as most were written and delivered by men, including those modules geared specifically for women. It was also evident that very little research had been done on gender and security. Some work had been done by INGOs but other than that, few markers existed. Nor were there reliable statistics on sexual assault, although WSAT was

not just about this issue. It was also evident that there was a lack of public and standardized procedures and/or policies on managing sexual assault, as well as little information on the security situation of female national staff (e.g. residential security).

173. It was reported to the IASMN that the WSAT training was piloted in Nairobi, DaDaab and Harghesa, where the programmes were very well received. The provision of female facilitators was highly appreciated and the pilots revealed that an integrated SAT/WSAT was preferred as many women preferred attending the training with men. Women did not wish to be particularly singled out for any kind of special treatment, but nevertheless did wish to be included in the training. However, while most women preferred to attend training sessions with men, there were certain circumstances where female only WSAT was more relevant, particularly in some cultures where fear of sexual assault was the biggest security concern for many women. In addition, the use of female facilitators helped enormously with the 'approachability' factor, as did using positive visuals which showed women in very positive roles.

174. There are 8 modules in the WSAT programme but it was not necessary to use every module - a pick and mix approach may be used depending on the context. In terms of differing from SAT, it was pointed out that SAT included topics such as residential security which clearly was not written from a female perspective.

175. In considering the development and roll-out of WSAT, the IASMN noted that the need for such training should perhaps not be left only to the security professional, but should be delivered by a collective team; that an integrated approach be applied, i.e. to include the training of men in these issues; that there was a need to deliver individual modules where the security situation for women is particularly challenging and that these programs were run only by a few organizations and in some cases, only for women who travelled on short missions in the field.

176. In addition, the IASMN was informed that the special manual for women's security that had been developed a few years ago had been very well received, although there was a need to update this manual. Having a unified WSAT course for all UN system organizations was also supported and it was suggested that consideration might be given to making WSAT available online and to updating both BSITF and ASITF to reflect women's security concerns.

177. The IASMN noted that national women were particularly vulnerable, especially in peacekeeping missions; in other duty stations, women national staff were under pressure for various reasons, while in the workplace, they underwent pressure just for being women. At the same time, it was also recognized that there were many initiatives in the UN system that had been developed to address women's issues, e.g. focal points for women in all offices; and online sexual harassment training programs already in place. Regarding women focal points, it was noted that while in theory a system for focal points had been established, in reality, it did not work very well, if at all and instead, in the event of a problem, strong female colleagues ended up addressing women's issues and not the focal point. It was further noted that there were instances in which some male security officers were still nervous about women's issues and that guidance needed to be provided to managers on how to manage incidents involving women, especially in the event of a sexual assault. The suggestion was made and also supported by the representatives of the Human Resources Network that the Assistant Secretary-General for Gender in the United Nations also be involved in these training initiatives for women. The HRN representative added that training must have a cross disciplinary approach and HR needs to be part of that team.

178. The Staff Federations supported these programmes, seeing them as worthy and much needed and requested that they be rolled out as quickly and as widely as possible, and that perhaps the training could include some self defence element as well. The importance of endorsing face to face training was stressed, as was the need for women to be able to have the chance to talk with other women.

179. The IASMN determined that it would be important to start the process of getting this information to the field. DSS would also like to start integrating this training for 35 new FSCOs joining the organization and would like to develop something online to reach a larger audience. Therefore, it would be reviewing the training materials provided to TDS.

180. It was noted that as the WSAT is rolled out that more issues would likely come to light and there needed to be a means by which to address these. In this respect, DSS confirmed that the Working Group on Women's Security would meet again next year, as there were still issues to be resolved, e.g. a support mechanism for female staff members not permitted to travel alone and residual residential security measures not addressed as part of MORSS.

### **Recommendations:**

181. The IASMN endorsed the WSAT Program as presented in the report by WFP and requested that the training programme be placed on the UNSMIN for dissemination to security officers and trainers in the UNSMS.

182. The IASMN also recommended that the Working Group on Women's Security remain cognizant of the issues raised in the report, particularly with respect to the inadequate dissemination of existing training material and information on security for women. With respect to the latter, the IASMN requested that the existing guidelines for the security of women be reviewed and revised as appropriate.

## **S. Any Other Business**

### **1. Submission by CTBTO**

183. CTBTO presented to the IASMN for information a paper on the impact of seismic hazards on UN monitoring stations wherein it was stated that the organization has 337 monitoring stations all over the world and four different detection technologies. OCHA added that it was also involved in early warning for natural disasters, particularly earthquakes.

### **Recommendations:**

184. The IASMN was grateful to CTBTO for their presentation on the impact of seismic hazards and their offer to share with the UN system, the capacity of its monitoring stations capable of providing early warning on natural disasters and major environmental catastrophes.

185. The IASMN requested that DSS explore the potential for further collaboration with the CTBTO to increase early warning capacity with relation to natural and manmade disasters.

## **2. ‘Saving Lives Together’ (SLT) Initiative**

186. The “Saving Lives Together” initiative provides a framework for UN and INGO security collaboration based on best practices in security management. The IASMN was provided with a copy of the latest SLT proposal that had been circulated to donors with a view to securing extra-budgetary funding to maintain a small liaison unit at DSS headquarters to provide oversight and strategic guidance to the implementation of “Saving Lives Together” initiatives in field locations such as, Afghanistan, Gaza, the Sudan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Columbia and Haiti.

## **3. Safety Issues**

### **a. Road and Driving Safety Administrative Instructions**

187. DSS informed the IASMN of its contribution in producing a recent administrative instruction on safe driving practices. This latest initiative built on DSS’ safe driving campaign which was launched several years ago.

188. The initiatives taken by other AFPOs on this issue was also reported, although it was noted that a harmonized policy on safe driving was still outstanding. The Chair hoped that the IASMN could develop a policy on this as it was important to demonstrate clear support to staff on safe driving practices. DSS added that it can provide materials to promote safe driving practices

### **b. Aviation Safety**

189. The IASMN was provided with a verbal update on the efforts taken by DSS on aviation safety wherein it was reported that ICAO had agreed to hire additional people for technical offices at ICAO to work closely with DSS in the area of aviation risk management. In addition, DSS was in the process of advertising the position that had been approved by the General Assembly in 2009 (P4) that would strengthen the ability of the department to address this issue, together with DPKO and WFP. WFP in particular was looking at contracting for UNHAS and UNPAS and DSS was looking at ways to assess commercial aviation.

190. In the context of these discussions, UNICEF raised the fact that there were not yet standards established on water safety.

## **4. Draft Model Host Country Security Agreement**

191. The IASMN was provided with a revised copy of the Host Country Security Agreement and took note of the start of the consultations with selected Designated Officials regarding the project to pilot the model Security Agreement with their respective Host Governments. It was recalled that the Agreement had been revised following concerns about some of the language in the previous agreement. Although the text of the present Agreement had not been shared with the Office of Legal Affairs, OLA confirmed at the meeting that nothing of substance had changed.

192. The IASMN was informed that by the end of July 2010, letters including instructions, plus a copy of the agreement (which is no longer a host country supplemental agreement), would be sent by the USG, DSS to the DO of those countries participating in the pilot, with a 60 day feedback time.



## **5. Matrix chart**

193. In order to effectively revise Chapter 3 of the current Field Security Handbook that referred to the applicability of the United Nations Security Management system, DSS' Policy Unit had initiated consideration of a matrix it had developed which attempted to identify all those persons covered by the UNSMS.

194. The IASMN was informed that it would be provided with an electronic version of the matrix in order that members may consult with their respective HR departments to consider the categories of staff, non-staff and other personnel and officials that are included in the matrix, with a view to providing any necessary clarifications.

## **T. Other Matters**

### **1. 2010 Steering Group and 2011 IASMN meeting schedule:**

195. The next meeting of the IASMN Steering Group will be held in Panama (hosted by UNFPA) from 29 November to 1 December 2010.

196. The next meeting of the IASMN's regular session will be held in New York at from 24 to 27 January 2011.

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**Annex A**

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**

<b>CHAIR</b>	<b>Mr. Gregory B. Starr (DSS)</b>
<b>CO-CHAIR</b>	<b>Mr. Antonio Kamil-Mikhail (IFAD)</b>
<b>SECRETARY</b>	<b>Ms. Anne Marie Pinou (DSS)</b>

**Agencies, Funds And Programmes and Other Entities of the United Nations Security  
Management System**

<b>Asian Development Bank (ADB)</b>	<b>Mr. Terrence Dunn</b>
<b>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)</b>	<b>Mr. Alan Drew</b>
<b>Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)</b>	<b>Mr. Rudolph Ziesler</b>
<b>International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</b>	<b>Mr. Llywelyn Skidmore Ms. Lody Wazir</b>
<b>International Criminal Court (ICC)</b>	<b>Mr. Lassi Kuusinen</b>
<b>International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)</b>	<b>Mr. Antonio Kamil-Mikhail</b>
<b>International Labour Organization (ILO)</b>	<b>Mr. Brian Wenk</b>
<b>International Monetary Fund (IMF)</b>	<b>Mr. Warren J. Young</b>
<b>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</b>	<b>Mr. John Shabatura</b>
<b>International Telecommunications Union (ITU)</b>	<b>Mr. Claude Vadeboncoeur</b>
<b>The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)</b>	<b>Mr. Robert Erenstein</b>
<b>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</b>	<b>Mr. Mourad Wahba</b>
<b>United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)</b>	<b>Mr. Naqib Noory</b>
<b>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</b>	<b>Ms. Julie Dunphy</b>
<b>United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)</b>	<b>Mr. Terry Davis</b>

<b>United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)</b>	<b>Mr. Paul Farrell</b>
<b>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</b>	<b>Mr. Andrei Lazykin</b>
<b>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC/UNOV)</b>	<b>Ms. Magdalena Landry</b>
<b>United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)</b>	<b>Mr. Kevin O’Hanlon</b>
<b>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)</b>	<b>Mr. Thomas Gerstenecker</b>
<b>United Nations Volunteers (UNV)</b>	<b>Ms. Laura Londen</b>
<b>World Food Programme (WFP)</b>	<b>Mr. Sven Amdi Madsen</b>
	<b>Mr. Mick Lorentzen</b>
	<b>Mr. Jess Torp</b>
	<b>Ms. Julie Spooner*</b>
	<b>Ms. Donna Ducharme**</b>
<b>World Health Organization (WHO)</b>	<b>Mr. Xavier Leus</b>
<b>World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)</b>	<b>Mr. Drew Donovan</b>
<b>World Bank (WB)</b>	<b>Mr. Robert Simpson</b>

**Departments of the United Nations Secretariat/Subsidiary Organizations of The Security Council/Inter-Agency Bodies**

<b>Department of Field Support and Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DFS/DPKO)</b>	<b>Mr. Bob Phillips</b>
<b>Department of Safety and Security (DSS)</b>	<b>USG Gregory B. Starr</b>
	<b>Mr. Gerard Martinez</b>
	<b>Mr. Gerald Ganz</b>
	<b>Mr. Christian Saunders</b>
	<b>Ms. Anne Marie Pinou</b>
	<b>Ms. Maida Henson</b>
	<b>Mr. Andre Dehondt</b>
	<b>Mr. Anthony Chester***</b>

<b>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)</b>	<b>Mr. David Kaatrud</b>
<b>Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)</b>	<b>Mr. Surya Sinha</b>
<b>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)</b>	<b>Mr. Abraham Mathai</b>
<b>Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)</b>	<b>Mr. Christopher Stretton Mr. Timothy Collins</b>
<b>HLCM Medical Directors Network (MDN)</b>	<b>Dr. Matthias Lademann</b>
<b>HLCM Human Resources Network (HRN)</b>	<b>Ms. Kaori Saito Ms. Mariam Moayed</b>

**Observers**

<b>Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations System (CCISUA)</b>	<b>Mr. Rick Cottam</b>
<b>Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations (FICSA)</b>	<b>Ms. Valerie de Kermel</b>

\*Consultant for WSAT agenda item

\*\* Representative of WFP Budget Office on behalf of the WFP Chair of the Finance and Budget Network Working Group on Safety and Security Costs (FBN WG)

\*\*\* DSS consultant

## Annex B

### AGENDA

1. IASMN Steering Group Report (CRP 2 - IASMN SG)
2. Private Military and Security Companies (CRP 3 - DSS)
3. Security Information Management Systems Report (CRP 4 - DSS)
4. Benchmark Validation Security Occupational Group (CRP 5 - DPKO-DFS)
5. National Security Staff Screening and Vetting Policy (CRP 6 - DPKO-DFS)
6. Brahimi Report Recommendations Status Update (CRP 7 - DSS)
7. Report on SLS training schedule, materials and evaluation mechanism (CRP 8 - DSS)
8. DSS Human Resources Review Project (CRP 9 - DSS)
9. DSS Jointly Funded Account Budget and 2010 Performance Report (CRP 10 - DSS)
10. Standard Country Security Cost-Shared Budget (CRP 11 - DSS)
11. Emergency Funding for Safety and Security of UN Staff and Premises in High-Risk Environments (Pakistan and Afghanistan) (CRP 12 - DSS)
12. UNSMS Policy Manual Report (CRP 13 - DSS)
13. UN Premises Safety and Security Policy Report (CRP 14 - DSS)
14. Critical Incident Stress Counseling Report (CRP 15 - DSS)
15. Compliance Evaluation and Monitoring Unit Report (CRP 16 - DSS)
16. ISECT Policy and review of Travel Notification requirement (CRP 17 - DSS)
17. Safety and Security Service Update (CRP 18 - DSS)
18. Women Security Awareness Training (CRP 19 - WFP)
19. Any Other Business
20. Other matters
  - a. IASMN, HLCM, CEB and Steering Group meeting schedule for remainder of 2010:
    - i. IASMN meeting in Vienna, 22-25 June 2010
    - ii. HLCM 20<sup>th</sup> Session, 27-28 September, Washington, D.C. (Confirmed)
    - iii. CEB meeting, 5-6 November, New York (Confirmed)
    - iv. Steering Group meeting, 29 November to 1 December 2010<sup>6</sup> (Panama - UNFPA) (Confirmed)

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<sup>6</sup> Reflects current dates decided upon