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United Nations system common approach to prevent and address transnational organized crime

Executive summary

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is an increasingly complex, multi-dimensional and hyper-globalized challenge, impacting all countries and regions, driving violence and insecurity and harming people and planet.

Responding to the call of the Secretary-General and the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) for the United Nations (UN) system to work together more coherently to tackle all components of TOC, the United Nations system common approach to prevent and address TOC aims to assist UN entities to better align and coordinate effective TOC-related support to Member States.

The common approach represents a shared understanding that UN system responses to prevent and address TOC must keep a focus on the immediate needs of people for security, justice and well-being, to support balanced and specific responses to endangerment of physical safety and crime threats, while promoting interventions and cross-sectoral partnerships that can help strengthen prevention and resilience to TOC and avoiding duplication with existing and ongoing interventions.

The common approach was elaborated by a time-bound task team comprising 23 UN system entities, operating within the framework of the High-level Committee on Programs (HLCP) under the leadership of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The task team conducted a mapping of UN system responses to TOC and agreed a conceptual framework that underpinned work to develop the common approach.

The resulting recommendations and joint actions seek to address the challenges and response gaps identified through this process, including data limitations, fragmentation and

coordination challenges as well as capacity and resource constraints, with the ultimate aim of supporting effective responses to TOC that are evidence-based, context-specific, balanced and comprehensive, addressing structural drivers while building resilience.

Focusing on supporting the UN system to speak and act as one against TOC, enhance data collection, sharing and analysis, develop common messaging as relevant and promote integrated programming, the common approach outlines six specific joint actions to be undertaken over the next four years:

- a feasibility assessment for joint TOC-related data sharing;
- a regional pilot to implement the common approach in Latin America and the Caribbean;
- an initiative against financial crime and illicit financial flows;
- a database of TOC-related legislation;
- data collection on TOC environmental impacts; and
- joint messaging on TOC for use by UN system principals and Resident Coordinators.

The common approach further proposes creating a standing inter-agency coordination mechanism outside of HLCP, led by UNODC with rotating co-chairs, to support implementation.

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I. Introduction

1. Transnational organized crime (TOC) has increasingly come to the forefront of the international agenda amid growing recognition that TOC is getting worse. TOC is affecting all parts of the world, diversifying and intensifying in scope and scale, driving violence and insecurity and harming people and planet at enormous cost to human life and life opportunities.

2. The United Nations (UN) system common approach to prevent and address transnational organized crime responds to the call of the Secretary-General and the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) for the UN system to work together more coherently to tackle all components of organized crime by proposing pathways for entities to align and coordinate their TOC-related support to Member States.

3. The common approach represents a shared understanding that UN system responses to prevent and address TOC must keep a focus on the immediate needs of people for security, justice and well-being, to support balanced and specific responses to endangerment of physical safety and crime threats, while promoting interventions and cross-sectoral partnerships that can help strengthen prevention and resilience to TOC and avoiding duplication with existing and ongoing interventions. The actions contained in the common approach are proposed in a context of limited resources and with due account for the respective mandates and priorities of UN system entities, with the aim of addressing existing gaps, leveraging synergies and providing support where such efforts and interventions are needed most, at global as well as at regional, sub-regional and country levels.

II. Context

4. The common approach is timely. The 9497th meeting of the Security Council on threats to international peace and security held in December 2023¹ was dedicated to TOC and resulted in a presidential statement calling for strengthening the coordination of UN actions.² Also in 2023, the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, tasked by the Secretary-General to identify recommendations on global governance, called for a global strategy on TOC. In March 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 78/267 declaring 15 November the International Day for the Prevention of and Fight Against All Forms of Transnational Organized Crime.³

5. The Pact for the Future,⁴ adopted by Member States in September 2024, recognizes that TOC and related illicit financial flows can pose a serious threat to international peace and security, human rights and sustainable development, including through the possible links that can exist in some cases between TOC and terrorist groups. To address this threat, Member States decided to:

- a) Scale up efforts in addressing TOC and related illicit financial flows through comprehensive strategies, including prevention, early detection, investigation, protection and law enforcement, tackling the drivers and engagement with relevant stakeholders; and

¹ United Nations, Security Council (2023). 9497th meeting. 7 December. S/PV.9497 (Resumption 1). Available at: [Security Council, 78th year](#).

² A 2024 analysis of Security Council resolutions found that more than half mentioned a form of TOC. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018, Organized Crime and Illicit Flows at the Security Council, Available at: [Organized Crime and the Security Council: Analytical Tool | Global Initiative](#).

³ United Nations, General Assembly (2024). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 March 2024. Available at: [A/RES/78/267](#).

⁴ United Nations, General Assembly (2024). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 September 2024. 22 September. Available at: [A/RES/79/1](#).

- b) Strengthen international cooperation to prevent and combat TOC in all its forms, including when committed through the use of information and communications technology systems, welcoming the elaboration of the new United Nations Convention against Cybercrime.

6. In May 2024 at its first regular session, CEB held a dedicated segment on the challenges posed by organized crime with a focus on governance and the rule of law. The UN system principals deliberated on the growing threat posed by TOC to sustainable development, noting that the phenomenon affected every country and the work of the entire UN system. The Board asked the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to lead a consultative process outlining how the UN system could work together more coherently to tackle the multiple dimensions of TOC that undermined the capacity of governments and institutions to protect societies and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

7. Subsequently, at its 48th session in October 2024,⁵ the High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) committed to develop the UN system common approach to prevent and address TOC and approved the [terms of reference](#) (ToRs) for the time-bound Task Team on transnational organized crime to be established under the leadership of UNODC.⁶

8. The process to develop the common approach has been swift, enabled by the high level of engagement demonstrated by the UN system entities and a sense of urgency in responding to the growing challenges and new threats posed by TOC. A [mapping](#) of current UN system engagement on TOC and a gap analysis of responses were undertaken by the Task Team and presented to HLCP at its 49th session,⁷ a conceptual framework providing a working definition of TOC, outlining the scope and focus areas relating to TOC to be addressed under the common approach was approved by HLCP at an intersessional meeting in June 2025.

9. The work of the Task Team was further informed by a complementary workstream led by UNODC outside of the context of HLCP, consisting of three regional dialogues in Ecuador (24 February 2025), Nigeria (28 April 2025) and Bangkok (6 May 2025), with relevant UN system entities, Resident Coordinators and other relevant organizations attending in-person and virtually. The dialogues captured field-based perspectives on local, national and regional manifestations of transnational organized crime and their impacts, as well as on Member State capacities, responses, challenges and policy needs. In addition, UNODC convened a group of high-level external experts (22-23 May 2025), including former government leaders and advisers, academics, practitioners and civil society representatives from all regions, to provide additional insights.

III. Purpose and scope of the common approach

10. As outlined in the Task Team's ToRs, the common approach seeks to fulfil the following objectives:

- a) Promote policy coherence and aid UN system leadership in advocating for and facilitating international cooperation and evidence-based responses to prevent and address TOC that are rooted in respect for international law, including human rights and the rule of law;
- b) Facilitate inter-agency coordination, leverage data and analytical capacities, reduce duplication, optimize resource mobilization and maximize impact, including by

⁵ United Nations, Chief Executives Board for Coordination (2024). Report of the High-level Committee on Programmes at its forty-eighth session. 21 November. CEB/2024/6. Available at: [CEB.2024.6 - HLCP 48th Session Final Report.pdf](#).

⁶ HLCP Task Team entities: UNODC (lead), FAO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IOM, UN-CTED, UN-DCO, UN-OCT, UN-ODA, UN-OHCHR, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, UNHCR, UN Tourism, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS, UNU, WHO, WIPO.

⁷ CEB/2025/4. Available at: [CEB.2025.4 - HLCP 49th Session Final Report.pdf](#)

leveraging existing relevant UN system work, processes and initiatives related to TOC; and

- c) Contribute to the capacity of the Resident Coordinator system and UN Country Teams as well as missions to provide integrated, data-driven policy advice and support to Member States and regional bodies that speak to national and regional needs and priorities, and increase buy-in.

11. The common approach to prevent and address TOC has been designed to be implementable, bridging global policy with integrated action on the ground that is rooted in international law and agreed international frameworks. Accordingly, it seeks to articulate a shared understanding of TOC in order to enable the UN system to speak with one voice, connect the resources of the UN system and draw upon its entities' diverse mandates more effectively through targeted coordination opportunities to support Member States and other stakeholders in addressing immediate needs and building sustainable responses to TOC. Furthermore, the common approach has been elaborated recognizing the need to align with existing relevant frameworks to ensure coherent responses to interlinked challenges.

12. To achieve these aims, the common approach puts forth a working definition of TOC, analysing the phenomenon through a human security lens,⁸ as well as a broad overview of the growing complexity of the problem; key trends and interlinkages; root causes; and impact on peace and security, sustainable development and human rights. The analysis and recommendations are rooted in the understanding that a UN system common approach must address the Global North and Global South as TOC is a phenomenon affecting all countries, developed and developing; and take into account cross-cutting issues, including environmental concerns, gender, human rights and the misuse of technology, among other priorities. Avoiding overlap with existing mechanisms and interventions already addressing root causes and impacts related to TOC is critical to ensure effective use of limited resources and avoid duplication of effort.

IV. Understanding TOC

13. Working definition: For the purpose of the common approach, TOC is broadly understood to encompass all serious profit-motivated criminal actions committed by a group to obtain a direct or indirect financial or other material benefit, conducted across national borders.⁹ Perpetrators may involve different criminal actors, including mafia-style groups, criminal networks, terrorist groups, non-state and state-embedded actors and private-sector actors, as well as other groups and persons providing services to TOC actors and participating in illicit activities such as money laundering. Some, including people in marginalized communities, communities in fragile, conflict and crisis contexts, children and women, may be coerced or compelled into providing services or participating in TOC-related crimes.¹⁰

14. TOC has emerged as one of the most complex and rapidly evolving threats facing Member States today, and the evolution of TOC reflects broader developments, with

⁸ UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290, adopted 10 September 2012. Available at: [A/RES/66/290](#), PP3 and OP3: <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/> "Recognizing that development, human rights and peace and security, which are the three pillars of the United Nations, are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, [...] human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people."

⁹ While the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the primary international legal instrument addressing this challenge, does not define TOC, it defines an "organized criminal group" as a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one serious crime, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. [UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PROTOCOLS THERETO](#).

¹⁰ UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020 (United Nations publication, 2020). Available at: [2020 Global Report TIP](#).

hyperglobalization, digital transformation and rising geopolitical volatility contributing to the spread and growing sophistication of criminal networks. There exists an enormous diversity of criminal markets, often interlinked, with new markets rapidly developing where regulation or scarcity can open up opportunities for criminal exploitation. Rising violence and visibility of acts of violence, notably including in Europe, have further heightened concerns about TOC.¹¹

15. States are the primary actors in preventing and addressing TOC. States may also be targeted or infiltrated by criminal groups through corruption and other means, and state actors may provide protection to criminal groups or engage directly in illicit markets.^{12,13} TOC weakens the rule of law and the capacity of the state, and is a driver and sustainer of conflict, exacerbating harms in conflict situations¹⁴ and undermining international peace and security as well as development.¹⁵ TOC seriously harms the environment and the economy, with people as the ultimate victims.

16. No country or region is unaffected by TOC, and organized criminal groups operate in all environments from small communities and villages to cities, the high seas, and financial capitals to warzones. While resilience to TOC's deleterious impacts varies, TOC is rooted in and driven by supply and demand dynamics in the Global North as well as in the Global South.¹⁶ TOC challenges differ in different contexts and regions, but modern TOC groups share core characteristics:

- a) Adaptability and agility: TOC groups have undergone significant structural transformations and are increasingly flexible and fluid in structure and in operations. A key trend across regions is the increasing use of "service providers" – specialized entities that manage specific parts of illicit supply chains, provide money laundering services, or offer "cybercrime-as-a-service", creating interconnected networks that are harder to detect and dismantle.¹⁷
- b) Corruption and capture: Criminal networks systematically abuse legal business structures and state institutions, facilitated by professional enablers across various fields, and corruption remains central to the TOC business model. TOC groups are very successful in laundering profits, using parallel global systems or clandestine transfer and investment vehicles, exploiting formal regulated financial systems; terrorist groups can often benefit from TOC for financing and logistical support.¹⁸
- c) Use of frontier technologies: TOC groups are making increasingly sophisticated use of technologies, with new digital infrastructures enabling entirely new forms of crime and

¹¹ UNODC, The Global Study on Homicide 2023 (2023). Available at: [2023 Global Study Homicide](#).

¹² UNODC, Inflection Point: Global Implications of Scam Centres, Underground Banking and Illicit Online Marketplaces in Southeast Asia (United Nations publication, April 2025). Available at: [Inflection Point 2025](#).

¹³ UNODC, World Drug Report 2024 (United Nations publication, 2025). Available at: [WDR24 Contemporary issues](#).

¹⁴ SG/SM/22073. Available at: [Transnational Organized Crime 'a Vicious Threat' to Sustainable Development, Rule of Law, Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Urging Unity Combating Menace | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases](#).

¹⁵ United Nations University, Multilateral Responses to Transnational Organized Crime and Conflict: Global Policy Considerations and Future Directions (United Nations publication, August 2024). Available at: [Multilateral Responses to Transnational Organized Crime and Conflict – Global Policy Considerations and Future Directions](#).

¹⁶ General Assembly GA/SHC/3976. Available at: [Transnational Organized Crime Extending Reach into New Areas — Cyber Crime, 'High Seas Poaching' — Which Needs Coordinated Response, Third Committee Told | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases](#).

¹⁷ UNICRI and UNOCT, *Beneath the Surface: Terrorist and Violent Extremist Use of the Dark Web and Cybercrime as a Service for Cyber-Attacks* (United Nations publication, 2024). Available at: [Beneath the surface update](#).

¹⁸ UNODC, Inflection Point: Global Implications of Scam Centres, Underground Banking and Illicit Online Marketplaces in Southeast Asia (United Nations publication, April 2025). Available at: [Inflection Point 2025](#).

providing tactical advantages that law enforcement struggles to match. Criminal groups are adopting artificial intelligence (AI), voice cloning and deepfakes at a rapid rate and are integrating drones into their operations.¹⁹

17. Organized criminal groups have been particularly adept at integrating new service-based business models and technologies. For example, TOC groups operate scam centres perpetrating romance, lottery, investment and other scams and extortion, with the proceeds laundered through underground cryptocurrency markets and formal banking channels.²⁰ Multiple forms of TOC converge in such operations: trafficking in persons for forced criminality as well as kidnapping for ransom, cyber-fraud, sexual exploitation, money laundering and more. Operating most prominently in Southeast Asia, victims are trafficked from Africa, Asia and the Americas to work in the compounds, while cyber-fraud targets extend to North America, Europe and other regions.²¹

18. A particularly heinous aspect of TOC is human trafficking.²² Trafficking for forced criminality is rising, as organized crime models use trafficking victims for online scams and other crimes. Most detected victims of this form of trafficking are men and boys, who account for the larger share of victims of trafficking for forced labour. Overall women and girls continue to account for the majority of detected victims – 61% – worldwide, with most trafficked for sexual exploitation.²³

19. The number of detected child victims of human trafficking increased by a third from 2019 to 2022, including a 38% increase in detected girls. Refugee, migrant and internally displaced children are especially vulnerable.²⁴ Children are also targeted by online networks²⁵ as evidenced by the increase in online exploitation and production of child sexual abuse material.

20. Organized criminal groups exploit displacement and lack of safe and legal pathways for migration to perpetrate TOC, notably trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation, forced labour and forced criminality as well as aggravated forms of smuggling. Refugees, migrants and internally displaced persons – particularly unaccompanied and separated children – are targeted due to weakened protection systems and socioeconomic instability.²⁶

21. Drug trafficking remains core to the TOC business model and its profits, and innovation in this illicit trade – from the trafficking of precursors and pre-precursors to the exponential rise of potentially lethal synthetic drugs such as fentanyl and nitazenes, and the unprecedented industrialization of the illicit production of coca – is driving new threats and challenges. Asia has seen a rapid expansion of methamphetamine production and trafficking

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime and the Convergence of Cyber-Enabled Fraud, Underground Banking and Technological Innovation in Southeast Asia: A Shifting Threat Landscape (United Nations publication, October 2024). Available at: [TOC_Convergence_Report_2024.pdf](#)

²¹ UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2024 (United Nations publication). Available at: [2024 Global Report TIP](#).

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ UNICEF, Children's Involvement in Organized Violence: Emerging trends and knowledge gaps; Based on evidence from different fields and areas of expertise (United Nations publication). Available at: [Working Paper Children's Involvement in Organized Violence](#).

²⁶ UNHCR, IOM, Mixed Migration Center (MMC), On this journey no one cares if you live or die, Vol.2 2024. Available at: [On This Journey No One Cares If You Live Or Die: Abuse, Protection and Justice along Routes between East and West Africa and Africa's Mediterranean Coast | Refworld](#); UNHCR, Rohingya refugees: Land and sea/river routes - Quarterly update. December 2024. Available at: [Quarterly Update: Rohingya refugees](#); UNHCR, UNHCR's Views on Asylum Claims from Individuals Fleeing Violence by Gangs and Other Organized Criminal Groups in Central America and Mexico 2022. Available at: [UNHCR on Asylum Claims](#); UNHCR, Division of International Protection, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs 2010. Available at: [Guidance Note on Refugee Claims](#).

of precursor chemicals for synthetic drugs. Production and trafficking of “captagon” remain an urgent challenge for the Levant and the Gulf.²⁷

22. In Latin America, long the region with the highest proportion of organized crime-related homicides,²⁸ fragmented organized criminal groups are using innovative techniques, mostly throughout the cocaine production chain. This has significantly enhanced profitability and scale, contributing to supply-fuelled increases in use, notably in Europe, and driving up violence and insecurity, including in countries which were previously less affected by the cocaine trade.

23. While drug trafficking remains a central activity, TOC groups are increasingly polycriminal, with individual groups engaged in multiple activities, including human trafficking and extortion,²⁹ arms and ammunition trafficking,³⁰ wildlife trafficking,³¹ intellectual property crime such as counterfeiting,³² illegal mining and the illicit extraction and trade of precious and critical minerals³³ and logging,³⁴ trafficking in cultural property, health-related crimes³⁵ and more. This diversification enables groups to expand their reach and establish alliances with international networks. Prisons in some countries are used by TOC groups to conduct their operations and recruit gang members.³⁶

24. Linkages between TOC and terrorism are noted in some regions,³⁷ for example West Africa.^{38, 39, 40} Criminal networks and terrorist groups are illegally exploiting natural resources, fuelling military coups and undermining governance in a highly fragile region, and are contributing to the erosion of social cohesion, including by exacerbating farmer–herder conflicts⁴¹ and closures of schools due to insecurity.⁴² In the Middle East, the looting

²⁷ UNODC, World Drug Report 2025 (United Nations publication, 2025). Available at: [WDR25_B2_Contemporary_drug_issues](#).

²⁸ UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2023 (United Nations publication). Available at: [Global_study_on_homicide_2023](#).

²⁹ UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2024 (United Nations publication). Available at: [GLOTIP2024_BOOK.pdf](#).

³⁰ UNODA (2022). Secretary-General’s Report on small arms and light weapons. United Nations publication. Available at: [UNOCT.pdf](#).

³¹ UNEP and INTERPOL, The Rise of Environmental Crime – A Growing Threat To Natural Resources Peace, Development And Security. A Rapid Response Assessment (United Nations publication, 2016). Available at: [The rise of environmental crime: A growing threat to natural resources peace, development and security | UNEP - UN Environment Programme](#).

³² 2020 EUROPOL report on poly-criminality. Available at: [2020 EUROPOL report](#).

³³ UNODC, Global Analysis on Crimes that Affect the Environment – Part 2b: Minerals Crime: Illegal Gold Mining (United Nations publication, 2025). Available at: [ECR25_P2b_Minerals_Crime.pdf](#)

³⁴ UNODC, Global Analysis on Crimes that Affect the Environment – Part 2a: Forest Crimes: Illegal deforestation and logging (United Nations publication, 2025). Available at: [ECR25_P2a_Deforestation.pdf](#).

³⁵ This can include the illicit production and trade of falsified medicines, vaccines and medical equipment, illicit drug markets, trafficking in persons for organ removal, and the misuse of biological agents. These are not only public health threats but also core enablers of TOC that undermine trust in institutions and endanger lives. See: [WHO and UNODC Report on contaminated medicines](#); [Expert Meeting On Combating Trafficking in Human Beings for the Removal of Organs | OSCE](#)

³⁶ United Nations system common position on incarceration (United Nations publication, May 2021). Available at: [United Nations system common position on incarceration - International Drug Policy Consortium \(IDPC\)](#).

³⁷ Security Council resolution 2617 (2021).

³⁸ UNICRI (2024). Expert briefing on the intersection of violent extremism and gaming held at the United Nations Secretariat in New York, 13 December. Available at: [UNICRI Expert briefing violent extremism and gaming](#).

³⁹ S/RES/2682 (2023).

⁴⁰ S/RES/2617 (2021).

⁴¹ UNODC, The Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment – Sahel (TOCTA Sahel) 2024 (United Nations publication). Available at: [Transnational Organized Crime in the Sahel](#).

⁴² S/RES/2199 (2015).

and smuggling of cultural property has been exploited by terrorist groups to support their recruitment efforts and operational capacities.⁴³

A. Impacts of TOC

25. Intersecting criminal ecosystems and the many diverse forms of TOC cause wide-ranging harms and may hinder humanitarian assistance. TOC can have multiple and different impacts on different groups, men, women and children. For example, the illicit transfer of arms, often linked to organized crime, can affect men and women differently. The overwhelming majority of small arms owners are men,⁴⁴ and young men perpetrate the most armed violence, with men aged between 15 and 29 years being at the highest risk of homicide globally. At the same time, the illicit transfer of arms can be a factor fuelling gender-based violence against women.⁴⁵

26. TOC and its enablers restrict and obstruct attempts to safeguard the environment, sustainably develop economies and preserve cultural heritage and rights,⁴⁶ providing pathways for the illicit trade in endangered species, flora and fauna, as well as cultural artefacts that lie at the centre of communities and their identity.^{47, 48}

27. TOC also undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance and rule of law institutions, and disrupts legitimate trade and financial systems, exacerbating poverty, inequality and corruption as it weakens formal institutions, limiting their ability and resources to respond to ever-increasing development challenges.⁴⁹

28. Measuring TOC impacts remains challenging, with different metrics highlighting different harms. Trafficking in persons causes great individual harm, while falsified medicines and other health-related crime pose a grave threat to public health, particularly for impoverished communities.⁵⁰ TOC groups harm the environment through illegal logging, illegal natural resource extraction, trafficking in protected species,⁵¹ dumping of banned chemicals and waste, and more.⁵² Cultural property trafficking destroys irreplaceable heritage and may fund terrorist operations.⁵³ All these manifestations of TOC affect the enjoyment of a range of human rights.

⁴³ United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2024, Cultural Heritage Smuggling and the Nexus with Terrorism. Available at: [UNICRI Smuggling-Terrorism nexus](#).

⁴⁴ United Nations, Human Rights Council (2022), Impact of the Civilian Acquisition, Possession and Use of Firearms by Children and Youth, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 19 January. Available at: [A/HRC49/41](#).

⁴⁵ United Nations, Human Rights Council (2020). The Impact of Arms Transfers on Human Rights. Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 19 June. Available at: [A/HRC/44/29](#).

⁴⁶ UNESCO, The Fight against Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property: for a strengthened global dialogue 2021 (International Conference Summary UNESCO in partnership with European Union). Available at: [UNESCO 2021 Conference on trafficking in cultural property](#).

⁴⁷ CITES (2016). International Consortium on combatting wildlife crime (ICWC) strategic programme 2016-2020. Available at: [Sixty-sixth meeting of the CITES Standing Committee](#)

⁴⁸ UNODC, "Tackling crimes that affect our ocean," fact sheet. Available at: [UNODC Tackling Crimes that Affect our Ocean](#).

⁴⁹ UNDP (2024). Promote Just, Peaceful and Inclusive Societies. Available at: [UNDP SDG16 profile](#).

⁵⁰ WHO, A study on the public health and socioeconomic impact of substandard and falsified medical products (United Nations publication, 2017). Available at: WHO Study public health

⁵¹ UNODC, World Wildlife Crime Report 2024: Trafficking in Protected Species (Vienna: United Nations publication, 2024). Available at: [World Wildlife Crime Report](#)

⁵² UNODC, World Drug Report 2024 (United Nations publication, 2024). Available at: [WDR24_Contemporary_issues](#).

⁵³ Security Council (2020). Action taken by Member States and United Nations entities to address the issue of linkages between terrorism and organized crime. Report of the Secretary-General. Available at: [S/2020/754](#).

29. The global scale of TOC and of illicit markets and their financial impacts are difficult to reliably estimate due to lack of quality data and the hidden nature of such activities. Estimates of the illicit proceeds from drug trafficking vary but the illegal trade generates hundreds of billions of dollars each year worldwide.⁵⁴ Losses from cybercrime in the United States alone exceeded an estimated 16 billion dollars in 2024.⁵⁵ The International Monetary Fund (IMF), examining the macroeconomic effects of crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, estimates that a 10-percentage point increase in the share of “crime-related news” is associated with a 2.5% contraction in industrial production three quarters later.⁵⁶ The cost of crime in the same region has been estimated at some 3.4% of GDP.⁵⁷ The NGO-produced Global Organized Crime Index estimates that 83% of the global population now live in countries with high criminality.⁵⁸

30. TOC is a significant factor among the root causes of refugee and migration movements, as well as endangering the safety of refugees and migrants *en route* as well as in destination countries.⁵⁹ Organized criminal activity has also been cited as an increasingly relevant driver of internal displacement, with the number of people displaced by crime worldwide doubling to 1.2 million from 2023 to 2024.⁶⁰

31. The response to TOC may also negatively impact human rights and inadvertently raise the potential for violence.⁶¹ For example, punitive approaches to drug control, including use of the death penalty for drug-related offences as well as securitized responses and the militarization of law enforcement, can breach human rights standards.⁶² At times punitive approaches have led to extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment and enforced disappearance.⁶³ Criminal legislation, such as cybercrime or counter-terrorism laws, have been misused to limit legitimate exercise of rights and the suppression of civil society.⁶⁴ State incapacity and corruption, which may characterize contexts in which organized crime is prevalent, can frustrate victims’ search for justice.⁶⁵

32. TOC groups may interfere with democratic processes, intervening in local elections, capturing local governance institutions, murdering and intimidating politicians, justice officials, police, journalists, civil society representatives and other community members.⁶⁶

⁵⁴ UNODC, World Drug Report 2025 (United Nations publication, 2025). Available at: [WDR25_B2_Contemporary_drug_issues](#).

⁵⁵ FBI (2024). Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Report. Available at: [2024_IC3Report](#).

⁵⁶ Bisca, P. M. et al. Violent Crime and Insecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Macroeconomic Perspective. Departmental Papers 2024 009 (2024). Available at: [2024 IMF Departmental Papers](#).

⁵⁷ IADB (2024). High Crime Costs Burden Latin America and the Caribbean (November 11). Available at: [2024 IADB Crime Costs LAC](#).

⁵⁸ GI-TOC, Global Organized Crime Index 2023. Available at: [2023 Organized Crime Index](#).

⁵⁹ UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2024 (United Nations publication). Available at: [GLOTIP2024_BOOK](#).

⁶⁰ United Nations, Human Rights Council (2025). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Paula Gaviria Betancur. 10 June. Available at: [A/HRC/59/46](#).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 6(2) permits States parties that have not abolished the death penalty to impose the death penalty only for ‘the most serious crimes’, which the Human Rights Committee has consistently interpreted as crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing. See: Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, (2019), para 35. Available at: Article 6: [General comment No. 36](#).

⁶³ United Nations, Human Rights Council (2023), Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, paras 17-22, 15 August. Available at: [A/HRC/54/55](#).

⁶⁴ See e.g. United Nations, Human Rights Council (2024), Findings of the Investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024. Available at: [A/HRC/57/CRP.6](#) See also: ‘Tunisia: Türk says rulings in ‘conspiracy’ case are a setback for justice and the rule of law’. Available at: [OHCHR Press Release April 2025 Tunisia](#).

⁶⁵ [A/HRC/59/46](#).

⁶⁶ Nickel Catharina, Summer Walker. Transnational organized crime and peacekeeping: strengthening mission approaches for greater impact: UNU-CPR, 2025. Available at: [2025 UNU-CPR TOC and Peacekeeping](#).

⁶⁷ TOC groups can also operate from within political and judicial institutions, instrumentalizing the state apparatus for the benefit of criminal structures and to ensure impunity for illegal acts. TOC groups, including some gangs, may engage as conflict actors and the lines between criminal groups, terrorist groups and other non-state armed actors increasingly blurred.⁶⁸

33. TOC represents a significant barrier to progress on global public goods, compromising and diverting the public financing capacities of states⁶⁹ and investments in health,⁷⁰ education, infrastructure, and services.⁷¹ Illicit financial flows from TOC activities drain essential resources needed for sustainable development, thus hindering domestic resource mobilization efforts. Illicit markets infiltrate legitimate markets, corrupt state officials, fund non-state and terrorist activities, violate embargoes and sanctions regimes, and prolong armed conflict and instability.^{72, 73} The funding of terrorist activities through TOC proceeds creates a vicious cycle where criminal enterprises benefit from the instability generated by terrorism, while terrorist groups gain the resources needed to sustain and expand their operations.

B. Root causes and structural drivers

34. TOC's ability to take root is interconnected with global challenges of poverty, inequality and social exclusion; lack of education and job opportunities; insufficient access to services; weak capacity in state institutions; limited territorial presence of the state and its protection systems; corruption and instability; accountability gaps and a lack of access to justice for victims of crimes.⁷⁴ Furthermore, TOC contributes to and exacerbates these same problems by undermining institutional legitimacy and efficacy, depleting public resources, harming livelihoods and lives, and eroding trust in state institutions that are often already weak.⁷⁵

35. Weak governance and situations where human rights are not met increase vulnerability to TOC. Concentrated criminal control of a territory – whether a conflict situation or border zone or area where law enforcement and the state have limited access and trust – can have devastating effects on the local population.⁷⁶ Communities can become dependent on illicit markets for subsistence, and organized criminal groups may step in to provide governance and services that states traditionally provide, contributing to complex structural challenges that cannot be addressed solely through measures to disrupt specific criminal actors.⁷⁷

36. Supply and demand dynamics connect the Global North and Global South and source, transit and destination countries, underscoring the need for cooperation and shared responsibility. Demand for drugs such as cocaine, for example, is centred in wealthier countries and segments of society, while cultivation and production entrap the

⁶⁷ OHCHR (2023). UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity. 31 January. CI-12/CONF.202/6. Available at: [UN Plan of Action](#).

⁶⁸ Security Council (2020). Action taken by Member States and United Nations entities to address the issue of linkages between terrorism and organized crime. Report of the Secretary-General. Available at: [S/2020/754](#).

⁶⁹ UNCTAD, Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa (United Nations publication, 2020). Available at: [Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa](#).

⁷⁰ Supra 50.

⁷¹ UN DESA (2025). Tracking Illicit Financial Flows for Effective Action. Available at: [Brief Series - UNCTAD_IFFs](#).

⁷² UNICRI, Organized Crime and the Legal Economy (United Nations publication, 2021). Available at: [UNICRI_Organized_Crime_and_Legal_Economy_report](#).

⁷³ CTED (2024). Trends Tracker: Evolving Trends in the Financing of Foreign Terrorists Fighters' Activity: 2014-2024. Available at: [CTED Trends Tracker 2024 Financing FTFs](#).

⁷⁴ UNDP, Journey to extremism in Africa: Pathways to recruitment and disengagement (United Nations publication, February 2023). Available at: [Journey to extremism in Africa: Pathways to recruitment and disengagement | United Nations Development Programme](#)

⁷⁵ GITOC (March 2021). Available at: [The-Global-Illicit-Economy-GITOC-Low](#).

⁷⁶ Supra 56.

⁷⁷ UNODC, Governing Safer Cities: Strategies for a Globalised World (United Nations publication, December 2016). Available at: [UNODC SaferCities](#).

impoverished. Persistent demand in affluent consumer markets⁷⁸ for wildlife, timber and marine resources is also contributing to TOC relating to environmentally sensitive commodities. For example, seizures of red sandalwood, used in high-end furniture and carvings, rose by 128% from 2022 to 2023, with demand concentrated in Asia.⁷⁹ Furthermore, TOC groups are adjusting operations to exploit market opportunities while maximizing profits and minimizing risk. For example, as gold prices have skyrocketed TOC groups have become highly embedded in the sector, from illegal mining to exploiting regulation gaps to introduce illicitly sourced gold into the licit supply.⁸⁰

C. Response gaps

37. The rapid evolution and spread of TOC in recent years are making it increasingly difficult for government and law enforcement responses to keep pace. In addition to capacity constraints, state responses to TOC in many countries are fragmented and weakened by a lack of internal coordination, with knock-on effects on a country's ability to effectively engage in international cooperation. Further, law enforcement and security agencies often lack the specialized skills and inter-agency coordination mechanisms needed to investigate and prosecute cases crossing TOC and other crimes such as terrorism. In response to enforcement actions, TOC groups shift operations to other commodities, crime forms or locations, and "jurisdiction shopping" and the "balloon effect" phenomenon⁸¹ further underscore the need for coordinated and sustained cross-border responses.

38. Lack of quality and comparable data is a continuing challenge, and the available relevant data is often siloed, hindering a more comprehensive understanding of TOC and its impacts, including the interplay between local, national, regional, sub-regional and global dynamics, and interaction between different criminal markets and ecosystems.

39. Use of surveillance technologies as well as other uses of AI, in compliance with international law and safeguarding human rights, could potentially be harnessed to help prevent and investigate TOC, but official capacities are lagging behind that of criminal groups. Capacity shortfalls also include the know-how to disrupt criminal financing, with financial institutions falling short when it comes to compliance with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulations, and cryptocurrencies further complicating the investigation of financial crimes.

40. The need to target TOC enablers and limit TOC's profitability further highlight the importance of interventions that address not just the Global South but the countries of the Global North, which function as key nodes in the international financial system and may be used by criminal groups to operate in and channel proceeds of criminal operations through their jurisdictions.

41. Within the UN system, there is high level of awareness around TOC, and entities are engaged in multiple relevant activities across their mandate areas. Nonetheless, gaps remain in both understanding the impact of TOC across the work of the UN system and how to effectively address it, considering the different mandates, priorities, capacities and resources of each UN system entity concerned with TOC. Given the different regional manifestations of organized crime, more work is also needed to connect the efforts of Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams and the UN Development Coordination Office (DCO) to confront the cross-border challenges of TOC.

42. In a mapping of UN system responses to TOC, conducted in the first quarter of 2025 with the participation of 25 entities, more than half considered TOC to be relevant to their

⁷⁸ UNODC World Wildlife Crime Report, 2024: Available at: [2024 UNODC WWC Report](#).

⁷⁹ World Customs Organization's (WCO) Illicit Trade Report - 2023, Chapter 4, Environment p. 122. Available at: [2023 WCO Illicit Trade report](#).

⁸⁰ UNODC, Global Analysis on Crimes that Affect the Environment – Part 2b: Minerals Crime: Illegal Gold Mining (United Nations publication, 2025). Available at: [ECR25_P2b_Minerals_Crime](#).

⁸¹ UNODC, Organized Crime Strategy Toolkit (United Nations publication, September 2021). Available at: [UNODC OC Toolkit](#).

mandates while the majority indicated that TOC impacts the implementation of agency mandates across the UN system. The mapping found that there exists a well-established level of inter-agency cooperation on a wide range of TOC-related issues, with many entities collaborating across the UN system at global, regional and national levels. The entities also indicated a high level of coordination with governments, regional bodies, civil society and the private sector, as well as with other institutions such as academia, think tanks and religious communities.

43. Despite existing collaboration efforts, the mapping and common approach process have highlighted that TOC is still not sufficiently recognized as an overarching issue for the UN system, which may have had the unintended effect of limiting coordinated planning, which in turn increases the risk of duplication of effort, siloed programming, misalignment of scarce resources and missed opportunities.

44. Initiatives may lack sustainability due to limited funding, personnel turnover and weak institutional memory, coupled with differing priorities and operational modalities between the different entities. Furthermore, the mapping found that existing platforms, mechanisms and legal frameworks are also underutilized and information and data exchange between entities is limited. According to the entities surveyed, [existing coordination mechanisms](#) are not used to their full potential as they are often resource- and time-intensive. Moreover, while relevant mechanisms addressing the rule of law, trafficking in persons, security sector reform and other related challenges could support TOC responses they do not in themselves seek to fully tackle TOC.

45. Greater coordination and innovation in support of state prevention and response strategies to TOC are needed. There exists an agreed international legal framework underpinning Member State responses and coordination. The primary global instrument specifically addressing TOC is the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its three supplementary Protocols⁸² on trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants and the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, which is further supported by the UN Convention against Corruption. The Conference of the Parties to UNTOC provides a key forum for Member States to strengthen international cooperation against TOC. The new UN Convention against cybercrime,⁸³ with full implementation of the Convention's human rights safeguards, has the potential to reinforce the fight against TOC, including by facilitating the collection, sharing and use of digital evidence. Moreover, the international legal framework, including international human rights law and environmental law, provides instruments to identify state responsibilities to respect rights in the context of TOC.

46. Despite this established framework, state capacities to prevent and tackle TOC, along with the ability to engage in international cooperation, including mutual legal assistance, vary considerably between countries, and enhanced, coordinated support from UN system entities – ranging from strengthening legal and regulatory frameworks and building capacity in key institutions, to promoting cross-border cooperation and facilitating asset recovery, as well as addressing the terrorism-TOC nexus – is urgently needed.

V. Enhanced UN system coordination: recommendations

47. Effective responses to TOC must be evidence-based, balanced and comprehensive, focusing on prevention, legislation and regulation, criminal justice and other measures anticipating and keeping pace with criminal innovation and addressing the real needs of those affected by TOC. A coherent UN policy approach to TOC is also human rights-based,

⁸² UNTOC, which entered into force in 2003, has 194 parties, while its protocol on trafficking in persons has 185 parties, its protocol on smuggling of migrants 154 signatories and its protocol on firearms 126 parties (UNODC, Signatories to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime and its Protocols. Available at: [Signature/ratification status of the CTOC](#)).

⁸³ United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, to be opened for signature in Hanoi in October 2025. Available at: [UNCC Call for Applications](#).

people-centred and victim-focused, and acknowledges the need to address structural drivers and build resilience.

48. Necessary measures include promoting macroeconomic stability, inclusive growth and education and job opportunities for young people, as well as strengthening the rule of law and addressing impacts on all human rights and harms to institutions, economies and services ranging from education and healthcare to food. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies must take TOC, and potentially TOC groups, into account, in light of the role they may have or play in situations of armed conflict.

49. UN assistance, programming and other measures must complement international standards, including human rights standards, and encourage state interventions that are aligned to international law. Balanced measures should not wrongfully criminalize vulnerable people nor exacerbate conditions which may serve to drive people towards TOC.

50. As appropriate, analysis should consider how TOC affects men, women and children, often in different ways, as well as people in vulnerable situations; and assistance, and programmes and other measures should be aligned accordingly. Engagement with civil society and most of all those affected by TOC must be a cornerstone of UN programming and action, with due attention to the protection of victims of TOC, including trafficking victims and in particular women and girls, and to the responsibility of perpetrators. A human rights-based, people-centred, victims-focused and protective approach to justice, including comprehensive corrections system approaches encompassing prevention and rehabilitation, should be emphasized.

51. While TOC is transnational in nature, organized criminal groups themselves and their operations are highly embedded in social structures and local contexts. Effective and sustainable solutions must be ground-up, localized and community-based, speaking to the needs of affected people and victims as well as drawing upon the strengths and mandates of the whole of the UN system. This is particularly critical for interventions promoting sustainable livelihoods and alternative development. A focus on coordinated and tailored prevention efforts to address TOC on the local level, also targeting organized crime “hotspots” such as prisons or urban areas, could be effective and cost-effective. Identifying and amplifying success stories and good practices from such interventions could provide a valuable resource and support effective South-South cooperation.

52. The strengths of the UN system in addressing TOC highlighted in the mapping, HLCP discussions and field dialogues include its extensive field presence, institutional expertise, strong convening and coordination power and, most importantly, its strong relationship with Member States and host governments. In this context, the UN system can do more to deploy its full potential and provide more coherent and coordinated policy, programmatic and technical support to Member States to tackle the increasingly complex problem of TOC, working with regional intergovernmental organizations, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders, to enhance understanding of TOC trends and impacts and help to address response gaps and fragmentation. To deliver on this potential, the following actions for UN system coordination are recommended:

- a) **The UN must speak and act as one against TOC**, building a strong narrative that responds to the realities of countries and regions and helps to connect TOC interventions, from prevention to criminal justice responses to addressing harms and impacts, in a coherent way. Greater coordination between UN system entities and the Resident Coordinator system for cross-border initiatives is essential, especially given the transnational nature of organized crime. The UN can serve as facilitator on a national level, to help articulate needs and create spaces for action and coordination with key institutions, including by involving non-traditional actors, such as the private sector, and strengthen international cooperation on regional and global levels.
- b) **Collection, generation and sharing of high-quality, timely data and evidence-based analysis across entities – including root cause analysis and collections of good**

practices – must be stepped up to fully leverage each mandate’s unique strengths and expertise. This is critical not only for helping to inform strategic Member State responses, but also for enabling early identification of high-risk areas, evolving threats, emerging trends and potential hotspots.

- c) **Common messaging, joint advocacy and joint resource mobilization should be pursued**, in support of UN system capacities to jointly and effectively address TOC through capacity-building, institutional development and targeted training. Joint advocacy can also serve to influence the narrative on TOC, including to promote policies rooted in human rights and the rule of law and promote whole-of-society and inclusive approaches that advocate for equal representation of women, men, young people and all communities, and the participation of all stakeholders, including civil society, in solutions to counter TOC.

53. With respect to implementation of the common approach on the regional and country levels, identified areas of focus include joint risk assessments and joint programming as relevant, potentially addressing gaps in data, development of foresight capacities and leveraging new technologies to combat TOC. It was further emphasized that at the regional and country levels, it is important to integrate law enforcement and security measures, rooted in human rights, with other interventions, including community dialogues and mobilization, youth engagement and trust-building between civil society and security actors. Such efforts strengthen local resilience and can reduce the appeal and influence of TOC.

A. The path forward

54. The following proposed areas of joint action, with expected deliverables, identified lead entities and timelines, respond to the recommendations outlined above and aim at developing solutions, on the global, regional and national levels, to equip the UN system to:

- a) Improve the understanding of and response to the evolving nature of TOC – its adaptability and use of factors such as corruption and illicit finance as well as emerging technologies, among others – and the convergence of TOC activities and criminal ecosystems, including the terrorism-TOC nexus, through:
- i. Enhanced data collection and sharing within the UN system and forward-looking analysis.
 - ii. Integrated support, coordinated across UN entities, to Resident Coordinators and Country Teams to address fragmented responses on the national level, support the development of national, sub-regional and regional strategies and strengthen cross-border coordination.
- b) Promote joint resource mobilization, develop programming and sharing of expertise to strengthen TOC-related support to Member States, including to address TOC activities in the Global North as well as Global South and the economic/financial crime, illicit financial flows and corruption underpinning TOC; and
- c) Foster a global and shared narrative on TOC that takes into account regional and national specificities and advocates for integrated, rule of law- and rights-based solutions.

55. Emerging technologies and their application in preventing and addressing TOC will be taken into account across initiatives to further support effective implementation and future-proof responses.

B. Joint actions for implementation

Improve the understanding of and response to the evolving nature of TOC	
Joint action 1: Strengthening exchange of information, analysis and opportunities on the use of technology and innovation for preventing and addressing TOC, and use of early warning, foresight and forecasting tools to more effectively anticipate, prepare and respond to the changing nature of TOC.	
Proposed deliverable(s):	Feasibility assessment of a joint, internal TOC-related data platform (global, regional, national) to support UN system-wide coherence, coordination and information-sharing, with the aim of pooling better data to inform the UN system, enable forecasting of potential hotspots geographically and thematically, provide insights and support decision-making, and strengthen prevention. The assessment will draw upon lessons from the UN system.
Lead entity(ies):	UNODC
Contributing entity(ies):	IOM, UN-OCT, UN-OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, WIPO, UN Women
Timeline:	2026
Joint action 2: Pilot in Latin America and the Caribbean to explore tailored, regional implementation of the global common approach.	
Proposed deliverable(s):	Regional roadmap for implementation with joint risk analysis, financing plan and advocacy anticipated.
Lead entity(ies):	UNODC, UN-DCO-LAC, UNDP
Contributing entity(ies):	UN-OHCHR
Timeline:	2026
Develop programming and sharing of expertise to strengthen TOC-related support to Member States	
Joint action 3: Joint action to address financial crime and illicit financial flows.	
Proposed deliverable(s):	Joint initiative to strengthen capacity to improve the confiscation of proceeds of crime through international cooperation, financial investigations and risk-based supervision of banks and non-banks and designated non-bank businesses and professions, drawing on the capacities of UNODC's regional anti-corruption and economic crime hubs for delivery.
Lead entity(ies):	UNODC, IMF
Contributing entity(ies):	UNCTAD, UNDP
Timeline:	2026
Joint action 4: Database of legislation relevant to TOC.	
Proposed deliverable(s):	Supplementing the existing UNODC database that facilitates the dissemination of information regarding the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime known as SHERLOC, a joint initiative to identify, collect and analyse other legislation relevant to TOC, to be displayed and made available in an open-access database, featuring as a subset of FAOLEX. ⁸⁴ This activity

⁸⁴ FAOLEX is a comprehensive and up-to-date legislative and policy database and online repository of national laws, regulations and policies on food, agriculture and natural resources management.

	would build upon an existing partnership between the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and UNODC on conceptualizing a FAOLEX subset dedicated to illegal fishing as a crime, expanding this idea to include TOC that affects natural resources and wildlife.
Lead entity(ies):	FAO
Contributing entity(ies):	UNEP, UNODC
Timeline:	2026-2027
Joint action 5: Data mapping and remedial measures on environmental crime, addressing TOC concerns relating to criminal activities that affect the environment.	
<i>First phase</i>	
Proposed deliverable(s): (subject to availability of resources and priorities)	A mapping/tangible data collection of the extent to which TOC contributes to environmental degradation and affects the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals. As a first step, a concept will be developed to determine the scope and geographical coverage (selected regions, countries or global).
Lead entity(ies):	UNEP, UNODC, UNDP
Contributing entity(ies):	FAO, with UNCTs and interested entities
Timeline:	2026-2027
<i>Second phase</i>	
Proposed deliverable(s): (subject to availability of resources and priorities)	Upon conclusion of the mapping process, a study may follow on how remedial and restoration measures for the environment and the communities may be incorporated into criminal justice measures to address TOC, such as, in crimes that affect the environment.
Lead entity(ies):	UNEP
Contributing entity(ies):	FAO
Timeline:	2027-2028
Foster a global and shared narrative on TOC	
Joint action 6: Joint messaging for use by UN system principals and Resident Coordinators.	
Proposed deliverable(s):	Joint messaging and campaign assets on TOC and associated financial crime for use on 15 November, International Day for the Prevention of and Fight against Transnational Organized Crime.
Lead entity(ies):	UNODC
Contributing entity(ies):	CITES, IOM, UN-OCT, UN-OHCHR, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Timeline:	October-November 2025

56. The common approach is intended to be a dynamic framework, capable of responding to the evolving nature of TOC and new challenges as they develop. In order to support implementation of the agreed as well as future joint actions under the common approach, it is proposed to create a standing inter-agency coordination mechanism outside of HCLP, led by UNODC with a rotating co-chair. Terms of reference are to be elaborated and agreed with participating entities.