The Inter-Agency Security Management Network
39th Session, 13 to 15 February 2024

(Image graphically edited)

Draft Report

Executive Summary

The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) held its 39th session from 13 to 15 February 2024 in Madrid, hosted by the United Nations World Tourism Organization. During the session, members reflected on the increasingly complex security environment as well as implications for the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), including the need for greater collaboration, comprehensive analyses, and consistent and effective advocacy.

During the two and a half days of discussions, members considered policy and strategic matters, including compliance issues, strategic communications plans, and HR strategy updates. They discussed UNSMS functionality, UNSMS membership criteria as well as ideas for the upcoming Security Symposium. Substantive leads delivered updates on training, strategic resource allocation, 2023 Jointly Funded Activities (JFA) expenditures and the results chain, among others. Members endorsed changes to the road safety policy, as well as to the guidelines on road safety to the Security Management Operations Manual.

The IASMN Steering Group will meet in Montreal, Canada, from April 17 to 18. The IASMN's 40th session will convene in June 2024, in Montreux, Switzerland.

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Introduction

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) held its 39th session from 13 to 15 February in Madrid. Some 43 representatives attended in person, with another 13 virtual participants, as well as additional presenters for specific sessions. The meeting was chaired by USG UNDSS[1] and co-chaired by the representative from WIPO. It was hosted by UNWTO, now also known as UN Tourism.

Opening Session

Welcome Remarks

2. The Executive Director of UN Tourism reflected on the challenges faced during three years since the outbreak of COVID-19 turmoil, and the efforts to ensure safety and security in travel. Following the welcome remarks, the representative of United Nations Tourism delivered a security briefing.

Introduction

3. The representative from the UNDSS Division of Field Operations (DFO)[2], opened by addressing the concept of the "age of chaos" as described by the Secretary-General, outlining six key trends contributing to global instability: loss of truth, democracy, plurality, environment, global governance, and consensus. These losses, he argued, fuel polarization, disenchantment with political systems, environmental crises, weakened international cooperation, and decreased adherence to international human rights norms. The DFO representative emphasized how these trends would likely lead to increased instability marked by unrest and violence volatility in terms of rapidly emerging crises; contagion due to spillover effects, the weakening of states; uncertain political transitions due to scheduled elections affecting close to 50 percent of the world's population; resulting in more fragmentation at national and international levels.

4. In terms of implications for the United Nations, the DFO representative referred to a decrease in demand for Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions; increasingly violent and dangerous humanitarian crises and the politicization of United Nations support; challenges in securing community acceptance; and uncertain support of financial, political, and troop and police contributors; leading to greater ambiguity and complexity of appropriate United Nations responses. In conclusion, the DFO representative stressed the need for the UNSMS to adapt by reviewing existing capacities and improving analyses to promptly identify shifts in political and security dynamics and risk assessments, collaborating closely with humanitarian and other partners, embracing innovative approaches to security, including community engagement in light of the multiplicity of threats beyond terrorism, while advocating for commensurate resources.

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[1] Please note that the names of UNSMS organizations are not spelled out at first use in this document.
[2] The UNDSS/DFO Director's remarks were circulated to IASMN members following the session.

Opening Remarks

5. The USG UNDSS acknowledged the critical discussions around security and safety and provided an update on his increased engagement with Member States on the significance of the United Nations' security efforts. He shared examples of engaging with the Security Council and receiving support from Fifth Committee for enhanced emergency response and organisational resilience capacities, a testament to the growing recognition of the United Nations' vital role in a tumultuous world.

6. Expressing concerns over risks to the Organization's credibility in the political sphere, he shared his vision of United Nations security professionals making the engine of the "United Nations bus" work through their technical expertise so that it can go where it has not been before, focusing in particular on humanitarian and development efforts. The USG UNDSS also thanked the IASMN for their hard work, dedication and expressed appreciation to their teams, reaffirming the need to work together.

Adoption of the Agenda

7. The USG UNDSS presented the agenda for endorsement. The DPO representative requested more information on the structural changes within UNDSS, particularly the new resources' operational capabilities and their expected full functionality, and the DPPA representative proposed jointly considering the reporting lines of Principal/Chief/Security Advisers (P/C/SAs). The UNDP representative emphasized the importance of sharing the Conference Room Papers (CRPs) with IASMN members in advance for feedback, noting the significance of recent departmental changes. The UNICEF representative suggested adding a discussion on the new UN Secretariat mobility policy to the HR Strategy Working Group session, noting it would benefit the group to understand how it will impact workforce dynamics within UNDSS.

8. **The IASMN:**
   - **Adopted the agenda as presented, with the addition of a sub-section on the Secretariat mobility policy under the "HR Strategy Working Group" session.**

Summary of Progress on Recommendations

9. UNDSS/SPPU and IASMN Secretariat, briefed on the outstanding IASMN recommendations (**CRP 1 Annex B**). The representative noted that, of 17 remaining actionable recommendations, 16 were still ongoing, some of which were long-term actions. The WFP representative highlighted the need to ensure alignment among the outcomes of various working groups, though members did not recommend further work on the issue.

10. **The IASMN:**
    - **Took note of progress.**

Sudan Lessons Learned

11. The USG UNDSS presented the agenda item on Sudan Lessons Learned. He noted that the report was not released for broader dissemination because it is a United Nations Operations and Crisis

Centre (UNOCC)/Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) product. Welcoming the IASMN's inputs to relevant recommendations of the review, which he noted are also relevant for other transition settings and were discussed at the Executive Committee (EC) meeting, the USG mentioned that he would share the finalized decisions once available. He explained that the EC has asked him to meet with the Deputies of selected entities (DPPA, DPO, DSS, DOS, OLA, DMSPC, OCHA, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, UNFPA, UNWOMEN, UNHCR, OHCHR) to jointly consider a proposed action plan to implement the recommendations.

12. To this end, the USG informed the IASMN that the Secretary-General (SG) has asked him to:

    a. Draft a plan (as mentioned in para 11) for increasing security staffing in Sudan with the understanding that UNITAMS is closing by the end of March, ensuring there is enough security support for continued operations of the United Nations Country Team;

    b. Devise a transition plan for DRC and Iraq, considering the planned closure e of MONUSCO and pressure on UNAMI and UNITAD; and

    c. Bring together a group of Security Focal Points with operations in volatile settings with no mission presence (e.g., Burkina Faso), to enhance coordination and ensure full cooperation across the entire security system, taking into existing consideration capabilities and capacities in specific countries.

13. The USG opened the floor for questions before going over the recommendations. The UNFPA representative noted the value of lessons learned exercises as opportunities to address systematic issues and requested that the recommendations stemming from the Sudan lessons learned are applied beyond Sudan. The OCHA representative agreed that the lessons learned are useful for other contexts as well.

14. Flagging an issue of governance, the UNICEF representative noted that the EC does not comprise all members of the IASMN and proposed an IASMN follow-up group to facilitate alignment with engagements at the Deputies level. In terms of methodology, the UNICEF representative also expressed concern about possible confirmation bias from the Team Leader, Ambassador Ellen Loej and a former Designated Official (DO) of Liberia, and some limits to her knowledge of the UNSMS policies. Agreeing with the point on underlying biases, the DPO representative noted that although the IASMN provided comments to the report, this was not done during the drafting process, which led to some inaccurate terminology.

15. The UNHCR representative mentioned that the report focuses on security management while the situation was happening, but it did not necessarily focus on the situation in the immediate aftermath, reflecting on the United Nations' ability to stay and deliver. She further highlighted inaccuracies in the report but appreciated that the EC is looking at the recommendations more widely. The UNOCT representative highlighted that the recommendations ought to consider root causes, such as inaccuracies that show the disconnect between security and operations.

16. The DPPA representative noted that it would be important to look at the overall process, such as the question of ownership on who implements the lessons learned. The WFP representative suggested to take a constructive approach, mentioning that the report offers an opportunity to do things differently and stressed the need to be inter-connected with other networks.

17. Expressing his desire for the IASMN to leverage the findings of the review, which have brought safety and security matters to the SG's attention, the USG clarified that it was led outside of the security realm, covering the System's overall response to the crisis that ensued in Sudan in April 2023.

18. Regarding recommendation 1.1, the UNICEF representative noted that the decision on the status of family duty stations is a complicated process that needs to remain decentralized. He further mentioned the need to push for a discussion with the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) on non-family duty station determination without family restrictions,, because in some locations, the security situation may not justify family restrictions, but the duty station could be non-family due to other considerations, such a lack of schools or healthcare facilities. The USG mentioned that an important element is the Member States' perspective on financial implications but noted that he would take the opportunity to engage in this conversation. The UNHCR representative inquired about the consultation with the Executive Group on Security (EGS) and the USG clarified that the EGS has been formed to discuss security-related decisions where there is no consensus or agreement across the system. The DPPA representative noted that the EGS can be convened by other members besides the USG UNDSS and asked that this be corrected in the recommendation.

19. The USG noted that he partially agreed with Recommendation 2.1 as UNDSS is already undertaking changes to ensure that DOs provide more meaningful inputs to performance assessments of P/C/SAs. On the decentralization of decision-making, the USG mentioned that the EC discussed elements of security that should not be decentralized, as DOs may not be familiar with security issues, though noting that the role of P/C/SA is to advise the DOs on decision-making. The UNICEF representative mentioned that this recommendation was overly simplified and DPPA noted that there is a need for further discussion on the role of P/C/SA's vis-à-vis Heads of Missions.

20. The USG noted that he partially agrees with Recommendation 2.4 because he needs to retain the ability to move P/C/SAs around and manage the UNDSS workforce. He highlighted the importance of consultations with DOs, but the ultimate approval and selection should rest with the USG UNDSS. The OHCHR representative agreed that the selection of the P/C/SAs should be retained by the USG UNDSS but indicated that the DO should be consulted. He suggested having an orientation for DOs and P/C/SAs on the relationship and interaction with UNDSS. The UNICEF representative proposed that DOs should be part of selection panels for P/C/SAs. The UNRWA representative suggested that UNDSS could provide a list of capable candidates for P/C/SAs, and the DO could provide input at that point. UNDSS/DFO clarified that DFO is soliciting feedback from DOs on the selection and performance of P/C/SAs.

21. The DPO representative agreed with recommendation 3.1 regarding the enhanced integration of analytical capacities across the system, mentioning a lack thereof peacekeeping operations and suggesting addressing the segregation between the Security Information and Operations Centres, the Joint Operations Centres, and Joint Mission Analysis Centres be addressed. The UNICEF representative stated that this recommendation is Secretariat-focused and should be expanded to other UNSMS organizations as well. The OCHA representative indicated a lack of focus on the purpose of the analysis, namely, to inform decision-making. The UNDP representative highlighted that even Member States with resources were unprepared for the situation, indicating that resources should be focused on preparedness and reaction to crises. The USG agreed and flagged the need to manage expectations around what is possible to deliver. UNDSS DFO noted that analysis in support of operational and security decision making needs to be connected to that of long-term planning, with the OHCHR representative highlighting delayed responses due to lack of planning and coordination between the decision-maker and the adviser.

22. The USG expressed agreement with Recommendations 3.2, 3.3., and 3.5. Regarding 3.4, the USG highlighted that a survey has been produced considering UNDSS/DFO/TRS products to inform the way forward on the services provided by TRS..

23. Regarding Recommendation 4.1, the USG expressed partial disagreement. The UNDP representative mentioned that the notion of the DO as the sole decision maker is concerning and that it is key to consult well-informed SMT members and to ensure their active participation in the SMTs. The OCHA representative agreed with the way the USG framed the answer to this specific recommendation but suggested that there are different interpretations on "supporting and advising". He noted that while Resident Coordinator (RC)/Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) type of DOs are used to collaborating with Heads of Organizations, Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG) type of DOs may be more prone to seeing the Security Management Team's (SMT's) role as only to support their decisions. In response to the UNESCO representative's point on distinct reporting lines of DOs and security professionals, the USG clarified that there is a reporting line of the DO to the Secretary General, through the USG UNDSS and that UNDSS takes part in the annual assessment of RCs. The UNESCO representative suggested that these assessments could be part of a lessons learned exercise, and the UNFPA representative, while recognizing the value of analyses, noted that the security risk management (SRM) process is solid enough to better predict scenarios. He advocated for the reinstatement of SMT training. The ADB representative noted that the UNSMS Framework of Accountability encourages UNSMS organizations to draft their own frameworks, which could be used to shape behaviour for those with SMT functions around the world. The DPPA representative pointed to the need to clarify the difference between SRSGs who hold political mandates and the country representatives of the Agencies, Funds, and Programmes (AFP), proposing the rejection of Recommendation 4.1. The UNRWA representative referenced the Framework of Accountability, stating that the country representative of an AFP is accountable to the decision made by the DO, and not their own decision. He further highlighted the lack of documentation trail behind a decision, noting that it would be important to share the minutes of

the SMTs. The USG clarified that the minutes from SMT meetings are shared with the Desks and that he consults these documents for decision-making purposes.

24. Regarding Recommendation 4.2, the USG referred to the need for enhanced analytical materials from SIOC (?) through UNDSS to the SMT, noting that at times incidents are reported without guidance for the discussions, and expressing his support for the recommendation.

25. On Recommendation 4.3, the DPPA representative requested a review/update of UNSMIN, and the USG clarified that this is one of the top priorities of the year for UNDSS' Digital Transformation project, alongside the technical element of staff lists, building on collaboration with Microsoft to leverage technology for facilitating the maintenance of staff lists and TRIP profiles. The UNDP representative pointed out that the issue with staff lists is not only technical but also involves aspects related to access of accurate information. In response to the UNHCR representative query on whether Microsoft would work on automatically uploading SMT minutes to SharePoint based Teams sites and if this could be linked then by AI to UNSMIN, the UNDSS/DPSS Director clarified that this issue has not been specifically discussed and took note of the suggestion. The WHO representative mentioned that it would be helpful if TDS would grant AFPs the capacity to upload their respective learning or training programmes in UNSMIN or be given access to extract status reports from the UNDSS Learning platform, for them to be able to directly monitor compliance and progress of their respective constituents. The FAO representative advised on the launch of the new Country Security Focal Point training on FAO learning platform.

26. On Recommendation 5.1, the USG explained that it is related to a more streamlined SRM process, with the UNICEF representative emphasizing that the SRM is not a document but a process and that the recommendation itself was not clear.

27. The USG noted that Recommendation 5.2 falls under the new UNDSS Operational Resilience Unit (ORU). The UNFPA representative expressed that P/C/SAs in field locations are capable of conducting this exercise and stressed that there is a challenge in decision-making when the SRM is not updated. The USG noted that one of the recommendations that he gives to new DOs is to undertake an exercise within the first six months of arrival to understand the SMT and to maintain security preparedness at the highest level. The UNICEF representative stressed that this is one of the most important recommendations, noting that conducting preparedness exercises leads to better security plans.

28. Concerning Recommendation 5.3, the OCHA representative noted that the recommendation also refers to medical integration and suggested that the USG "partially agrees" with this recommendation given that respective coordination is under the purview of the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM) in collaboration with DOS, UNDSS and the HR Network, with which the USG expressed his agreement.

29. On Recommendation 5.4, the USG highlighted that this was discussed at the EC meeting and received support. He noted that the USG of OCHA raised the point on flash appeals for crises including a percentage of funding earmarked for security. The OCHA representative expressed

that a flash appeal and humanitarian response plan helps to identify the needs, without necessarily attracting funding that can be earmarked for security. The USG mentioned that the notion of over expenditure on the JFA could be alleviated if some elements of responses to crises could be captured under a funding appeal. The UNEP representative enquired whether a mechanism to ring-fence any additional funding would be considered, considering the liquidity crisis with the Regular Budget. The USG agreed that the current crisis may impact the creation of a separate crisis fund, though indicated there was support during the EC meeting to consider such an instrument.

30. The USG indicated that Recommendations 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 are more specific to Sudan. The UNDP representative noted that he was expecting the number of vacant/lack of personnel posts in UNDSS Sudan to be one of the recommendations, as this was pointed out in the report. He stressed that this is a systemic issue of the United Nations Secretariat Human Resources system, which may not provide the USG UNDSS with the ability to ensure flexible and agile support to the UNSMS. The OCHA representative noted that the prioritization of recruitment should be based on the risk of not having capacity in place, and The USG agreed and indicated that UNDSS has created an UNDSS has established a dedicated HR Team to expedite recruitment and onboarding processes of P/C/SAs. The USG also highlighted the need to prioritize recruitment for high-risk countries with no senior leadership. The IOM representative noted that the recommendations do not mention the feasibility of implementation for some of the risk management measures. The USG clarified next steps and advised that DFO will consult entities that will be part of the Deputies group.

Compliance

31. The representative of the Strategic Planning Service (SPS) of UNDSS provided a briefing regarding the Audit of the Compliance Function in UNDSS conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) (**CRP 3**). He indicated that the OIOS issued nine recommendations. Some of these recommendations concentrate on internal procedures, particularly concerning the capacity and function of the compliance, evaluation, and monitoring section within UNDSS, while others address compliance issues more broadly, including the compliance monitoring system within the UNSMS. The SPS representative indicated that a recommendation of particular importance is the suggestion to establish or develop an overarching conceptual framework for compliance monitoring, evaluation, and reporting on security policy standards by UNSMS organizations, to be adopted by the IASMN and then submitted to the HLCM. He mentioned that the recommendation did not provide extensive details about this overarching conceptual framework, leaving room for interpretation. However, the report suggests complementing the *Security Policy Manual* (SPM) and improving compliance monitoring with UNSMS policies and SRM requirements. It was noted that certain elements of policy compliance were lacking, such as the issuance of an annual compliance report by UNDSS, and that chapter five of the SPM is not sufficiently clear on reporting incidents of noncompliance and the processes involved. SPS suggested working to enhance compliance without altering policy, emphasizing the need for tighter adherence to the SPM.

32. The OCHA representative underscored that compliance presents a significant concern, as considerable time is being spent developing and explaining new policies and systems that are not fully adhered to. He also questioned the effectiveness of a decentralized compliance system, suggesting the need for a centralized approach to ensure reliability. The representative suggested going beyond the recommendation to develop a framework for monitoring indicators, which would provide decentralized information flow and identify specific instances of noncompliance by individuals or organizations. He emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach to compliance beyond just individual recommendations.

33. The UNFPA representative recalled historical practices where a UNDSS headquarters team would conduct extensive compliance assessments in the field, producing reports for the IASMN. This was followed by a transition to self-assessment tools, and, while there have been efforts towards comprehensive compliance evaluations, the issue persists. He also expressed concerns about the lack of input from UNSMS organizations' clients on the OIOS report.

34. The WFP representative emphasized the need for accountability and coordination to ensure compliance with the UNSMS system. She identified gaps in addressing non-compliance and called for clarity on escalation processes and mechanisms for disputing non-compliance. The representative urged for alignment of efforts across various forums and emphasized the importance of integrating knowledge, training, and assessments.

35. The UNICEF representative noted that this audit report was not discussed at the Steering Group. He further noted that OIOS has no remit outside the Secretariat (while the Joint Inspection Unit, or JIU, has inter-agency remit) and questioned the extent to which its recommendations apply across different agencies. He mentioned the challenges and past discussions regarding the implementation of a common compliance system among agencies, emphasizing the need to assess whether a common system would be more effective than existing agency-based ones. The representative also discussed the difference between compliance with policies and compliance with SRM measures, noting that the latter is more complex. He emphasized the importance of ensuring that compliance monitoring mechanisms provide meaningful outputs and expressed hesitation about undermining existing systems.

36. The UNRWA representative questioned the efficacy of the current compliance mechanism and advocated for a country-specific compliance system managed by UNDSS. He highlighted discrepancies between compliance with policy and SRM measures, advocating for a more comprehensive understanding of compliance.

37. The UNHCR representative noted that other UNSMS organizations were not consulted during the process, considering the extensive discussions on compliance over the years. She highlighted previous efforts to establish compliance frameworks and mechanisms within an IASMN working group, suggesting that showcasing different tools and systems would have been beneficial for OIOS. She noted the need to identify topics for compliance reviews and suggested revisiting this practice. The representative pointed out discrepancies in the OIOS report, regarding the status of policies and emphasized the importance of clarity in recommendations, especially on training targets and compliance rates.

38. The UNODC representative discussed the challenges faced by smaller organizations like his on compliance assessments. He mentioned relying on self-assessments due to limited security teams in the field, which makes it difficult to interpret and understand compliance requirements, as well as accurately compare compliance levels. The representative emphasized the need for support from larger entities and a clear linkage with the SRM to assist security focal points in smaller organizations. He highlighted the importance of technical support from UNDSS on the ground.

39. The IOM representative recalled past discussions on compliance and highlighted a previous agreement for UNSMS organizations to develop security compliance mechanisms. He also expressed concern about the lack of consultation regarding the audit report and recommended bringing it back to the Steering Group for further discussion, together with the UNICEF representative. The representative suggested that discussions on resources follow deliberations on the compliance framework.

40. The SPS representative emphasized the importance of focusing on vulnerabilities and opportunities rather than being strictly bound by the report. He suggested exploring potential avenues such as country-level mechanisms, thematic reviews, and operational aspects of the UNSMS compliance system. He also stressed the need to consider existing efforts by individual UNSMS organizations and proposed consultations with interested colleagues to identify what is required and define issues for consideration by the Steering Group. Additionally, the SPS representative mentioned the reinforcement of CEMS capacities to address compliance vulnerabilities.

41. **The IASMN:**
   - **Took note of recommendations from the audit report.**
   - **Requested to have a comprehensive discussion at the next Steering Group meeting on the way forward in response to the recommendations made by OIOS.**
   - **Requested that interested parties meet with UNDSS/SPS before the next Steering Group meeting to discuss ideas.**

Strategic Communications Working Group

42. The chair of the Strategic Communications Working Group (SCWG) provided a briefing to the IASMN regarding the efforts of the SCWG (**CRP 5**). She discussed the Security Week initiative held in the last quarter of the previous year, providing details on the virtual and in-person events, as well as the extensive engagement across the UN system. The SCWG chair highlighted the success of the online events, with over 3,500 attendees from 110 countries, and positive feedback from participants. She also mentioned the diverse activities held in field offices and headquarters worldwide, including panel discussions, demonstrations, and exhibitions. The SCWG chair emphasized the coordination efforts in developing over 45 products to ensure consistency throughout Security Week. She expressed gratitude for the collaboration among organizations and outlined plans for future Security Weeks, including increased field involvement and better advance planning for materials and engagement with colleagues across

the globe. The SCWG chair emphasized the need for increased involvement of UNSMS organizations in future Security Weeks to diversify perspectives. She underscored the importance of sustainability for the initiative, highlighting the necessity of a resourcing mechanism and the identification of a target audience. The SCWG chair discussed the revamping of the UNSMS Hub, which now serves as a repository for UNSMS communications output, and the production of an animated video focusing on collaboration and decision-making within the UNSMS.

43. The UNDSS/SPS communications representative and co-chair of the working group, outlined the goals for the group in 2024. She proposed scheduling the next Security Week for the first week of November 2024 and considered linking it to the Security Symposium in subsequent years. Addressing the sustainability of the initiative, the SCWG chair requested broader engagement and support from all participating organizations.

44. Concerning the **content of Security Week**, the OHCHR representative proposed the inclusion of achievements from various agencies during connecting events, emphasizing the importance of showcasing successful missions and accomplishments, such as accessing areas and gaining community acceptance. He suggested that sharing experiences between programme managers and decision-makers could enhance awareness of security's utility within the United Nations. The representative recommended that UNSMS organizations share stories and achievements before events, with selected ones being highlighted during the event and subsequently published widely, thus making the event more effective and useful from a marketing perspective. The UNFPA representative discussed the need for embedding communications on security life-saving interventions in United Nations communications, referencing past examples like Iraq. He suggested a need for clearer timelines and communication of life-saving interventions. He noted the importance of resources and engagement with United Nations entities to enhance security communication and enable life-saving activities effectively.

45. The UN Women representative voiced full support for all the recommendations presented, noting that the current **funding** model may not be sustainable and suggesting exploring alternative mechanisms, such as the JFA. The UNDP representative raised questions regarding the requests for resources and funding, expressing a need for further clarification on the specifics of these requests. The IOM representative stressed the importance of deciding who will finance the production of necessary products, noting that IOM contributed financially to the production of a video for Security Week and emphasizing the need to highlight such contributions. The WIPO representative emphasized his opposition to funding the working group as it currently stands, suggesting that any decision regarding funding should involve a discussion about the strategic communication element and how it aligns with the goals of the IASMN.

46. The UNHCR representative emphasized the need to increase **participation** further, particularly considering the larger target audience for security awareness. She highlighted the importance of engaging all field personnel in security initiatives and suggested focusing Security Week primarily on UNSMS personnel to enhance internal understanding and support. The

representative expressed concerns about limited resources and the need to reprioritize within agencies like UNHCR, noting the challenges of allocating additional resources. She reiterated her commitment to ensuring ongoing engagement and advocated for synchronized messaging across various working groups to address resource constraints and messaging consistency. The WIPO representative noted that the event reached only two per cent of the United Nations personnel and highlighted the need for strategic communication efforts throughout the year on various United Nations topics instead of adding more security-focused days. The IOM representative acknowledged the contributions made by various organizations towards communication efforts, highlighting that IOM conducted 20 events during Security Week. He further noted that the events primarily targeted security personnel and therefore advocated for targeting field personnel and decision-makers to enhance the culture of security. He added that working groups should not be funded directly. The UNDSS strategic communications representative expressed satisfaction with the success of Security Week, noting the significance of introducing the UNSMS to a wider audience for the first time. She acknowledged that while the turnout might not have been as high as desired, the event facilitated collaboration and the creation of useful products. The representative emphasized the importance of having established the UNSMS and highlighted the creation of the UNSMS website as a notable achievement.

47. Concerning the **periodicity of Security Week**, the UNDP representative indicated that November did not align well with UNDP's schedule. The UNICEF representative emphasized the importance of considering quality versus quantity when organizing Security Week, suggesting that it might be more strategic to hold it every second year to maximize its impact with limited resources. He also highlighted the need to target decision makers as the audience for Security Week, rather than staff members or externals, as they play a crucial role in addressing weaknesses in decision making related to security matters. Additionally, the representative mentioned the significance of integrating the annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel l (A/78/369) into the communication strategy to inform readers about the UNSMS's functions and initiatives. The IOM representative expressed a preference for holding Security Week every two years to ensure the effort is managed effectively and suggested discussing the required projects and associated costs to determine feasible contributions from participating organizations.

48. The SCWG chair emphasized the importance of increasing participation from additional agencies in the working group to enrich its efforts. She highlighted the need for sustainable funding mechanisms to support the group's work, as the current volunteer-based approach proved stressful and unsustainable. The SCWG chair suggested exploring options like formal leadership roles or contracting graphic design work to ensure continuity and prevent disruptions in future projects. Regarding the frequency of Security Week, she acknowledged the possibility of considering a longer timeline and emphasized the importance of field engagement and targeting internal decision-makers for future initiatives. She noted the importance of building expertise within the team initially and then rolling out the project gradually over time.

49. The USG UNDSS sought clarification regarding the funding aspects, particularly in understanding the purpose of the funding and the estimated amount needed to sustain the efforts. He emphasized the importance of having a clear understanding of the financial requirements to ensure effective support for their initiatives. The SCWG chair suggested the possibility of having someone dedicated to leading Security Week and overseeing communications for the UNSMS. This could either involve hiring a consultant for a few months leading up to Security Week or creating a formal position for this role to ensure continuity and expertise in organizing the event. She expressed openness to considering other suggestions regarding the structure and staffing of Security Week.

50. USG UNDSS emphasized the importance of proactive communication regarding security measures within the community. He highlighted the need for the United Nations to share its successes globally instead of waiting for crises to occur, which often leads to a defensive stance. He summarized the discussion indicated that the focus was on quality over quantity, especially as they look toward the next iteration in 2025. He also indicated there was a discussion about targeting decision-makers – including DOs, SMT members, and heads of AFPs - to raise awareness about security issues and amplifying leadership's message. Additionally, the USG UNDSS sought input on existing mechanisms and events where security could be discussed and engaged the group in considering opportunities to enhance awareness. Finally, he suggested rethinking and adjusting plans for future events rather than replicating previous approaches.

51. **The IASMN:**
    - **Recognized the work completed to date, notably Security Week 2023 and the Animated Video Sequel.**
    - **Recommended that the Working Group further discuss the direction on strategic communications, including potential events, timing and more detailed resource requirements for consideration by the Steering Group.**
    - **Recommended that decision-makers be the target audience for the next Security Week.**
    - **Recommended that the Security Week be convened biennially, with the next Security Week taking place in 2025.**

HR Strategy

Mobility Exercise

52. UNDSS / Executive Office representative provided a comprehensive overview of the new mobility exercise initiated by the Secretariat on January 1st, which applies to all categories of staff on an annual basis. The exercise, led by the Office of Human Resources of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, is also decentralized to department heads.

53. The representative explained that the eligibility criteria require participants to hold fixed-term, permanent or continuing appointments, thereby excluding those on temporary arrangements and non-staff members. Participants must have also gone through the Central Review Board (CRB). However, many staff members, particularly those in peacekeeping missions, may not have gone through such reviews. Additionally, staff members with less than five years until

retirement cannot participate, posing challenges for UNDSS as   a significant portion of staff nearing retirement are not considered eligible for the UN Secretariat's mobility exercise.

54. The Executive Office representative indicated the mobility process is characterized by rigorous screening mechanisms and eligibility assessments conducted at the departmental level. Staff participation is contingent upon voluntary expression of interest, which introduces a degree of fluidity but also engenders challenges, as withdrawals can disrupt finalized placements. The exercise is further complicated by visa denials from some host countries, which can precipitate chain reactions, adversely affecting multiple staff members.

55. She also indicated lessons are being learned from this mobility exercise, with financial impacts and future mandatory mobility for new recruits. She explained the Secretariat has moved towards mandatory mobility for new recruits, integrating it into job openings and appointment letters.

56. The UNFPA representative raised questions regarding the nature of the mandate, particularly in relation to the HR model and deployment practices. He queried potential solutions to deployment delays, noting observations of other Secretariat entities that appear to navigate mobility and deploy personnel within existing frameworks. The representative enquired about the Secretary-General's authority to mandate and deploy personnel across Secretariat entities. He sought clarity on the processes involved in job assignments and deployments, underscoring the need for transparency and understanding regarding the Secretary-General's prerogatives in staffing matters.

57. The UNICEF representative underscored the importance of mobility, not only for the Secretariat but also for the broader workforce and international collaborations, citing its role in facilitating ideas exchange. He discussed the Secretary-General's authority to deploy personnel and proposed parallels with UNICEF and UNDP's mobility models under common UN staff rules. The representative also questioned exclusion criteria regarding staff near retirement and those lacking CRB clearance, advocating for a deadline to encourage staff engagement and prevent indefinite delays in the mobility process. The UNDP representative emphasized the necessity of effective communication and collaboration among Secretariat contacts and external partners to address these issues and facilitate greater mobility. The IOM representative discussed the experience of staff mobility within his organization, emphasizing its positive impact despite challenges. He noted the difficulty of matching personnel with appropriate positions, especially in a limited workforce, and advocated for broader consultation within the HR network to address these issues comprehensively.

58. The Executive Office Representative discussed the various avenues available for staff mobility within the Secretariat, highlighting the authority of the heads of department to laterally reassign personnel based on operational exigencies. She emphasized that the Secretary-General had delegated the authority to USG DSS on lateral movements of security personnel across field missions, and between UNDSS and field missions. In such cases, the Department collaborates with the senior leadership of the field missions on lateral movements. The representative addressed concerns regarding staff mobility and clarified the distinctions between UN

Secretariat mobility exercise and UNDSS' managed reassignment programs. She mentioned the potential for another round of the General Job Opening campaign for P-3 to P-5, which would give further opportunities for CRB clearance.

59. The DPPA representative sought clarification on the authority regarding personnel contracts within missions, particularly focusing on Field Service personnel. He noted that the authority typically rests with the head of the mission. Additionally, he inquired about whether UNDSS considers the mobility of security personnel with mission contracts as part of its security officers' mobility or if it remains separate for HR purposes. The Executive Office representative clarified the delegation of authority to USG UNDSS for security personnel in the sense that the USG UNDSS has delegation authority over UNDSS personnel, whereas the Heads of Missions have authority over security personnel on mission contracts. The Executive Office described the mechanisms for consultation within missions. Finally, she mentioned the ongoing drafting of the Secretary-General's Bulletin to formalize the authority for moving personnel across missions and within UNDSS. DPPA representative suggested consultations should take place with departments overseeing field missions and relevant Secretariat entities during the development of the document.

60. USG UNDSS mentioned the challenges associated with exercising delegated authority for lateral transfers based on operational exigencies. He emphasized the importance of staff members' willingness to relocate to avoid disruptions and ensure effective operational management.

HR Strategy Working Group

61. The Executive Office representative discussed the extensive consultations undertaken for the common roster exercise, highlighting the collaboration within the working group and among participating entities (**CRP 5**). She noted that out of the nine participating entities, four have not yet signed the MoU for the Mutual Recognition of Rosters (MRR), which impedes their participation. She underscored ongoing efforts by the Office of Human Resources to engage with these organizations and facilitate their participation. As of the present, only five entities are eligible to participate in the common roster exercise.

62. Additionally, the representative provided insights into the estimated costs associated with various phases of the exercise, including outreach, screening, testing, and logistics. She emphasized the need for dedicated capacity to manage the process efficiently and the importance of funding support for timely completion. Additionally, the representative raised concerns about the recurring expenditure for maintaining rosters in the platform.

63. The UNDP representative stated that his organization did not support sharing the costs of the common roster and suggested that only the participating agencies should bear the expenses.

64. The UNHCR representative expressed interest in the shared roster and its operation, mentioning her organization's status as a signatory to the UNMRR. However, she indicated that UNHCR is currently not interested in the common roster due to downsizing security positions and a freeze on their own external recruitment.

65. The IOM representative expressed agreement with the idea that organizations interested in participating should fund the common roster, rather than adding the costs to the JFA. He shared positive news about the signed copy of their MoU, indicating their interest in participating in the UNMRR and leveraging the shared roster.

66. The FAO representative stated that his organization is one of the four organizations which have not signed the MRR yet, and due to internal HR changes, the director has discontinued the use of rosters. Consequently, the organization cannot select and appoint candidates from these rosters, seeing no benefit in signing the UNMRR at present. However, they may reconsider their position on roster use if HR rules change under future management.

67. The WHO representative also indicated that WHO is one of the four organizations which have not signed the MoU for UNMRR yet. However, there have been recent changes in their HR contract policies and modalities and WHO's participation in the common roster is currently under review by their HR team.

68. The UNICEF representative indicated that his organization would not support co-funding the common roster. He acknowledged the discrepancy between workforce improvement initiatives and the constraints imposed by existing HR policies and suggested redirecting the HR working group's focus towards workforce enhancement, separate from HR-regulated areas. He proposed initiatives like cross-fertilization and sabbaticals to foster collaboration and skill development beyond HR constraints.

69. The UNFPA representative highlighted the systematic issues hindering workforce mobility despite the efforts of the working group. He suggested exploring ways to support interagency mobility within existing constraints. The representative emphasized the need to streamline processes related to candidate selection and contract issuance to improve efficiency and expressed support for broader initiatives aimed at enriching the workforce's exposure and experience.

70. The IOM representative mentioned his experience with a reimbursable loan agreement to allow security personnel to gain experience in another UNSMS organization. He also emphasized the need for the HR Network to reconsider obstacles and enable easier movement of personnel.

71. The UNRWA representative emphasized the importance of cross-fertilization and urged UNDSS to consider longer-term staff exchanges beyond six months, suggesting periods of one or two years. He shared his positive experience of sending staff to UNDSS and underscored the need for cooperation between agencies regarding staff exchanges. The representative encouraged collaboration among various UNSMS organizations to enhance capacity of personnel, echoing sentiments from UNICEF's discussion on cross-fertilization and skill development.

72. The UNICEF representative commented on the potential for re-framing rules and regulations regarding staffing. He proposed focusing on on-the-job training and opportunities for cross-fertilization. The representative recommended exploring mechanisms that don't rely on self-selection, promoting a more inclusive and equitable approach to workforce development within the UNSMS.

73. The Executive Office representative discussed various avenues for workforce mobility and enrichment, including surge arrangements for temporary job openings in the field. She proposed exploring non-reimbursable loans among UNSMS organizations for staff exchanges and explained the simplified process and benefits of such loans, emphasizing their feasibility within the United Nations system within the existing framework of inter-agency agreement. She welcomed further discussion within the working group to explore additional mechanisms for workforce enhancement. The USG UNDSS emphasized the importance of finding mechanisms outside traditional HR rules to expose the workforce to diverse experiences for development purposes. The objective is to ensure that desk officers gain field experience and vice versa, contributing to a well-rounded skill set. The USG encouraged further exploration of these ideas and solicited input on managing the working group and implementing such initiatives.

74. **The IASMN:**
    - **Did not endorse the proposed expenditures for the Common Roster Exercise and decided not to pursue the Common Roster Exercise.**
    - **Recommended that the Working Group explore professional development opportunities for security personnel outside of the staff selection process.**

Policy Update

75. Representatives of the Strategic Partnerships and Policy Section (SPPS) of UNDSS delivered the policy update (**CRP 12**), noting that two sets of documents, one on the warden system and one on road safety, were being presented for the IASMN's endorsement. SPPS highlighted that the warden guidelines, spearheaded by the Policy Review Group, offer flexible guidance for varying field situations. The representative added that these guidelines had been requested by field colleagues and would be helpful in addressing frequent queries from security personnel. In addition, she noted that two documents on road safety (the updated policy and a road taxonomy of road crashes, for addition to the Security Management Operations Manual) were being presented for endorsement as well.

76. SPPS also discussed efforts to broaden the scope of the travel clearance policy, which were initiated in 2019. This expansion of scope aims to enhance the management of UNSMS personnel and their families' security information, moving beyond travel clearances to record their presence at various locations. The Policy Review Group was seeking endorsement to proceed with this initiative in close consultation with subject matter experts, including ICT professionals.

Warden Guidelines

77. In the discussion that followed, the UNRWA representative highlighted a need for clarity regarding the source of warden appointment letters, noting confusion over whether they should be issued by the UNSMS organization itself or the DO. The DPPA representative echoed the concern, pointing out a shift from previous practices where wardens were appointed by the DO to the new approach allowing appointments by either the heads of offices or the DO. He suggested simplifying the process by having wardens geographically appointed by the DO and

those related to specific UNSMS organizations by the organizations themselves, and suggested that the issue of rewards for wardens, after the removal of Compensatory Time Off for this function, should be reconsidered. SPPS noted that the guidelines provided for flexibility on the issue of rewards for wardens, but agreed the HR Network could be consulted on how this could be operationalized.

78. The UNICEF representative praised the document's overall quality and suggested that if members had minor language changes, these should be submitted via track changes for review by the next day so they could be addressed without further delaying the document. The representative then commented on the topic of compensation for wardens, which had been extensively discussed. He stated that, in his view, there was a consensus among UNSMS organizations that issues of motivation should not be resolved at this level and advocated for excluding compensation from the document.

79. The UN Women representative suggested that, whenever possible, modern technology be used to facilitate the implementation of the warden system. He expressed concerns about ambiguity and potential misinterpretation in security policies at the country level, specifically regarding who has the authority to sign off on decisions. The representative highlighted the issues arising from unclear rules, functions, and reporting lines within the security management system, arguing that such decisions should not be left to individual countries due to the risk of disputes.

80. The WFP representative suggested the importance of considering lessons learned to evaluate the effectiveness of current practices and indicated that despite the challenges, there was a need to provide clear guidance as requested.

81. The UNFPA representative highlighted that paragraph 10 offered sufficient clarity on roles. He noted the tendency towards excessive emphasis on accountability, arguing that the focus should not be overly placed on who is appointed to specific roles, as accountability ultimately resides with the representative at each level. He suggested that internal compliance issues arise when individuals do not feel accountable due to a lack of formal appointment and endorsed UNICEF's recommendation to progress with the document, urging that any substantive feedback should be provided by the next day.

Road Safety

82. On road safety, members agreed to endorse the technical changes and taxonomy, as an addition to the Security Management Operations Manual (SMOM) guidelines, without further debate.

Personal Security Profile / Travel Clearance Policy

83. Members discussed the proposed direction for the travel clearance policy. The UNDSS/DFO representative observed that the policy in question had undergone multiple changes in direction, reconceptualization, and rebranding in the last six years, and raised concerns about potential non-compliance if the policy's scope was overly expansive. He suggested initially introducing it in high-threat areas.

84. The UNICEF representative clarified that the policy discussion aimed to reconceptualize aspects of accountability. He explained the policy's goal is to maintain accountability for individuals in specific locations by ensuring all covered by the UNSMS fill out a profile with key information. This shift prioritizes understanding who is where, at all times, with travel updates serving as location changes. The representative suggested security clearances only be required only for high-threat locations to control or manage personnel numbers. He advocated for a personal security profile integrated with HR systems for efficiency.

85. The DPPA representative expressed concern about potential confusion among colleagues using the system if it's not adequately explained, stressing the importance of clear communication. The OCHA representative cautioned against delving too deeply into details since the policy is still being developed. He simplified the issue to knowing "who" and "where" individuals are, acknowledging that while the question is straightforward, the answer is complex due to the involvement of multiple organizations.

86. The UNODC representative supported the proposal but emphasized the importance of addressing detailed issues, including those related to consultants without UN email addresses, deletion of job profiles, and incorrect data in Umoja. He suggested deferring the detailed discussion but recommended thorough review with input from the group to address the everyday challenges faced. The UNOCT representative highlighted the necessity of modernizing data management systems to replace outdated methods.

87. The USG agreed there was consensus on the need to change the approach to data management, particularly to enhance accountability and the ability to know who is present in a country at any given time. The USG acknowledged the importance of focusing on high-risk countries and the potential for natural hazards or crises. He noted that DPSS's work on utilizing technology for staff lists would assist with these efforts.

88. **The IASMN:**
   - **Recommended the endorsement of the Guidelines on Warden System, which will be circulated for endorsement via silent procedure after inputs are considered.**
   - **Supported the broadening of scope and reconceptualization of the Security Clearance Policy to comprise UNSMS personnel information management in consultation with related subject-matter experts.**
   - **Endorsed editorial changes in the Road Safety Policy.**
   - **Endorsed the addition of the taxonomy annex to the SMOM.**

UNSMS Membership and Security Symposium

89. UNDSS/DPSS/SPPU representatives briefed on the CRP on UNSMS membership and the Security Symposium (**CRP 6**). The representative briefly reviewed discussions on UNSMS membership, highlighting historical interest from non-UN organizations in joining the UNSMS and the reiterated need for clear membership criteria. This was particularly relevant to requests from the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB). The last Steering Group meeting emphasized the importance of establishing consistent criteria

for membership, which could be communicated to non-UN organizations during the security symposium to manage expectations.

90. The SPPU representative provided an update on the security symposium, noting feedback from the IASMN steering group regarding location and themes had been considered. Scheduled for Monday, 24 June in Geneva at the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), right before the IASMN's 40th session in Montreux, the symposium will be co-hosted by the AIIB and will focus on the challenges and opportunities of generative AI and innovation in security risk management. Proposed sessions include discussions on the global security environment, innovation in global security, the application and potential misuse of AI in security management, cybersecurity impacts on international organizations, and road safety, aligning with the UN road safety strategy. Potential speakers from various organizations like the Gates Foundation and Interpol were being considered, though arrangements were still tentative, and feedback on topics and speakers was welcomed.

UNSMS Membership

91. The USG noted that two issues needed to be discussed vis-à-vis membership: the need to develop criteria for membership as well as on the specific applications to join from AIIB and IsDB. In the plenary discussion, the OCHA representative questioned the need to extend UNSMS membership beyond United Nations organizations and their subsidiary organs and raised concerns about the capacity to meet requirements for additional organizations not aligned with United Nations operations. He queried whether the MoUs that UNDSS had signed with AIIB and IsDB would have an impact on the UNSMS.

92. The UNDP representative noted that the criteria discussed for membership were straightforward, focusing on whether organizations are United Nations organizations or affiliates. He mentioned the symposium's role in liaising with non-UNSMS organizations, emphasizing that membership criteria are essentially limited to organizations under the Secretary-General's authority. On the MoUs with AIIB and IsDB, he noted the concern on whether JFA resources, that could otherwise support UNSMS organizations, were used to support non-UNSMS entities.

93. The UNICEF representative emphasized the necessity of attaching the IASMN Steering Group report to CRP 1 as an annex, for better reference and transparency. He noted that the discussion should be framed about expanding membership in general, not about specific entities such as the AIIB or IsDB. This was a matter of eligibility based on specific criteria, recalling that the criterion discussed previously was affiliation with the United Nations, as defined by the Office of Legal Affairs. The representative also noted the potential for raised expectations among organizations viewing the Symposium as an opportunity to join the UNSMS and stressed the importance of managing these expectations effectively. He highlighted the points discussed in the Steering Group on the matter, including that no JFA funds should be spent for implementing the MoUs with AIIB and IsDB, that there should be no inclusion of personnel from these entities in UNSMS training without consultation with UNSMS organizations also involved and that no UNSMS organizational personnel or programme information would be shared with non-UNSMS organizations.

94. The UNOPS representative supported the positions of UNICEF and UNDP, emphasizing that membership should align with the higher organs to which they report, such as the HLCM and Chief Executives Board (CEB). The FAO representative also emphasized the need for consistency in the discussions about UNSMS membership, noting that the majority of Steering Group members advocated against expanding membership beyond UN organizations.

95. The UNFPA representative highlighted the primary concern regarding UNSMS membership expansion was the system's capacity to incorporate new entities. He supported maintaining the current approach to membership and suggested the Symposium continue to be a means to bridge gaps and share information without expanding UNSMS membership.

96. The IOM representative proposed that developing and adhering to clear criteria could prevent recurring debates and manage expectations effectively. He noted the importance of partnership and information sharing through existing mechanisms, like the Saving Lives Together mechanism, where appropriate, without incurring additional costs.

97. The ADB representative highlighted the potential contributions of organizations like the African Development Bank (AfDB) and IsDB, expressing concern over the optics of refusing membership to these entities.

98. The USG suggested bringing the issue to the HLCM for endorsement due to its strategic implications, particularly concerning AIIB and IsDB, as well as the AfDB, which had also expressed interest in membership. He suggested that this would ensure a unified stance across all organizations. Regarding the MOUs with AIIB and IsDB, the USG noted they were signed in the spirit of the Saving Lives Together mechanism and were aimed at managing expectations without overextending UNDSS resources.

99. The UNICEF representative highlighted the importance of maintaining the original function of the UNSMS and ensuring that members are accountable to the Secretary-General. He also mentioned the potential risks involved when UNSMS organizations act independently, particularly in relation to faith-based organizations or host governments. He suggested that a submission to the HLCM should involve collective input from all relevant parties. Lastly, the representative expressed concerns about information sharing, citing a previous issue with ICC as an example of the complexities involved in sharing information with external entities.

100. The OCHA representative argued that the burden of proof for inclusion in the UNSMS should not be on those resisting expansion but on the entities seeking membership. He noted that financial contributions do not justify membership, highlighting the fundamental differences in mandates and the lack of compatibility with UNSMS criteria.

101. The UNOCT representative echoed the need for precise articulation in presenting the case to the HLCM and emphasized that the issue was not a simple yes-or-no decision but a matter of compatibility with the essence of the IASMN. The WHO representative highlighted the importance of clarifying the IASMN's position and the existing criteria for UNSMS membership as outlined in the SPM, noting the inclusion of related organizations through MOUs.

102. The OCHA representative expressed concern over the consistency of membership criteria, emphasizing a reluctance to expel long-standing members but cautioning against using consistency as a rationale to admit new non-UN organizations. The IAEA representative highlighted the need to focus on fair criteria for membership, rather than deliberating over individual organizations' eligibility. He emphasized that the discussion should centre on establishing clear criteria to guide decisions on membership.

103. The USG highlighted the critical need for a collective and well-articulated position on UNSMS membership in consultation with OLA for the HLCM's consideration. He underscored that, while he heard and understood the concerns raised, he believed that the current consensus against expansion might be strategically misguided. He pointed out that UNDSS faces significant operational challenges, which he acknowledged as valid reasons for caution against increasing membership. However, he emphasized the potential missed opportunity in rejecting new members and suggested that, strategically, this could be the wrong direction. He noted that there was support from the highest levels of the United Nations for extending membership to the organizations discussed and advocated for drafting a detailed rationale to submit to the HLCM. He stressed the importance of presenting a unified stance and committed to ensuring that arguments would be thoroughly documented and circulated.

Security Symposium

104. The USG requested members to volunteer further topics for the Security Symposium, in addition to those introduced by Ms. Cardon earlier in the session. The UNFPA representative suggested considering topics that would interest entities outside the immediate scope, emphasizing the importance of diversity in participation and proposing the inclusion of Resident Coordinators from complex duty stations to share their experiences. He recommended further development of the agenda to ensure relevance and utility for participants.

105. Ms. Cardon shared a list of five proposed topics in the chat for easier access, inviting feedback and speaker suggestions by the end of the week to begin outreach. She emphasized choosing Geneva, Switzerland, for the symposium to facilitate in-person attendance, noting the challenges of travel to the previous year's location in Jeddah.

106. The UNOCT representative advocated for ensuring symposium discussions are relevant to the IASMN and its organizations, cautioning against topics that, while interesting, may not directly relate to field issues. He supported UNFPA's idea of involving Resident Coordinators and DOs to focus on practical challenges and solutions in the field.

107. The UNHCR representative suggested establishing common positions on information security before the symposium and noted her organization's efforts in data protection and information security management. She also supported focusing on road safety, highlighting WHO's leadership and the potential for broader collaboration.

108. The UNICEF representative appreciated UNDSS's decision to relocate the symposium for better in-person engagement and echoed the need for the symposium to add value through fundamental security discussions. He suggested the creation of a symposium planning group

involving UNDSS, IASMN members and external participating organizations to foster ownership and engagement. The representative also discussed logistical arrangements for traveling to Montreux and proposed inviting a wider range of participants to ensure a diverse discussion. He advocated for less formal, roundtable discussions to maintain an open and interactive atmosphere at the symposium.

109. The UNRWA representative advocated for a meeting between IASMN, UNDSS, and symposium planners to ensure discussions align with the expertise and comfort levels of participants, especially regarding topics like information security which might not fall directly within everyone's remit.

110. The OPCW representative recommended adding a topic on the integration of digital and physical security to cover cybersecurity and explore ways to blend these aspects effectively, suggesting it as an interesting area for discussion.

111. The USG expressed appreciation for the contributions and noted that the Secretariat would organize a meeting the following week to refine the symposium topics, address concerns, plan logistics and to proceed with preparations[3].

112. The IASMN:
- **Endorsed the recommendation to not extend UNSMS membership to non-UN entities.**
- **Requested the IASMN Secretariat to summarize inputs from the discussion on UNSMS membership, informed by OLA considerations, to be circulated to IASMN members for endorsement ahead of submission to the HLCM.**
- **Took note of the update on the 2024 Security Symposium and requested that a meeting with IASMN members be held to discuss topics for the event during the week of 19 February 2024.**
- **Requested that IASMN Steering Group reports be appended as an annex to future IASMN sessions.**

UNSMS Functionality
Retreat and Way Forward

113. UNDSS/DPSS/SPPU, presented the CRP on the UNSMS Functionality. She summarized some of the points discussed by the IASMN on the topic, which include clarifying roles and responsibilities, enhancing internal and external strategic communications, facilitating greater inclusion in workshops and joint missions, strengthening efforts to reduce the policy-practice gap, and enhancing emerging threat analysis. She added that the last IASMN Steering Group discussed the idea of convening a retreat potentially with the support of an external facilitator.

114. The DPPA, UNHCR and WFP representatives supported having focused **quarterly meetings** on operational issues with DFO and DPSS and additionally a full day session to take stock of key operations, lessons learned and what needs to change. The UNDP representative indicated that

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[3] A dedicated virtual meeting for this discussion was convened on 21 February 2024.

having quarterly meetings with the DFO Director would solve many functionality issues and that the retreat should not replace the proposal of having these meetings. He and the DPO representative suggested convening the retreat only in case the meetings with DFO do not present the desired outcomes. The USG confirmed that there is a commitment to have regular meetings with the DFO and DPSS Directors and noted that convening a retreat would not prevent such meetings from happening.

115. The UNRWA representative proposed having **regional retreats** with Security Focal Points instead of a global retreat. The USG noted the need to be mindful of the costs of regional retreats and travels. The UNRWA representative clarified that some Security Focal Points with a global footprint may already have planned visits to specific regions, and that a retreat could be integrated to such visits. The DPPA representative pointed out that this could be achieved through participation in UNDSS' regional workshops.

116. The WFP representative welcomed having strategic and longer-term discussions, including information management within the IASMN. She supported the proposal of having a retreat, which could also be convened virtually, to focus on structural issues. The UNICEF representative appreciated the initiative of having breakout group discussions on the UNSMS functionality and noted that some of the identified issues still need to be discussed. He stressed that conceptual discussions should take place and mentioned that the main issue with the UNSMS' design is the decision-making role of the DO to prevent security issues from happening instead of enabling operations within acceptable levels of risk. He reflected that one of the problems is when decision makers pay less of a price when they are wrong in one way, no matter what price other people pay (i.e., the DO could pay a price for a security failure but not for lack of enabling – only the mandated organization is accountable).

117. The OCHA representative expressed concern about retreats that do not lead to a conclusion. He suggested that the IASMN should first identify key problems to be discussed. The UNOCT representative suggested having lighter agendas at the IASMN and suggested having more discussion groups at the next IASMN. The UNFPA representative pointed out some of the conclusions that emerged from the break-out groups' discussions at the 38th IASMN session, including expanding collaboration and invitation to UNDSS workshops. He explained that the UNSMS functionality should be focused on what is fit for purpose and what are the inhibiting factors that do not allow the system to be more agile. The IOM representative supported a discussion on the fitness for purpose of the UNSMS and noted that a communications strategy may help fight the issue of "survey fatigue". He summarized some of the quick wins on UNSMS functionality, which include invitations to UNDSS workshops, joint security support missions in the field, and the strengthening of communication between the IASMN and the DFO and DPSS.

118. The USG noted that structural engagements with DFO and DPSS can address some of the issues but the notion of fit for purpose raises valid points to be discussed separately. He highlighted that there has been a change in philosophy in the system, around the notion of "stay and deliver", and that this might be a good moment to discuss if the UNSMS is still fit for purpose. He

suggested that a survey be carried out of DOs and field operators on the UNSMS and its policies, to understand if the system is supporting them and helping enable operations.

119. The UNICEF representative agreed with the proposal from the USG and appreciated the suggestion to consult IASMN members on the survey questions. He added that it would be helpful to have a discussion on redesigning the format of the Wednesday VTC meetings to include early warning points, as well as to extend invitations to the UNDSS regional workshops. The UNDSS/DFO representative expressed openness to discussing ways of improving the Wednesday VTCs, as well as the establishment of the regular operational and policy meetings. He suggested dedicating one day of the next IASMN on decisions and another day on thinking through key issues.

120. The WFP representative supported the USG' proposal and indicated that the target audience of the survey should be broader that just DO's and SMT members. The UNDP representative supported the way forward but stressed that the IASMN should not be limited by the results of the survey, noting that heads of agencies should also be consulted. The UNHCR representative supported the review and broadening the scope of the survey's audience. The UNRWA representative noted that there is a risk that the survey is misinterpreted by those without specific training. He suggested implementing a blended methodology and indicated that the survey could be composed of questionnaires and phone interviews with colleagues in areas with different levels of risk.

121. The OHCHR representative suggested consulting humanitarian coordinators and deputies in countries to get an overall view on programme delivery efficiency, which reflects the level of support provided by the United Nations security apparatus in country. Regarding the questions for the survey, he suggested that they should be related to UNSMS policies and how they are applied by security professionals on the ground.

122. The DPPA representative supported the idea of the survey but noted that the methodology should be diverse. He stressed that hiring a company or a consultant might be a good idea but noted that the substance should come from the IASMN. The representative added that the survey should be expanded to senior managers from Special Political Missions.

123. The USG stressed the importance of including Heads of AFPs to ensure that the specific agency perspective is captured. He suggested that a company or external consulted is hired to help frame the questions for the survey in an unbiased way and asked for colleagues' feedback on the format and support in identifying options for this purpose, noting that finalising this process would take time.

124. The IASMN:
- **Expressed support for quarterly engagement with the Directors of DFO and DPSS on operational issues.**
- **Recommended gathering inputs on UNSMS functionality ("fit for purpose"), including through a survey, with questions to be coordinated with IASMN members.**

- **For its next IASMN session, recommended that the Secretariat streamline the agenda and ensure sufficient time for substantial discussions.**

Training

125. The representative of the Training Development Section (TDS) of UNDSS presented an update (**CRP 9**), emphasizing the collaborative efforts with various UNDSS entities and UNSMS Secretariat, including increased collaboration with OHR learning entities. He also mentioned outreach to OCHA for developing a course on security and humanitarian action.

126. Regarding the development of learning priorities for 2023, the TDS representative mentioned the revamping of the Security Certification Programme, with the first four modules launched in June 2023 and completed by October. He noted that online training for UNSMS Organization Country Security Focal Points has been completed and launched. Collaborative efforts with the World Food Program to empower bystanders in cases of sexual harassment and sexual exploitation and abuse are underway and a pilot for online training for security decision-makers was conducted in February.

127. The TDS representative also addressed the training needs analysis, which involved administrative delays but has progressed with the selection of a vendor. He updated participants on the provisional training calendar for 2024, pending approval from the Security Training Governance and Prioritization Mechanism. The proposed calendar includes various courses offered by TDS, with plans to schedule 26 courses for Field Security Associates (FSAs). Furthermore, he outlined development priorities for 2024, including training on crisis management, updates to the "BSAFE" program, and initiatives in security and humanitarian action. Lastly, the TDS representative highlighted challenges with the SCOLT Chairs' recent resignation and reiterated the need for a consolidated view from the SCOLT on training and development issues. Requests for access to training data from various organizations have been ongoing, prompting the need for a more comprehensive solution.

Training Issues and Training Needs Assessment

128. The UNODC representative expressed appreciation for the implementation of the organization country security focal point training, acknowledging its significance and long-awaited arrival since mid-January. He also commended the regular updates to the training calendar and raised a concern about the fragmented delivery of SSAFE training across various entities within the organization. He proposed having a centralized platform, possibly under UNSMIN, where all SSAFE training sessions could be listed. The UNODC representative also expressed the need for a streamlined process to monitor compliance with mandatory trainings such as SMT training and SRM for decision makers. He mentioned ongoing initiatives regarding road safety training within UN entities and suggested collaboration to avoid duplication of efforts.

129. The UNOPS representative noted that UNOPS and WHO will be jointly facilitating SSAFE and Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) courses in Denmark in 2024, mainly targeting agencies at United Nations City in Copenhagen.

130. The WHO representative emphasized the need for improvements in the learning management platform, particularly regarding access to reports and user-friendliness. He highlighted the importance of agencies having access to reports for compliance purposes and the lack of access to generate reports.

131. The FAO representative confirmed the availability of SSAFE training in Italy, with the calendar regularly shared. Additionally, he acknowledged the high participation in the Security Certification Programme and requested clarity on the on-the-job training phase following the completion of online modules.

132. The IOM representative questioned the prioritization of items listed in Annex B. He highlighted the exclusion of success stories like the IFAK 2.0 from the CRP and emphasized the need to consider input from UNSMS organizations in course development. The representative also noted concerns about the publication of the 2024 security training calendar without the input from UNSMS organizations and emphasized the importance of quality over quantity in training initiatives. He noted the need to invest more resources internally for training and acknowledged positive collaboration with TDS.

133. The UNHCR representative raised concerns about courses being rolled out without considering all inputs and the challenges faced in providing feedback at short notice. She addressed various points related to the rollout of the Security Certification Programme, emphasizing the need for accurate materials and reflection of fundamental elements in training courses, and sought clarification in particular on Part 2 and 3. The representative also discussed the involvement of the Gender and Inclusion Working Group in training initiatives and highlighted the importance of their input being considered as had been the earlier decision of the IASMN She raised questions about the target audience and clarity regarding proposed training courses and expressed interest in contributing to decision-maker training and road safety initiatives. Additionally, the representative mentioned concerns regarding the WSAT and emphasized the need to revitalize the SCOLT for effective security learning and training.

134. The UNDSS/DPSS Director mentioned the challenges faced due to the current lack of SCOLT chairs and emphasized the importance of TDS receiving input from the SCOLT to ensure that priorities are accurately reflected in proposed calendars and initiatives. She suggested exploring ways to gather this input efficiently. The Director stressed the importance of functional mechanisms within the SCOLT to facilitate effective collaboration.

135. The TDS representative emphasized the importance of carefully evaluating feedback for correctness and relevance, explaining that not all suggestions can be implemented verbatim due to considerations such as alignment with existing policies and the overall structure of the training curriculum. He highlighted the need for a balanced approach to incorporating feedback while ensuring the integrity and coherence of the training content. The TDS representative reiterated the complexities surrounding the identification of training priorities and the engagement with the SCOLT. Despite these challenges, he reiterated the commitment to working collaboratively to address training needs within the UNSMS. Regarding training responsibilities, the TDS representative underscored the limitations of TDS in delivering all necessary training within the

UNSMS and suggested the need for a coordinated effort among different entities to ensure comprehensive training coverage. He emphasized the importance of clarifying roles and responsibilities to optimize training delivery and effectiveness.

136. The UNFPA representative highlighted UNFPA's efforts to tailor training initiatives to its own structure and share them with other agencies, underscoring the need for effective feedback mechanisms to ensure stakeholders' inputs are adequately addressed.

137. The WFP representative acknowledged the challenges in allocating resources and guiding the process effectively as the co-chair. She announced that WFP will not serve as co-chair.

138. The UNRWA representative addressed the issue of the feedback loop and emphasized the importance of incorporating and acknowledging the feedback from UNSMS organizations. The UNDP representative suggested a more thorough discussion on how to enhance the system's functionality. He also emphasized the importance of collaboration and communication among colleagues to address training needs effectively, as well as the need to consider the feedback submitted.

139. The TDS representative expressed concerns about the lack of coordination and decision-making mechanisms regarding training priorities. He mentioned receiving numerous inputs last year and the need for a body to collate and prioritize them efficiently. He emphasized the importance of having structured decision-making authority for training and development priorities. He also highlighted challenges with feedback collection, noting that some feedback was not related or was duplicated, leading to delays in course development. The TDS representative suggested the need for a balance between engaging with feedback and avoiding multiple iterations that could impede training delivery.

140. USG UNDSS emphasized the continued necessity of the prioritization mechanism to manage the workload of TDS effectively. He highlighted that the mechanism allows for the prioritization of training requests based on the capabilities and resources available. The USG provided examples of how the mechanism helps in determining training needs, such as the requirement to increase training for DOs and SMT members after Sudan lessons learned. Additionally, the USG expressed the need for a discussion on how to revive and improve the prioritization mechanism to address current training priorities effectively.

SCOLT Chair Selection

141. The UNFPA representative proposed that TDS should take the lead as SCOLT chair, with support from other entities, in a manner similar to past practices where the head of the training unit served as chair. He emphasized the importance of this coordination function in bringing people together and ensuring continuity. The USG UNDSS expressed openness to exploring solutions, including to have DFO serve as the chair of SCOLT, which could facilitate discussions on deprioritizing training requirements and expedite decision-making processes.

142. The UNICEF representative highlighted the potential for dysfunction in certain areas and suggested that the perception of a division between UNDSS and other UNSMS organizations

might contribute to this issue. He supported the idea for TDS to chair the SCOLT, emphasizing that it could foster collaboration and break down barriers between different entities.

143. The DFO representative expressed his willingness to collaborate closely with TDS and the IASMN to ensure responsiveness to the needs of the agencies regarding the proposed role.

144. The following day, during the presentation of session outcomes, the ADB representative volunteered to be SCOLT Co-chair, which was approved by IASMN members.

Emergency Trauma Bag Review

145. On the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Section (CEMS) review of the emergency trauma bag (ETB) training, the TDS representative mentioned that recommendations have been implemented. These recommendations focused on gender and local context considerations, multiple language availability, and detailed reporting on the use of the emergency trauma bag and training. The material has been updated accordingly, including translations into Arabic, and reporting mechanisms have been strengthened.

146. The SPS representative gave a more detailed overview of the ETB assessment. He noted that the process was downgraded from an evaluation to a review as it did not meet the standards for an evaluation but suggested that its final report would still be useful. The IOM and UNDP representatives expressed disappointment over the report not addressing the effectiveness of ETB as an SRM measure or comparing it with alternatives and highlighted a lack of inclusion of their feedback in the report. The SPS representative agreed the report did not answer the core evaluation questions that had been expected and suggested the possibility of a new, joint evaluation with better processes in place.

147. The UNHCR and UNFPA representatives raised concerns about the relevance of ETB versus fundamental medical training like first aid (IFAK training) emphasizing the latter's importance for broader application. The UNFPA representative stressed the ETB's lack of cost-effectiveness and expressed support for wider use of the IFAK. The ADB representative noted the value of separating the bags themselves from the ETB / First Responder Training programme, emphasizing the latter's necessity in ensuring UNSMS personnel can fulfil their obligations in mass casualty incident management. usefulness in health emergencies. The OCHA representative agreed that ETB training could be useful but that, when it is an SRM measure, it was difficult to be compliant with it due to a shortage of training. In addition, he noted that the bags themselves often contained expired materials and that investing in IFAK training would be more practical.

148. Members agreed that a full-scale evaluation would not be required and agreed to leverage collective knowledge for a more informed approach rather than conducting another full-scale evaluation. The USG requested that SPS work with DPSS on a proposal for the way forward.

149. **The IASMN:**
   - **Took note of the training achievements detailed in the 2023 Annual Report on Training.**
   - **Took note of the anticipated training development priorities for 2024 and noted that these do not yet reflect inputs from the SCOLT; recommended that these be submitted as**

soon as possible to TDS for final endorsement of the training calendar by the Security Training Governance and Prioritization Mechanism.

- **Recommended that UNDSS chair the SCOLT, with support of ADB as co-chair.**
- **Recommended that TDS and SPS present an alternative approach to reviewing the effectiveness of the Emergency Trauma Bag training/First Responder Programme as an SRM measure at the next Steering Group meeting.**
- **Requested that the revised Security Learning and Training Policy be promulgated.**

Feedback Loop Results Chain

150. The ASG UNDSS presented the notion of Feedback Loop in the Results Chain (**CRP 2**). She noted that some ideas from the discussion on UNSMS functionality can also be considered as a feedback pathway. The ASG highlighted that the Results Chain is a system-wide initiative and not a product for UNDSS' use exclusively.

151. The ASG mentioned that the Results Chain Working Group was tasked with providing a scoping discussion paper on the feedback mechanism for the Results Chain, which also includes comments from the IASMN Steering Group. She explained that the scoping discussion paper summarizes the current status of the Results Chain metrics, which is finalized for 2023 and 2024 implementation. The ASG further noted that the Working Group is looking at the amendments to the metrics for 2025, which is one of the six ongoing activities to be undertaken by the Sub-working group of the Results Chain Working Group.

152. She indicated that the scoping discussion paper proposes that the feedback mechanism be maintained at the outcome level of the Results Chain, suggesting the identification of indicators that can be focused at the field and global levels. The ASG highlighted the suggestion to establish a new sub-working group to explore the development of the indicators, which would be led by the representative of UNDSS/ORU. The ASG concluded by noting that the implementation of the Results Chain is voluntary but highlighted that UNDSS has fully adopted it.

153. The OCHA representative noted that there has only been one Results Chain Working Group meeting since the last IASMN, where the group summarized and included the inputs from the IASMN Steering Group in the scoping discussion paper. He stressed that UNDSS, agencies and entities have worked on implementing the Results Chain, and concluded that the working group should continue with its meetings before providing any further guidance.

154. The USG summarized that the next step would be for the working group to continue to develop indicators as part of the feedback mechanism. He added that the scoping discussion paper should be adjusted according to the timeline and that the working group could provide an update at the next IASMN Steering Group. The WFP representative agreed with the proposal.

155. **The IASMN:**
- **Recommended that the Working Group prepare a mechanism for feedback, including indicators of progress against outcomes and outputs, and highlighting areas of concern at the activity level.**

Strategic Resource Allocation Update

156. The ORU representative explained that UNDSS is working on a system that will assist decision-making for strategic resource reallocation. He noted that UNDSS is developing a dashboard to enable data driven decision-making by providing quantitative indicators on a global scale covering a range of security-related aspects, including resource allocation and global readiness in countries. The ORU representative added that the aim is to have the dashboard as a central hub for visualizing UNDSS field resources and key security aspects, including process metrics and readiness across all country offices to understand the needs of UNDSS' programmes globally.

157. He explained that UNDSS will use existing data from UNSMIN to include security risk levels in countries, as well as external datasets and indicators of various risk criteria (e.g., humanitarian crisis, conflict and violence, and the risk of natural disasters occurring). The ORU representative indicated that the dashboard should display curated scores, indicators and metrics that will enable data driven decision-making. He provided a few examples, including an indicator of whether a UNDSS country team is staffed correctly when compared against the complexity of the country, the threat levels, the assessed risk levels and the scale and scope of United Nations operations.

158. The ORU representative further explained about the process of getting the dashboard ready, which includes working with the IASMN to identify quantitative information and data streams needed to support qualitative decision-making. He noted that the aim is to predominantly use internal data sources such as staff lists, SRM and Security Incident Recording System (SSIRS) data, as well as other UN internal data repositories. The representative pointed out that one of the challenges is that data across the UNSMS are mostly focused on thematic areas, which does not easily allow for blended integrated analysis, particularly of resources. He explained that UNDSS is already working with existing data sets manually and developing recommendations for reallocation of resources. The ORU representative highlighted that new posts for data professionals have been secured and this will help produce the data streams and dashboard.

159. As next steps, the ORU representative indicated that a comprehensive overhaul of UNSMIN is underway as part of the UNDSS Digital Transformation Project, and that the design of the dashboard has started. He explained that UNDSS will look to further enrich the dashboard through outreach to professionals and through a concept note that has been developed for the incremental rollout of the dashboard, which will be shared with the IASMN.

160. The OCHA representative flagged that he has not yet had the opportunity to read the concept note but that the work that has been described might have already been done internally at the United Nations through the Emergency Directors and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. He mentioned that what is needed is to find good predictors and link that to existing analysis of humanitarian, development, political and security impact. The USG explained that UNDSS uses existing information to inform decision-making, and not recreating what is already available.

161. The WFP representative noted that it is important to make sure that there is interoperability between systems in place. She stressed that further efforts are needed on the cleaning of data sources, such as the personnel lists and the SRM, and expressed support for the initiative.

162. Several members noted that a project document, and further detail in the CRP, would be helpful to explain the initiative. The UNICEF representative indicated that the IASMN still has not been consulted on the initiative and highlighted the need for a briefing where there is an opportunity to give feedback before providing any insights on which data should be used. The UNFPA representative discouraged the use of external fragility indicators that might be misinterpreted by Member States. He suggested making use of the country quadrant profiles from agencies, funds, and programmes.

163. The UNODC representative expressed appreciation for the initiative and flagged that he is working on a similar undertaking at UNODC. He offered to support and share information. The DPO representative noted that a project document would be useful to understand the initiative and suggested that UNDSS contact the DTS team at DPO regarding digital transformation.

164. The UNHCR representative expressed interest in being a part of the process and enquired about the timeline of the project.

165. The DPPA representative asked about the dashboards' accessibility, noting that Executive Heads and Security Focal Points should be able to access it, and highlighted that the dashboard should display the current existing resources that are in a specific country at a given time.

166. The ORU representative committed to involving IASMN colleagues in the initiative and noted that UNDSS is starting to pull the existing data from different UNSMS organizations. He noted that fragility indices would only be used as a metric, and not to characterize a country. The representative clarified that it is not yet possible to commit to a timeline and to whom the dashboard would be visible. The USG added that he plans to move forward with the resource reallocation in 2024, even if the process is not completely finalized, and aims to have the process finalized in time for the budget 2026 discussion.

167. **The IASMN:**
- **Took note that a first iteration of the resource allocation process would commence in 2024.**
- **Requested to be consulted on the resource allocation process.**

UNSMS Resource Review

168. The Consultant for the UNSMS Resource Review briefed the IASMN on the UNSMS Resources Review. She explained that, as an independent expert, she analyzed the sources and uses of funding through a theory of change of using data to support decision-making. In terms of the governance, the UNSMS Resource Review consultant explained that the review was mandated by the FBN and followed the principles of maximizing transparency while minimizing efforts by using existing data collection methodologies and code definitions used by the CEB and the UNSMS (e.g., definitions from the UNSMS Framework of Accountability). She further explained that the

review ensured data security in a trusted data environment (i.e., CEB Secretariat Platform), data privacy, and linking data on the security resources to trends in the United Nations operating environment.

169. The UNSMS Resource Review consultant explained that the scope of the process included using the list of UNSMS entities on the 2021 JFA cost-attribution spreadsheet and their headcount as a basis for reporting and for creating groups of UNSMS entities for data analysis. She pointed out that the review managed to achieve 100 percent of the headcount but for nine entities the data excluded internal security resources and consisted only of data sets that were created for them with available JFA and Locally Cost-Shared Security Budget (LCSSB) data. The consultant noted that the project board met and agreed that the overall dataset is deemed valid and can be used for data analysis.

170. While explaining the emerging big picture of the review, the UNSMS Resource Review consultant explained that she looked at three parts of contextual data, which was the total headcount of UNSMS entities as collected by the CEB Secretariat, the total figures of United Nations expenses and United Nations revenues. On the revenue, she indicated that assessed and voluntary core funding have hardly grown while voluntary non-core grew the most. She further explained that the Programme Criticality lists from 2018-2022 were used as an indicator of risk. Based on this, she informed that the risk level has gone up by 98 percent. The UNSMS Resource Review consultant summarized that UNSMS entities are delivering more with more personnel in an overall far riskier environment. She further indicated that security expenses are mostly paid with core resources, which have hardly grown over the past five years. On total numbers, she pointed out that security comprises 2 percent of the UN expenditure and the headcount comprises 3 percent of the total workforce.

171. She pointed out that there is a large difference between the financing instruments composing the United Nations' total revenue and the sources of funding used to fund UNSMS security services. The consultant added that the security funding also varies a lot between groups of UNSMS entities. Regarding the changes in security expenditures between 2018 and 2022, she noted that it grew 11.8 percent, with the joint expenses (e.g., JFA and LCSSB) presenting a growth of 22.4 percent, especially the LCSSB (i.e., 38.2 percent).

172. The UNSMS Resource Review consultant concluded her presentation by highlighting an identified trend of UNSMS security expenses representing a larger proportion of total core for the five largest humanitarian/development agencies (mostly voluntary core) than for the UN Secretariat (mostly assessed budget). She also explained the next steps, which include having the final report ready by 1 March 2024.

173. The World Bank representative clarified that the World Bank decided not to participate in this exercise but noted that the nine entities that did not participate still had a partial accounting of the JFA contributions. He suggested to remove the entities that declined to participate in the exercise to protect the integrity of the data. The UNSMS Resource Review consultant explained that the overall data is not fully accurate in a way that removing the organizations who declined to participate would not make a considerable difference in the results.

174. The DPPA representative highlighted that DPPA and DPO come under the Secretariat but noted that some estimations for resources allocated to the field come under mission resources instead of the Secretariat. He stressed that this may lead to confusion and mentioned that the Headquarters' budget was included under the Secretariat but highlighted that those are quite different from the arrangements at the field level and suggested to reflect these differently. The UNSMS Resource Review consultant clarified that DPO and DPPA's contribution to the LCSSB were included under the UN Secretariat numbers and that the Secretariat shared the numbers regarding key missions that still exist. She further clarified that she used the data standard codes for geographical locations that are used by the FBN for Secretariat locations.

175. The UNICEF representative noted that it is difficult to capture the information during the briefing but that it would be helpful to receive a copy of the presentation, as well as the draft report. He pointed out that the report will be very beneficial for the discussions at the IASMN. The USG explained that he would consult the FBN to seek authorization to share the draft report with the IASMN.

176. The UNDP representative noted that the data is very useful and highlighted that the usage of the JFA and the balance with the LCSSB is a very important point for UNDP. He mentioned that UNDP is not in the forefront of humanitarian emergencies but stressed that a lot of the resources, including the JFA, are used for this purpose. He thus explained that UNDP contributes based on a global footprint but at times this does not match UNDP's presence (e.g., UNDP has offices in Latin America were not many resources are spent). The UNDP representative asked about the reference to the total revenue and whether the JFA was considered as an assessed contribution for UNDSS. Ms. Keijzers noted that the data explains the use of security funding depending on countries' risk profile.

177. The IOM representative commented about the 98 percent increase of the risk being analyzed based on the Programme Criticality lists, which in his view was not a good way to assess risks. The UNSMS Resource Review consultant explained that countries on the Programme Criticality list received a code, while areas of a country or those who were not on the list at all received a different code. She thus explained that the 98 percent of risk is due to an increase in countries or areas in the Programme Criticality list in the period covered.

178. The USG added that UNHCR and ITU were part of the project board alongside two representatives of the FBN from UNFPA and the UN Secretariat to support with the sources of information that could be used to identify changes in risk between 2018 and 2022. He further informed the IASMN that the Power BI tool is helpful to extract information per country and per year and that the data was collected in a way as to ensure protection and privacy of the data per agency.

179. The OCHA representative cautioned against using Programme Criticality as an indicator of risk because between 2018 and 2022, Programme Criticality was used as a business continuity planning tool during the COVID-19 pandemic to maintain the most critical activities against the health threat, with security not being the only driver of the need for a Programme Criticality exercise. The UNICEF representative added that it may be better to speak about the complexity

or the dangerousness and threat of the security situation rather than the risk. The WFP representative mentioned that her organization uses some indicators for prioritization based on the personnel list, the risk indicators, the premises, and their capacity.

180. The USG explained that the UNSMS Resources Review is a financial exercise for the FBN to better understand security expenditures, noting that it can help with building a better security apparatus.

Presentation of 2023 JFA Expenditures

181. The Executive Office representative reviewed the JFA expenditures for 2023 (**CRP 4**), noting that while the General Assembly had appropriated $145.2 million for the budget, the Finance and Budget Network (FBN) had set a ceiling of $134.6 million for the JFA budget in 2023. She emphasized that their practice has been to monitor and manage expenditures in accordance with the FBN's ceiling rather than the higher appropriation approved by the GA. The representative noted that the total projected expenditure for the year was approximately $136.2 million, exceeding the ceiling by about $1.6 million. She emphasized that these figures were still estimates as the financial books had not yet closed, with the final financial statements due by March 31. The Executive Office representative highlighted ongoing reconciliations and charges from both UNDP and internal United Nations sources. She also noted under-expenditures in certain areas, such as post costs due to recruitment challenges, and over-expenditures in other areas like staff costs, travel, and contractual services, driven by operational needs and crisis responses. The representative mentioned that voluntary contributions totalling $15.5 million had mitigated the potential deficit, underscoring the Department's efforts to manage finances amidst various operational pressures and uncertainties.

182. The UNDP representative noted the feedback from the UNDP Chief of Finance to the FBN was clear, emphasizing the expectation for UNDSS to manage within the budget approved by the FBN and request additional funds prior to incurring extra expenses. He observed what seemed like discrepancies in the budget, particularly noting a significant deficit in the DFO at headquarters, largely attributed to staff costs, despite expectations for deficits to occur in the field due to emergencies and crises. The representative also addressed concerns regarding the financial management of vehicle and equipment expenditures and the methodology behind UNDP's service charges, clarifying that these are based on transactions and services provided. He expressed support for a reserve fund to ensure immediate availability of resources for situations like Gaza.

183. The OCHA representative noted concerns regarding the adequacy of funding for UNDSS in meeting its operational needs based on security requirements, suggesting that the current allocations may not be sufficient. He suggested that a coherent narrative explaining the necessity for additional funds would be helpful, noting that the details of the extra-budgetary funding secured through DPSS were not included in the presentation. The representative noted that there appears to be underspending in field operations and overspending at the headquarters,

and stressed the importance of developing a clear narrative through the IASMN to explain why additional resources are necessary for UNDSS to function effectively.

184. The Executive Office representative discussed the DFO headquarters expenditure, explaining the factors driving up salary expenditures, including post adjustments and inflation. She also mentioned currency fluctuations as another factor impacting costs and pointed out that travel costs for official business at headquarters and for field operations are budgeted centrally from the Headquarters Cost Center of the DFO, with field travel limited to in-country movements. On the service charges, the representative noted that negotiations with UNDP were still ongoing to transition to a transaction-based billing model and the number was still an estimate. Regarding the overall funding level, she noted that the numbers indicate UNDSS is not funded at the necessary level, which is affecting the Department's ability to fully meet requirements.

185. The USG highlighted the challenge of articulating the need for additional funding in the face of multiple, ongoing crises. He noted that the $15.5 million in voluntary contributions to the JFA reflects the urgent necessity for extra-budgetary funding. The USG posed that while the JFA serves as a foundational component, it should not bear the sole responsibility for initial crisis response costs. Instead, there should be a mechanism to cover these expenses temporarily, giving organizations time to secure further funds through appeals. The USG emphasized the original formula created for headcount and budgeting upon the establishment of the UNSMS and UNDSS, which, if fully utilized, would suffice for the Department's needs.

186. The WFP representative emphasized the importance of linking the narrative to the specific impacts of funding gaps on crisis response, suggesting that a more detailed account of what has been achieved versus what has been left unaddressed due to financial constraints could illustrate the consequences of insufficient funding. The UNICEF representative highlighted issues with reporting overspending and suggested introducing a narrative that pre-empts overspending by seeking pre-approval for expenditures and making strategic cuts where necessary, rather than providing a justification for overspent budgets.

187. The USG emphasized that the main drivers of the over-expenditure are crises, noting the practical difficulties with seeking approval before responding to urgent needs such as deploying support to Gaza or Sudan. He highlighted his proactive communication with the FBN, where he indicated from the outset that the approved budget for 2023 would likely be insufficient. The USG stressed that the budget is used for collective benefit and underscored the necessity of flexibility in crisis response.

188. The USG noted that UNDSS had mentioned the potential deficit during the June IASMN session and reflected on the 2024 budget, noting the FBN's approval for additional post fillings to address the high vacancy rates that have been hindering operational efficiency. He expressed a commitment to utilizing the provided window of opportunity to fill as many positions as possible in 2024.

189. The UNDP representative suggested a footnote would suffice to address his concerns on headquarters costs, and Executive Office representative agreed this would be added to the JFA presentation for next year.

190. **The IASMN:**
   - **Took note of 2023 JFA expenditures.**
   - **Requested that a brief narrative accompany the summary of expenditures.**

SRM/SSIRS Update

191. The UNICEF representative and the OCHA representative presented the SRM and SSIRS update (**CRP 14**). On SRM, the UNICEF representative noted that there have been webinars on SRM comprehension building done for WFP, UNESCO, as well as webinars for the Security Cell in Somalia, amongst others. He highlighted discussions on the value of the aggregate Security Level as an output of the general threat assessment and explained that the proposal is to remove the Security Level as an output of the General Threat Assessment (GTA) in the SRM.

192. The UNICEF representative also presented on the hazards assessment in the GTA. He explained that the hazard assessment is an outlier in the SRM, but that it is still a useful assessment to have. He presented the proposal to remove the hazard assessment from the GTA and move it to a different tab in UNSMIN. He instructed the IASMN to review the mock-ups prepared by IT colleagues on how the move of hazards to a different tab in UNSMIN would look like.

193. The USG opened the floor for comments on the SRM portion of the CRP. The UNODC representative asked for confirmation on whether hazards would still be a part of the mandatory assessment. He clarified that hazards will not be a part of the security risk assessment, but a part of the security risk management responsibility and accountability at the country level vis a vis the obligation to support Occupational Health and Safety (OHS).

194. The ADB representative asked about the host government response capacity, which is an important factor to be considered by the ADB in small island countries. He agreed with moving the hazard assessment but stressed that it would be important to view the host government response capacity. The UNICEF representative noted that the existing indicators in the hazard assessment were approved by the IASMN in 2011 and any changes to the indicators would need to be discussed at the IASMN level first.

195. The WFP representative commended the work of the working group and emphasized that the SRM process and tool be evaluated to ensure effective use and agility of the process to aim to create value for decision-makers.. The UNICEF representative stressed that by removing the security levels, the weights would no longer exist, and it would be easier to extract the data from the SRM tool and compare crime across multiple locations.

196. The UNHCR representative agreed with the removal of the security level and welcomed the move of hazards to a different tab. She asked if there was going to be further delineation of what hazards are and the appropriate risk management for hazards. The UNICEF representative noted that the IASMN may want to discuss more on the hazards as next steps in the form of a working group. The ADB representative expressed interest in establishing a working group on hazards and volunteered ADB's participation.

197. The OPCW representative agreed with the proposals and asked about the security level measures related to the frequency of SMT meetings. The UNICEF representative explained that there are policy statements about required activities, including the frequency of SMT meetings, and that the working group and DFO should decide on guidance for DOs and the SMT on this.

198. The UNDP representative expressed support for the proposals. The IOM representative supported the removal of the security levels but mentioned that terminology in the tool is outdated (i.e., current risk) and asked for the terminology to be in line with the SRM Manual. The UNICEF representative indicated that the working group will go through the Manual to update it for consistency.

199. The World Bank supported the proposals and flagged the World Bank's Think Hazards webpage, which was designed for supporting operations globally and looking at hazards from a risk perspective.

200. The UNICEF representative highlighted that when the work on the SRM review started, one of the main points was separating safety from security aspects. He then explained that the UNSMS in country has an obligation to identify all existing hazards and get inputs from experts to help them respond but not to manage the risk, as per *Security Policy Manual*, Chapter VII, "Guidance on UNSMS Role in OSH".

201. The UNICEF representative mentioned the request to have an SRM webinar for the IASMN and added that it would be helpful to keep the momentum of the webinars and focus on UNDSS Desk Chiefs, P/C/SAs to achieve better results in the SRM. The USG expressed support for this.

202. The OCHA representative continued the presentation of the CRP on *ad hoc* SRMs. He explained that the proposal is to have a more agile and focused process that helps rapid decision-making. He clarified that the working group is not yet bringing forward clear recommendations on the decision-making as the work is still ongoing. The representative informed the IASMN that the working group is using the best practices of the current *ad hoc* SRM and including them in the SRM Manual. The UNICEF representative added that *ad hoc* SRMs are already being used in some locations as part of the enabling process. The OCHA representative added that the group is also addressing unclear language in the Manual.

203. The OCHA representative continued the CRP presentation on the SSIRS and explained that most of the work is being carried out by ORS/UNDSS. Ms. Roberta Belli, UNDSS, explained that ORS is working on a dashboard that is constantly revised based on the feedback received.

204. The UNFPA representative expressed no opposition to removing the hazards as a category but explained that the reason why it had been retained under the SRM was for consequence management, so countries would have hazards as a standing item in the SRM. He enquired if the current system would enable extracting a one-pager from the SRM that the SMT can review to help agile decision-making. The representative recalled an outstanding request to institute an online self-assessment of existing SRM measures and asked if this is still a part of the working group's tasks. The OCHA representative noted that there is a discussion in the working group about having a dashboard for easy comprehension of the *ad hoc* SRM but that it is important for decision-makers to have access to a detailed report. On this point, the USG added that the Desks

at DFO support with extracting key information from the SRM report to decision-makers and encouraged security advisers to do this type of work in support of decision-makers.

205. The UNRWA representative commended the working group for its progress and noted that UNRWA has a similar Power BI Dashboard. The UNICEF representative addressed a question on linking SSIRS to the SRM and noted that it is an important point because there may be different reasons as to why an incident occurred. He added that the SRM was designed to identify rising threats (including for events that haven't happen to the United Nations yet) and the person doing the assessment is supposed to go through all available information, including SSIRS.

206. The UNHCR representative asked about mandatory measures and wondered if there should be a discussion on mandatory measures and the impact on the Framework of Accountability at the next IASMN Steering Group. The IOM and UNICEF representatives agreed with having this discussion at the next IASMN Steering Group meeting. The UNICEF representative further added that it is a complex discussion as there are some mandatory measures which are not implementable, or which may take time to be implementable, and the relevance of the measure to a specific environment.

207. The IOM representative noted that his organization is supportive of the discussion on *ad hoc* SRMs as it provides for granularity in making an accurate assessment.

208. The DFO representative expressed that *ad hoc* SRMs are helpful but noted some complications in their use due to complexities regarding mandatory measures and different descriptors that affects the accountability. He stressed that the DO's single accounting line should not be changed but that DFO is supportive of exploring the wider use of ad hoc SRMs.

209. Reiterating that SRMs are the main tool for decision making while holding security professionals accountable, the USG pointed out that he is supportive of making the SRM tool as flexible as possible. He cautioned, however, against questioning the mandatory nature of some SRM measures and changing their meaning and the effect they have. On the nature of the SRM and its mandatory measures, the UNICEF representative explained that some of the measures are not applicable and are overly restrictive but highlighted the role of managers and personnel in managing risk and being prudent.

210. The DPPA representative supported the way forward but noted that in the measures are listed as approved by the DO in the SRM, but they are not listed as implemented, which can lead to an incorrect view of the actual risk level.

211. The World Bank representative highlighted concerns as to the observed lack of comprehension on the wider SRM fundamentals throughout the UNSMS and suggested focussing more attention on developing a better understanding of principles among all stakeholders. WBG noted the continued excellent work carried out by the by the SRM WG on this effort but encouraged a wider UN SMS review of knowledge gaps to be undertaken. On the agency specific *ad hoc* SRMs, it was expressed that they continue to provide a critical tool for the World Bank, as such SRM better reflect risks aligned with the specific organization's business model. The representative suggested that further considerations should be given to explore a more systematic use of independent *ad hoc* SRM practices across the UNSMS. The UNESCO representative suggested to

focus on training and making sure that security advisers and SMT members are comfortable with the tool.

212. The IASMN:

- **Took note of progress made by the Working Group.**
- **Supported the recommendations to: (i) Remove the aggregate "Security Level" as an output of the General Threat Assessment (GTA) in the SRM, and (ii) Separate the "hazard" assessment out of the General Threat Assessment and place it in its own tab on the United Nations Security Management Information Network (UNSMIN). Implementation is pending readiness of IT systems.**
- **Supported the incremental updates to the SRM Manual with a view to enabling mandate and programme implementation.**
- **Recommended to continue discussing the mandatory nature of SRM measures at the Working Group level.**

Close of Session

LCSSB

213. The DFO representative introduced the item on the LCSSB, highlighting the need to address various issues without undergoing a full review, as one had been conducted in 2021. He mentioned topics such as recruitment of international personnel and expenditure reports, among others, suggesting that the DFO work with UNFPA to draft internal guidance and recommendations. The UNFPA representative noted his organization's willingness to share its experiences to address the challenges of different interpretations of the policy. He advocated for a simplified checklist to streamline implementation and suggested that the next steps include seeking member contributions to the guidance, mentioning the potential usefulness of webinar sessions for comprehensive understanding and integration of SRM linkages.

214. The UNICEF representative expressed his support for the proposal and discussed the potential need for feedback from other UNSMS organizations to ensure the guidance adequately addresses any issues. UNHCR noted that other organizations might benefit from participating in this process, having developed internal guidance and conducted webinars themselves. UNDP emphasized the importance of either being part of the working group or having the opportunity to provide input, citing his organization's significant financial interests in the LCSSB. The UNOCT representative proposed considering the appointment of national programme officers instead of Local Security Assistants to ensure continuity and fair compensation.

215. The IASMN:

- **Supported UNDSS to work with UNFPA, and other interested IASMN members, on drafting guidance on LCSSB implementation.**

Commercial Air Travel Safety

216. A SPPU representative summarized a previous Steering Group meeting's recommendation to revisit certain terms in the existing guidelines on commercial air travel safety, mentioning the

proposal for forming a working group. Ms. Lisa Anderson Spencer detailed the need to reevaluate the guidelines, highlighting that donated flights are not covered in the current document and that confusion over air travel focal points and delegation of authority still exists. She suggested involvement from other Secretariat organizations for a comprehensive review.

217. The OCHA representative expressed reluctance to revisit the guidelines, pointing out the time it took to establish the current version and its operational effectiveness. He mentioned concerns about how DOS's full oversight would affect non-Secretariat organizations, suggesting any revisions occur post-transfer.

218. The USG recognized the need for guideline revisions to address activities not currently covered and clarify the process. DPPA argued against waiting for the transfer's completion before updating the guidelines, emphasizing the importance of immediate clarity.

219. Members agreed to form a working group with interested UNSMS organizations to undertake the review and report back to the Steering Group.

220. The IASMN:
- **Supported the establishment of a Working Group on Commercial Air Travel Safety with interested IASMN members to discuss changes to the guidance.**

Risk Avoidance Guidelines

221. A SPPU representative discussed the ongoing efforts to finalize and promulgate risk avoidance guidance, noting that the policy had been endorsed by IASMN in June of the previous year. She mentioned that the Policy Review Group worked on the guidelines, which are meant to accompany the policy, until November, with the promulgation package nearly complete. However, HR colleagues from DMSPC suggested that the HR Network and the Standing Committee on Field Duty Stations review the guidelines due to HR-related issues, including benefits and allowances related to evacuation, terms regarding recognized versus eligible family members, and references to specific country names. She sought endorsement to move forward with promulgating the policy separately, which would be followed by the guidelines at a later date, once these were approved. In response to a question on timelines, the representative mentioned that the HR Network planned to present the issue at their biannual meeting in June, after which they would provide feedback.

222. The OCHA representative expressed confidence that the guidelines were not far off from HR's requirements, and that the review would ensure HR implications are correctly reflected in the guidelines and would not change the way the policy will be implemented. The SPPU representative confirmed the policy was endorsed by the HLCM and no changes were required.

223. The IASMN:
- **Supported moving forward with the promulgation of the Risk Avoidance Policy while the related Guidelines are reviewed by the Human Resources Network Standing Committee on the Field Duty Stations and Co-Chairs.**

IASMN's 40th Session

224. The IOM representative highlighted that, for the summer IASMN session, it will be essential for participants to adhere to timelines for room bookings in Montreux. He emphasized the importance of meeting the hotel's deadline, typically set four to five weeks before the event, to avoid financial penalties due to the hotel's high occupancy rates.

225. Additionally, the IOM representative mentioned that the event duration was confirmed to be three days, following the Security Symposium, which was being held in Geneva. He mentioned that the Swiss Federation, which has been providing support for the IASMN session for the past few years, was open to the meeting being hosted in another location within Switzerland and expressed willingness to negotiate alternatives for future events. He noted, however, the favorable rates offered in Montreux made the city a cost-effective option. The USG indicated an email would be sent to provide the necessary details to members on the June events to facilitate making travel arrangements.

Annexure (Agenda, Participant List and List of Current Participation in IASMN working groups)