REPORT OF THE INTER-AGENCY SECURITY MANAGEMENT NETWORK
(Lyon, 28-30 July 2008)

I. INTRODUCTION

1.   The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Lyon, France, from 28 to 30 July 2008. A list of participants from organizations, agencies, programmes and funds (hereafter referred to as the Organizations) as well as the agenda and list of documents are attached as Annex A.   The IASMN wishes to express its gratitude to the IARC and the World Health Organization for hosting the meeting.

II. CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL ON SAFETY AND SECURITY (IPSS)

2.   The IASMN considered in detail the report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security (IPSS) of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide with a view to making recommendations to the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) and Chief Executives Board (CEB) on strengthening the UN's culture of security and accountability.

3.   As a general overview the IASMN notes that many of the recommendations contained in paras 87 to 306 of the IPSS report mirror those that have already been elaborated and forwarded by the IASMN and HLCM to the CEB since 2003. In this regard, the IASMN strongly reiterates that the time has come to translate these recommendations into actions to enable the delivery of the mandates of the United Nations system whilst maintaining the safety, security and well-being of staff as a high priority.

4.   At the request of the HLCM, the IASMN has developed a detailed matrix which includes both implicit and explicit recommendations of the IPSS as well as recommendations previously made by IASMN and HLCM which have yet to be implemented. This matrix is attached at Annex B of the IASMN report. For ease of reference, these recommendations have been grouped in the following subject areas:

> (a)   The perception of the United Nations
> (b)   The governance of the UN Security Management System
> (c)   The structure of the UN Security Management System
> (d)   The funding of the UN Security Management System
> (e)   Human resources/administration of the UN Security Management System

5.   In the absence of the IPSS providing any prioritization on the level of importance of its recommendations, the IASMN recommends that the implementation strategy for these recommendations be based on short, medium and long term requirements. In the time provided to it, IASMN has not been able to conclude all the work required to develop the details for implementing the medium and long term requirements. Instead, it has focused on what is required in the immediate and developed recommendations in this regard. The IASMN has also flagged as critical all those recommendations (whether short, medium or long term) which have financial requirements.

6.   However, with regard to the attack in Algiers, the IASMN expresses concern regarding the imbalances in the report resulting from the fact that the IPSS does not address a number of fundamental issues. For example, the report gives no evidence that the host government carried out an investigation of the criminal actions of the perpetrators, as called for by the Security Council in its statement of 11 December 2007 and reiterated by the Secretary-General in his statement of 12 December 2007. The report also does not properly examine the failure of the host government in the discharge of its primary responsibility for ensuring the security and safety of United Nations staff and premises.

7.   The IASMN notes that, as clearly indicated in paragraph 7 of its report, the IPSS did not consider that it could or should determine individual accountability; nevertheless, a number of unsubstantiated allegations are made against named positions throughout the report, notably in the unnumbered paragraph between paragraphs122 and 123. The IASMN regrets that, despite the fact that accountability investigations have not been concluded, insinuations and assumptions have already been made which are likely to influence the proceedings of the on-going Accountability Panel.

8.   The IASMN is further concerned to note that, whilst the IPSS report makes an initial determination of accountability, it does not examine the factors which should be in place before accountability can reasonably be expected, such as those outlined by the Secretary-General in A/55/270 Annex I.

9.   The IASMN expresses grave concern that the IPSS report has already had a negative impact on the UN Security Management System. These consequences already include the resignation of the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Safety and Security and the noticeably growing reluctance of staff and officials to assume positions and accept responsibilities for safety and security.

10.   Noting the lack of a proper investigation into this incident, the IASMN recommends that there be a full investigation into the circumstances which led up to the bombing as well as the aftermath which would include, inter alia, establishing who was responsible, the methodology used in planning and executing the attack, the types of materials used in the explosive device, the exact cause of death of the victims, etc. This process is vital in order to apportion responsibility properly and to identify how the UN system may better protect itself from such attacks in the future.

11.   Further to comments in paras 6 to 10 above, the IASMN categorically rejects as unfounded the statement contained in para 95 of the IPSS report that the IASMN is not a governance body and the statement contained in para 97 of the IPSS report which states that :

        "Many stakeholders within the UN Security Management System observed that the number (46) and diversity of entities represented in the IASMN makes it an unwieldy body in which it is difficult to reach agreement. Because of this size and diversity of the IASMN, its members all comment that their needs are not sufficiently reflected in the outcome of its work."

12.   The IASMN members have reaffirmed their organizational positions in regards to the continuing importance of the existing security management system and its governance structure. The members unanimously wish to record that the strengths of the IASMN lie in its diversity and that it has proven beyond question to be a very decisive, pragmatic and productive body providing both strategic and policy recommendations as well as technical and operational guidance to the UN system.

13.   In this connection the IASMN was presented with a statement on behalf of the Specialized Agencies and Bretton Woods Institutions which reads as follows:

        "The Specialized Agencies (FAO, ICAO, IFAD, ILO, ITU, UNESCO, UNIDO, WHO and WIPO) and the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank, IMF), having met on 29 July 2008, reaffirm their strong support for the current governance mechanisms of the UN Security Management System (IASMN, HLCM, CEB).

        These bodies recall that they have their own governing bodies and would not be in favour of the establishment of another UN body dealing with security policy at which the Specialized Agencies and Bretton Woods Institutions were not properly represented.

        In addition Annex G contains a statement presented jointly by the Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations System (CCISUA) and the Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations (FICSA) entitled "On Staff Safety and Security- Restoring Confidence and Morale".

III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

A.   IASMN RECOMMENDATIONS REQUIRING ACTION FROM HLCM LINKED TO THE IPSS RECOMMENDATIONS

(The IASMN has not reproduced all the recommendations contained in the matrix attached at annex B in the Executive Summary. Only those recommendations which the IASMN wishes specifically to refer to the HLCM have been included in this section.)

(a)   The Perception of the United Nations

14.   The IASMN recommends that HLCM recommend to CEB the establishment of a group of communications experts to devise an advocacy strategy that would seek to find ways of restoring the credibility of the United Nations (See matrix para. 1, IPSS para 292).

(b)   The Governance of the UN Security Management System (See also paras 11-13 above)

15.   The IASMN recommends that the Secretary-General consult Member States on how to increase adherence to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and the Optional Protocol thereto as well as on ways in which to broaden their scope of application to include more UN activities. (See matrix para 13, IPSS para 267)

16.   The IASMN recommends approval of a proposed model agreement to be concluded between the UN and the Host Country to the benefit of the members of the UN Security Management Systems, outlining arrangements with the Host Country concerning the safety and security of UN system personnel and premises. (See matrix para 14, IPSS para 267 and paras 78-80 below)

(c)   The Structure of the UN Security Management System

(i) Enhancement of the Department of Safety and Security

17.   The IASMN recommends approval of a proposal developed by DSS and ICAO to create an **Aviation Risk Management capacity** within DSS. Consideration should be given to locating the unit outside New York within a globally friendly user time zone. The financial requirements of this proposal are contained in Annex E. (See matrix para 21, 52; IPSS para 156,132 and paras 65-67 below)

18.   The IASMN recommends approval of the request from DSS for the immediate recruitment of additional **professional security officers** to serve as CSA/SA/FSO as well as a small number of staff in the Division of Regional Operations to provide urgently required assistance in and to the field. The financial implications of this recommendation are contained in Annex E. (See matrix para 54, IPSS 178 and paras 68-70 below).

19.   The IASMN notes the dramatic increases in the need for **surge capacity** deployment and activation of the Crisis Coordination Centre over the past year, including a 240% increase for the first six months of 2008 when compared to 2007 and, noting that the need for surge capacity will likely increase to respond to higher levels of global insecurity as well as natural disasters and humanitarian crises, recommends that DSS be provided with additional and appropriate surge capacity. The financial requirements of this recommendation are contained in Annex E. (see matrix para 57, IPSS para 131, 133, 149 and paras 71-72 below)

20.   The IASMN recommends approval of the proposal to create security analyst posts in the field to provide accurate and timely information at vulnerable duty stations. Additional posts are recommended to strengthen the threat and risk assessment capabilities at Headquarters. The IASMN also recommends the creation of Security Information Operations Centres (SIOCs) in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen as a matter of priority. The financial implications of this recommendation are contained in Annex E. (see matrix para 58, IPSS para 136 see para 73 below)

21.   The IASMN recommends that pending a thorough review of planning, development and delivery of **security training**, the gap created by the four posts redeployed out of Training and Development Section should be filled through four new P-4 posts. The financial implications of this recommendation are contained in Annex E. (See matrix para 63, IPSS 140 and para 41 below)

ii) Information Management

22.   The IASMN strongly reiterates that, in the absence of a truly integrated and professional information management system, it will not be possible for the UN Security Management System to work effectively to ensure safety and security of staff members. The IASMN points out that, as also flagged in the report of the IPSS, there continues to be a significant lack of resources for information management and security communication infrastructure which must be addressed as a matter of urgency by HLCM. The IASMN regrets that the previous HLCM recommendations have not been implemented. IASMN requests that HLCM set a deadline by which it expects to receive a plan of action from the ICT network, as requested in HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 26. (see matrix para 48, IPSS 150 and paras 45-48 below)

iii) Security Training

23.   The IASMN recalls its recommendation contained in para 19 of the report of its meeting in Washington early this year that "DSS be given the resources to develop and implement a highly focused training programme in conjunction with resources and capacities of other training entities, to be provided to managers, prior to assuming their responsibilities, to include leadership, risk and crisis management skills". In this connection, the IASMN recommends that HLCM endorse the new approach to mandatory training for Designated Officials, Security Management Teams, Area Security Coordinators and Area Security Management Teams with specific emphasis on security risk management and commit in principle to providing the financial resources required to implement this recommendation, to be determined by DSS. (See matrix para 60, 64, 65, IPSS para 144, 146, 187 and paras 34-42 below).

24.   The IASMN recommends that a strategy be developed to further design and implement a training package to enhance the Organization's capacity to respond to and manage incidents involving mass casualties, including the consideration of such issues as training and certifying staff, ensuring that appropriate budgetary provisions are made by legislative bodies for such purposes when approving mandates, entering into agreements with member states and other measures.

25.   In this connection, the IASMN recommends that HLCM support and encourage the ongoing efforts of the Medical Directors Working Group to establish an infrastructure capable of ensuring adequate health care including emergency medical services for UN system staff worldwide. (See matrix para. 50, IPSS 200, 207 and paras 49-54 below)

iv) Inclusion of Security Responsibilities in Job descriptions

26.   The IASMN recommends that HLCM adopt a statement requesting all organizations to include security responsibilities in the job descriptions and post profiles for all relevant positions within the UN system and to report back to HLCM on implementation no later than September 2009.(See matrix para 53, IPSS 162)

v) Security Phases

27.   As a result of their politicization, the security phases which were meant to be an internal UN procedure, have to a large extent lost their initial purpose. The IASMN recommends that a Working Group be established to further review the system in light of the Security Risk Management process which is now in place to determine what adjustments might be required and to review the implications across the system of any decision to replace the existing phasing system (see matrix para 55, IPSS para 195, 197).

(d)   The Funding of the UN Security Management System

28.   The IASMN recommends that HLCM instruct that security requirement are systematically considered as an integral part of every activity undertaken by the organizations of the UN system and guarantee sufficient resources preferably provided by the regular budget of the United Nations, so that the organization does not have to compromise on security matters. (matrix para 68, IPSS para 229). The World Bank reserves its position on this matter and is not prepared to increase its contribution to the UN System as it has its own internal security apparatus.

(e)   Human Resources/Administration of the UN Security Management System

29.   The IASMN recommends that the HLCM refer to the Human Resources Network the issues contained in matrix paras 71, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84; IPSS report para 211, 214, 225 concerning inter alia entitlements, employer responsibility, hazard pay, locally recruited staff and information sharing with staff.

B.   OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IASMN REQUIRINGHLCM ACTION

30.   The IASMN considered the document prepared by DSS regarding implementation of an evaluation policy for DSS, as recommended by OIOS. The IASMN recommends that HLCM endorse this policy, funding for which will be required from the UN regular budget. (See para 64 below).

31.   The IASMN considered a policy linked to the exclusion of DSS from the locally cost-shared budgets on grounds that local billing to DSS offices results in a two-tier billing to the UN system agencies, funds and programmes since any costs apportioned to the DSS office would have to come out of the centrally cost-shared budget for DSS and could result in charges to UN system agencies, funds and programmes that may not have a presence in that country. IASMN recommends that HLCM take note of this issue pending further discussions amongst IASMN members with a view to reaching a satisfactory conclusion to this matter. (See para 81 below)

32.   In view of the complex rules and responsibilities of the IASMN and the need for preparation of multiple policy and operational papers for two meetings of a year of the plenary, two meetings of the Steering Group and multiple working group meetings, the IASMN recommends approval for the creation of a small secretariat of the IASMN and recommends that HLCM allocate appropriate resources to UNDSS for this function. In this connection, the HLCM may wish to note that, effective immediately, the title Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) is being changed to the United Nations Security Management System Network (UNSMS Network) The financial implications of this recommendation are contained in Annex E (See paras 58-60 below).

33.   The IASMN points out that there are a number of recommendations on procedural matters and work in progress which do not require the specific approval of the HLCM at this time. The IASMN recommends that the HLCM take note of what is contained in the paragraphs below so that work may proceed on these matters.

IV. DISCUSSIONS OF THE IASMN

Training (See recommendations contained in para 23 above)

34.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which provides an update on the activities of the DSS Training and Development Section during the reporting period, and responds to the recommendations made by the IASMN meeting in Washington DC, in February 2008. The IASMN welcomes the new approach in the mandatory training for DOs and SMTs undertaken by DSS and requests that this training be extended also the ASCs and ASMTs as well as to DOs a.i., with specific emphasis on security risk management which remains critical issue for DOs and SMTs.

35.   In this connection the IASMN recalls that it had already pointed out that the adoption and implementation of a Risk Management Strategy would require a significant education and training programme also for Executive Heads and their managers at the Headquarters, regional and country levels.

36.	The IASMN also welcomes the fact that DSS will immediately begin informing all security focal points of upcoming security training for DOs and SMTs such that organizations can assist in the process of ensuring that all members of the SMT participate.

37.	The IASMN endorses the new Intermediate Training Programme (ITP) standard and welcomes the link between the training for security officers and the newly approved career management structure.

38.	The IASMN endorses actions taken by DSS with regard to the implementation of SSAFE including:

- Ensuring accurate record keeping of who has attended
- Considering a reasonable period for refresher training
- Confirming that decision as to attendance of SSAFE rests with the DO and SMT.
- Ensuring that trainers give appropriate consideration to issues related to gender and cultural diversity;

39.	The IASMN reconfirms that the completion of the Basic Security Training in the Field (BSITF) remains a mandatory requirement for all staff but suspends the requirement for 3 year refresher training until such time as the BSITF has been updated in 2010.

40.	The IASMN recommends that adequate and appropriate training is in place for national staff to ensure that they are well informed of their rights and responsibilities under the UN Security Management System.

41.	In the reprioritization at DSS Headquarters which took place as a result of the HLCM of October 2006, four P-3 posts were redeployed from the Training service to the Division of Regional Operations to reinforce the regional desks in an attempt to effectively support the field. In light of the recommendations regarding the need for enhanced security training that have been flagged by the IPSS panel, as well as the comment by the IPSS panel that trainers are at a disadvantage owing to their level, DSS proposed that, pending a thorough review of planning, development and delivery of security training, the gap created by the deployment of four posts out of Training and Development Section to the Division of Regional Operations, should be filled through four new P-4 posts.

42.	The IASMN notes that a comprehensive review of security training in the UN system is required to identify and develop training for all levels of staff for which commensurate resources will be required. The IASMN recommends that a Working Group be established as a matter of priority to address this issue.

Critical Incident Stress Management

43.	The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which provides an update on actions undertaken by DSS since the IASMN meeting in Washington DC, in February 2008 and outlines steps that remain to be taken.

44.	The IASMN welcomes the progress made on achieving consensus and agreement amongst the critical incident stress counsellors of the UN system. The IASMN points out that, as flagged also in the

report of the Independent Panel (IPSS), there are not enough critical stress counsellors in the UN system nor are there enough financial resources to hire such expertise in the event of crisis to provide the required coverage globally. The IASMN requests the Critical Incident Stress Management Working Group to develop proposals to be submitted to HLCM and CEB that would address this shortcoming. The World Bank reserves its position on this matter.

Information Management (See recommendations contained in para 22 above)

45.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which gives a brief progress report and overview of issues faced by DSS with respect to Information Management. The IASMN strongly reiterates that, in the absence of a truly integrated and professional information management system, it will not be possible for the UN Security Management System to work effectively to ensure safety and security of staff members.

46.   The IASMN points out that, as also flagged in the report of the IPSS, there continues to be a significant lack of resources for information management and security communication infrastructure which must be addressed as a matter of urgency by HLCM. The IASMN regrets that the previous HLCM recommendations have not been implemented. IASMN requests that HLCM set a deadline by which it expects to receive a plan of action from the ICT network, as requested in HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 26.

47.   The IASMN points out that ISECT is a system for security clearance and travel notification, and there is no difference between Headquarters and the fields in this regard; and thus, recommends that the name ISECT should remain.

48.   The IASMN endorses the proposals made by DSS to enhance the information management system.

Mass Casualties (See recommendations in paras 24-25 above)

49.   The IASMN notes with appreciation the presentation by DSS on a mass casualty exercise conducted in Haiti. The IASMN notes that this exercise reveals a number of significant short-comings in the UN system for dealing with incidents involving mass casualties. The IASMN recommends that a strategy be developed to further design and implement a training package to enhance the Organization's capacity to respond to and manage incidents involving mass casualties, including the consideration of such issues as training and certifying staff, ensuring that appropriate budgetary provisions are made by legislative bodies approving mandates entering into agreements with member states and other measures.

50.   The IASMN notes with concern the limited resources in the UN system to manage, support and monitor field medical services. It therefore supports and encourages the ongoing efforts of the Medical Directors Working Group to establish an infrastructure capable of ensuring adequate health care including emergency medical services for UN system staff worldwide.

51.   The IASMN recommends that consideration should be given to the pre-positioning of critical medical equipment but points out that such equipment will only be effective if there is medical backup available to support first responders.

52.   The IASMN recommends that coordination be undertaken at each duty station with host government, key donors and partners, local Red Cross, ICRC, MSF and other NGOs to provide medical assistance.

53.   The IASMN recommends that, in addition to being provided with relevant information regarding possible deployment, including risks, mitigating measures and entitlements, staff should also be provided with information on the medical infrastructure limitations at each duty station before they are deployed.

54.   The IASMN recommends that medical capacity be a critical factor in the security risk assessment process and MOSS.

Policy on the Applicability of the UNSMS to Individually Deployed Military and Police Personnel in DPKO and DPA Led Missions.

55.   The IASMN considered a proposal to include individually deployed military and police personnel serving with DPKO and DPA missions in the UN Security Management System (UNSMS) which was submitted by DPKO.

56.   The IASMN agrees in principle to this proposed policy subject to the following confirmation that:

   a)   The Controller of the United Nations agrees to include such personnel in the UN's component of the cost-sharing formula;
   b)   DPKO and DPA ensure that all personnel covered under this policy fully comply with all provisions of the IASMN, including, inter alia, the policy regarding presence of dependents.

Sharing of Information Regarding Dismissal of Security Staff

57.   The IASMN considered a document regarding cases where an organization has recruited persons to positions in the security area without knowledge whether they had previously worked for a common system organization. In such cases, the recruiting organization would not have been able to factor into its recruitment decision the circumstances of that staff member's separation from service from other organization, in particular whether it involved performance or disciplinary issues. The IASMN agrees that the issue of vetting of staff is a critical issue and requests that this matter be brought to the attention of the HR network such that a system-wide approach to the issue can be agreed.

Management of the IASMN (See recommendations contained in para 32 above)

58.   The IASMN notes the increased volume of the IASMN related matters and the fact that the lack of a full-time secretariat will impact on the work of the IASMN. The IASMN endorses the creation of a small secretariat of the IASMN, consisting of one Professional and one General Service staff members, and recommends that HLCM allocate appropriate resources to UNDSS for this function. See Annex E for details.

59.   The IASMN reviewed a request from HLCM to consider whether a Vice Chair was required for the IASMN. The IASMN does not believe that a Vice Chair is necessary at this time but will keep the matter under review.

60.   Noting that the membership of the IASMN is broader than what is indicated in the title Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), the IASMN decides that, effective immediately, its name be changed to the United Nations System Security Management Network, with the acronym UNSMS Network.

Use of Armed Guards

61.   The IASMN discussed the revision of the existing Annex O of the Field Security Handbook to bring it in line with GA Resolution 55/232 of 20 December 2000 (attached as Annex F), where the General Assembly has set the following conditions for outsourcing:

- it may be used to provide an activity not needed on a long term basis;
- it must respect the international character of the organization;
- it must avoid possible negative impact on staff ;
- steps must be taken to ensure appropriate management over the services to be provided; and,
- activities that could compromise the safety and security of staff must not be outsourced.

62.   The IASMN notes the serious concerns of its members (with the exception of the World Bank) regarding the increasing use of private security providers and recommends that extreme caution be exercised in engaging such outsourced services so as not to contradict the resolution of the General Assembly. In this respect the IASMN recommends that a Working Group be convened to revise the Annex O and to submit the revised version to the IASMN in January 2009 for consideration. The revision should take into account the following:

- A distinction must be made between locally engaged guard companies who are hired to protect UN premises and facilities and major international private security providers who offer a heavily armed paramilitary capability.

- The policy must clearly spell out the circumstances under which locally engaged guard companies may be armed under exceptional circumstances.

UN Policy on Delivering Close Protection

63.	The IASMN considered a close protection policy outlining the objectives of using close protection, the circumstances under which it may be used and the applicability of the policy, and agrees in principle to the proposed policy subject to the revision of a number of paragraphs. IASMN requests DSS to circulate the revised text electronically to all members for approval.

Evaluation (See recommendations contained in para 30 above)

64.	The IASMN considered the document prepared by DSS regarding implementation of an evaluation policy for DSS, as recommended by OIOS which states that all programmes should have dedicated evaluation capacity; all programmes should establish evaluation policies; all programmes should ensure that evaluation plans at the programme and subprogramme level are developed and all programmes should ensure that evaluation reports are made available on the internet and/or intranet. The IASMN endorses this policy and recommends that DSS be provided with the additional resources required to undertake these expanded functions.

Aviation Safety (See recommendations contained in para 17 above)

65.	At the April 2008 CEB meeting, the ICAO Secretary-General offered assistance to DSS in the area of Aviation Safety. Subsequently DSS met with ICAO as well as with aviation professionals from DFS and WFP to determine how best the UN system can address this issue. During these discussions it became obvious that there is not a single organization that looks holistically at Aviation Risk Management with respect to the travel of staff. It was therefore recommended that DSS create an Aviation Risk Management Office.

66.	IASMN recommends approval of this which would involve the creation of three Professional and one GS level posts. The financial requirements of this proposal are contained in Annex E.

67.	As it has already been suggested that this office be collocated with an existing UN aviation safety structure to take advantage of inherent synergies and efficiencies, the IASMN recommends that DSS, in consultation with the ATAG (Aviation Technical Advisory Group), consider locating this office outside of New York.

Requirement for Enhanced Resources for the Division of Regional Operations
(See recommendations contained in para 18 above)

68.	The IASMN considered and recommends approval of a proposal from DSS outlining the lack of sufficient resources and staff to fully meet its mandate and support to the field. The proposal highlighted the additional Professional and Local Level posts required to provide Field Security Officers in 29 locations including Afghanistan, Chile, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Tunisia. A brief justification for each country is provided in Annex D.

69.   The IASMN notes that included in these 29 posts is a proposal to restructure the security hierarchy at Offices away from Headquarters, using the model already being implemented in Beirut, Lebanon, where the Chief Security Officer would have the Chief of the Security and Safety Service and the Deputy Security Adviser reporting to him/her. The IASMN notes that the current arrangement of having the Chief of Security and Safety (P-4) serve as the CSA has proven to be ineffective with not sufficient attention being paid to the wider UN system community.

70.   Also included in this proposal are three positions in the Division of Regional Operations to provide support to the field, including a D-1 Deputy to the Director of Regional Operations. This post would permit better efficiencies at the strategic level within the Division as well as responsiveness to the field, including security requirements linked to humanitarian crises and natural disasters. A security coordination officer at the P-4 level is required for the East Africa regional section of DRO which at present is staffed with 1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 P-3 to cover 21 countries with 7,000 international and 25,000 national staff members. Of these 3,500 international and 10,000 national staff are deployed to countries with a security phase is in effect, thereby requiring additional attention. Finally, a P-4 operations officer is requested for the operations section to manage the significant surge capacity, developing deployment instructions, resolving issues and coordinating the deployments with the respective Designated Officials. The financial implications of this recommendation are contained in Annex E. (see matrix para.54, IPSS para 178).

Requirement for Surge Capacity (See recommendations contained in para 19 above)

71   The IASMN considered a report from DSS outlining the grave situation of surge capacity in DSS, which are an essential part of crisis response. The IASMN notes that DSS does not have a "standing" ready reserve deployment team of security professions. Security Advisors (SA) are deployed in various roles required to assist the Designated Official in carrying out his/her expanded duties during a crisis. The IASMN also notes the dramatic increases in the need for surge capacity deployment and activation of the DSS Crisis Coordination Centre over the past year, including a 240% increase for the first six months of 2008 when compared to 2007. Based on these figures, and given that the expectation is that security coverage will be required to respond to continuous high levels of insecurity and incidents around the world as well as a growing number of natural disasters and humanitarian crises, it will be necessary to increase the number of officers available to DSS to deploy in the field.

72.   The IASMN therefore recommends that HLCM approve the proposal that DSS be provided with additional and appropriate surge capacity, consisting of 10 Professional posts to meet urgent need. The financial requirements of this proposal are contained in Annex E.

Requirement for Security Analysts (See recommendations contained in para 20 above)

73.   The IASMN considered a proposal by DSS designed to remedy the inadequacies cited in the IPSS report with regard to the need to carry out continuous threat and risk assessments at headquarters and in the field. Noting that the HLCM had already approved a proposal to employ security analysts as part of the DSS team to support the Designated Officials and Security Management Teams, the IASMN recommends approval of the proposal to create 29 posts at the P3/P4 level for deployment to the field. Pending completion of a full review of the nature and scope of the work of the Threat and Risk Unit,

the IASMN also recommends approval for the creation of 3 P-4s to enhance regional threat coverage; 1 P-2 for information management and 2 GS for media monitoring and collation.

Security Risk Assessment

74.   The IASMN thoroughly reviewed a proposal for a revised Security Risk Assessment process. The IASMN requests DSS to modify the document, taking into account the comments made by IASMN and to circulate the finalized version electronically for approval for submission to HLCM at its fall session.

75.   The IASMN emphasizes that the Security Risk Assessment is the fundamental requirement for security management at each location where UN personnel are located; the SRA is the means by which the risks are determined for which mitigation measures (including MOSS) are required.

76.   The IASMN recalls that at its meeting in February 2008, it had recommended that Executive Heads consider a broad strategy with regard to the implementation of the UN security management system including, deciding on the level of acceptable risk that they are prepared to ask or allow their staff to take in the implementation of the mandates entrusted to them by Member States and agreeing on a Risk Management Strategy that achieves a balance between the delivery of programmes and the maintenance of safety and security of staff and assets of the organizations of the UN system. In this regard the IASMN has endorsed a useful guide entitled "What is acceptable risk?" prepared by UNICEF, which is attached as Annex C.

MOSS

77.   The IASMN thoroughly reviewed a substantive and comprehensive DSS policy proposal on a streamlined MOSS which is more closely linked to the SRA. The IASMN requests the DSS Policy Unit to proceed with a finalization of the MOSS, taking into account the comments made by the IASMN and to submit a finalized version to the next IASMN meeting.

Host Country Agreement (See recommendations contained in para 16 above)

78.   At its meeting in Washington in February 2008, the IASMN requested the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and DSS to develop a model agreement for consideration by the IASMN with a view to its eventual use by UN organizations and Security Management Teams in their discussions on the finalization of such agreements with Host Country authorities.

79.   The IASMN considered the proposed model agreement developed by OLA and DSS and recommends approval of the proposed model agreement to be concluded between the UN and the Host Country to the benefit of the members of the UN Security Management Systems, outlining the Host Country's specific responsibilities for the safety and security of UN system personnel and premises.

80.   Those organizations wishing to make final comments on the proposed model agreement are requested to submit these for final review in time for submission to HLCM.

Exclusion of DSS Offices in the Field from Cost-share Payments
(See recommendations contained in para 31 above)

81.   In connection with the conference room paper on the proposed exclusion of DSS field offices from the locally cost-shared budgets, the IASMN was informed that locally cost-shared expenses at the country level arise from MOSS implementation and other common services requirements. The DSS operational budget as approved by HLCM and the General Assembly provides only for salary costs for the authorized number of international and local posts in the country as well as related general operating expenses like rent, utilities, supplies, furniture and equipment. The DSS operational budget does not include funding for MOSS implementation or capital expenditures resulting from office relocation or refurbishments. The proposal to exclude DSS from the locally cost-shared budgets is made on grounds that local billing to DSS offices results in a two-tier billing to the UN system agencies, funds and programmes since any costs apportioned to the DSS office would have to come out of the centrally cost-shared budget for DSS and could result in charges to UN system agencies, funds and programmes that may not have a presence in that country. The IASMN agreed to further consider this matter and if not resolved amongst its membership informally to submit a formal policy proposal for consideration by HLCM.

Annex A

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(28-30 July, 2008)

CHAIRPERSON	Ms. Diana Russler (DSS)
SECRETARY	Ms. Kathy Qi (DSS)
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS	Mr. Surya Sinha

AGENCIES, PROGRAMMES AND FUNDS AND OTHER ENTITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Asian Development Bank (ADB)	Mr. Andrew Clinton
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)	Mr. Robert Erenstein
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	Mr. Alan Drew
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	Mr. Michael Hage
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)	Mr. Shahid Ahmad
International Criminal Court (ICC)	Mr. Lassi Kuusinen
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	Mr. Antonio Kamil
International Labour Organization (ILO)	Mr. Satoru Tabusa Mr. Brian Wenk
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	Mr. Warren J. Young
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Mr. Jon Shabatura
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)	Mr. Claude Vadeboncoeur
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	Mr. Robert Simpson
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)	Ms. Helena Eversole Ms. Susie Bolvenkel-Prior
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Mr. Andrew Lukach
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	Ms. Lamia Salman-El Madini
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	Ms. Janie McCusker

United Nations High Commissioner for	Mr. Raouf Mazou
Refugees (UNHCR)	
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Mr. Bill Gent
United Nations Industrial Development	
Organization (UNIDO)	Mr. Paul Maseli
United Nations Office in Nairobi/	Mr. Peter Marshal
United Nations Environment Programmel (UNON/UNEP)	
United Nations Relief and Works Agency	Ms. Laura Londen
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)	
World Food Programme (WFP)	Mr. Mick Lorentzen
World Health Organization (WHO)	Mr. Patrick Beaufour
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	Mr. Jan Van Hecke
World Bank	Ms. Autumn Hottle

DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT AND SUBSIDIARY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Department of Field Support (DFS)	Mr. Harinder Sood
Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO)	Ms. Florence Poussin
Department of Political Affairs (DPA)	Ms. Roselyn Akombe
Department of Management Medical Services (DM)	Dr. Brian Davey
Department of Safety and Security (DSS)	Mr. Gerard Martinez
	Mr. Mohammad Bani Faris
	Mr. Gerry Ganz
	Mr. Jean-Gael Ruyffelaere
International Criminal Tribunal	Mr. Kevin St. Louis
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)	
Office of the High Commissioner for	Mr. Stuart Groves
Human Rights (OHCHR)	

OBSERVERS

Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions	Mr. Rick Cottam
And Associations of the United Nations System	
(CCISUA)	
Federation of International Civil Servants	Mr. Edmond Mobio
Associations (FICSA)	

Agenda

1. Policy Issues

    a.   MOSS and SRA (CRP 8A, 8B)
    b.   Policy on the Applicability of the UNSMS to Individually Deployed Military and Police Personnel in DPKO or DPA Led Missions (CRP 9)
    c.   Use of Armed Guard (CRP 10)
    d.   UN Policy on Delivering Close Protection (CRP 11)
    e.   Host Government Agreement (CRP 16)

2. The Report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide (CRP 3, Annex A, B, C, and D)

3. Security Training (CRP 4, Annex A, B, C, and D)

4. Critical Incident Stress Management (CRP 5)

5. Information Management (CRP 6)

6. Medical Issues (mass casualty presentation)

7. Aviation Safety (CRP 7)

8. Cost of Surge Capacity (CRP 12)

9. Management and Title of the IASMN (CRP 15)

10. Other Matters

    a.   Sharing of Information Regarding Dismissal of Security Staff in the UN Common System (CRP 13)
    b.   Evaluation (CRP 14)
    c.   Budgetary Matter (CRP 17)

List of Documents

CRP 1	Agenda
CRP 2	Report of the Steering Group, Hague, June 2008
CRP 3, Annex A, B, C and D	The Report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide
CRP 4, Annex A, B, C and D	Security Training
CRP 5	Critical Incident Stress Management
CRP 6	Information Management
CRP 7	Aviation Safety
CRP 8A	MOSS
CRP 8B	SRA
CRP 9	Policy on the Applicability of the UNSMS to Individually Deployed Military and Police Personnel in DPKO or DPA Led Missions
CRP 10	Use of Armed Guard
CRP 11	UN Policy on Delivering Close Protection
CRP 12	Cost of Surge Capacity
CRP 13	Sharing of Information Regarding Dismissal of Security Staff in the UN Common System
CRP 14	Evaluation
CRP 15	Management and Title of the IASMN
CRP 16	Host Government Agreement
CRP 17	Budgetary Matter

INVENTORY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IPSS REPORT
AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS BY IASMN AND HLCM

A.   PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

IPSS RECOMMENDATION	PREVIOUS IASMN NETWORK/HLCM RECOMMENDATIONS	IASMN RECOMMENDATIONS LYON JULY 2008
1. Restoring the credibility of the UN needs to be a commitment of all parts of the system beginning with member states at their deliberations in the General Assembly, security council or other organs but also in other fora and in their own countries. The guiding spirit for all should be the principles of the Charter itself; UN staff from the highest to the lowest in the hierarchy, no matter where they serve and in what capacity, need to do their part by taking decisions and behaving in a manner that is always consistent with the Charter and Oath of Office (IPSS para 292)		The IASMN strongly endorses this recommendation which is the responsibility of all Executive Heads and Managers as well as the General Assembly and the Security Council. The IASMN recommends that a group of communications experts be established to devise an advocacy strategy.

The IASMN points out that it is also the responsibility of host governments to ensure that balanced statements are made with regard to UN programmes and activities. |
| 2. The people of the world, which | | The IASMN fully endorses this recommendation |

the UN serves, expect to hear statements from the UN that are consistent with the Organization's principles. Statements mainly by the GA and the Security Council but also by the SG are the ones most scrutinized and therefore best placed to meet these expectations and demonstrate an impartial fair and principled UN (IPSS para 292)		which requires action by member states and senior officials of the UN system.
3. When adopting resolutions that restrict contact by UN officials with local political actors, Member States need to be aware of the impact such decisions may have on the image of impartiality and neutrality of the UN and on the security of UN staff and property around the world (IPSS para 292)	HLCM has stated that The UN system should project itself as an impartial actor to facilitate conflict resolution, both from a substantive and from an external communications perspective, without prejudice to its duty to pronounce itself on violations to the principles of the UN Charter (HLCM CEBB/2008/3/Annex II para 8).	The IASMN fully endorses this recommendation which requires action by member states and senior officials of the UN system.

B.   THE GOVERNANCE OF THE UN SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

4. The SG should consider establishing an independent audit and accountability procedure to review the responsibilities of key individuals and offices concerned with the 11 December 2007 attack on the UN offices in Algiers. Such independent procedure should provide the basis for whatever	Ongoing, as established by the SG; Accountability Panel expected to finish its work within 6 weeks.	

actions the SG might decide to take with respect to those individuals and offices.(IPSS para 86)		
5. The Framework for Accountability needs to be operationalized within DSS in order to eliminate lack of clarity among staff regarding their responsibilities and reporting lines. The USG must clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the different work units in his own Department within the Framework for Accountability. (IPSS para 107)		The IASMN notes that, as is required by the General Assembly, the roles and responsibilities of the various components of DSS are outlined in the ST/SGB for the department and do not need to be included in the Framework for Accountability. The IASMN notes that the requirement to change the ST/SGB for headquarters locations and offices away from headquarters with regard to reporting lines for security has delayed the finalization of the ST/SGB. MEDIUM TERM
6. The USG for DSS should convene a working group comprising key actors and stakeholders in the UN security management system – particularly DOs and agency security managers—to review the Framework for Accountability in order to identify where further clarity may be needed (IPSS para 249)	.	The IASMN endorses this recommendation but recalls that it took over 2 years to achieve consensus on the existing Framework for Accountability. The IASMN recommends that HLCM make available the resources and level of support required to implement this recommendation. MEDIUM TERM
7. Executive managers should ensure that the Framework for Accountability is widely distributed	The IASMN has already recommended that CEB direct each of its members to ensure that the accountability framework has been	The IASMN endorses this recommendation and recommends its immediate implementation by each organization of the UN system.

through their respective Organizations. Furthermore, they should see to it that the Framework is operationalized within each organization by identifying internal lines of responsibility and accountability for security and safety. As a necessary corollary, all actors must be given the necessary training, tools and resources to fulfill their responsibilities for security (IPSS para 249)	implemented as a policy within their own organization as a means of ensuring that comparable security policies are in place across the UN system (IASMN Feb 008 para 26d(i)) The IASMN further recommended that Executive Heads thoroughly familiarize themselves with the Accountability Framework (IASMN Feb 2008 para 26d(i). Further the IASMN recommends that internal oversight mechanisms within each organization incorporate compliance with the UN security management system in their assessment process, also utilizing information available from DSS CEMU (IASMN Feb 2008 para 26d(i) HLCM also stated that "Executive Heads should ensure that the Framework for Accountability for the UN security management system, as adopted by both the CEB and the GA, is fully and actively implemented, and that all aspects of its implementation are auditable" (HLCM CEM/2008/3 Annex II para 14)	MEDIUM TERM
8.The USG/DSS should assign a senior staff member in DSS to review all those recommendations which have been made over the years and which have not been implemented. (IPSS para 90)	HLCM requested that a consolidated list be prepared for consideration by HLCM of estimate financial implications of previous recommendations arising out of reviews, investigations, lessons learned and studies conducted on the UN security management system, including summary list of all	The IASMN points out that this is an ongoing activity, using the matrix of recommendations discussed by IASMN at its meeting in February 2008. ONGOING

	activities in need of funding submitted to or recommended by HLCM (HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 12).	
9. Because of its size and diversity, the IASMN does not sufficiently reflect the needs of all members in the outcome of its work. If the IASMN is going to service the UN security management system, it must be led and supported in a manner which can produce policy guidance appropriate for the variety of its members needs. (IPSS Para 97)		The IASMN categorically and unanimously rejects as unfounded the statement contained in para 97. The IASMN members have reaffirmed their organizational positions in regards to the continuing importance of the existing security management system and its governance structure. The members unanimously wish to record that the strengths of the IASMN lie in its diversity and that it has proven beyond question to be a very decisive, pragmatic and productive body providing both strategic and policy recommendations as well as technical and operational guidance to the UN system. (See paras 12-13 in text)
10. The SG, as Chair of the CEB and the CEB must review regularly the security system, its strategy, performance and resources; consideration should be given to have the CEB/HLCM serviced by a small working group that brings in IASMN representatives and DSS to provide the substance for the decisions by CEB. (IPSS para 100)	HLCM had adopted a recommendation that Executive Heads reaffirm their commitment to the established governance mechanism for the UN security management system, ie the IASMN, the HLCM and CEB (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 13)	The IASMN endorses and fully supports the full involvement of all Executive Heads with respect to security matters. The IASMN recommends that should this small working group be established to provide substance for the decisions of the CEB shall consist of the members of the IASMN Steering Group.
11. Given the pressing and strategic nature of security-related issues and		The IASMN points out that there is danger of having security decisions made by a committee

the fact that the CEB only meets twice a year, the SG should convene a smaller senior management group, serviced by the USG/DSS, that will meet every two months, or as required by events, in order to review and decide on strategic security issues, provide policy guidance and review country-specific situations. Overall the group would ensure that senior managers of the Organization are and are seen as leading the change to a managerial culture of responsibility and proactivity on security that enables delivery of programmes (IPSS para 100)		which is outside the accountability framework. However, the IASMN also believes that Executive Heads should have a greater involvement in strategic security matters. The IASMN recommends that this small senior management group consist of Executive Heads of the field based members of the CEB together with selective members such as DFS and DPKO. The IASMN recommends that this group not be New York centric and should be consistent with the existing inter-agency security governance mechanism. See paras 11-13 in main text
12. The UN can and should expect from the host government that it provides security to the best of its ability. The central element of the cooperation and trust between the two sides is information sharing about security conditions (IPSS para 261)		The IASMN points out that whatever their means, Host Countries remain fully responsible and accountable for the security and protection of UN staff**.** The IASMN recalls that the primary responsibility for the security and protection of staff members, their spouses and eligible dependants and property, and of the organizations' property rests with the host government. This responsibility flows from every government's normal and inherent function of maintaining law and order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction.
13. The SG should consider making it a regular element of all		The IASMN fully endorses the recommendation. The IASMN recommends that the Secretary-

conversations with senior officials of Member States to promote an understanding of the need for closer cooperation on security matters, including the signing and ratification of the 1994 Convention and the 2006 Optional Protocol as a manifestation of the determination of both parties to work closely together in this crucial area of the Organizations work (IPSS para 267)		General consult Member States on how to increase adherence to the convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and the Optional Protocol thereto as well as on ways in which to broaden their scope of application to include more UN activities. LONG TERM
14. To help insure "buy in" by all Member States into the requirements of protecting UN staff and premises worldwide, a working group of senior UN officials, led by the USG/DSS and interested Member States should urgently propose practical guidance for a best practice mechanism (IPSS para 267)		The IASMN endorses this recommendation. In this connection, the IASMN considered and recommends approval of a proposed model agreement to be concluded between the Designated Official to the benefit of the members of the UN Security Management System, outlining arrangements with the Host Country concerning the safety and security of UN system personnel and premises. Those organizations wishing to make any final comments on the proposed model agreement are requested to submit these for final review in time for submission to the HLCM. SHORT TERM See paras.16, 78, 79, 80 in main text
15. The members of the Security Council should hold a special thematic session on staff security (IPSS para 267)		The IASMN endorses this recommendation.

16. The USG/DSS should further intensify his efforts on building mutual trust and cooperation with Member States on security matters. These contacts and joint efforts of members States with the UN should be reflected in the annual report to the GA on UN security (IPSS para 267)		The IASMN endorses this recommendation.
17. The SG and other members of CEB must provide strategic direction for country presences in terms of offices, staff and dependants. The size of the UN staff presence and the manner in which the system does business must be reviewed in light of security considerations and opportunities offered by modern information and communications technology (IPSS para 205 and 207)	The IASMN at its meeting in Feb 2008 recommended that Executive Heads consider the following broad strategy with regard to the implementation of the UN security management system: a.) Decide on the level of acceptable risk that they are prepared to ask or allow their staff to take in the implementation of the mandates entrusted to them by Member States; b)Agree a Risk Management Strategy that achieves a balance between the delivery of programmes and the maintenance of safety and security of staff and assets of the organizations of the UN system; c) Ensure that security is an integral part of any programme, project or activity of the organization they represent and for which they are accountable; d) Ensure that training programmes are implemented as critical steps in managing risk and crises; e) Ensure that security is provided with appropriate and sustainable funding; and,	The IASMN endorses this recommendation which is the responsibility of Executive Heads of Agencies, Programmes and Funds.

	f) Ensure that the established governance mechanism for the UN security management system, i.e. the IASMN, HLCM, and CEB, is adhered to in order to avoid confusion, duplication and decision-making on security matters outside the framework for accountability for security.	
18. It is ultimately the Executive Head of Agency and the SG himself who not only must advocate internally for integration of security into programming but who also are accountable for implementation of compliance and it is they who must advocate externally with Member States to guarantee sufficient resources so that the Organization does not have to compromise on safety measures (IPSS para 229)	The HLCM at its meeting in March 2008 stated that security must be considered as an integral part of every activity undertaken by the organizations of the UN system. Staff security and safety aspects should be included in the earliest stages of planning at all levels and especially at the country level (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 3).	The IASMN endorses this recommendation.
19. The USG/DSS should have direct and frequent access to the SG and the Executive Heads of Agency to discharge his responsibility (IPSS para 231)	The IASMN at its meeting in Feb 2008 recommended that it is critical that the senior security managers/security focal points have immediate and unimpeded access to executive level management and to be provided with adequate resources, both human and financial, to enable them to discharge their responsibilities under the Accountability Framework. (CEB/2008/HLCM 3)	The IASMN endorses this recommendation which falls within the purview of the Secretary-General. Similarly all senior security managers should have access to their Executive Heads.

20. Security must be proactively supported throughout the Organization and at each and every level. (BRAHMI para 232)	HLCM had recommended that the UN system should act cohesively on all actions and recommendations that will be formulated both as a result of the inter-agency discussion of the matter and of the outcome of the Independent Panel (HLCM/2008/3 para 2)	The IASMN endorses this recommendation

C.   THE STRUCTURE OF THE UN SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

TECHNICAL ISSUES

21. DSS should determine the best ways to acquire specialized technical expertise in areas such as blast engineers, building and aviation safety specialists, information technology and quality control for protective equipment (IPSS para 132)	With regard to aviation safety, HLCM already adopted a recommendation stating that "ICAO to advise DSS on the options and corresponding costs for the provision of system-wide guidance on aviation safety, including on available solutions internal to the UN system (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 28)	CRITICAL IMPORTANCE SHORT TERM The IASMN considered and approves a proposal developed by IASMN and ICAO to create an Aviation Risk Management Capacity within DSS consisting of three Professional and one General Service Staff. The IASMN recommends that DSS, in consultation with the ITAG consider locating this office outside New York. The financial requirements of this recommendation are outlined in **Annex E. See paras 17, 65-67 in main text.**

COMMUNICATIONS

22. There is a need to improve internal and external DSS communications since DSS does not seem to recognize and support the role of DOs as intended by the UN security management system (IPSS para 127)		In the view of the IASMN this is an internal DSS management issue.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

23. DSS should gradually take the lead role in crisis response and crisis management in the UN system (IPSS para 148)		The IASMN endorsed the active leadership of DSS in security related matters including crisis response and its involvement in the existing crisis response mechanism.
24. The UN system must establish standing crisis management support teams that can be activated when needed. Only staff with experience and proven competence in this area should be selected. They should be trained as teams and be immediately released from their regular jobs when called for deployment (IPSS para 149)		CRITICAL IMPORTANCE SHORT TERM The IASMN considered a report from DSS outlining the dramatic increases in the need for surge capacity deployment and activation of the Crisis Coordination Centre over the past year, including a 240% increase for the first six months of 2008 when compared to 2007. Noting that the need for surge capacity will not decrease and, in fact, will increase to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises, the IASMN recommends that DSS be provided with additional and appropriate surge capacity. The financial requirements for implementing this recommendation are contained in **Annex E**. See paras. 19, 71-72 in main text.
25. HQ should deploy rapid response administration personnel as part of the immediate post crisis response to help victims and/or their families understand entitlements and process claims (IPSS para 214)		IASMN recommends that HLCM direct the HR Network to consider this matter and make appropriate recommendations.

CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT

26. DSS and the agencies should	IASMN recalls that it had already said this	CRITICAL REQUIREMENT MEDIUM TERM

carefully review the need for expanding the stress counseling capacity (IPSS para 139)	in Feb 2008 when it recommended that the number of critical incident stress counselors should be significantly increased across the UN system (IASMN Feb 2008 para 26 bii)	The IASMN welcomes the progress made on achieving consensus and agreement amongst the critical incident stress counselors of the UN system. The IASMN fully endorses the recommendation that there are not enough critical incident stress counselors in the UN system and strongly recommends that the HLCM and CEB agree to make available the resources required for this purpose following submission of a strategy to be developed shortly.
27. DSS management must ensure that the health, well being and welfare of DSS staff are effectively cared for (IPSS para 140)		The IASMN endorses this recommendation but is of the view that the responsibility rests not only with DSS but with the entire membership of the UN security management Network.

DESIGNATED OFFICIALS

28. For the DO system to function as intended, it must be more effectively supported by senior managers, by staff and by the UN system The authority, responsibility and resources required to carry out this central task must converge in the DO which does not happen now (IPSS para 164)	HLCM has already adopted two recommendations on the issue of Designated Officials: "in light of the discrepancies in the application of the GA resolution requiring that the DO function is entrusted to the senior most official in the country, the value and appropriateness of such resolution should be analyzed in the context of changed security and safety related requirements" (HLCM CEB 2008/3 Annex 3 para 31); and "noting that the function of Designated Official is often the 3rd or 4th for an individual who is already tasked to be the RC, HC, etc, a comprehensive analysis of the requirements	CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION MEDIUM TERM The IASMN endorses this recommendation and recommends that this be addressed as a matter of priority by the HLCM and the UNDG.

	and limitations of such functions should be carried out (HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 32).	
29. The DO is noticeably absent as a function to resource, develop and support (IPSS para 167)		The IASMN notes the observation and reconfirms the central role of DO in the UNSMS. See matrix recommendation 28 above.
30. The panel identified a number of shortcomings in the current DO arrangements and relationship with DSS. DOs have the responsibility for ensuring that MOSS and other security measures are taken but control neither the authority nor resources to ensure their decisions are implemented (IPSS para 169)		The IASMN notes that neither the Designated Official nor DSS control resources. This recommendation must thus be addressed by HLCM.
31. Senior managers in DSS need to focus on the relations that CSA/SAs establish with DOs as well as SMTs. It is essential for efficient security management that these key actors are able to work as a team (IPSS para 170)		The IASMN recommends that the Consultative Group of DOs consider how to strengthen the dotted reporting line between the DO and DSS and to establishing an effective functioning of this relationship. This matter will be addressed in the context of security training programmes.
32. Host government should be officially informed of functions of DO (IPSS para 170)	The HLCM had already raised this as a concern, stating that "Consideration should be given to include the functions of Designated Official in the country level agreement signed between the UN and the host country (HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 33)	The IASMN was informed that the appointment of the RC as the DO is now included in the Letter of Accreditation prepared by UNDP. ONGOING
33. DO should be supported at all levels of the UN system. They	IASMN had already recommended that DOs be empowered by the CEB to ensure	The IASMN endorses this recommendation. Action to implement this recommendation rest

should be encouraged to call on senior management at DSS/HQ for guidance and support if faced with difficult situations that warrant engagement from HQ (IPSS para 174)	compliance with security policies, practices and procedures by all organizations of the UN system present at the duty station (IASMN Feb 2008 para 26 2dii).	with the CEB.
34. For a DO in HQ (OAH) locations to lead the SMS to the standards expected, the profile and resources of the DSS offices must be strengthened (IPSS para 182)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION SHORT TERM The IASMN recommends that the security structure in the Offices Away from Headquarters be amended to more adequately reflect the level of responsibility and the complexity of these functions. The financial implications of this recommendation are contained in **Annex E. See paras 18, 68-70 in the main text.**
35.. There is no reporting line between Heads of Agency and the DO; there must be a line of accountability between these two groups that mirrors that at the global level between the SG and the Executive Heads of Agency (IPSS para 242)		The IASMN disagrees with the need for this recommendation. Heads of agencies in country are responsible to their Executive Heads according to the accountability framework.
36. The issue of chain of command continues to merit attention as a means of enhancing the authority of DOs (IPSS para 244)		The IASMN agrees to this recommendation and recommends that it be considered by the Consultative Group of DOs.

DHSSS OAHS

37. Further effort is required to		IASMN believes that this is a DSS internal

clarify reporting lines in a consistent and standardized manner across the OAHs so that the DSS standards and practices, though acknowledging the different needs and responsibilities of each of the department component units are applied everywhere. All remaining contradictions should be clarified. (IPSS para 115 and 121)		management issue; however, the IASMN reiterates the critical need for the full integration of the SSS offices at OAHs in the UN security management system.
38. Setting a common agenda for HQ locations requires a clear body of policies and guidelines from the UN specifically designed for such settings. The Panel was informed that the use of field oriented policies and guidance in the FSH is not appropriate. Instead the USG/DSS should consider further developing the Headquarters MOSS (IPSS para 183)	The IASMN has already recommended that there be a common policy document that covers all aspects of security; this has been endorsed by the Office of Internal Oversight in its audit of DSS. HLCM has already endorsed the concept of a single MOSS being developed that applies to all locations.	The IASMN thoroughly reviewed a substantive and comprehensive proposal for a streamlined MOSS which would more closely be linked to the SRA. The IASMN requests the DSS Policy Unit to finalize this document, taking into account the comments made by IASMN and to submit a definitive version to the next meeting in January 2009.
39. All UN locations suffer from many years of lack of attention to and investment in security (IPSS para 183)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION SHORT TERM The IASMN notes that significant investments have been made at UN Headquarters locations and offices away from Headquarters through the PACT. With regard to UN system offices and facilities at other locations, urgent action will be required from Executive Heads in order to remedy the situation which requires significant financial investments

40. The still incomplete integration of SSS into DSS both in managerial acceptance and career prospects leads to a lack of flexibility and thus under utilization of resources for the common system (IPSS para 184)		The IASMN points out that this is a DSS internal management issue.

DSS STRUCTURE

41. The post of ASG for Safety and Security should be established to enable the USG/DSS to focus on strategic issues with the guarantee that a senior official will be available for both day to day overall management and strengthening of internal management of DSS as well as to represent the Department in the absence of the USG.(IPSS para 110 ii)	As this is a matter which has already been presented to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General at least twice before.	The IASMN endorses this recommendation. MEDIUM TERM
42. (i)The USG for Safety and Security should clearly delineate – and clarify any remaining contradictions in—the reporting line of the Chief/SSS to the CSA in Headquarters and OAHs (IPSS para 121i)

(ii)The USG/DSS should consider integrating POSS offices into the Regional desks as an alternative to | . | CRITICAL IMPORTANCE SHORT TERM
(i) The IASMN has proposed a model to integrate the structure of the Chief /SSS and the CSA in HQ and OAH. (**See Annex E on financial implications and paras 68-70 in the main text)).**

(ii) The IASMN supports the full integration of POSS into desks but also points out that the paragraph contains a factual error since the POSS |

the current stand-alone desk. POSS officers would maintain their dedicated function for peacekeeping mission environments but report to the Chiefs of the Regional Desks. A dual reporting line through a POSS senior coordination officer would remain the main link to DPKO and DFS. (IPSS para 121)		reports to the Director of Regional Operations and there are no dual reporting lines.
43. A review of the work processes of the desk would be beneficial for the Department's capacity and greatly help make better use of skill and experiences of the desk officers themselves (IPSS para 124)		In the view of the IASMN, this is an internal DSS management issue.
44. The desk officers should be out in front of emerging trends for DSS to be able to provide guidance to the UN system in a form relevant to the full scope of clients for which the department is responsible. (IPSS para. 126)		In the view of the IASMN, this is an internal DSS management issue.
45. There is a requirement for improved capacity and procedures at the Regional Desk level to bring them into line including standardizing procedures across the desks and formats used in duty stations for core documents of the UN security management system. (IPSS para 126)		In the view of the IASMN this is an internal DSS management issue.

46. Move the Regional Desks to the field (IPSS para 129 and 133)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION LONG TERM The IASMN recommends that before this issue can be considered, a full cost analysis and operational impact must be undertaken. IASMN considers this to be a **long-term project which will have significant financial implications.**

EQUIPMENT

47. The USG/DSS should consider in cooperation with agencies and Secretariat departments, expanding predeployment of security equipment to facilitate rapid distribution to duty stations in the event of a sudden negative change in the security environment (IPSS para 133)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION MEDIUM TERM The IASMN endorses this recommendation and recommends that it be considered as a **Medium Term** project, to be considered by IASMN after all aspects and especially the financial implications have been studied.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

48. The Panel strongly underlines the urgent need to develop the IT support function of DSS for the field and HQ. Without a serious level of investment within the overall framework of the UN's information technology and knowledge development, DSS will not have the capacity to exercise its leadership in UN security (IPSS para 150)	This has already been agreed by both the IASMN and HLCM through the recommendation of HLCM stating "The ICT Network in consultation with IASMN, should prepare a costed plan of action to put in place commercially available security telecommunications and information technology systems which are compatible across the UN system and with full inter-connectivity and inter-operability at all levels, in support of risk and security related	CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION SHORT TERM The IASMN strongly reiterates that, in the absence of a truly integrated and professional information management system, it will not be possible for the UN security management system to work effectively. The IASMN also points out that there continues to be a significant lack of resources for information management and security communications infrastructure which must be addressed as a matter of urgency by

	issues" (HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 21) The HLCM had also stated that "IASMN should prepare an updated project plan, with costs, for the development and maintenance of a UN security information Management system. Such system would also provide the necessary tool for sharing information and statistics on security casualties across the spectrum of UN entities and activities to support a more comprehensive analysis of the types of risks UN staff face" HLCM (CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 26)	HLCM. The IASMN regrets that the previous HLCM recommendation has not yet been implemented by the ICT Network and requests HLCM to set a deadline by which it expects to receive a plan of action from the ICT Network as requested in HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 21. (See paras.22, 45-48 in the main text)

MOSS

49. There is a need for a UN system wide minimum standard. (IPSS para 117)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION See matrix recommendation 38 above.
50. Medical preparedness needs to be developed as part of MOSS (IPSS para 200 and 207)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION MEDIUM TERM The IASMN strongly recommends that UN Medical Dispensaries be properly staffed and equipped to assist UN staff in the event of mass casualty incidents by supplementing local response capabilities to the extent practicable. The IASMN also recommends that a strategy be designed to further develop and implement a training package to enhance the Organization's capacity to respond to and manage incidents involving mass casualties, including the

		consideration of such issues as training and certifying staff, ensuring that appropriate budgetary provisions are made by legislative bodies approving mandates, entering into agreements with Member States and other measures.
51. The Panel notes that there may be an issue of Organizational liability in determining that an office is not compliant with the enhanced MOSS but requiring personnel to continue working in the premises IPSS (para 206)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION The IASMN endorses this recommendation and recommends that the CEB engage host countries on premise issues; provide HQ support to UNCT; and provide guidance to programme delivery and security consideration in vulnerable locations. The IASMN considers this to be an immediate requirement

SAFETY

52. To enhance the safety of UN personnel, a dedicated Safety Unit should be established within DSS with competent staff and resources to fulfill the safety related aspects of its mandate. As a matter of immediate priority, the Unit should facilitate development of system wide guidance on air safety (IPSS para 156)	At its Working Group meeting in Rome in July 2005, the IASMN endorsed the definition of Safety and recommended that DSS focus on fire safety, road safety and air safety.	See **para. 21** above with regard to Air Safety. The IASMN notes with appreciation the road safety campaign being undertaken by DSS.

SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

53. Various UN managers should be fully aware of their individual responsibility to make the SMT and		MEDIUM TERM The IASMN endorses this recommendation and endorses the recommendation that security

country-level arrangements work. All UN organizations should include the security responsibilities of their country office representatives in their job descriptions and post profiles. This includes the responsibility to contribute to an effective SMT in support of the DO (IPSS para 162)		responsibilities must be included in the job descriptions and post profiles for positions within all organizations of the UN system. IASMN recommends that HLCM adopt a statement requesting all organizations to implement this recommendation.

SECURITY OFFICERS

54. DSS does not have sufficient presence and resources to fully meet the mandate or specific needs of Agencies; nor is it able to provide agencies with full time and one on one service. Agencies therefore continue to require their own security personnel which should coordinate with DSS through the security cell and at the programme level through the SMT. (IPSS para 178)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION IASMN recommends approval of the request from DSS for immediate 29 professionals and 29 LL posts to provide urgently required assistance in and to the field. The financial implications of this recommendation are contained in **Annex E. See paras18, 68-70 in main text.**

SECURITY PHASES

55.. The security phase system is no longer in line with the UN's approach to security (IPSS para 195)		As a result of their politicization, the security phases which were meant to be an internal UN procedure have to a large extent lost their initial purpose. The IASMN therefore recommends that a working group be formed to further review the system in light of the SRM process

		which is now in place.
56. The Existing UN security phase system should be replaced with a system in which country and area based security measures are determined on the basis of the Security Risk assessment. DSS and the IASMN should determine the implications of such an approach to the application of MOSS, travel clearance, and other security policies and procedures (IPSS para 197)	The IASMN recommends formation of a working group to further review this issue HLCM has already stated that "Executive Heads of UN system organizations together with DSS should ensure that challenges regarding the management of security risks and phases which cannot be effectively resolved at the country level should be subject of coordinated action. This process must be quick but based on local realities (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II, para 34) At the same meeting the HLCM also stated that "A differentiated approach would be required in determining security risks and the appropriate phase, depending on specific conditions (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 35)	See matrix recommendation **para 55 above**.

SURGE CAPACITY

57. DRO needs an effective surge capacity and maintains a roster of experienced security professionals within the UN system who are willing to deploy when surge capacity is needed. (IPSS para 131 and 133))		**CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION - SHORT TERM** The IASMN recommends approval for additional surge capacity for DSS. See paras 19, 71-72 in main text.

THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT/ANALYSIS/MANAGEMENT

58. The USG/DSS should consider deployment of additional	The IASMN notes that it had already made recommendations in this regard at its	CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION SHORT TERM

| operational/tactical assessment capabilities, including establishment of analyst posts at high risk duty stations (IPSS para 136) | meeting in Feb 2008 when it stated that it strongly recommends that a security analyst be employed as part of the DSS team to support Dos and SMTs in the gathering, analysis and dissemination of relevant information be considered. HLCM has already approved this concept in its report HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 29 when it stated that "in order for any risk management strategy to be successful, it requires that information be provided in a timely and accurate basis at the country level. In this regard, the possibility that a security analyst be employed as part of the DSS team to support DOs and SMTs in the gathering, analysis and dissemination of relevant information should be considered. Both the IASMN and the HLCM recommended that "where there are existing JMACs and/or SIOCs, the terms of reference and remits for these entities would need to be broadened to ensure that they are operating on an inter-organizational and inter-departmental basis. (IASMN Feb 2008 para 18, HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 30).The IASMN will consider additional resources for security analysts (CRP 21) in selective high risk countries at its meeting in July 2008. | The IASMN endorses this recommendation and recommends approval of a proposal to create 29 posts at the P-3/P-4 level to provide accurate and timely information at vulnerable duty stations. An additional 6 posts are recommended to strengthen the threat and risk assessment capabilities at Headquarters. In addition, country level SIOCs should be created in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen as a matter of priority. The financial implications of this recommendation are contained in annex E. See paras 20, 73 in main text) |
| 59. USG/DSS should provide the UNDP Administrator as head of | HLCM had approved a recommendation stating that "any risk management | The IASMN recommends that these security risk assessments should be provided to ALL |

UNDG as well as Executive Heads with a security risk assessment for high risk non mission environments where the UN has a presence. The UNDG thus will be able to recognize risk and commit to measures for mitigations (IPSS para 136)	framework must provide the different types of risks linked to the variety of mandates of UN system organizations, as current and future security challenges are not and will not be solely linked to terrorism and criminality, including cyber criminality, but also to conflict situations, to diseases and to an increasing number of natural and manmade disasters, including those resulting from climate change. Security-related assessments and analyses should also cater for sociological and cultural variables (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 5)	Executive Heads of agencies, programmes and funds. Information should not be restricted to only one part of the UN system MEDIUM TERM
60. All CSA/SA and DO/SMT should be fully familiar with the SRA model which is complex and its implementation needs to be strengthened and improved. DSS needs to exercise active and creative leadership using innovative training, briefing and discussion methods to achieve this goal (IPSS para 187)	HLCM has adopted the following statement "Security Risk Assessments should be conducted regularly by the SMT through the chief security advisor at all duty stations at country, capital and sub-office/deep field location levels to ensure that the requisite mitigating measures are identified and implemented. This should be done in accordance to a structured risk management strategy which would take into consideration the delivery of programmatic mandates, staff security and safety at all levels, in accordance with the specificies of security requirements of individual organizations (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 4) HLCM had also adopted the following	CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION SHORT TERM The IASMN fully endorses this recommendation and points out that significant financial resources will be required to ensure that all staff are appropriately trained. The IASMN strongly reiterates that training with specific emphasis on security risk management remains a critical issue for DOs and SMTs.

	recommendation with regard to Risk Management Training "Risk management training programmes should be implemented as critical steps in managing risk and crises. The risk model developed by UNICEF offers a good starting point for consistent application under the aegis of UNDSS, considering generic and specific risk factors applicable to each of the UN system organizations." (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 7)	
61. USG/DSS and DPKO should be required to provide the Security Council with a security risk assessment for all peacekeeping and special missions that the Security council decides to establish. On the basis of that analysis of the security implications for UN personnel, the council will ensure that resources are made available for mitigating measures (IPSS para 267)		The IASMN endorses this recommendation but points out that it should also be extended to include DPA.
62. The proper use of SRAs should provide the opportunity to identify specific needs of programmes, projects and activities which should inform the design of security measures. (IPSS para 287)	IASMN had already recommended that Executive Heads should agree a Risk Management Strategy that achieves a balance between the delivery of programmes and the maintenance of safety and security of staff and assets of the organizations of the UN system (IASMN Feb 2008 para 9b). Further IASMN had recommended that security must be	The IASMN thoroughly reviewed a proposal for a revised Security Risk Assessment process. The IASMN requests DSS to modify the document, taking into account comments made by the members and to circulate the finalized version electronically for approval and for submission to HLCM for its fall session. The IASMN emphasizes that the Security Risk Assessment is the fundamental requirement for

	considered as an integral part of every activity undertaken by the organizations of the UN system and must not be treated as an add-on either for programmatic or budgetary purposes. The IASMN recommended that the existing mechanism for security risk management must be integrated into programme planning and design, including the development of individual project proposals and in planning frameworks such as CCA/UNDAF and CHAP/CAP. (IASMN Feb 2008)	security management at each location where UN personnel are located; the SRA is the means by which the risks are determined for which mitigation measures (including MOSS) are required. The IASMN reiterates the importance of Executive Heads and senior managers (please see matrix para 17 above for broad strategies recommended by the IASMN in February 2008). In this connection the IASMN thanks UNICEF for having provided a guideline for how to determine what is acceptable risk. (**see Annex C**)

TRAINING

63. Further attention to and resources for educating all actors within the UN security management system on the principles, policies, rationale and purpose of security is a vital need IPSS (para 144)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION MEDIUM TERM The IASMN endorses this recommendation, noting that additional resources will be required and requesting DSS to prepare a comprehensive training package with required cost requirements for the next meeting.
64. TDS should prioritize planning, development of training packages and standards as well as monitoring of the impact of training. Implementation should be carried out by the various stakeholders (IPSS para 146)		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION MEDIUM TERM The IASMN endorses this recommendation .
65. TDS should hire a former DO		CRITICAL RECOMMENDATION

as part of its training team to support the design of SMT training packages as well as to provide real life experience and insight to incoming DOs on their role, challenges and guidelines (IPSS para 146)		The IASMN does not endorse this recommendation but recommends instead that the Consultative Group of Designated Officials be utilized for this purpose.
66. A dedicated Safety and Security Training Centre should be established as part of the UN Staff College as the focal point for all safety and security training within the UN (IPSS para 146)		The IASMN endorses this recommendation in principle but believes it must be considered in the **long term** with a cost benefit analysis to be undertaken.
67. DSS and UNDP as the administering support agency for RCs should design a comprehensive training programme for DO and Heads of Agency. They should consult a number of experienced DOs to ensure that the programme does meet all the needs of new DOs (IPSS para 174)	This is the result of a recommendation already adopted by HLCM that "The Human Resources Network, in consultation with IASMN and the UN system staff college should formulate costed plans of action to ensure that the appropriate level and amount of training is provided to all Dos prior to their deployment (HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 18)	On going. DSS and UNDP are discussing training. DSS is hosting a DO consultative group meeting with 5 serving DOs in November 2008 at UN SSC.

D.   THE FUNDING OF THE UN SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

68. It is ultimately the Executive Head of Agency and the SG himself who not only must advocate internally for integration of security into programming but who also are accountable for implementation of	The HLCM at its meeting in March 2008 stated that security must be considered as an integral part of every activity undertaken by the organizations of the UN system. Staff security and safety aspects should be included in the earliest stages of planning at	The IASMN endorses this recommendation.

compliance and it is they who must advocate externally with Member States to guarantee sufficient resources so that the Organization does not have to compromise on safety measures (IPSS para 229)	all levels and especially at the country level (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 3)	

E.   HUMAN RESOURCES/ADMINISTRATON FOR THE UNSMS

69. The EO of DSS is responsible for staff worldwide; its administrative capacity should reflect this responsibility. The DSS EO should be provided with the necessary resources and delegation of authority to assume full administrative responsibility for all DSS staff, including recruitment (IPSS para 160)		The IASMN endorsed the recommendation but points out that it is a **LONG TERM** project. In order to make this recommendation viable, additional resources, change of policy, system and practices such as, condition of services, will be required, to be approved by the General Assembly.
70. The USG/DSS should engage Member States to review and propose the best option available for the conversion of the DSS budget to the UN regular budget, for recommendations to the General Assembly (IPSS para 225)		The IASMN notes this recommendation and points out that CEB direction and action is required.
71. The USG/DSS should engage with donor countries to establish the Principle of "no programme without security" in which security is streamlined as an integral part of		The IASMN strongly endorses this recommendation which requires CEB direction and action. The IASMN recommends that HLCM refer this matter to the FB Network for consideration and recommendation as soon as

the programming. The same standards and methods for financing security should be adopted across agencies, in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration which called for the harmonization of donor budget processes (IPSS para 225)		possible.
72. When Member States require the UN to take on responsibilities in difficult environments they must also commit the necessary resources to safely carry out these mandates (IPSS para 236)	HLCM stated that "Member States should be engaged with UN system organizations to ensure that security is provided with appropriate and sustainable funding, including through the establishment of an appropriate framework for extra-budgetary funding of safety and security based on an objective assessment of needs in the field" (HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II para 9) Further, "analysis of funding sources should be developed taking into consideration alternative business models. Financial support from public and private channels should be sought, as appropriate. The FB Network, in consultation with IASMN, can assist in identifying alternative and programming mechanism for inclusion of security-related resources in programme costs (HLCM CEB/2008/3/Annex II, para 11)	The IASMN fully endorses this recommendation.
73. Pending UN HR management reforms, DSS security professionals on UNDP contract should gradually		While the IASMN endorses the recommendation in principle, this is a **long-term project** and a full cost benefit analysis is

be transferred over to the DSS contracts and all new recruitments should be through DSS (IPSS para 160)		required to determine whether a change of system would be positive for the UN security management system. In addition, additional resources, change of policy, system and practices such as, condition of services, will be required.
74. The recruitment pool from which DSS draws security professionals should be expanded to include qualified staff from agencies, peacekeeping missions as well as NGOs(IPSS para 180)		The IASMN points out that this recommendation is already being implemented.
75. Selection panels for CSA/SA must include representation from agencies and DPKO (IPSS para 180)		The IASMN points out that this has been implemented by DSS since early 2005.
76. The professional level and experience of security advisers should be commensurate with both the security environment at the duty station and the grading of his/her peers on the SMT. DSS in conjunction with DM should review the post grading structure of country and area level security advisers based on their role and responsibilities as members of the SMT (IPSS para 180)		The IASMN endorses this recommendation and requests DSS to prepare a proposal to be considered as part of the **long term review** of the UN security management sytem.
77. To facilitate the exchange of security advisers, a system-wide policy or guideline (e.g. on		The IASMN endorses this recommendation and points out that it requires close coordination with the HR Network as a **medium term**

secondment and surge capacity support) should be developed by DSS and agencies (IPSS para 180)		project.
78. The UN needs to be seen as proactively addressing the problems related to the perception that national and international employees are not treated in an equal manner. (IPSS para 211)		IASMN recommends that HLCM refer this matter to the HR Network.
79. The senior management of the UN and its agencies, funds and programmes should aim to articulate a statement of Employer Responsibility. The statement should outline the Organization's measures to manage risk, the duties of staff for risk mitigation and the measures in place to ensure that staff and their dependants are cared for when, despite all reasonable measures to protect staff, incidents do occur (IPSS 214)	HLCM stated that "the HR offices of the UN system organizations should undertake a review of the 269 families of victims who lost their lives to malicious acts since 1992 to determine the lessons learned and to develop strategies for the future. The HR Network should coordinate such a review (HLCM CEB/2008 Annex II para 23) In addition the HLCM requested the HR Network, in consultation with the FB Network and IASMN, as well as with the Network of stress counselors, should develop a proposal to improve and harmonize financial and psychosocial support for survivors and families in the event of a crisis, building on lessons learned from the attacks in Baghdad and Algiers (HLCM CEB 2008/Annex II para 25)	IASMN recommends that HLCM refer this matter to the HR Network.
80. Staff should be regularly updated and informed through a compensation and benefits guide in a clear, easy to follow manner		The IASMN recommends that HLCM refer this matter to the HR Network

(IPSS para 214)		
81. The Hazard pay system should be harmonized among the Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programmes (IPSS para 214)		Hazard pay is administered by the ICSC. The Chairman of ICSC has confirmed that there is no issue. The system is harmonized, as decided by the General Assembly. However, the IASMN recommends that HLCM refer this matter to the HR Network.
82. Options for extending the locally-decided MORSS to national staff should be reviewed based on the safety concerns of staff themselves as well as the country specific threat and risk assessment (IPSS para 214)		The IASMN recommends that HLCM refer this matter to the HR Network.
83. The UN should develop the means to provide all staff and associated personnel with all relevant information regarding possible deployment, including risks, mitigating measures and entitlements, enabling them to make informed decisions on accepting assignments to a specific duty stations (IPSS para 237)		The IASMN fully endorses this recommendation and recommends that the HLCM refer this matter to the HR Network.

Guidelines for Determining Acceptable Risk

1)   Determining acceptable risk is a difficult process and one for which there is no definitive solution or precise cut-off line. It is rather an issue of sound judgement and balanced decision-making on a case-by-case basis that follows a threat and risk assessment process. This process is Risk Management and could be broken down into the following stages:

- **Identify programme** / **project goals**. In higher risk situations there will be a need to prioritize these goals. More important goals may dictate that the organization accept a higher level of risk to achieve results.
- **Identify and assess the threats faced**. These are the obstacles that threaten the achievement of programme goals.
- **Identify the risk** by looking at the likelihood and impact of the threats affecting the UN and each agency. Impact assessment is very important. Understanding how bad something could be is essential to discussion of acceptable risk. In other words, how bad an event can we accept?
- **Identify how to manage the risks identified**. In other words, this is putting in place measures that will lower the risk and evaluating if the measures are working.
- Over all, there is a need to answer a number of critical questions. "How important is the activity?" "Will the anticipated gains justify accepting a high level of risk? Has enough been done to lower the risk to a level that is reasonable to expect staff to take?" "Do we think that the risks we have identified are manageable?"

2)   If the answers to the above are "yes" then it is possible to proceed. If the answers are "no" then alternative options should be considered to achieve the goals.

3)   In the management of security, there are some whom might advocate that by the nature of our business we should expect and plan for staff to die, or be seriously injured, in the line of duty. This concept contradicts the basic UN principle that the health, safety and security of staff is paramount. In this connection, a safer and more structured risk-management approach would be to reduce the risk of staff to a level deemed to be responsible and manageable that will allow for successful programme delivery.

4)   In other words, the unnecessary death or serious injury of staff must not be accepted. We will do what we can to prevent this and proceed in the knowledge that if the mission is so important, then death or serious injury could happen despite our best laid plans.

5)   Finally, if we follow the risk management process and decide to conduct programme activities in areas of projected high risk, it is very important to evaluate the effectiveness of the programme activities in regards to achievement of the relevant goal(s). If the programme action adds value then there may be justification to continue. However, if activities were not possible or did not add value to the programme, then it may be that that the benefits are not sufficient enough to justify continuing to exposing staff or the organization to such level of risk. This is to say that without programme success or benefit, previously acceptable levels of risk become unacceptable.

Justification for additional field security posts

Countries	Justification
Afghanistan	The security structure in Afghanistan is heavily reliant on DPKO funded posts and does not provide for the renewed SC mandate to strengthen and expand UN field presence. Accordingly, the 'core' RB funded DSS posts will be unable to sustain the extension of programme activity to the provincial level. Seven additional posts will facilitate the conversion of currently held DPKO posts to assist in maintaining the critical DFSCO regional posts, add the required depth to the structure and enhance integration to SIOC level.
Chile	This duty station is the Headquarters for the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and includes the presence of 10 UN system organizations, comprising a total of 417 national staff, 219 international staff and 1078 eligible dependants. Chile's greatest risk is that it is situated in a highly active seismic and volcanic region prone to earthquakes and tremors. Common street crime and the usage of weapons in the commission of these crimes are on the rise, as is residentially related crime, which presents a problem for the UN system at large. There is also an increase in violent social activism, mainly in eastern part of Santiago where the UN system offices are located during which some have been subject to occupation by social activist groups. Currently, the ECLAC Chief of the Security and Safety Section (SSS) has dual functionality as the Chief of SSS for ECLAC and as the DSS Security Adviser for the UN system presence throughout the country. Based on the above, it is recommended that 1 UNDSS CSA be recruited for Chile who would be responsible for all UN system activities within Chile (to include ECLAC headquarters) and with regional responsibilities for Paraguay as well.
Ethiopia	Ethiopia has a large UN presence with a total over 2700 staff and 4500 dependents. The Economic and Social Commission for Africa (UN ECA) in Addis Ababa continues to expand with new office buildings and includes a large conference centre. DPKO has a significant presence in Addis Ababa with one mission (UNMEE) and several offices connected to the African Union. Over 2000 staff of UN agencies work on large UN humanitarian and development programmes The UN response to droughts and food insecurity is among the largest programmes globally. Ethnic and political tensions prevail in many areas of the country. Regional aspects, such as the border dispute with Eritrea and the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, require additional vigilance and security planning efforts. Tribal tensions and banditry pose significant security risks for UN field operations, and military operations are ongoing in some areas of the country, most notably in the Somali region. The current DSS staffing (ECA SSS: 1P4, 1P3, 1 P2, DSS Field posts: 1 P4, 2 P3), whereby the Security Adviser (DSS field post) and the UN ECA Chief of Security and Safety are both at the P4 level, lacks the required senior post to unify the DSS reporting structure. The proposed P5 Chief Security Adviser will provide the required level of seniority and allow to clearly delineate responsibilities for UN field and UN ECA security management.
Jordan	In our Vulnerability Matrix, Jordan has been designated as a country of 'critical concern', along with Lebanon. With increasing threat and with many UN offices/ dependants of Iraq and Israel (Phase III and IV) located in Jordan, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the current staff to provide security support to all Jordan based-Iraq UN agencies/ staff and dependants. (Jordan Programs are staffed by 148+347 International and national staff whereas Iraq Programs in Jordan have 315 international and 383 national staff). 9 FSCOs of 8 UN agencies are present in Jordan, indicating the significance and importance placed on security in this country. Since the bombing of the UN office in Baghdad in 2003 there have been many concerns as to the increased risks due to the decision to locate the UNAMI office and UN Iraq Agencies offices in Jordan. Hence, it is proposed to provide a P-3 position in Jordan, exclusively to focus on physical security of premises and MOSS compliance and issues thereof.
Kenya	Kenya has a very large UN presence mostly concentrated in Nairobi, with a total of over 4500 staff and 10000 dependents, 85 offices of Agencies, Funds and Programmes, including several regional offices and the Somalia programme. The Gigiri compound is the largest facility of the United Nations worldwide and comprises the United Nations office in Nairobi, as well as the headquarters of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and UN-Habitat. Kenya is also a major regional hub for UN operations, with Mombasa as the main port in East Africa for UN logistics. Field programmes in Kenya comprise several large refugee camps in the North of the country at the borders to Sudan and Somalia (Security Phase III), and new programmes in areas affected by the post-election crisis in the West of Kenya. Risks for staff security in Kenya include political instability, ongoing tribal tensions and armed conflict in some areas, as well as high crime rates. The current DSS staffing and seniority (UNON SSS: 1P5, 1P3, 1 P2, DSS Field posts: 1 P4) is not commensurate with the level of UN operations in the country, in particular to manage security for the vast staff and UN assets in Nairobi. Moreover, the present staffing does not provide for the required coverage for field locations. The proposed additional staffing (1 D1, 1 P5, 3 P3) will provide the required level of seniority and capacity to oversee the enormous security programme

	and will allow the current CSA & Chief of Security and Safety of UNON to focus on the management of the SSS uniformed officers and the security installations and construction at the Gigiri compound. The additional P3 posts will provide for appropriate coverage of field duty stations and additional flexibility to respond to emergencies.
Mauritania	With the recent murder of French tourists by suspected Al Qaeda sympathizers and a brazen grenade attack on a nightclub, it is clear that a single UNDSS SA cannot provide the required level of security support to the UN agencies operating in the country. In addition, there is a well known weapons smuggling route that goes through the country, emerging anti-west sentiment and pro Al Qaeda affiliations being discovered on a frequent basis. Mauritania is part of the African Maghreb countries that has active pro Al Qaeda segments of society. A deputy position would be highly desirable.
Morocco	Given the prevailing security situation in Morocco with the recent declaration of Phase I for the country and the relocation of UN staff to new premises in Rabat, in combination with the continuing threats against UN staff and premises in the Maghreb countries it has been determined that an additional security officer's post should be authorized to face the ongoing security challenges. The organization of the Al Qaeda in the Maghreb remains a real threat to UN operations in the North African countries and it is imperative that safety and security concerns are addressed in a proper way.
Pakistan	Serious deterioration in the security situation and the poor prognosis requires four additional posts to establish an Operations capability and a SIOC to remain abreast of the complex environment. There is a clear resource gap in the current UNDSS staff structure to provide information/analysis support to UN staff security in Pakistan. The urgent need to establish a SIOC to reinforce inter-action with the Afghanistan SIOC prevents the necessary sub-regional overview and the provision of sound analysis on cross border issues.
Somalia	The ongoing insecurity in Somalia and the active confrontation between competing factions is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. As a consequence more that five percent of the population (about 400,000 people) have been displaced by conflict and the lack of infrastructure and administrative capacity by local authorities adds greatly to the burden faced by UN staff members operating in the region. Indeed, the targeting of aid workers by extremist groups is likely to remain a significant and possibly growing threat, adding to the difficulties of delivering support to the population at risk. Thus the addition of two security officers to the present complement is intended to establish an increased capacity to provide an appropriate level of professional security support in a highly volatile security environment.
Sri Lanka	Increasing political instability within Sri Lanka. Rising terrorist activity in the capital and elsewhere in the country and the tempo of military operations in LTTE areas requires three additional staff (one FSCO and two analysts) to keep abreast of programme activity, associated staff movement and establishment of a permanent SIOC capability.
Thailand	This duty station is the Headquarters for the Economic & Social Commission for Asia Pacific (ESCAP), plus 26 UN Agencies, with a total of 1,266 national staff, 643 international staff and 1,956 eligible dependants. A number of military coups and high profile, disruptive and protracted demonstrations over past years is indicative of the country's vulnerability to political instability and civil unrest. Internal security problems associated with Islamic militancy and ethnic tensions in the south and border areas (Cambodia & Myanmar) present elevated levels of risk to UN staff and activities. Currently, the ESCAP Chief of Security and Safety Section has dual functionality and responsibilities as the DSS Security Adviser. The duties of this post consume the majority of the incumbent's effort. A P5 CSA is required to embrace an overview of the general security situation to assist AFP in operations outside the Capital and to enable humanitarian operations in the security troubled regions of the country.
Tunisia	Common street crime violence is on the rise, as is residentially related crime, presenting a problem for permanently assigned staff. With the continuing threats against UN staff and premises in the Maghreb countries it has been determined that an additional security officer's post is needed to ensure proper security coverage for UN personnel operating in Tunisia. The organization of the Al Qaeda in the Maghreb remains a real threat to UN operations in the North African countries and it is imperative that safety and security concerns are addressed.

LIST OF COUNTRIES WHERE SECURITY ANALYSTS
ARE REQUIRED

In connection with the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit, the independent panel found that the resources available to the Unit to carry out continuous threat and risk assessments are inadequate (four professional level posts at Headquarters, and no dedicated resources at the field level). Consequently, the panel recommended the establishment of analyst posts for high-risk duty stations. Furthermore, in its recommendation to the CEB, the HLCM has recently proposed (HLCM CEB/2008/3 Annex II para 29) that security analysts should be employed as part of the DSS team to support Designated Officials and Security Management Teams to ensure that information is provided in a timely and accurate basis. These posts would also provide a much needed analytical capability to better understand the current and developing security situation through enhanced security analysis and trend identification. These functions are normally beyond the capacity of an unsupported CSA in a complex, high-risk duty station. The following is the list of countries where security analysts are required.

Afghanistan	Indonesia	Libya	Opt/WB/Israel
Algeria	Iran	Mali	Philippines
Azerbaijanan	Iraq	Mauritania	Saudi Arabia
Bangladesh	Jordan	Morocco	Syria
Egypt	Kosovo	Nepal	Tanzania
Eritrea	Kuwait	Niger	Thailand
Ethiopia	Lebanon	Nigeria	Tunisia
India			

Resource requirements

Posts

Purpose	No. of posts	Level	Total
Aviation Safety	1	P-5	
	2	P-4	
	1	GS	4
IASMN Secretariat	1	P-4	
	1	GS	2
Field Security staffing	1	D-1	
	4	P-5	
	7	P-4	
	17	P-3	
	29	LL	58
Security Analysts - field	15	P-4	
	14	P-3	29
Security Analysts – HQ	3	P-4	
	1	P-2	
	2	GS	6
SIOC	25	P-4	25
Surge capacity	10	P-4	10
DRO management and operational capacity	1	D-1	
	2	P-4	3
Training and development	4	P-4	4
TOTAL			142*

* represents an overall increase of 20.5 per cent over current staffing levels

Financial resources

	Resource requirements			
		Onetime, Non-		
	Posts	*recurrent*	*Recurrent*	*Total*
Aviation Safety	642,000	118,049	60,417	820,466
IASMN Secretariat	257,300	52,490	30,209	339,999
Division of Regional Operations				
Field Security Staffing	7,133,500	493,000	1,458,700	9,085,200
Security Analysts – Field	5,542,000	493,000	1,284,700	7,319,700
Security Analysts - Headquarters	815,500	161,755	90,626	1,067,881
Security and Information Operations Centre (SIOC)	5,165,000	425,000	1,107,500	6,697,500
Surge Capacity	1,804,400	283,900	601,000	2,689,300
DRO management and operational capacity	601,200	113,764	45,313	760,277
Training and development	721,600	113,500	60,417	895,517
Total	**22,682,500**	**2,254,458**	**4,738,882**	**29,675,840**

* The above staff costs ($22,682,500) have been calculated at standard incumbency rates for the purpose of establishing an on-going estimate. It should be noted however that, when submitted to the General Assembly and in keeping with current budgetary practices, these costs will be calculated at reduced initial incumbency rates (50% and 65 % for Professionals and General Service/Local Level, respectively) during the first biennium. Thus, the cost of the new posts that will be submitted to the General Assembly for its approval will amount to $11,613,720 (at current standard costs).

United Nations

General Assembly

Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 116

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[*on the report of the Fifth Committee (A/55/532/Add.1 and Corr.1)*]

55/232. Outsourcing practices

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 54/256 of 7 April 2000,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on outsourcing practices[1] and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,[2]

1.   *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to ensure that programme managers are guided by the following four basic reasons for outsourcing:

(*a*)   To acquire technical skills not readily available within the Organization, including accessing state-of-the-art technologies and expertise or acquiring needed flexibility to meet quickly changing circumstances;

(*b*)   To achieve cost savings;

(*c*)   To provide a source more effectively, efficiently or expeditiously;

(*d*)   To provide an activity or service not needed on a long-term basis;

2.   *Affirms* that at least the following three significant goals must be considered with regard to the use of outsourcing by the United Nations:

(*a*)   To respect the international character of the Organization;

(*b*)   To avoid a possible negative impact on staff;

(*c*)   To ensure appropriate management and/or control over the activities or services that have been outsourced;

3.   *Affirms also* the firm commitment of the United Nations to provide fair treatment on as wide a geographical basis as possible to all participants involved in United Nations procurement activities, including outsourcing;

---

[1] A/55/301.
[2] A/55/479.

4.   *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to consider outsourcing actively in accordance with the guidance and goals mentioned above and to ensure that programme managers satisfy all of the following criteria in their assessment of whether or not an activity of the Organization could be fully, or even partially, outsourced:

(*a*)   Cost-effectiveness and efficiency: this is considered to be the most basic criterion; unless it can be adequately demonstrated that an activity can be done significantly more economically and, at the very least, equally efficiently, by an external party, outsourcing may not be considered;

(*b*)   Safety and security: activities that could compromise the safety and security of delegations, staff and visitors may not be considered for outsourcing;

(*c*)   Maintaining the international character of the Organization: outsourcing may be considered for activities where the international character of the Organization is not compromised;

(*d*)   Maintaining the integrity of procedures and processes: outsourcing may not be considered if it will result in any breach of established procedures and processes;

5.   *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session on the following:

(*a*)   Progress achieved with regard to the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution, including information on the location and type of outsourced activities and the reason therefor;

(*b*)   The activities outsourced during the years 1999-2000, by providing similar detailed information as mentioned in paragraph 5 (*a*) of the present resolution;

6.   *Requests* the Joint Inspection Unit to conduct a management audit review of outsourcing in the United Nations and the United Nations funds and programmes in accordance with existing practice and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session.

89th plenary meeting
23 December 2000

CCISUA

FICSA

On Staff Safety and Security – Restoring Confidence and Morale

JOINT STATEMENT
IASMN, Lyon, July 2008

---

1. The Presidents of CCISUA and FICSA thank the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for the opportunity to provide this joint statement. Staff safety and security is something our Federations, our member unions and associations and all staff recognize as the cornerstone of effective programme delivery.

2. We welcome the *Report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide* commonly referenced as the "Brahimi Report" whose recommendations represent a valuable and important step toward restoring the confidence and morale of the staff. However, what the staff are waiting to see is a full, objective and transparent accountability procedure in line with the report's recommendation. This should include a full assessment of responsibility at all levels of the UN System, as well as with the host government.

3. We are concerned that the Brahimi report did not focus on the shortcomings of the host country in security related matters prior to, or following the attacks. The report seemed to praise the host country for the fact that no attacks had previously been carried out against UN staff. However, we are not aware of any evidence that the UN was under threat in Algiers prior to March 2006, when Ayman al-Zawahiri declared UN staff as targets. It is unclear what the host country has done to investigate the attacks of 11 December 2007 and to bring any surviving co-conspirators to justice.

4. We deeply regret that the Independent Panel did not consult either of our Federations. Many of our member unions have highlighted the importance of staff safety and security both to our administrations and our Governing Bodies. CCISUA had invited the Panel to meet with its General Assembly (composed of 15 staff unions and associations from across the Common System and involving a delegation from FICSA) in early April, but received no response from the Panel. While we were fortunate to have some individual staff representatives and union / association presidents heard by the panel, we believe that had the Panel sought a greater voice of staff representatives, and in particular discussed the issue at the global level with our Federations, the report would have better reflected the concerns of staff.

5. If the results of this accountability process are to be credible, the Accountability Panel must look beyond placing blame on a small number of low-level

international civil servants, and its recommendations must be implemented. Surely all those who played a role in the events leading up to this disaster should be held accountable. However, the investigation must look closely at whether the political and financial resources were made available (by the Organizations and the Member States) to guard against threats, and the extent to which the non-implementation of IASMN recommendations played a role. While we would have appreciated the opportunity to clarify the role of the panel and its procedures, there was no contact or correspondence with our Federations before this panel was commissioned. The terms of reference for the Accountability Panel should be made public, with all evidence-gathering procedures reflecting international best practice. Furthermore, any staff member believing that an interview may result in discipline should retain the right to have a staff representative present during the proceedings.

6. An important conclusion found in the report – and one which reflects what our field-based staff have said, and our Federations have supported for some time – is that for many years, the focus of security measures has been on international staff. Whereas national staff make up almost 75% of our personnel in the field, it is troubling that the report references only the "perception" of discrimination, as we believe that this discrimination manifests itself in very real ways for national staff.

7. In remote duty stations, including those in border regions, a national staff member may be many kilometres away from her home, family and support network. In these circumstances, national staff face the same problems with respect to security, isolation and access to resources as international staff. In cases where ethnic or religious tensions are involved, they may be even more targeted than their international counterparts. The UN system has a moral obligation to provide these people with the same protections as are provided for expatriate staff, without compromise. In addition, mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that UN staff – and particularly national staff – can communicate with the Security Management Team (SMT) and have their voices heard. Locally recruited staff from across the system are seeking to become more involved in security issues, through training and active participation in implementation measures.

8. While we welcome the "Model Supplementary Agreement with Host Government" produced in the latest IASMN session, as it strengthens and clarifies the obligations of the Host Country vis-à-vis the UN and its staff, the responsibility of the Organizations themselves cannot be downplayed. As the report points out, "As an employer, the UN continues to be morally and legally responsible for what happens to its personnel." We are troubled by the numerous occasions where the primary responsibility for certain security decisions is placed on the staff member ("risk-transfer" whereby the staff member is expected to assume the liability for taking a decision that in our opinion should be assumed by the Organization). While it is true that each staff member bears a heavy responsibility for his / her personal safety and security, the Organizations must be primarily accountable in a number of areas, including:

- Whether an office or project should be present in a given location;
- What types of contracts will be allowed for use in high-risk locations;
- Whether, and under what conditions a mission will be authorized to a particular duty station;

- By what means a staff member will be expected to travel to this location, and
- What additional measures might be required in duty stations in which women's rights are less respected.

9. The issue of the employment relationship, particularly as regards consultants, external collaborators, SSAs, or other forms of supposedly "independent" service providers, pose real problems. The improper use of these types of precarious contracts, sometimes to do "regular" work of the office, should not disqualify these people (and their families) from coverage by the internal security measures. As the report notes that these contractors are "paid to provide [their] own security arrangements" it is essential that the Organizations ensure that the contract provided for a particular job corresponds to the actual employment relationship warranted by that job, and that in cases of doubt, all necessary security measures are extended to these individuals.

10. UN security staff, Designated Officials and members of the Security Management Team should always and without exception be recruited and selected on the basis of merit and experience. There must be no tolerance for political appointments in this critical area. In addition, the UN must guard against situations where Designated Officials are required to balance political or programme delivery considerations against security concerns. Wherever such conflicts exist, there should be mechanisms in place to ensure that security issues are not overlooked.

11. Our Federations place a great deal of importance on broad and regular training on security matters. All UN staff and consultants should be trained and updated on security measures that they as individuals are expected to take. At present most staff are asked to undergo a computer-based training programme. While the ubiquitous nature and quality of this system are notable, more direct contact between security personnel and staff is desirable. Further, staff members receive a certificate, which is valid for life, whereas the knowledge acquired in the relatively short training programme cannot be expected to last indefinitely.

12. While the Brahimi Report criticizes the IASMN as being "unwieldy" and as a result unable to serve its members' needs, the input of our Federations has always been appreciated by the Network. Our Federations were particularly surprised by the extent to which the recommendations[1] made, either by the IASMN or in reports issued following specific security incidents, have not been fully implemented. Of the 89 recommendations, nearly 70%, to date, have not been implemented. The situation is made all the more deplorable in light of the fact that the majority of these shortcomings are due to lacking resources and poor management. This should be a primary focus of the Accountability Panel.

13. The United Nations, the General Assembly, and the entire Common System must address budgetary issues on an urgent basis. The United Nations Common System cannot function unless its personnel are guaranteed a minimum level of safety and security – and it is only from this commitment to "leading the change to a managerial culture of responsibility and proactivity on security [can] enable delivery of programmes." This extends to the security of premises, where the logic of housing multiple UN agencies in common premises has come into question.

---

[1] See Annex D to IASMN CRP 3, July 2008

Any consideration of common premises must be accompanied by adequate resources to ensure that the location is well-protected and secure.

14. History has shown that this will not be the last attack on UN staff, and we must now operate under the assumption that we will again be targeted and that lives will be lost.. Both CCISUA and FICSA contend that staff representatives have a role to play in all levels of discussion, pre- and post-incident, at the inter-agency level as well as within each individual organization. The presence of a staff representative, while respecting the confidential nature of the discussions, will ensure that staff interests are taken into account in both policy development and implementation.

15. As representative Federations, we pride ourselves on the consultations we regularly carry out with our members in all duty stations. As such, we represent a potentially invaluable resource for identifying and communicating problems, as well as targeting training, on security-related matters. We hope that we can build on these channels, and that the Panel's oversight in communicating with the Federations will not be repeated as we move forward.