

**Chief Executives Board  
for Coordination**

CEB/2008/HLCM/3

11 February 2008

**HIGH-LEVEL COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT (HLCM)**

Fifteenth Session

FAO, Rome, 17-18 March 2008

Agenda item 3

**REPORT OF THE INTER-AGENCY SECURITY  
MANAGEMENT NETWORK  
(Turin, 8-9 October 2007)****I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the International Training Centre of International Labour Organization (ITC/ILO), Turin from 8-9 October 2007. A list of participants from organizations, agencies, programmes and funds (hereafter referred to as the Organizations) is attached as Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members are presented in Annex B. The IASMN wishes to express its gratitude to ITC/ILO for hosting the meeting.

**II. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING****A. SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT (SRA)**

2. The IASMN was provided with a briefing on the security risk assessment model being implemented by DSS. The IASMN takes note of the contents and its implementation by Designated Officials and Country Teams. Given the need to implement this SRA process consistently across the UN System, the IASMN recommends that a presentation be provided to the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) as well as to the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (ECHA).

**B. SECURITY TRAINING**

3. The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which provided an update on the activities of the DSS Training and Development Section during the reporting period and an update on implementation of the recommendations made by the IASMN meeting in Rome, Italy in March 2007.

4. The IASMN welcomes the positive developments which have occurred in the area of security training. In this connection, the IASMN:

- endorses the proposed DSS field security training database system which will provide information regarding the numbers of UN personnel who have attended security training at the country level by organization;
- approves the new development schedule for the revision of the Basic Security in the Field CD ROM;
- endorses the proposal from DSS to require DSS Security Officers to visit all heads of organizations at their duty stations within the first 60 days of their assignment in order to ensure that they have a complete understanding of security concerns of each organization;
- requests that the Security Training Working Group further examine mechanisms to exchange security training officers as well as to identify additional opportunities to conduct joint security training.

5. The IASMN welcomes the development and implementation of the SSAFE training programme and thanks DSS and the UN System Staff College for the effort that has been made to bring this training to fruition. The IASMN also thanks the Sudan, Haiti and Columbia Country Teams for enabling this training to be delivered at their duty stations and commends it to all other high risk duty stations.

6. The IASMN confirms that the decision to implement SSAFE at a particular duty station rests with the Designated Official and the Security Management Team who will decide on participation and its mandatory nature. The IASMN also recommends that the Designated Official, in consultation with DSS, will have the discretion to exempt individuals on a case by case basis from part or all of the training.

7. In order to further refine the SSAFE, The IASMN requests that measures be put in place to ensure accurate record keeping of who has attended, determine a reasonable period for refresher training, determine where exemptions apply and ensure that trainers are made aware of the requirement to give due weight to gender and cultural variables, particularly in respect of country specific SSAFE training programme.

8. The IASMN also requests DSS to develop further the 3-5 year security training strategy with a view to ensuring that all target groups are identified and measures put in place to ensure that all such groups receive adequate training. In addition, the strategy should identify the funding implications so that appropriate fund-raising can be undertaken.

### **C. CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS COUNSELLING**

9. Noting that the system of Critical Incident Stress Counselling needs to function in a cohesive and cooperative manner, the IASMN requests the Chief of Field Support Service, DSS to convene a meeting of all the UN System Stress Counsellors, as well as representatives of the Human Resources Network and the Medical Service, with a view to reducing disagreement amongst the counsellors, and to ensure that the mandate approved by the General Assembly in respect of CISMU is achieved.

10. The IASMN also requests that a system of accountability be developed for the stress counsellors and submitted to it for review and approval at its March 2008 meeting.

**D. SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARRANGEMENTS FOR HEADQUARTERS LOCATIONS**

11. The IASMN recalls that at its meeting in March 2007 it requested all organizations in countries where there is a UN headquarters located to put in place security management arrangements on an inter-agency basis. The IASMN notes that this process effectively has been completed for Switzerland and calls on those organizations who have yet to do so to report back to the IASMN no later than 1 December 2007.

**E. LESSONS LEARNED – DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)**

12. The IASMN reviewed the after action report on events in DRC, compiled by DSS based on submissions from agencies, programmes and funds and MONUC. The IASMN acknowledges and thanks Ms. Lise Grande, Head of Integrated Office of MONUC, for attending IASMN and providing a briefing on events during the March 2007 crisis as well as an update on measures proposed and implemented by the mission and measures yet to be implemented. The IASMN notes that these measures are the result of both an internal review conducted by MONUC and the UN Security Management Team as well as the after action report commissioned by DSS which together helped to identify and prioritize key issues such as:

- the need for a structured information sharing system;
- the need to ensure that there is a clear understanding of the command and control structure;
- the need to ensure that the Security Plan takes account of the TORs of the mission and the capacity of the mission to fulfil these roles and responsibilities;
- the need for all organizations to ensure an appropriate level of preparedness by their staff to include the maintenance of accurate staff lists, emergency rations, water and all other normal preparedness measures;
- the standardization of all nomenclature and terminology for security by all actors of the UN Security Management System.

13. Based on the briefing, the IASMN requested MONUC to prepare a best practices document based on the lessons learned to be shared with the wider UN System.

14. The IASMN recommends that all this information be shared with the Working Group on Integrated Missions by 1 December 2007 in order that the findings be consolidated and submitted for review by IASMN by 15 January for consideration in March 2008.

15. The IASMN notes that the process that led to a change of phase in Kinshasa in March 2007 was not fully consistent with the policies, practices and procedures of the UN Security Management System. The IASMN points out that had the inputs of the Security Management Team, the Designated Official, and DSS security advisors been taken into full account by actors at all levels and stages in the process, an unwarranted phase change would have been avoided.

16. The IASMN recalls that the framework for accountability defines the responsibilities for security of every actor of the UN System, including individual staff members. In light of the foregoing,

the IASMN requests that Designated Officials be made aware as soon as possible of their specific responsibilities. The IASMN requests the Designated Official and the Security Management Team to consider implementing SSAFE training as soon as possible to ensure that all Staff members are aware of specific security risk mitigation measures.

17. The IASMN recalls that all security matters in countries must be addressed within the Security Management Team and not in isolation by the UN Country Team or in other fora.

18. The IASMN strongly reiterates that the preparation of after-action reports is a critical component of security management and requests that these be undertaken in a consistent and structured manner with appropriate follow-up. The IASMN also requests that steps be taken to ensure that the lessons learned are implemented across the System.

19. Given the importance of integrated missions in the future, the IASMN unanimously reiterates that the participation of DPKO at both IASMN and the Steering Group meeting is essential to fulfil the mandate of the UN Security Management System as approved by the General Assembly.

#### **F. SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

20. The IASMN considered a conference paper prepared by DSS which highlighted the issues faced by DSS with respect to a security information management system. The IASMN recalls that the ability to collect, analyze, disseminate and act on key information is fundamental to an effective decision-making mechanism and is of special importance to the UN Security Management System.

21. The IASMN notes that UNDSS does not have formal resources in place to effectively manage the information it possesses, to maintain an integrated information system, or to develop and maintain existing systems such as SIMS, ISECT, SIRS and the various DSS websites, and warns that the entire system could collapse.

22. In view of the critical nature of these systems, the IASMN recommends that HLCM members utilize a portion of the unspent resources from the 2006 – 2007 DSS budget to fund the UN Security Information Management System and to ensure that this funding is available on a sustainable basis.

#### **G. POLICY ISSUES**

23. The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which proposed changes to the Field Security Handbook and an update of the Security Operations Manual. The IASMN approves the proposal by DSS to review and update Security Operations Manual and requests DSS to proceed with its development for consideration by the IASMN at its March 2008 meeting. With regard to the existing Field Security Handbook, the IASMN requests that this document be renamed “Policies of the United Nations Security Management System.” The IASMN recommends that any substantive revision of this document be undertaken by a Working Group concerned for this purpose and not on a piecemeal basis.

24. The IASMN recommends that when, due to security concerns, the Designated Official and the Security Management Team decide that it is necessary to establish staff ceilings, the SRA be used, along with other critical elements, to determine the number of staff. The Designated Official and the

Security Management Team will then take into account the prioritized programmatic needs of the UN country team members in this regard.

25. The IASMN notes that, in light of the creation of DSS, as approved by the General Assembly, traditional distinctions such as “Headquarters” and “Field” do not apply to matters of staff security and recommends that security documents reflect the global nature of the UN Security Management System.

26. The IASMN notes the progress made in the implementation of the Secretary-General’s vision of a Security Management System as outlined in his report A/57/365 on the Framework for Accountability of the UN Security Management System. The IASMN stresses that, based on Chief Executives Board (CEB) decision, as approved by the General Assembly, the UN Security Management System applies equally to all UN locations and operations and recommends that all security policies, procedures and documents, new and revised, reflect this universality and integration.

#### **H. PROPOSED REPORT TO THE POLICY COMMITTEE**

27. The IASMN considered a report prepared by DSS for submission to the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee on operating in high risk complex environments. The IASMN made a number of recommendations to DSS on how to restructure portions of the report to make it more effective.

28. The IASMN agrees that there must be mechanisms in place to process information at duty stations. Whilst not wishing to delay the implementation of such mechanisms, the IASMN requests that DSS prepare a proposal (including financial implications) regarding the establishment and management of Security Information and Operations Centres (SIOC) for discussion at its next meeting.

#### **I. COHESIVE SECURITY STRUCTURE FOR DARFUR**

29. The IASMN reviewed a conference room paper prepared by DSS which outlined the cohesive security structure for Darfur and provided an update on the NGO Liaison Project currently underway for Darfur. The IASMN expresses appreciation for the opportunity to comment on mechanisms to ensure security in Darfur and requests DSS to provide a detailed mapping of where DSS is planning to place its security personnel and SIOC. The IASMN regrets that its members will not be in a position to provide detailed information on deployment plans and structures until there is more clarity regarding where UNAMID will be located and how it will operate.

30. The IASMN was provided with information from the staff representatives regarding specific concerns of staff members in Darfur such as violation of privileges and immunities, aircraft and airfield security and compliance of residences and offices with MOSS. The IASMN requests DSS to discuss these issues further with DPKO/DFS to determine what additional security and safety measures may be implemented to ensure staff security.

31. The IASMN recommends that measures be put in place to ensure effective communications and coordination between UN operations in Darfur and Khartoum to ensure that security issues are fully coordinated.

**J. INFORMATION SHARING PROTOCOLS**

32. The IASMN welcomes the technical document prepared by DSS regarding information-sharing protocols as a vehicle for achieving a common understanding of terminology. The IASMN believes that what is required for the UN Security Management System is a specific set of guidelines for the membership of IASMN which will enable the use of information without violating confidentiality and requests that DSS submit a proposal in this regard.

33. In this connection, the IASMN requests that these guidelines specifically address the issue of information that can or can not be released into the public domain, including being posted on public website.

**K. COMPLIANCE**

34. The IASMN notes the information provided regarding the outcome of compliance missions conducted by the DSS Compliance Evaluation and Monitoring Unit from its inception in 2006 through August 2007. The IASMN reiterates that this information provides an effective means for organizations to monitor MOSS implementation at the various duty stations.

35. The IASMN is of the view that further refinement of the process of compliance visits is required with missions actually verifying the statements made by those actors at the duty stations instead of simply using a checklist to determine whether a particular MOSS requirement is in place. The IASMN also is of the view that valuable insight can be obtained if mission members dialogue with a large representation of staff members instead of limiting themselves to those in charge.

36. The IASMN strongly recommends that a more robust follow up mechanism be established to ensure that recommendations emanating from a compliance mission are implemented at the duty station. In this regard, IASMN requests that feedback on the implementation rate be provided to it. The IASMN also requests further review of the ratings utilized by the compliance missions to rate MOSS implementation.

**L. IASMN MEETING SCHEDULE**

37. The IASMN approved to distribute its workload for 2008 as follows:

For the 1st session: Human Resources Management for Security Professional, Security for Women, Aviation Safety, the Strategic Framework-implementation 2006-2007 and planning 2010-2011, Critical Incidents Stress Management, Information Sharing Protocols, Policy Issues, Security Information and Operations Centres (SIOC), the Integrated Missions/Lessons Learned DRC, the Secretariat of IASMN and Other Matters.

For the 2nd session: Security Training, Compliance, Policy Issues, Information Technology Issues, Report of Working Groups and Other Matters. MOSS, SRA and country specific issues will be standing items for every IASMN meeting.

38. The IASMN also decides that at each meeting, a number of country specific issues will be discussed, with an invitation extended to concerned Designated Officials to participate in the discussion.

39. The IASMN notes that there is no full time secretariat for the IASMN and currently the Office of the Under-Secretary-General handles all work related to the IASMN on a part time basis. The IASMN requests that DSS put forward a proposal at the March 2008 meeting for consideration.

**M. OTHER MATTERS**

40. The IASMN notes with great satisfaction that the funding for the next biennium is agreed and is particularly grateful of the World Bank for resolving its concerns.

41. The IASMN notes with great displeasure the absence of UNODC from the IASMN and requests DSS to raise this matter at the highest level. The IASMN wishes to remind UNODC that by virtue of CEB decision it is bound by the rule of the UN Security Management System.

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS, OCTOBER 2007**

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**INTER-AGENCY SECURITY  
MANAGEMENT NETWORK  
Turin, 8-9 October 2007**

**AGENDA**

1. Security risk assessment
2. Security training
3. Critical incident stress counselling
4. UN security management system arrangements for headquarters locations
5. Lessons learned-DRC
6. Security information management system
7. Policy issues
8. Proposed report to the Policy Committee on operating in high risk complex environments
9. Cohesive security structure for Darfur
10. Information sharing protocols
11. Compliance
12. IASMN meeting schedule
13. Other matters

**LIST OF CONFERENCE ROOM PAPERS**

CRP 01	Agenda
CRP 02	Report of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network Steering Group Meeting August 2007
CRP 03	After action report Kinshasa/DRC
CRP 04	Security information management system
CRP 05	Compliance
CRP 06	Information sharing protocols
CRP 07	UN security management system arrangements for headquarters locations
CRP 08	Proposed report to the Policy Committee on operating in high risk complex environments
CRP 09	Policy issues
CRP 10	Proposed schedule of work for IASMN
CRP 11	Security training
CRP 12	Cohesive security structure for Darfur