HIGH-LEVEL COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT (HLCM)
Fourteenth Session
New York, 20-21 September 2007

Agenda item 7

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REPORT OF THE INTER-AGENCY SECURITY MANAGEMENT NETWORK

Rome, 5-9 March 2007

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I.   INTRODUCTION

1.   The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Rome from 5-9 March 2007. A list of participants from organizations, agencies, programmes and funds (hereafter referred to as the Organizations) is attached as Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members are presented in Annex B. The IASMN wishes to express its gratitude to IFAD for hosting the meeting.

II.   RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING

A.   UN SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

2.   As a central theme of this year's IASMN meeting, members decided to consecutively review the following conference room papers with the ultimate goal of ensuring that the UN Security Management System remains sensitive and appropriate to the various mandates and programmes of its members:

- Conference Room Paper 2-Report of the IASMN Working Group Meeting in Madrid,
- 11 – 13 December 2006;
- Conference Room Paper 3-Key Issues on Security Management in Humanitarian
- Operations – UNHCR, WFP discussion paper;
- Conference Room Paper 4-The IASMN After-Action Report on Lebanon;
- The outcome document of the ECHA Expanded Core Group meeting of 11 January 2007.

3.   In this regard, the IASMN reaffirmed its commitment to the mission statement of the UN security management system, namely that it is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of UN activities whilst ensuring the safety, security and well-being of staff as a high priority. With this in mind and with reference to the aforementioned documents, the following recommendations were made:

a)   In order to ensure that security is considered at the highest levels, the IASMN recommends that the Under-Secretary-General for DSS should engage with principals of agencies, programmes and funds on a more regular basis;

b)   In addition, the IASMN recommends that the Under-Secretary-General for DSS should discuss with the Secretary-General implementation of the framework for accountability for the UN Security Management System in general and of the Designated Official and members of Security Management Teams in particular;

c)   With regard to the Designated Official function, a mechanism be established to:

i.   Ensure that individuals who are appointed are suited for the position and are provided with the requisite training to enable them to fully carry out their functions;
ii.   Address cases where the Designated Official or members of Security Management Teams are not carrying out their functions appropriately. In those instances where problems persist in the performance of the DO/SMT, this will be brought to the attention of the IASMN and other appropriate authorities as a matter of urgency;
iii.   In addition, a focal point should be established in DSS to monitor the performance of the DO and SMT:

d)   With regard to surge capacity, the IASMN, while recognizing that this is the responsibility of DSS, encourages OCHA and DSS to work more closely together to ensure that security requirements are built more consistently into the appeals process at or during the on-set of a crisis and to develop better coordination mechanisms to streamline the Headquarters response to a crisis;

e)   The IASMN strongly reiterates that security cannot be managed by a Committee or a Task Force but must be managed by and through the existing dedicated mechanisms and structures developed on an inter-agency basis;

f)   Noting the need for information by security focal points, the IASMN calls on DSS to provide more consistent and regular sitreps at the onset and throughout a crisis;

g)   The IASMN strongly supports the DSS initiative to disseminate best practices documents to all DOs and SMTs and to the security focal   points of agencies, programmes and funds;

h)   The IASMN identified the need for better information for staff at the field level and recommends that key security points relative to local security arrangements should be distributed to all staff members at the duty station to increase their awareness.

4.   The IASMN reaffirms that Security is a collective undertaking, and it is necessary for all concerned to develop an enabling environment that will permit balance to be achieved between security and operational delivery. To this end there has to be a greater understanding within the

security community of the mandate and overall objective of the different organizations of the UN System and vice versa.

5.   The IASMN reiterates that the preparation and completion of SMT minutes must be done in accordance with established procedures with the views of all parties being recorded. Should the DO overrule a consensus decision of the SMT, he/she should state in writing why this is being done.

6.   The IASMN reiterates that there should be a much closer alignment between security risk assessments and programme needs assessments.

7.   The IASMN notes that at many meetings of SMTs, agencies are represented by very junior staff who are not in a position to make decisions. The IASMN strongly reiterates that attendance at SMTs is governed by paragraph 5.5 of the Field Security Handbook and encourages the Designated Officials to ensure adequate levels of representation by all organizations.

8.   The IASMN requests that DSS should share SMT minutes, risk assessments, and other security related information with the security focal points of agencies, programmes and funds on a timely basis; IASMN recommends that protocols be established regarding confidentiality of information as a matter of urgency.

9.   In the view of the IASMN, secondment of personnel from agencies, programmes and funds to DSS, and vice-versa, would be beneficial in terms of promoting closer teamwork and a better understanding between the different parties.

10.   The IASMN reiterates that Security Risk management must be made an integral part of organizational culture and not just an issue for security personnel. Every agency, programme and fund of the UN system has a responsibility to ensure that this process involves all levels of the organization.

11.   In emergency situations, UN system staff ceilings should be managed by the SMT in accordance with the prevailing security conditions, the Security Risk Assessment and MOSS requirements with some scope for flexibly and refinement to respond to prioritized operational requirements and changing needs.

12.   The IASMN requests DSS to explore the means of training a cadre of DHSSS officers to be used as part of surge capacity on the understanding that associated costs would be reimbursed through CAP/SERF.

13.   The IASMN decides to establish a Working Group to address security support concerns of the agencies, programmes and funds at integrated mission and to prepare a report for consideration of the next IASMN meeting.

B.   SECURITY TRAINING

14.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which addressed a number of issues raised by the IASMN Working Group in December 2006 including, inter alia, the need to change the strategic focus of security training from security personnel to Designated Officials/Security Management Teams; to provide security training schedules and a list of local training to agencies, programmes and funds; to further enhance inter-agency coordination on training; and to further develop security training modules.

15.   Recognizing the difficulties in providing system-wide security training to all DOs and SMTs, the IASMN welcomes the strategic shift by DSS to train these security officials. The IASMN commented on the positive feedback from the SMT training already presented in 2007, and welcomes this change in format and content.

16.   The IASMN welcomes on-going efforts to expand DO training, and supports DSS in its examination of using the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Learning Management System (LMS) as a key tool in providing security training to all DOs and SMT members thru e-learning.

17.   The IASMN expresses its encouragement at the continuing efforts to ensure that all DSS officers are trained to the Security Certification Programme standard. With regard to training of DSS Security Advisers (SA) and Field Security Coordination Officers (FSCO), the IASMN strongly endorses the efforts of DSS in this area, and believed that the participation of agencies, programmes and funds in DSS security training is a positive example of inter-agency cooperation in the area of security. The IASMN approves the 2007 DSS plan to train the remaining DSS officers to the SCP standard in 2007.

18.   The IASMN welcomes the inclusion of the DSS Training Schedule on its website as well as the new response time for providing attendance reports for SMT training. The IASMN is of the view that these are key steps in keeping the membership better informed on DSS training activities and results.

19.   The IASMN expresses appreciation to DSS for providing additional time in the Security Certification Programme and the Refresher Training Programme which allows them more effectively to present the mandates and security requirements of their respective organization. IASMN accepts the open invitation for them to remain as long as they desire in any DSS course, as their individual schedule permits.

20.   The IASMN welcomes and reiterates its desire to exchange security training officers where possible; DSS agrees to provide a detailed report at the next meeting of the IASMN regarding the feasibility of doing this within existing budget limitations. DSS will follow-up with all interested parties to further discuss this initiative.

21.   The IASMN strongly supports DSS efforts to ensure that Security Advisers and Field Security Coordination Officers establish close and continuing relationships with heads of

agencies, programmes and funds. The IASMN looks forward to reviewing the DSS guidelines regarding this new initiative; The members of the IASMN will ensure that their Representatives invite the new SA/FSCO to their organization, as this is a two-way process.

22.   Reiterating that planning for mass casualties is important, the IASMN approves the DSS recommendation to incorporate a mass casualty table-top exercise in its SMT training programme, and requests that this training be considered mandatory for all countries.

23.   The IASMN strongly endorses the establishment of a mechanism to provide early support, such as SMT training and other additional security support to enhance emergency response preparation to countries which are facing impending emergencies.

24.   With regard to security training presented by DSS in the field, the IASMN welcomes the establishment of a simple automated training database in ISECT for DSS officers to record security training conducted at their duty station, which also enables IASMN members to access this database for data concerning attendance by their personnel.

25.   The IASMN notes that many organizations are working diligently to have required personnel complete ASITF training. In light of some technical difficulties experienced by some members, the IASMN extends the deadline for ASITF to be completed to 1 April 2007.

C.   SECURITY CELL GUIDELINE

26.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which proposed a method for the operation of a UN Security Cell in order to ensure a consolidated approach at the technical working level across the UN Security Management System. The IASMN recommends that guidelines be developed on structure and method of operations and that these be circulated to all IASMN members for further consideration.

D.   SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISANCE DETECTION

27.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS on the detection of surveillance and reconnaissance, which provided a synthesis of best practice resulting from the development of this capacity in response to clear indications that UN premises around the world have been and continue to be subject to surveillance and reconnaissance effort by those preparing either criminal or terrorist acts against the organization. The IASMN recommends that this matter be further developed at a number of different levels including providing training to security professionals and guard forces as well as to staff at large through the preparation of awareness brochures. However, the IASMN points out that this is a host country responsibility.

E.   SECURITY MANAGEMENT AT HEADQUARTERS LOCATIONS

28.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS regarding UN Security Management arrangements for headquarters locations. The IASMN thanked DSS for preparing the proposal and approves the establishment of UN Security Management System arrangements for such locations. For this purpose, the IASMN agrees that for duty stations with multiple headquarters locations working groups be established at each location with the participation of all organizations present with a view to agreeing to a recommendation on appropriate security management structure at that duty station. At those locations where there is a single headquarters location, consultation should be held amongst the concerned security managers for the same purpose. All Headquarters duty stations should submit their proposals to DSS by 1 May 2007.

F.   SAFETY

29.   The IASMN considered a best practice document prepared by DSS on Fire Safety guidelines. The IASMN recommends that DSS continue to develop these guidelines, taking into consideration the requirements for MOSS. The IASMN requests that DSS share the draft guidelines with the participants as soon as possible.
30.
31.   The IASMN welcomes the offer from UNICEF to collect data on an inter-agency basis for 2006 to determine the extent of vehicular accidents and the resulting damage with a view to developing strategies to address situations which result in the largest number of UN casualties.

G.   BUDGETING MATTERS

32.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS containing the programme performance report and the provisional budget performance report for jointly funded activities as well as the strategic framework for the biennium 2008-2009 with the corresponding resource requirement. The IASMN unanimously agrees that it is responsible for recommending measures to enhance, maintain and sustain the security and safety of staff of the UN System. In this context, the IASMN emphasizes that all finance and budget matters related to cost-shared security should be considered and decided upon by the HLCM while striking a balance between the discharge of their responsibilities for safety and security and the allocation of the required resources.

33.   The IASMN also considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS on reimbursement of charges for the evacuation of UN personnel. The IASMN reconfirms that the reimbursement of costs for evacuation should be charged only to those funds, agencies and programmes or third-party entities that have benefited from evacuation, based on the number of their personnel evacuated. The IASMN strongly reiterates that evacuation costs will not be charged according to the inter-agency cost-sharing formula. The IASMN also strongly reiterates that when evacuation assistance is provided to members of NGOs, nationals of member states or others, these costs should be recovered from the individual, organization, or member state concerned.

H.   IASMN MEETING SCHEDULE

34.   The IASMN considered the recommendation of the Working Group meeting in December 2006 that it meet twice a year to address security related matters expeditiously. The IASMN decides that in light of the volume of security-related matters requiring timely response and inter-agency consultation, it will meet twice a year. Times will be determined based on the HLCM meeting schedule, taking into consideration the meeting schedules of organizations concerned.

I.   POLICY ISSUES

35.   The IASMN considered conference room papers prepared by DSS on policy issues, including the revision of the Field Security Handbook relating to applicability of Security Arrangements. The IASMN expresses concern that there are increasing numbers of internationally mobilized interns being deployed to areas where security phases are in effect. The IASMN requests DSS to refer this matter to the Human Resources Network for a decision regarding the employment of interns at duty station where there is a security phase in effect.

36.   Following discussion regarding aspects of the Field Security Handbook which require modification, the IASMN notes that as the Security Management System evolves, it may be necessary to review nomenclature used. The IASMN will revert to this matter at its next meeting. In this connection, whilst approving the modifications recommended by DSS, the IASMN requests DSS to take into consideration of specific requirements of members by revisiting the applicability of security arrangements, as currently laid down in chapter 3 of the Field Security Handbook.

37.   The IASMN wishes to recall paragraph 17 of the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, A/59/365, which states that: "The overarching policies, procedures and programmes of work of the United Nations field security management system are governed by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. The Network, which comprises senior managers who have oversight over security within their respective entities, is responsible for reviewing policies and procedures and monitoring their implementation. It makes recommendations to the High Level Committee on Management of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination."

J.   MOSS

38.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper presented by DSS on revisions to the Minimum Operating Security Standards which would result in an all-encompassing policy document. The IASMN decides to convene a Working Group to further develop the overall system of security standards for the UN Security Management System. The IASMN requests the Working Group to complete its work and report back to it at its October meeting.

K.   ARMOURED VEHICLES

39.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by WFP on the use of armoured vehicles. The IASMN thanked WFP for preparing the paper and requests those organizations who use such vehicles to jointly develop guidelines and best practices for consideration by the IASMN, including exploring possibilities of use of common services.

L.   COMPLIANCE

40.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which summarized compliance missions done by DSS in 2006. The IASMN unanimously agreed that these missions were useful. The IASMN requests DSS to publish a schedule for compliance visits on the IASMN website. The IASMN requests DSS to undertake compliance visits to duty stations where the security situation is complex as a matter of priority.

M.   INFORMATION SHARING PROTOCOLS

41.   In its 2006 report the IASMN had noted that organizations with an analytical capacity utilized the same information sources and requested DSS to prepare and disseminate protocols for information-sharing. In this context, the IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS on information sharing protocols. IASMN welcomes the preparation of the document and requests DSS to continue to develop such policy and protocols in consultation with all organizations for presentation and consideration at the next meeting of the IASMN.

N.   HOST COUNTRY AGREEMENTS

42.   In light of the General Assembly resolution 61/133 of 14 December 2006, which requested the Secretary-General to take further measures, among others in, 1.) Seeking the inclusion, in the negotiations of headquarters and other mission agreements concerning the UN and associated personnel, of applicable conditions contained in relevant Conventions related to the UN and associated personnel and 2.) enhancing the security consciousness within the UN's organizational culture and promoting increased cooperation within the UN system in implementing measures to address common issues, including collaboration with host governments, the IASMN considered a conference room paper proposed by DSS on host country agreements. The IASMN has very serious concerns and reservations regarding the contents and recommends that it must be reviewed and significantly rewritten.

43.   The IASMN further, in view of the fact that the paper deals with the fundamental issues of security and security management, insists that any revision of the document must be resubmitted to it for further consideration following consultation with the legal departments of all UN Security Management System members.

44.   Implementation of the proposals contained in this document must be held in abeyance until such time as these matters are resolved on an inter-agency basis.

O.   JOINT MISSION REPORTS

45.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by WHO on the preparation of joint inter-agency security assessment mission reports. The IASMN decides that in case of joint inter-agency security missions, divergent views should be included in the document. In addition, reports submitted to DSS by such joint missions should not be modified without prior consultation with all agencies concerned.

P.   SAVING LIVES TOGETHER

46.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which provided an overview of the implementation of Saving Lives Together (SLT). The IASMN requests DSS to establish a mechanism to monitor the implementation of SLT and to identify best practices and issues which require further elaboration or clarification. The IASMN recalls its recommendation that the implementation of SLT should not incur additional UN expenditures and calls on all concerned parties to identify other sources of funding.

Q.   SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

47.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS which outlined the progress and achievements made in the development of a number of tools which constitute the Security Information Management System (SIMS), including DSSWEB, ISECT, SIRS and Groove. The IASMN notes that DSS does not have dedicated personnel to manage the DSS security information management systems, a matter that needs urgent attention, and undertakes to assist DSS in secure funding.

48.   The IASMN calls on DSS to engage with an inter-agency IT group to resolve matters of interoperability and conflict between security software and IT systems. In addition, the IASMN should commission a sub-working group to consider these matters on a system-wide basis and report thereon.

49.   The IASMN requests DSS to undertake a system-wide inventory of all UN and non-UN related initiatives, studies and reviews which have a bearing on security management to determine how best to harness these activities for the benefit of the UN security management system..

50.   The IASMN requests DSS with regard to ISECT:

   i)   to give management rights to all designated security focal points and alternates so that staff members requesting security clearance keep their management informed of their travel plans;

ii)   to have a one-month transition period between the implementation of ISECT and the cessation of acceptance of e-mail and fax security clearance requests;

iii)   to provide firm and accurate data as to when ISECT will be rolled out at particular duty station;

iv)   to provide training tools also for staff at Headquarters locations to enable them to access ISECT.

R.   WITH REGARD TO SIRS

51.   The IASMN requests DSS:

i)   to ensure that designated security focal points and alternates have full access to all information in respect of their organization;

ii)   to implement a faster reporting mechanism so that incidents are included in the database in a more timely manner;

iii)   to develop mechanisms whereby as much information possible on security incidents, minus personnel details, analysis of trends on a country or regional basis is available to all designated security focal points;

iv)   to include two further fields on SIRS templates, a lessons learned component and an impact scale for reference and guidance in the SRA process.

S.   IASMN WEBSITE

52.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by DSS to introduce the newly launched website designed for use by members of the IASMN only, inter alia, as a means of sharing security documents. The IASMN welcomes the development of the IASMN website and agrees that the access to this website would be limited to security focal points and one alternate and that a confidentiality protocol should be developed by DSS on the use of this information.

T.   HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

53.   The IASMN considered a conference room paper on personnel matters which described a series of new initiatives undertaken by DSS to further refine the management of human resources. This included a code of conduct for security personnel. The IASMN welcomes the development of a code of conduct for security officers with some modifications and recommends that this code be considered for adoption by all IASMN members for all system-wide security officers.

54.   The IASMN believes that the time has come to develop a new profile for the next generation of security officers and requests DSS to convene a working group to examine the competencies which will be required for the future operation of the UN Security Management Systems.

55.   The IASMN requests DSS to implement a programme whereby career development in the UN Security Management System should include second language competency for all CSAs, FSCOs, FSOs, etc.

56.   The IASMN wishes to acknowledge the efforts made by DSS to identify qualified female candidates and expresses concern regarding difficulties in both recruitment and retention of female candidates. The IASMN believes that the recruitment and retention of women security officers must be addressed by its member organizations and member states as a matter of urgency. This could also include approaching accredited institutions which offer higher-level education courses in the field of security and risk management.

U.   SECURITY FOR WOMEN

57.   The IASMN discussed what further steps could be taken to enhance security of women. Recognizing the significant progress made on this important issue, in order to maintain momentum, the IASMN requests DSS to appeal to UNFPA Executive Director so that the UNFPA security focal point is permitted to serve as the chair of the Working Group on Security for Women until such time as an alternative solution is found.

V.   AVIATION RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

58.   The IASMN recalled that it had been a year since progress had been made on the issue of aviation risk management. The IASMN notes that the Aviation Risk Management Working Group will meet before the end of 2007 to discuss a number of outstanding issues and looks forward to receiving recommendations in this regard at one of its subsequent meetings.

W.   HUMAN PANDEMIC

59.   The IASMN discussed the issue of how best organizations could manage the preparedness for the Human Pandemic. The IASMN, while recognizing that the response to the human pandemic is multi-disciplined, endorses the position of the WHO that avian flu is a health issue and restates the position of many organizations that this should not be led by security. The IASMN is categorical that there can be no diversion of security personnel or resources to lead this effort.

X.   IT SECURITY

60.   The IASMN once again flagged the issue of information technology security and the dangers of not securing information in the UN System. The IASMN requests the ICT network to consider the requirement for IT security in the security management system and invites them to present a paper and enter into discussions with IASMN on this matter.

Y.   PEP KITS

61.   The IASMN considered a request from the Inter-Agency UN Cares Task Force that PEP kits be held within the UN security management system and fully supports the deployment and availability of PEP starter kits. Taking the view that PEP kit custodianship is a country-specific issue, the IASMN requests that this matter be reviewed and fully addressed by the Designated Officials, who will be responsible for advising all staff members of the availability of such kits at all locations within the country.

Z.   PARTICIPATION IN UN SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (UNSMS)

62.   The IASMN discussed the issue of requests from non-UN System organizations to join the UN Security Management System. The IASMN recommends that no new participation from outside the UN System can be accepted until the new cost-sharing formula has been reviewed and a review of capacity has been undertaken. The IASMN also recommends that a definition be developed as to what responsibilities are ensured by each organization when joining the UNSMS.

AA. PRIVATIZING SECURITY

63.   The IASMN was provided with a draft discussion paper entitled "Privatising Security" which had been circulated by OCHA. The IASMN expressed significant concern about the direction being taken in this document and recommends that all participants ensure that they closely coordinate their positions present a common approach to the discussion. The IASMN requests that this matter be included on the agenda of the next IASMN meeting

ANNEX A

IASMN 2007 PARTICIPANTS LIST

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ANNEX B

**INTER-AGENCY SECURITY MANAGEMENT NETWORK
Rome, 5-9 March 2007**

AGENDA

1. Key Issues on Security Management
2. After-action report Lebanon
3. UN Security Arrangements for Headquarters Locations
4. Review of Policy Issues
5. Meeting Schedule of IASMN
6. Safety
7. Training
8. Security Clearance
9. Administrative Issues including HR and Budget
10. Compliance
11. Threat and Risk
12. Host Country Issues
13. Use of Armoured Vehicles
14. Security Information Management System
15. Saving Lives Together
16. Security Cell Guidelines
17. Hostile Surveillance and Reconnaissance
18. Joint Mission Reports
19. Other Matters

ANNEX C

LIST OF CONFERENCE ROOM PAPERS

CRP 01   Agenda and List of Conference Room Papers
CRP 02   Report of the Inter-Agency Security Management
                    Network Working Group Meeting December 2006
CRP 03   Key Issues on Security Management in Humanitarian Operations
CRP 04   Lebanon After Action Report
CRP 05   UN Security Management Arrangements for Headquarters Locations
CRP 06A   Revision of Minimum Operating Security Standards
CRP 06B   Field Security Handbooks Issues
CRP 07   Training plus annexes A-C
CRP 08   Host Country Issues
CRP 09A   Security Information Management System
CRP 09B   IASMN Website
CRP 10   Fire Safety Guidelines
CRP 11   Group Security Clearance
CRP 11A   Security Clearance and Mandatory Training
CRP 12   Information Sharing Protocols plus annex
CRP 13   Use of Armoured Vehicles
CRP 14   Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring
CRP 15   IASMN Meeting Schedule
CRP 16   Saving Lives Together plus annex
CRP 17A   Budget
CRP 17B   Evacuation Costs
CRP 18   Security Cell Guidelines
CRP 19   Hostile Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CRP 20   Personnel
CRP 21   Joint Mission Reports

LIST OF DISCUSSION PAPERS

DSP 01   Privatising Security: Understanding Usage and Establishing Norms and
                    Standards for the Humanitarian Community