

Final Report

Executive Summary

The IASMN held its 25th Session in Washington, DC from 7 to 9 February 2017, hosted by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Fifty-six representatives from 44 entities of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) participated in the session; including seven representatives attending as observers: the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the UN Medical Directors (UNMD), the Secretariat of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), and two staff associations, CCISUA and FICSA.

Mr. Peter Drennan, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG UNDSS) and chair of the IASMN, led the session with Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison, Head of Staff Security Unit for the International Organization for Migration (IOM), serving as Co-Chair. Ms. Florence Poussin, Chief of the Policy, Planning, and Coordination Unit (PPCU) for UNDSS served as Secretary.

Mr. Shaolin Yang, Managing Director, and World Bank Group Chief Administrative Officer, opened the session. He expressed appreciation on its behalf for the efforts of the IASMN in a challenging security environment.

The Chair of the IASMN thanked the IASMN Working Groups for their collaborative work toward this session. Key outcomes from the 25th Session included establishing an IASMN Advisory Group on Technology; a new Working Group on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) environments and a Working Group on Compliance. The Advisory Group on Technology will provide advice on business needs related to security and technology; the WG on CBRN will establish guidance on UN operations in CBRN environments, and the Compliance WG will develop a new compliance management policy.

With regard to policy development, the locally cost-shared security budget (LCSSB) policy will be endorsed at the June IASMN session, along with the guidelines; and with expected implementation in 2018. DRO/UNDSS will review the legal and policy basis of a UN policy on crisis management and will assess what type of additional guidance is required. The MOSS WG will revisit the objectives of the MOSS. The WG on Residential Security Measures for Locally-Recruited Personnel will present a summary of practical options as well as broader issues for further consideration by the HLCM. Completed guidance on all of these aspects will be presented at the 26th IASMN in June, through the Steering Group in May.

The IASMN agreed on the suspension of work on a draft governance policy and on a revision to the Terms of Reference for the IASMN under the Governance WG. Instead, it recommended that PPCU/UNDSS draft an SOP on governance hierarchy and start compiling recommendations for changes to the Framework of Accountability. The IASMN agreed that all UNSMS policies should be made available to the public unless there is a strong rationale

for a specific policy not to be shared publicly. The technical review of policies in the Security Policy Manual is complete and the policies will be compiled as an e-book available for download.

The United Nations road safety strategy has been developed in line with the Sustainable Development Goals and the UN Decade of Action on Road Safety. It will adopt a “Vision Zero” and a safe-system approach, which are both internationally-recognized strategies on Road Safety. The strategy will be presented to the HLCM for endorsement to ensure buy-in from the all concerned components of the UN-system. The WG on Security Arrangements in OECD Countries concluded its work. Its recommendations will be sent to DRO/UNDSS for review and prioritization.

Mr. Craig Harrison, Chief, UNDSS/PCCS, and Mr. Wairoa-Harrison (IOM) will represent the IASMN on the Steering Committee of the new Duty of Care Task Force.

The IASMN Steering Group will meet in Rome, 10-11 May, hosted by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Organizations that are willing to join the membership of the Steering Group should send their nominations prior to the next SG meeting. The composition of the Steering Group members will be endorsed by the 26th IASMN in June 2017.

A. Introduction

1. Under the auspices of the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM), the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) meets twice a year with representatives of the 54 organizations of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), including United Nations Departments, Offices, Agencies, Funds and Programmes, to coordinate security policies and best practices across the UN-system.
2. The IASMN held its 25th Session in Washington, DC from 7 to 9 February 2017, hosted by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Fifty-six representatives from 44 entities of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) participated in the session; including seven representatives attending as observers: the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the UN Medical Directors (UNMD), the Secretariat of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), and the two staff associations, CCISUA and FICSA.
3. Mr. Peter Drennan, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG UNDSS) and chair of the IASMN led the session with Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison, Head of Staff Security Unit for the International Organization for Migration (IOM), serving as Co-Chair. Ms. Florence Poussin, Chief of the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit (PPCU) for UNDSS served as Secretary.
4. Mr. Shaolin Yang, Managing Director and World Bank Group Chief Administrative Officer, opened the session. He expressed appreciation on its behalf for the efforts of the IASMN in a challenging security environment. He said it is a challenging time protecting United Nations personnel that are working in areas with increasing security challenges. He noted that the recent spread of security incidents beyond traditional high threat areas has made both the WB and IMF rethink how to manage their premises around the world. Security of United Nations personnel is of highest priority in light of the increasing attacks on civilians globally and in the fragile areas served by the UN, World Bank and the IMF. He also noted it was important to reassess the WB's security posture and recommended moving forward to strengthen the WB's commitment to protecting staff and families wherever they work.
5. The Chair of the IASMN thanked the WB and IMF for hosting the 25th Session of the IASMN. He thanked Mr. Derrick Erkkila and Mr. Martin Kraus of the World Bank for their work in preparing the meeting. The Chair noted the United Nations was in a time of transition with a new Secretary-General and new senior management. He also noted that the UN-system relies on the work carried out by the IASMN with regards to the safety and security policies implemented for the UNSMS and for their role in enabling programme delivery. He recommended that the IASMN maintain momentum as the policies it has developed are reflective of the operational environment of the United Nations and the needs of United Nations personnel. The IASMN Chair thanked the IASMN Working Groups for their collaborative work toward this session.

B. Adoption of the Agenda and Review of previous IASMN Recommendations

6. The IASMN adopted the Agenda for its 25th Session.
7. Ms. Florence Poussin, Secretary of the IASMN, reviewed the recommendations previously made in the 24th Session in June 2016. As noted in the implementation matrix (CRP 1, Annex B), 21 recommendations required action, and 11 remained ongoing. She noted most of these recommendations would be discussed in the session with a decision on the way forward.

8. The technical review of UNSMS policies was completed. Two IASMN WGs: Security Arrangements in OECD Countries and Residential Security for Locally-Recruited Personnel also completed their work and presented their recommendations. Ms. Poussin noted that for the 26th Session of the IASMN in June 2017, the following should be completed: road safety strategy, policy and guidelines on locally cost-shared security budget, policy on crisis management, and recommendations on MOSS, first response and gender considerations in security arrangements.
9. Based on the recommendation of a member and as a matter of procedure established by the IASMN, the outcome and recommendations of the IASMN meetings would be summarized by the Secretary prior to the close of the session. In addition, the Secretariat will circulate the report of the Steering Group as a Conference Room Paper for full sessions of the IASMN.
- 10. The IASMN took note of the progress made in the implementation of recommendations from its last session.**

C. Strategic Update

i. Security Environment

11. Mr. Mike Croll, Director, Division of Regional Operations/UNDSS gave a briefing on the different weapons used by terrorists. Terrorist attacks are occurring in many parts of the world with concentrations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and the Maiduguri area in Nigeria. He noted that in 2016, the number of terrorist attacks increased. He anticipated this trend to continue into the future. He gave an overview on the explosive effects of VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device), RPG (rocket-propelled grenade), roadside IED and drones; and protection against their effects. He also noted that DHSSS/UNDSS are looking at counter-measures against drones.
12. One representative commented on a recent attack on his agency's offices in Kabul and Kandahar. Both attacks validated the use of mitigation measures and demonstrated the importance of investing in physical security. However, a critical point of failure was that the blast was outside the perimeter at the compound next door, which could then have provided access to his agency's compound
13. The IASMN Chair noted that mitigation measures such as stand-off distance and UNDSS physical security missions make a significant difference. Such attacks highlighted the need to obtain good threat information and the need to address the psychosocial impact on staff.
14. The IASMN Chair called for a holistic approach to safety and security; an approach that not only looked at physical security or threat assessment but also duty of care for United Nations personnel. The IASMN should be providing advice on this integrated approach. He noted the HLCM has recently established a task force on duty of care and he will continue to maintain focus on this issue.
15. The Chief of PCCS/UNDSS noted there will be a Steering Committee of the new Duty of Care Task Force and asked the IASMN to provide another representative.
16. A representative noted that 13 deliverables were identified by the Duty of Care Task Force and a majority of those deliverables are related to human resources, occupational safety, medical and psychosocial recommendations, which have been taken forward to the UNMD.

17. One representative noted that his Agency is looking at its operational environment and has identified that the security environment is becoming more complex. He noted that the training needs of United Nations personnel must be met in order for them to effectively deliver programmes in this environment and this should be a priority of the IASMN for 2017.
18. The IASMN Chair noted that much of the work of the Duty of Care Task Force was on training.
19. A representative questioned the status of the concept note on the United Nations global response to gender incidents. He asked if they could still provide this input for the Task Force to consider. The Secretary of the IASMN agreed to follow-up.

20. The IASMN took note of the presentation from DRO/UNDSS.

ii. Key Points from the Report of the Secretary-General

21. The Secretary of the IASMN presented key points of the 2016 Report of the Secretary-General on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and the protection of United Nations personnel. The report reflected the increasing challenges of the security environment where the number of direct attacks against United Nations personnel and premises has increased three-fold, but was not commensurate with the number of attacks. Criminality accounted for the majority of the deaths with terrorism a second close. The report also highlighted that road fatalities remained unchanged and more than 30 non-United Nations personnel were killed and 174 persons injured in traffic accidents caused by the United Nations.
22. She also noted that the General Assembly adopted the resolution on Safety and Security of humanitarian personnel and the protection of United Nations personnel (A/71/159) without a vote. The resolution had an unprecedented number of cosponsors with 70 compared to 55 in 2015 and 60 in 2014. Another positive development for UNDSS is the unanimous support of Member States in welcoming the integration of all security personnel of the Secretariat under the leadership of USG/UNDSS. The Resolution also underlined the need to allocate adequate and predictable resources through regular and extra-budgetary resources, and through the consolidated appeals process. It encouraged Member States to contribute to the Trust Fund for Security of Staff Members of the United Nations system.
23. One member pointed out that when taking into account year-to-year statistics presented in the Secretary-General's Report, the analysis should aim at reviewing the long-term impact of the security environment on the UN as individual years, or even two or three years, cannot statistically support sound conclusions or forecasts.

24. The IASMN took note of the presentation on the Secretary-General's Report.

iii. Integration of Security Resources of the Secretariat (UNSSSIP)

25. The Chief, PCCS/UNDSS gave an update on the three streams of work for integration: management, finance and human resources. He noted that integration is a means toward a more flexible, effective and professional security workforce. It does not affect United Nations Country Team settings, but aims to establish one United Nations Secretariat department (UNDSS) to provide all the safety and security services which would enable the delivery of UN programmes in countries with field missions. The personnel of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the Department of Political Affairs will

not become UNDSS personnel. UNDSS is not taking over their contracts, but will manage all aspects of their work including settings standards for recruitment, budgeting and equipment.

26. In his presentation, the Chief/PCCS highlighted the timelines of integration for 2016-2017. Communications on integration started last fall. There is a currently a video on integration by the USG/UNDSS on UNSMIN. The UNSSSIP team is drafting a report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on integration. He made note of the pilot project in north Lebanon, where UNDSS will have authority over UNSCOL security personnel. The pilot project will serve to test the memo on UNDSS authority over mission security personnel signed by the Secretary-General last December. The Chief/PCCS also noted there were currently 40 mission security budgets, completely independent of each other. As a result, there is no immediate planning to try and establish a single source security budget as this will delay the integration process.
27. In response to a question, the Chief/PCCS noted that UNSSSIP developed guidelines to implement the Secretary-General's memo in the field and the guidelines were being consulted with the Secretariat departments involved. It was agreed to have only one set of guidelines for the Secretariat, and not separate guidelines for UNDSS and DPA/DPKO/DFS. The draft has been consulted with various security advisers in the field.
28. Another representative asked for more information on the HR stream and on the different capabilities between the Departments. He noted that while his Agency's saw integration as providing more support to staff in the field; it could pose a problem if security personnel did not have the required skill sets. Integration should ensure that people are employed in accordance with their capabilities and ensure that security services do not suffer. He also asked how integration would impact field service personnel that have been historically part of the mission. Using Iraq as an example, he highlighted the need to have a consistent approach on the personnel cost covered by the locally cost-shared security budget.
29. The Chief/PCCS noted MONUSCO and UNAMA as two peacekeeping missions that were integrated and worked well. He noted that when SAFETYNET is rolled out in 2018, the P-level staff in the missions will be part of the broader network and FS-level staff will become mobile through the Secretariat managed mobility programme. The P-level staff will have a global scope and the FS-level staff will no longer be bound to the mission they were recruited in, although their mobility will be restricted to PKOs and SPMs.
30. The Chair of the IASMN said the HR strategy for the Department will ensure that there is consistency in the training security that personnel receive. There will also be a joint SOP for protective services. On the issue of the locally cost-shared security budget, the IASMN would need to rely on the work that is being done by the WG to identify the best way forward.
31. One representative noted the integration update showed the complexity related to the deployment of security structures for DPKO and DPA, as they were guided by standard deployment practice different from UNDSS. Within integrated missions there was a different risk management system developed with a heavier workforce. He raised a concern with upsizing and downsizing of missions when the workforce is no longer mission-specific. Even through the managed mobility system, personnel may not have the necessary skill set to move to a different post, so it does not necessarily offer more flexibility to staff.

32. The IASMN Chair noted that with the Secretary-General's memo, the USG/UNDSS had the authority to address these issues. Currently, the system did not allow flexibility in managing upsizing and downsizing of missions and this was something that needed to be addressed; however, it was important to make a distinction between movements of posts vs personnel. Posts can be more problematic to move, but not personnel. The Secretary-General and the other USGs involved were all on board with integration and wanted to make it work. USG/UNDSS will be the head for the security and safety job network, which is an advantage, but it would take time to implement the full extent of integration. It was important to focus on developing security staff so that they receive the knowledge and expertise they need to do their job well which is an important part of the long term development of staff in the Department.
33. In response to questions, the Chief/PCCS noted that integration did not change the existing human resources regulatory framework or rules for field-service staff. In general, the movement for security professionals will fall under the rules of the occupational group SAFETYNET.
34. One staff representative noted it was encouraging to see the level of priority being given to the investment in staff and the opportunity of movement, and referred to the ICSC's ongoing work on the FS category.
35. In relation to the impact of integration on the delivery of services, the USG/UNDSS indicated that Integration would provide a whole range of benefits for safety and security. The DO, P/C/SA on the ground will continue to manage the delivery of safety and security services for the country in the most effective way.
36. One representative advised to also look at field occupational safety to strengthen the safety component.
37. Another representative highlighted the difficulties for security personnel from AFPs to join UNDSS and inquired whether the UNDSS HR strategy would have linkages to the HR strategies of the AFPs' security personnel. She asked if UNDSS would look into a system-wide approach for integration.
38. The USG UNDSS noted that integration would bring more capacity to the Department. Although the Department cannot put together an HR strategy for the UNSMS, it can enhance the principles in the professionalization of security professionals across the board. The Department wants to make sure that there is recognition and transference of security skills and security knowledge in individuals. Once this is achieved, there will be a truly flexible and mobile workforce across the UNSMS.
- 39. The IASMN took note of the progress made on integration of security resources.**

iv. JIU

40. The Executive Officer, UNDSS gave a brief update on the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) Report (JIU/REP/2016/9), a system-wide review that covered the UN, its agencies, funds, and programmes.
41. The Report offered eight recommendations, with specific recommendations for UNDSS and for the USG/UNDSS as Chair of the IASMN, to be implemented by January 2018. These

involve host country agreements, road safety, analysis capacity, evacuation plans, surge capacity and funding mechanisms.

42. One representative noted his Organization provided comments and highlighted several factual errors contained in the report, none of which had been taken into consideration. None of the recommendations took the perspective of humanitarian delivery or security support as an enabler of delivery of humanitarian operations or UN mandates. He further pointed out that policy related issues mentioned in the report were currently being addressed through the IASMN WGs. Many other representatives agreed with the comment that their factual corrections or recommendations had not been captured in the report, including on the important issue of crisis management and response.
43. One member noted that although some of the JIU recommendations and language had value, there was no suggestion on how to move forward in their specified timeframe or how they will be implemented.
44. One staff representative cautioned the IASMN to take the JIU recommendations and comments seriously, even if some members had different expectations of the report. He noted that the JIU recommendations were important for the safety and security of all staff.
45. Another observer expressed concerns with the feasibility of the recommendation related to the global review of existing agreements with the host country. Two representatives inquired if the JIU recommendations were binding, if funding requirements were associated with these recommendations, and what was UNDSS' view of the report. The Executive Officer noted that the JIU had an online platform where AFPS should report the implementation.
46. Some members noted that the JIU report was posted on its website. Considering the detailed discussion and the fact, in the opinion of a member, that most of the factual information had not been revised, the member requested the Chair of the IASMN to ask the JIU to withdraw its report until it was finalized.
47. The USG/UNDSS indicated he was not sure why the feedback and comments the AFPS provided were not taken into account and agreed that there were some inaccuracies in the report. He noted that the response was coordinated by the CEB Secretariat.
- 48. The IASMN noted the update on the JIU. AFPs will send their comments on the JIU report to the CEB Secretariat, while UNDSS will concurrently send a summary of the IASMN discussion on the JIU report to the CEB Secretariat.**

D. DRO Update

i. Lessons Learned from UNDSS Workshops

49. The Director of UNDSS/DRO informed the meeting that the workshops addressed 307 participants: 110 Designated Officials (DOs), 109 UNDSS field personnel, 41 UNSMS representatives and 47 UNDSS HQ personnel. Forty-nine per cent of participants were very satisfied with 2% unsatisfied. The main audience for the workshops were the DOs and the feedback received from them was overwhelmingly positive. The SRM process was discussed at length and it was recognised that it was not always a swift process. Some workshop participants wanted more access to threat and risk analysis. The workshops were also an opportunity to discuss UNSMS policies, communications, duty of care, and the role of the

security advisers. Several important takeaways had been noted such as the need to develop soft skills for stakeholder management, and the need for increased communication support for policies. Overall, these workshops have generated a large number of recommendations, which, compounded with UNDSS priorities established at the end of 2016 put a heavy toll on DRO (more than 150 recommendations to take forward this year). He also noted that the next annual workshop for P/C/SA is in November 2017 in Long Island, New York.

50. The USG/UNDSS indicated that the rationale for the new format of the regional workshops was the recognition that there had been under-development of DOs, many of whom do not have a background in security. Adding to the 150 recommendations mentioned above, he also pointed out the numerous recommendations brought from his visits to the field, and highlighted the importance to carry them all out in the current security environment.
51. One representative noted that the AFPs were trying to be part of the solution and not to downplay the legitimate mechanism of other security roles such as the SMT. He recognized that the decision-making authority is with the DO but highlighted that the AFPs have to pay for the services. This is a situation where the decision-maker was not the payer.
52. The USG/UNDSS indicated that in every country he visited he met with the SMTs and spent time with them to ensure that there was understanding on the role of the SMTs, and the role of the DO. They share the same objective, which is programme delivery in a safe and secure manner. The Department will organize another crisis management workshop for DOs at the end of the year. The USG also highlighted the approval process for a DO a.i., and the requirement for online training. DOs have to report back to him when the training of the DO a.i is completed. This will help to strengthen the UNSMS and to make sure that people that are taking on security responsibility are making use of security resources already in place.
53. The Chief of PPCU/UNDSS informed the meeting that there were 12 different guidance documents approved last year, including five UNSMS policies, five guidelines and two manuals (both guidelines and manuals supporting the policies). There had been a number of communications sent to the field on the promulgation and clarification of policies; briefings done to P/C/SAs through videoconferences; participation in regional workshops; DO training; and training that was incorporated into the policies themselves. She noted there was one new Departmental priority to improve the implementation of policies through coordinating a multi-dimensional approach.

54. The IASMN took note of the outcomes from the DRO workshops.

ii. Security Risk Management Process

55. The Director UNDSS/DRO, provided an update on the SRM process. He noted the completion rate was 50% with another 75% of the remaining SRM in progress. In some countries, there were still multiple areas that needed to be covered by an SRM. He noted that a UNDSS Communiqué was sent in July 2016 on the importance of timely completion of the SRM process, which had an immediate effect on increasing the completion rate. He noted that the compliance rate is expected to be 90% by 31 March 2017, the new target date for completion.
56. He further noted that the SRM was a work-in-progress. DRO will look for ways to refine the SRM process next year, especially for areas where there is more than one SRM. The feedback received highlighted issues with the implementation, but the general philosophy of the SRM was sound. DRO/UNDSS will also look into issues with rollout and lessons learned.

57. Some representatives recommended that during the SRM review exercise for consideration to be given to including visual context, a map of the SRM area and GIS capabilities; and to decrease the length of the report. DRO/UNDSS agreed. The USG UNDSS also noted ongoing discussions with OICT on GIS capacity, which should come to fruition soon, and the Chief of PCCS noted that CMISS/UNDSS was looking at presenting the SRM output as a graphic map.

58. The IASMN took note of the progress made on the SRM process.

iii. Management of safety and security crisis in the field

59. The Director, DRO/UNDSS requested guidance from IASMN members on several issues including a decision on the type of guidance required (policy or guidelines).

60. A few representatives noted they did not see a need for a UNSMS policy after following the adoption of the UN system-wide policy on crisis management; as an example, one representative indicated that his Department already developed SOPs for peacekeeping operations following the issuance of the system-wide policy.

61. Another member noted that the draft policy was very Secretariat-centred and did not cover the whole UNSMS. The draft policy presented in November at the Steering Group was tactically focused without operational or strategic level support, oversight and decision-making required within crisis management. He noted that the UNSMS needed a framework on crisis management response that applied throughout the UNSMS and added that, at the least, guidelines for the field were needed.

62. One representative noted there are many directives on crisis management and crisis information management within a number of different initiatives and there is a need to be conclusive and clear.

63. The IASMN Chair noted that part of the issue was that the crisis management policy came from the Secretary-General which is at a high-level and does not necessarily address the lower level needs. He recommended that any guidance must recognize that safety and security is a critical part of any crisis response.

64. Another representative asked whether crisis response was covered by the Framework of Accountability.

65. A representative recalled having discussions at length since 2013 on the requirements for a crisis management policy and agreed there is a need for a system-wide policy, but it should be specifically for security.

66. As a way forward, the IASMN Chair recommended a review of the high-level crisis management policy to assess if it applies only to the Secretariat or to the entire UNSMS, and if it provides a sufficient legal or governance basis. He agreed that the Framework of Accountability is a framework for the DOs to rely on at the time of crisis and recalled one outcome of the DRO workshops was to produce an aide memoire to assist the DOs in times of crisis. The WG must reconvene to take these issues forward and continue its work to develop guidelines that can be applied to a security crisis response, and to look at what coordination mechanisms are in place if there are any other types of crisis.

67. The Chief of PPCU/UNDSS provided clarifications on the levels of guidance and respective scope and applicability: the overarching ORMS policy adopted by the HLCM covered the AFPs under the UNSMS except those that are members by way of an MOU. The policy adopted in July 2016 by the Policy Committee applied to the Secretariat and to the members of the WG, but it was not applicable across the UNSMS. On the security side, the only system-wide guidance were a couple of remaining paragraphs of the Field Security Handbook (FSH) on crisis management which were supposed to be transferred to the crisis management policy, and a couple of Annexes in the FSH which also needed to be updated.
68. One representative noted that the responsibility of the USG/UNDSS is very distinctive and should be reflected in the crisis management policy for security. However, he recommended that the policy not be too prescriptive and constrain the ability to make decisions.
- 69. The IASMN recommended that DRO/UNDSS review the legal and policy basis of the UN Policy on Crisis Management to assess whether a UNSMS Policy or guidelines are required, and if so, requested that the WG reconvene to prepare guidelines and/or a policy for submission to the 26th IASMN Session in June.**

E. Security Arrangements in OECD Countries

70. The Chair of the WG briefed the meeting on the progress made with regard to OECD countries, and the survey that was conducted in the fall 2016 with the aim to gain an understanding of: 1) the security support the United Nations receives from Host Country Authorities; and 2) the Host Countries' security capabilities. Thirty-one OECD countries were covered by the survey while the United States was not part of it since the United Nations did not have a DO there. The Survey was sent to Designated Officials (DO), Members of the Security Management Team (SMT), UNDSS (Chief) Security Advisers (SA), Country Security Focal Points, and Single-Agency Security Officers in OECD countries that could be accessed through a user-friendly survey platform.
71. The results of the survey indicated that the UNSMS policy on host country support was sound and many of the issues can be resolved through capacity building. More optimal utilization of resources can be achieved through the correct application and implementation of UNSMS policies and procedures, supported by additional training, and with proper oversight by UNDSS. He also noted that gaps in security coverage have been addressed through assignments of regional Security Advisers so that all countries had proper oversight.
72. One representative said he supported the paper and approaches of the WG. He did not want to see solutions with large costs or those that resulted in a reduction of services. He supported stronger links to host-governments, more support for information-sharing mechanisms, and better training and awareness of staff, as these would not require many resources.
73. Another representative took the example of Germany, where there was sufficient host-country capacity and a number of incidents in the last six months. The UNSMS was faced with staff that was not used to living and working in this kind of environment and required more communication and training. Thanks to good relationships established in Bonn, the Bonn police met with the SMT and explained the relative threat level to the UN in comparison to the rest of the city.

74. The IASMN Chair noted this was a useful observation, as the reality of the threat was not commensurate with the level of angst among staff. As seen in Brussels, the presence of a security adviser there was very significant for dispelling some of the security concerns. He recommended that IASMN member convey the message that there must be a distinction between threat and risk. This can be done also through duty of care and psychosocial support.
- 75. The IASMN took note of the progress of the WG and its recommendations. The IASMN Chair requested IASMN members to direct further feedback, as required, to the WG Chair. The recommendations of the WG will be sent to DRO/UNDSS for review and prioritization. A final set of prioritized recommendations should be presented to the next IASMN session through the Steering Group.**

F. Update on MOSS

76. The Chair of the WG presented the current impasse that blocked the WG and recalled the intentions of the SRM policy as a background for the current discussions on MOSS. When the SRM policy and methodology were developed, the intention was that MOSS would no longer exist, since any measure approved by the DO, then became a security risk management measure (SRMM) that had to be put in place; therefore, the SRM measures were supposed to be the equivalent of what was MOSS. At the IASMN Steering Group meeting in November 2016, some members had indicated that MOSS held people and organizations accountable and supported compliance. Many other issues were raised including governance, the ability of AFPs to have a say before a SRMM becomes a cost to them, compliance and oversight in the SRM policy.
77. Currently, the WG does not agree on the substance of the SRM policy or the rewrite of the manual. There is no consensus on whether there should be a stand-alone policy or if it should be incorporated into the SRM policy. He suggested keeping MOSS as a separate policy, as it is easier to work with. The second issue was the name “MOSS”, as the WG, could not come to a consensus. He finally suggested that if there was agreement on the policy and the SRM manual, it might be easier to address the name change of MOSS through a vote or survey by IASMN members.
78. The IASMN Chair said he agreed with the approach proposed as a way forward. He asked the IASMN if there was agreement on the content of the proposed policy irrespective of where it sits or what it is called.
79. One representative indicated that clearer language was needed in sections of the draft policy, in particular (paragraph 6, 7 9, 11 and 12).
80. The Chair of the WG noted that the WG does not disagree that there is a need for additional guidance, but inquired if the AFPs needed MOSS to hold organizations accountable for the implementation of approved measures.
81. A representative requested clarity on paragraph 14 and noted his preference to keep the word MOSS because it was an “industry-standard”, but also highlighted that donors were clear that they did not like MOSS. There was also concern for accountability and oversight on the quality control. Questions may arise if the measures were really needed and it was not clear who was looking at that.

82. Two members noted preference for a systematic process where a set of applicable measures approved by UNDSS are shared with the AFPs.
83. The WG Chair noted there can be oversight at UNDSS-HQ and at the AFPs' level, so that the measures can be approved. The WG looked at the oversight structure approved prior to the SRM, and assessed that it was not in line with the FoA. He noted paragraph 14 of the new policy, which gives the DO time to consult with HQs of the AFPs on approval and clarification so that they can support properly the DO. He suggested maintaining an oversight process and not completely get rid of MOSS, since at the time of the meeting, not all the SRM processes have been completed. The oversight mechanism should be in line with the FoA, especially at the level of the SMT whose role is to give advice and support to the DO.
84. One representative asked that consideration should be given to support and facilitate decision-making for personnel in the field.
85. A staff representative noted that the draft policy had to be understood by security and non-security personnel.
86. The Chair of the WG also suggested working with IT to correct and shorten the SRM product approved by the DO and SMT and to enable the IASMN to decide whether more oversight was needed.
87. The IASMN Chair concluded that there was a wide range of views and different perspectives seeking different outcomes. He asked the WG to reflect upon what the IASMN members commented on and on the intended outcome, which was to have mitigation measures in place that were evidence-based and stemming from an SRM process. The focus should be on the objective and once this is clear, the IASMN can agree or disagree on the name change.
- 88. The IASMN took note of the update of the MOSS WG. The WG will revisit the objectives of the MOSS and propose a finalized guidance for submission at the 26th IASMN Session in June through the Steering Group.**

G. Road Safety Strategy

89. The Chair of the WG updated the meeting on the progress made, and presented the content of the road safety strategy. The WG supported a coordinated UN strategy in line with the goals and aspirations set in the Decade of Action for Road Safety and the UN Sustainable Development Goals. On the basis of the data included in the 2016 Secretary-General's Report and SSIRS data collated by TRS, she briefed that from 2009-2015, 91 UN personnel were killed and there were twice as many fatalities from road accidents than terrorism, with sub-Saharan Africa accounting for 80% of the total number of accidents.
90. She noted that the UN had an important role globally on road safety in leadership, advocacy, reporting and monitoring, norms and technical assistance to countries. Internally, the only system-wide guidance was the road safety policy in the SPM complemented by individual organizations' internal policies. The WG had established that a number of organizations were very advanced in terms of internal policies but others had very little. The JIU recommendation for a system-wide road safety policy and the HLCM Strategic Plan for 2017-2020 also recognized the need for a system-wide strategy.

91. The draft strategy was based on two main principles: Vision Zero and a safe-system approach, both of which were highly recognized on the international agenda. The next step was to finalize the draft strategy with consultations in the coming months, followed by endorsement of the strategy at the IASMN session in June and, presentation to the HLCM in Fall 2017. The WG will continue to work, in parallel, on developing data management.
92. In response to a question, the WG Chair noted that there was agreement to use SSIRS as the tool for data collection but it had to be improved and connected with other systems that are in place within the Organizations. In relation to the recommendation of the JIU to develop a policy, the chair of the WG indicated that the strategy would have to be developed first and followed by a review of the existing policy, to make sure it is in line with the new vision and the safe-system approach.
93. Another representative suggested starting to aggregate the data on third parties killed in road accidents in UN vehicles (such as visitors, guests, and non-UN personnel). UNHCR started collecting this data two years ago and the statistics were shocking. The Director of DRO/UNDSS noted that one of their priorities this year was a 100% capture of all security incidents affecting UN personnel. He recognized the imperfection with regard to SSIRS, but the Division was committed to capture data as accurately as possible.
94. A staff representative noted excessive overtime and long working hours of drivers among the reasons why fatalities occurred. He also highlighted the need for training of UN contractors (who may be drivers) and a requirement for better maintenance of vehicles.
95. Another representative supported the cross-cutting nature of this strategy as her Organization must work across different disciplines. In order to minimize the impact traffic accidents had on third parties, her organization had internally developed a safety-training programme for drivers.
96. One member informed the meeting that his Organization published a road safety policy in 2009 and was now surveying compliance. They were putting together their first fleet safety training programme, and developed specific training for drivers of armoured vehicles.
97. The Chief of PCCS noted there was a need to look at road traffic data, so as not to overreact to the numbers as they may not be far out of line of comparable statistics for the various countries in question. He also mentioned that there is possibly underreporting of minor accidents not involving injury.
98. One representative remarked that while security is not solely responsible for road safety, it had become the go-to section on this issue notwithstanding the fact that there are many elements of road safety that are outside the scope of security.
99. The Chief FSS/UNDSS indicated that in DPKO missions, board of inquiries were established for fatalities, which may provide additional data on the causes of road traffic accidents. With respect to training, safe-driving programmes should be emphasized as a priority.
100. The Chair of the WG agreed with underreporting and inconsistency on the data and the current data management does not yet provide a global and accurate picture.

101. The WG currently represents the interagency “task force.” As to the issue of leadership, it was important to note that the strategy will be endorsed by the IASMN, HLCM and the CEB because higher level involvement is needed to build support for this strategy.
102. In relation to leadership on road safety, the IASMN Chair reiterated that as a cross-cutting issue, it was important that the HLCM had included it in their strategic plan and came together at their level to ensure that there is system-wide engagement.
- 103. The IASMN took note of the update on the progress made with the draft strategy and the revised timelines for the deliverables. The IASMN will provide guidance and feedback on the strategy directly to the WG with a view to review and approval of the final strategy at its 26th session, through the Steering Group.**

H. Budget Update

104. The Head of the EO/UNDSS noted that there was agreement on the JFA (Jointly-Financed Activities) for the biennium 2018-19, and once the re-costing is known, they would know the impact of the post increases. As for the review of the funding mechanism, she noted that UNDSS is currently in consultation with the Controller’s Office, in particular on the headcount.
105. A representative asked if the concept note on the funding models could be shared.
106. The USG/UNDSS noted that organizations operating in high-risk environment should pay more for security services. The review of the funding model was for the Finance and Budget network and the CEB to decide.
107. Another representative expressed concern that the headcount only captured part of the equation, and asked if there was merit in expanding the scope of the traditional budget, to see what could be included there, and what would still be under the LCSSB.
108. One representative asked for clarification on the report to the Policy Committee where UNDSS was asked to review its funding mechanism but also, in his view, to review the skill set requested for security posts. When it comes to prioritisation, he believed this was an area that must be discussed at the IASMN, and inquired at what stage they would have the opportunity to look more comprehensively at the UNDSS vacancy rate, expenditures, and the budget performance report for 2015-16 to see how it all fits into a strategic review of UNDSS and broader UN reform.
109. The Executive Officer advised that the two reports were shared with Finance and Budget Network and UNDSS will provide these to the IASMN as requested.
110. The Chair of the IASMN responded that UNDSS would continue the ongoing work of the HR strategy and the review of the required skill sets of UN security personnel as this is a departmental responsibility. There was no other review of the Department taking place.
111. The EO/UNDSS noted that the headcount was determined by a methodology created by the FBN. She also indicated that with the revitalization of the trust fund, the idea was to see how the Department could pursue voluntary areas of funding where the JFA does not make sufficient provision.

112. One representative noted that UNMAS had a very large voluntary trust fund for many years.

113. The IASMN took note of the budget update.

I. Update on Locally Cost-Shared Security Budget (LCSSB)

114. The co-Chair of the WG presented the draft LCSSB policy as agreed within the WG. As many technical issues needed to be covered, the WG agreed that some of these would be covered in more detail in the LCSSB guidelines. Both the policy and guidelines will complement each other and serve to streamline preparation, submission, approval and implementation of the LCSSB.

115. One representative suggested taking into consideration the context of integrated missions in the policy or guidelines.

116. Another representative commented that the draft LCSSB policy should not be endorsed without further guidance on how to implement it. He encouraged the WG to look what is appropriate to be in the policy and what belongs in the guidelines. He gave the example that if a Chief Security Adviser (CSA) looked at the eight categories in the draft policy, he would note that there was some overlap with the JFA. More was needed to guide the judgement of the security professional as to what is appropriate and what is legitimate, or when it should be under the JFA.

117. The Secretary of the IASMN indicated that the Steering Group, in November 2016, recommended that the draft policy be presented at the IASMN but only be promulgated along with the LCSSB guidelines. She further noted the reason it is mentioned that the budget should be agreed upon at the local level is because they will have the discussion on what security services will be provided for the UN community.

118. Others noted to keep in mind cost recovery, compliance and oversight, transparency, and more clarity on ownership of the cost-shared budget, and whether it belongs to UNDSS or to the Administering Agency.

119. The IASMN Chair recommended that different setting such as missions or country teams be addressed in the guidelines. He further noted that decisions on local cost-shared budgets should not be made at HQ, the decision should be taken as close as possible to where implementation occurs. The P/C/SA needed to have more clarity on this to carry out their tasks as part of their responsibilities.

120. The IASMN took note of the update on the progress made with the draft UNSMS policy and requested that the policy be rolled out in conjunction with Guidelines, and that both be submitted for approval as soon as possible and ideally at the 26th IASMN Session through the Steering Group, acknowledging that this is a tight deadline. The IASMN also agreed that the implementation of the guidance (to be approved at the next session) should start in 2018 or as soon as practically feasible.

J. Update on First Response

121. On behalf of the Chair of the WG, the DPKO-DFS Representative updated the IASMN on progress made with a timeline that will have guidelines ready for endorsement at the next IASMN in June.

122. One member highlighted the importance of the ETB course for FSCOs and SAs and expressed willingness for the Asian Development Bank to join the First Responders WG.
123. Another member asked for all first responders to be versed in gender-based incidents.
- 124. The IASMN took note of the progress of the WG.**

K. Update on Residential Security Measures for Locally-Recruited Personnel

125. The Chair of the WG presented an update on the progress made and the final conclusions and recommendations from the two-phased approach.
126. One representative noted that all the conclusions presented by the WG were very sound and based on a credible and evidence-based process. It was also aligned with what risk management professionals have been seeing. The staff representatives said it has become a big issue managing expectations from locally-recruited personnel versus international personnel. There was discussion at the last IASMN to develop a good communications strategy which would offer an element of buy-in. He further asked the WG's views on raising awareness and communications with local staff to ensure that there is understanding and support for them from the IASMN.
127. One member said her Organization does not differentiate between national and international staff. This is an issue related to personnel. To move forward with the recommendations presented by the WG, the paper should be referred to the HR network so they can see the amount of work done and decide how best to take this forward.
128. The Director of DRO/UNDSS cautioned on the need to assess the impact of some recommendations on local security capacity.
129. Other representatives suggested to look at implementing simple measures for local staff, such as taxi service to their homes, or not to allow late work hours at all; and recommended guidance on what they can do. There were many measures to consider that do not have a cost-implication, such as awareness training.
130. The IASMN Chair noted that the recommendations touched upon a range of issues far broader than the IASMN's responsibilities. There were HR issues, but also budget issues which need to be addressed by the HLCM.
- 131. The IASMN took note of the progress made, and requested the WG prepare two summaries: one of all security options for local staff; and, the second a summary on the broad cross-cutting issues for the USG/UNDSS to take to HLCM, and for submission at the 26th IASMN Session.**

L. Update on Gender Considerations in Security Management

132. The co-chair of the WG on Gender Considerations indicated that a draft manual would be presented to the IASMN Steering Group in May to review ahead of the 26th Session of the IASMN in June. With regard to the security response to gender-related security incidents, the co-chair indicated that the internal UNDSS memo requiring 100 per cent reporting in SSIRS was not in line with the policy on gender considerations, which requires consent of the

affected person. The women's security awareness training was much appreciated and was in very high demand in the field, therefore there was need to have a commitment to pursue and expand it.

133. There was a coordination group working with Agencies to move this forward. The UNDSS gender focal point informed that the gender tab on UNSMIN would be active within a month. She also updated the IASMN on the various progress made internally by UNDSS following the establishment of the Departmental strategy, and highlighted recent initiatives and goals established by the new Secretary-General.
134. The Chief of PCCS noted that from an integration perspective they would refer to the Secretary-General's memo and ensure that recruitment is taking place in the field with consideration to the gender parity goals for the Department while recognizing difficulties in this regard.
135. One member confirmed that the WSAT has been a success with security personnel, and that the demand was widening. Another representative requested to have a CRP prepared for the next IASMN meeting.
136. The IASMN Chair noted that it was imperative to change security culture and behaviour to make the UNSMS an attractive place for women to work; a place where gender is valued, important and respected.
- 137. The IASMN took note of the update.**

M. Update on Governance and Framework of Accountability

138. The Chair of the WG briefed that the Steering Group had recommended to the IASMN to suspend revision of the UNSMS governance and the ToR for the IASMN; and rather to refer to the FoA as the only governance framework for the IASMN and the UNSMS.
139. One representative asked how the membership to the IASMN Steering Group would be addressed and if there would be a hierarchy on the issuance of UNSMS policies. The Secretary of the IASMN noted that there should be an internal SOP on the hierarchy of the policies that could be taken up by PPCU/UNDSS.
140. The IASMN Chair recommended that there should be a reference document on what is a policy, guidelines or strategy, as it may not be clear to those not involved in policy development. He also recommended that PPCU collate potential amendments to the FoA as matter of good maintenance of policies.
- 141. The IASMN took note of the update and the suspension of work of the Governance WG. The IASMN recommended that PPCU/UNDSS collate potential amendments to the FoA for eventual revision, and to draft an SOP or similar guidance on governance hierarchy.**

N. Update on Security Training

142. The Chief, FSS/UNDSS gave an update on the progress made by the Security Training Working Group (STWG). She described the three main strategic outputs of the WG: a training needs assessment (TNA); a UNSMS training strategy; and, an enhanced UNSMS learning programme. The TNA stage of the project was the data collection and analysis

phase in an effort to achieve a revised training programme that is fit-for-purpose, responsive, and adaptable to changing needs.

143. She noted that the TNA was currently reviewing the job categories for security management in four phases with Phase I having been completed in December 2016. The decision to begin the TNA exercise with these categories was because of concerns raised by members of the IASMN regarding apparent gaps in knowledge and skills for these groups; issues raised by DOs; the urgent need to address gaps that may exist in preparing for integration; and, the applicability of the data in analysing other categories of the UNSMS that would be addressed in the later phases.
144. The Chief/FSS further noted that UNDSS/TDS would resume training in February 2017 and prioritize its training commitments to the field. The training schedule for the second half of 2017 was being developed in consultation with the IASMN STWG and is expected to be finalized shortly.
145. She referred the IASMN to Annex A for details on the TNA process and its deliverables, and to Annex B for the timeline of activities, the review of the SSAFE programmes and proposal for the security awareness training continuum. She asked the IASMN to note the status and progress made by the WG while endorsing the continuum approach.
146. One representative noted that the STWG is not functioning properly. It was established in 2012, with a broad agenda and now there were eight WG members participating from seven different Organizations and the latest ToR for the WG did not include the agreed points from their last meeting. He noted the TNA does not give his Organization anything that they have been expecting or asking for the last two years. The TNA does not reference staff training and he is concerned that the WG will continue to meet with no agreement on the way forward and no addressing of their concerns for staff training.
147. Another representative agreed that the STWG has had no direction over the past two years. The ToR did not incorporate the recommendations made. One of the first recommendations from the Chair was to reconvene the WG at a later date. The TNA lacked client orientation and client input. It was UNDSS-centric and did not take into account the needs of the UNSMS. This was not the TNA they requested and they get pushback from UNDSS when they ask for changes. He noted BSAFE had the potential to be a good product but there has not been sufficient consultation with the AFPs.
148. One representative said the expectation was that the WG ToR would be presented for consideration of the IASMN on how to move forward. The reason the WG was not working was there were no clearly defined ToR. From an AFP perspective, the WG should identify the training needs for the UNSMS, develop the required programmes and deliver the training. Without clear direction and understanding, the WG cannot do its work. She said she wanted to see where the WG was going before committing any more personnel to the WG.
149. Another noted he was glad there was some progress made in replacing BSITF and ASITF. He was interested to hear how the new training will be rolled out and if there is any consultation with the insurance providers for MAIP.
150. One member said that there have been some positive outcomes from the STWG. He recommended that the WG continue meeting in its present state. The WG meetings so far have been good in that they provided an exchange of ideas on how to better coordinate the

training needs in their respective organizations, and the approach of the WG had been open. He noted they did not have an agreed ToR yet, because they did not reach a conclusion on this at their last meeting. On the way forward, he recommended to consult with the different stakeholders to better develop a strategy that can meet everyone's needs.

151. Two representatives requested that the needs of United Nations personnel in the field be addressed as specifically as possible as the way forward, and they would like to know the timeline when they can share information on upcoming training with their organizations.
152. The Chief of PPCU/UNDSS noted that from the policy side, the STWG was mentioned in the Security Policy Manual chapter on Security Training and Certification with three roles: certification, sharing of training materials and development of learning and best practices. The STWG was mentioned as being under the Training and Development Section (TDS) in UNDSS.
153. Another representative said he would like to see a forum that identifies training needs and establishes a standard that coordinates the development and implementation of training. The TNA should be circulated widely for input from AFPs and the field, so as to make it a comprehensive strategy. He asked for the needs of his staff in the field to be reflected in the strategy. He noted that BSAFE is a positive direction and would like to see a product. He further noted his Organization had raised issues with the current BSITF as their staff did not see much value in retaking the same course every three years for recertification. Nonetheless, BSITF remained a valuable tool for new recruits to the United Nations.
154. The UNMD noted two issues linked to training: the administrative aspect when personnel apply for exemption from training and the need to support better decision-making. He asked for elements of Occupational Safety and Health to be part of security training, and asked to be added to the STWG.
155. Two members noted that TDS/UNDSS should serve as the Secretariat for the STWG, not as the Chair of the WG, and they should be taking direction from their clients and providing client services.
156. The Chair of the IASMN agreed that the current set-up of the STWG was not sustainable as they needed clear direction to produce the outcomes that their clients were requesting. He recommended that the STWG meet again and rework their deliverables with clarity, direction, purpose and a mechanism for reporting back to the AFPs because ultimately they have the responsibility of addressing the training needs of the UNSMS. He noted that this issue could be further discussed under AOB, prior to the conclusion of the IASMN session.
157. In the resumed discussion, the Chief of FSS/UNDSS presented the IASMN with excerpts from Chapter V, Section C of the Security Policy Manual, 'Security Training and Certification,' on the development of training materials and delivery of training programmes.
158. The Chair of the IASMN noted there was a general agreement that ToR were needed for the STWG. Those ToR should be sourced from the current UNSMS policy and directed by what the IASMN wants done. The STWG needs to support the IASMN as the coordination group for training requirements within the UNSMS. The STWG should come back to the IASMN with ToR based on the current policy, for endorsement by the IASMN out of session.

159. Two members noted that there is a ToR for the STWG but it was not made part of the CRP for the IASMN. The ToR that was agreed is in line with the policy and gives UNDSS leadership for the STWG as well. The Chair of the IASMN requested that the ToR to be circulated firstly to the entire STWG for their approval, and then to the Secretariat to be shared with the IASMN, who can then finalize and endorse the ToR virtually before the next IASMN meeting. The IASMN agreed on these steps as the way forward.
- 160. The IASMN noted the update from the Security Training Working Group. The STWG will agree on the ToR and then circulate it to the full IASMN, for remote endorsement.**

O. Update on Compliance

161. The Chief of PCCS briefed on the rationale for the Compliance Working Group and expressed the goal to identify volunteers for the WG and chair. He noted Annex A was the draft ToR for the WG and Annex B the suggested structure for a UNSMS policy on compliance, but both Annexes were for the WG to further develop, not for endorsement by the IASMN at this session.
162. One member noted that the Annexes were developed in isolation and not shared with IASMN until this meeting for endorsement, and that the previous compliance approach was more technical- oriented and geared toward finding errors than providing solutions.
163. The Director of DRO/UNDSS, as well as other representatives expressed their interest to join the WG.
164. One member said his Organization had its own compliance mechanism in place and could share how to improve the compliance management system.
- 165. The IASMN agreed to establish a Working Group on Compliance. The IASMN reviewed and endorsed the approach for a new compliance management policy to be developed by the Working Group.**

P. Update on Maintenance of Policies, Field Security Handbook, Translations, and Confidentiality of UNSMS Policies

166. The Chief of PPCU/UNDSS noted that the technical review of UNSMS policies was completed as well as all editorial changes made to reflect the newly promulgated policies. A full set of policies will be compiled into an e-book, which can be downloaded. As for the Field Security Handbook, six remaining components need to be updated. One on telecommunications was drafted by PPCU/UNDSS and sent to the WG on Emergency Telecommunications for input. With regard to the translations to French, she further noted that the expectation was to have this completed by PPCU by the end of the year. In addition, she briefed the IASMN on the Steering Group's recommendation to make all UNSMS policies available to the public.
167. The Chief of PCCS noted that if the IASMN expects security personnel to comply with UNSMS policies, the policies along with the guidelines should be made readily available to everyone. As none of the UNSMS policies were confidential, there was no reason not to make them available to the public as well. This would solve the problem of providing guidance to NGOs.
168. Another representative suggested that volunteers be used to look at all UNSMS policies and guidelines to see if there is anything sensitive that should not be shared with the public.

169. The IASMN Chair noted that public access of all policies and guidelines should be the default position, but if the author of the policy wanted to keep a document confidential, they would need a justifiable reason.
- 170. The IASMN took note of the progress made and agreed that the UNSMS Policies and Guidelines should be available publicly unless there is a strong justification brought to its attention on a specific policy.**

Q. IASMN Priorities for 2017

171. The Chief of PCCS/UNDSS noted that 2015-2016 were very busy in terms of IASMN WGs, as a number of policies had been developed and promulgated. He recommended that what was not finished in 2016 be carried over to 2017, in addition to the ongoing work of the WGs, and that no further priorities are set until the June IASMN session, at which time this position could be reconsidered.
172. One member requested the IASMN to consider other priorities during the year that can be added later. This was agreed upon.
173. The IASMN Chair said he recognized the comments on “policy fatigue”, but recalled the role of the IASMN with regard to policy development, in line with the FoA. The IASMN needed to establish good policies to support personnel to make security decisions, not to be prescriptive or an impediment for actions. He needed to make sure that, in consultation with the IASMN, the UNSMS had measures in place for people to be safe.
- 174. The IASMN agreed on the 2017 priorities recommended by the Steering Group: transition from the FSH; policy Q&A on UNSMIN; policy priorities including crisis management in security crisis, compliance, locally cost-shared security budget (LCSSB), MOSS; and the Training-Needs Assessment and Training Strategy.**

R. Briefing on Emergency Telecommunications

175. Mr. Alpha Bah, WFP, made a presentation on interoperability of security telecommunications and proposals for new radio communications infrastructure. He noted that one of the key drivers for the move to digital has been the industry itself. Today there are systems in use in the UNSMS that do not talk to each other. The current system used a two-way radio and they agreed working on the technical level to ensure that all players have telecommunications adaptability. Afghanistan will be used as a pilot study. He noted that due to changes in priorities and management, they needed to look at new investments to support the proposal.
176. One of the discussions at the ETC plenary meeting in March 2017 will be the adoption of multiple means of communication. Fifteen years ago, there was usually no connectivity except for radios and it was the main means of communications. Today in remote areas, there are different connectivity means available, and today many people also use a smart device. For future technology, there should be a tool that allows these different means to work together. He noted that radio has been an independent and reliable network. However, when services are run on the top of IP connectivity, features such as voice, messaging, and tracking, people have access to several applications on the top of that

connectivity to communicate with each other. IP Connectivity is the future of security telecommunications.

177. Many questions were raised about acquisition and maintenance costs, key milestones of the project proposal and timeline, global mapping, cost-benefit analysis, and the implication for using radio in the future.
178. One representative noted that establishing reliable connectivity on an individual basis is the way forward for security communications and others recognized that the existing technology is outdated, while raising concerns about governments' shutting down network systems .
179. With regard to the timeframe, Mr. Bah responded that he would present a concept note by the end of March and use the opportunity at the ETC plenary meeting to get input on the concept note from technology experts. He noted that the business needs must come from the IASMN to support and validate the business requirements. He would welcome inputs from the IASMN to refine those requirements. After the concept note is presented, they can agree on a pilot, which could take another six months.
180. He further noted that it was difficult to come up with a unit cost, however, the ETC is looking at minimizing the investment for the existing radio network. As for reliability, in the past a mobile network was not considered reliable, but today that capability is there. This must be part of the risk analysis.
181. He recognised the need for a global mapping exercise so people are not left out. However, tracking of personnel was presented before. There is already a system for tracking and they have an app that works on smartphones. They will consider privacy issues and will be part of the design for any system.
182. A representative noted there are situations where they need direct and local communications for close-protection operations or movement of humanitarian convoys.
183. The IASMN Chair proposed as a way forward to establish an Advisory Group on Telecommunications as a subset of the IASMN and to work with the ETC to give advice on UNSMS business needs. The Advisory Group will also consider the priority areas for the IASMN in security communications.
- 184. The IASMN took note of the briefing on emergency telecommunications and established an IASMN Advisory Group on Technology to look at business needs and cross-cutting issues (Note: During the 'Any Other Business' session, the IASMN decided for the Advisory Group to broaden its scope to technology, rather than only emergency telecommunications).**

S. TRIP System Capability

185. The UNHCR Representative noted that when a TRIP clearance is submitted, a staff member should be able to get security information such as an advisory followed by an attachment of basic and critical information.
186. The Chief, CMISS/UNDSS (participating via VTC) responded that in the TRIP system, when a security clearance request is processed and cleared, an email with a link is sent with the

country security profile. However, not all countries have all their profile updated and there is no global standard in place. DRO/UNDSS made a business case for a sample travel advisory that will be rolled out soon. The next step is to add several topics including local emergency services; however, implementation would require the local offices to populate these fields

187. Other members asked for additional functionality such as an app that would provide a travel risk map and other security information. Resources would be required to do this.
188. The IASMN Chair recommended to put aside the resourcing issue and if there were functionalities that could be implemented through TRIP in the short-term, to proceed rather in that direction. He raised concern about divergent requirements on technology because currently there was no coordination or unified requirement.
189. It was agreed that a travel advisory will be provided with all approved TRIPs; and expanded/systematized use will be made of alerts to people registered in TRIP when critical incidents occur.
- 190. The IASMN recommended establishing an IASMN Advisory Group on technology with CMISS/UNDSS to provide a paper by end of March on current capabilities and opportunities for consideration of the Advisory Group. The IASMN will spend ½ day on a strategic discussion on technology at the 26th Session in June.**

T. Request from the African Development Bank (AfDB) to join the UNSMS

191. The Secretary of the IASMN presented the request from the African Development Bank to join the UNSMS [CRP 15].
192. A representative said his Organization has been approached several times by the AfDB to be included, as they know other development banks are included. He would support their request, and several others, agreed.
193. Another representative suggested maintaining the current cost-share arrangement and increasing the budget proportionally to this new requirement to provide UNDSS additional funds, adequate to the additional work. The Director DRO/UNDSS cautioned about the resources implications.
- 194. The IASMN noted the request from the AfDB to join the UNSMS and noted that there was general principle support for inclusion of the AfDB. They agreed the way forward is to review the financing for this once the re-costing model is reviewed through the Finance and Budget Network.**

U. Any Other Business

195. The IASMN agreed to form a WG on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments which, among other activities to be described in its ToR, might review intelligence assessments that Member States may have regarding the use of CBRN weapons in their country [CRP9].
196. The IASMN noted the update on global identification [CRP 14].
197. The outcomes and recommendations of the 25th Session of the IASMN were reviewed.

198. The IASMN will accept nominees for the Steering Group for review at its meeting in May 2017. The IASMN will endorse the composition of the Steering Group at its 26th session in June 2017.
199. The IASMN agreed that CRPs instead of verbal updates would be shared ahead of the next IASMN because it helps to identify a way forward more clearly.
200. UN Women will confirm whether it can host the 27th Session of the IASMN in New York, February 2018.
201. The next IASMN Steering Group meeting is in Rome, hosted by WFP, from 10-11 May and the 26th Session of the IASMN will be from 20-22 June in Montreux, hosted by the Swiss Confederation.

Final Agenda

Tuesday, 7 February 2017

- 0800 - 0900 ID Issuance -1818 H Street NW (Visitors entrance at Pennsylvania Ave-18th St)
- 0900 – 0930 Opening Session
- Welcome (Shaolin Yang, Managing Director and WBG Chief Administrative Officer)
 - Security Briefing (Martin Kraus, Security Specialist WBG HQ); Admin instructions (Derek Erkkila).
 - Adoption of the Agenda (USG, UNDSS) - [\[CRP 1\]](#)
 - Review of IASMN 24th session Recommendations (PPCU) - [\[CRP 1, Annex B\]](#)
- 0930 – 1030 Strategic Update
- Security environment (DRO)
 - Key points SG report (PPCU)
- 1030 – 1100 *Break*
- 1100 – 1230 Strategic Update (continued)
- Integration of Security Resources of the Secretariat (PCCS)
 - JIU (EO)
- 1230 – 1330 *Lunch*
- 1330 – 1430 DRO update
- Lessons learned from UNDSS 2016 Workshops (DRO) [\[CRP 10\]](#)
 - Security Risk Management Process (DRO)
 - Management of safety and security crisis in the Field (DRO)
- 1430 – 1530 Security coverage in OECD Countries (UNDP) [\[CRP 2\]](#)
- 1530 – 1600 *Break*
- 1600 – 1700 MOSS (OCHA) [\[CRP 8\]](#)
- 1700 – 1800 Road Safety Strategy (PPCU) [\[CRP 4\]](#)
- 1800 *End of Day*

Wednesday, 08 February 2017

- 0900 – 1000 Budget update
- Security Budget for the 2018-2019 Biennium (EO)
 - Review of funding mechanisms (EO)
 - Trust Fund (EO)
- 1000 – 1100 Working Group Updates
- Locally Cost-Shared Security Budgets (UNDP) [\[CRP 3\]](#)
 - First response (DPKO-DFS) [\[CRP 5\]](#)
- 1100 – 1130 *Break*
- 1130 – 1300 Working Group Updates

- Residential Security for Locally-Recruited Personnel (IOM) [\[CRP 6\]](#)
 - Gender Considerations in Security Management (UN Women, UNDSS Gender Adviser)
 - Governance Framework-Framework for Accountability (PCCS) [\[CRP 13\]](#)
- 1300 – 1400 *Lunch*
- 1400 – 1530 Security Training (FSS/TDS) [\[CRP 7\]](#)
- Security Training Working Group
 - Update on the training strategy
 - SSAFE
- 1530 – 1600 *Break (*Including photograph)*
- 1600 – 1730 Other policy issues
- Compliance policy (PCCS) [\[CRP 16\]](#)
 - Programme Criticality (OCHA)
 - Update on Maintenance of Policies: Field Security Handbook, Translation, Confidentiality of UNSMS Policies (PPCU) [\[CRP 12\]](#)
 - IASMN Priorities 2017 (PCCS) [\[CRP 17\]](#)
- 1730 *End of Day*
- 1745-2100 Social Event, International Spy Museum

Thursday, 09 February 2017

- 0900 – 1030 Other issues:
- Emergency telecommunications (WFP) by VTC - TBC
 - TRIP (UNHCR, FSS/CIMSS by VTC) [\[CRP 11\]](#)
 - Request from the African Development Bank (PPCU) [\[CRP 15\]](#)
- 1030 - 1100 *Break*
- 1100 – 1300 Any Other Business
- NRBC environments (PPCU) [\[CRP 9\]](#)
 - Update on progress on global ID (ITU) [\[CRP 14\]](#)
- 1300 *Close of Session*
- 1315 *Lunch*

List of Participants

	<u>Entity</u>	<u>Name of Participant</u>
1	ADB	Mr. Dewaine Farria
2	DPA	Mr. Valentin Aldea
3	DPKO/DFS	Mr. Adriaan Bezuidenhout
4	EBRD	Mr. Russ Stewart
5	FAO	Mr. Piergiorgio Trentinaglia
6	IAEA	Mr. Casper Oswald
7	ICC	Mr. Lassi Kuusinen
8	IFAD	Ms. Claudia Fiori
9	ILO	Mr. Guillaume Verwaerde
10	IMF	Mr. James Blakeney
11	IOM	Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison
12	ITU	Mr. Drew Donovan
13	OCHA	Mr. Simon Butt
14	OPCW	Mr. Kevin Mephram
15	PAHO	Ms. Maria Teresa Angulo
16	UN Women	Mr. Paul O'Hanlon
17	UN Women	Ms. Bridget Hancock
18	UNAIDS	Mr. Peter Koopmans
19	UNDP	Mr. Luc Vandamme
20	UNDP	Mr. Thomas Shannon
21	UNDSS HQ	Mr. Peter Drennan
22	UNDSS HQ	Mr. Mike Croll
23	UNDSS HQ	Ms. Harriet Solloway
24	UNDSS HQ	Mr. Craig Harrison
25	UNDSS HQ	Ms. Menada Wind-Andersen
26	UNDSS HQ	Ms. Florence Poussin
27	UNDSS HQ	Ms. Tamara Anderson
28	UNDSS HQ	Mr. Andre Dehondt
29	UNDSS HQ	Ms. Dina Daoud
30	UNECA	Mr. Carlos Haddad
31	UNFPA	Mr. Naqib Noory
32	UNHCR	Michael Dell'Amico

33	UNICEF	Ms. Janie McCusker
34	UNIDO	Mr. Guillermo Jimenez-Blasco
35	UNON/UNEP	Mr. Peter Marshall
36	UNOPS	Mr. Arve Skog
37	UNRWA	Mr. Timothy der Weduwen
38	UNV	Mr. Mitsuhiro Inaba
39	WFP	Mr. Christophe Boutonnier
40	WHO	Mr. Richard Preston
41	WIPO Geneva	Mr. Mark Gibb
42	World Bank	Mr Jeffrey Culver
43	World Bank	Mr. Derek M.A. Erkkila
44	WTO	Ms. Amène BELLIR
45	CEB Secretariat	Mr. Remo Lalli
46	CEB Secretariat	Ms. Laura Gallacher
47	CCISUA	Mr. Guy Avognon
48	FICSA	Mr. Jason Sigurdson
49	OLA	Mr. Luke Mhlaba
50	UNISERV	Mr. Stephan Flaetgen
51	UNMDWG	Dr. Brian Davey

Summary of IASMN Recommendations

1. The IASMN noted the update on the JIU. AFPs will send their comments on the JIU report to the CEB Secretariat, while UNDSS will concurrently send a summary of the IASMN discussion on the JIU report to the CEB Secretariat.
2. The IASMN recommended that DRO/UNDSS review the legal and policy basis of the UN Policy on Crisis Management to assess whether a UNSMS Policy or guidelines are required, and required that the WG reconvene to prepare guidelines and/or a policy for submission to its 26th Session in June.
3. The IASMN took note of the recommendations from the WG on Security Arrangements for OECD Countries. The IASMN Chair requested IASMN members to direct further feedback, as required, to the WG Chair. The recommendations of the WG will be sent to DRO/UNDSS for review and prioritization. A final set of prioritized recommendations should be presented to the next IASMN session through the Steering Group.
4. The IASMN took note of the update of the MOSS WG. The WG will revisit the objectives of the MOSS and propose a finalized guidance for submission at the 26th Session in June through the Steering Group.
5. The IASMN took note of progress made by the WG on the draft Road Safety Strategy and the revised timelines for the deliverables. The IASMN will provide guidance and feedback on the strategy directly to the WG with a view to review and approve the final strategy at its 26th session, through the Steering Group.
6. The IASMN took note of the update on the progress made by the WG on the draft UNSMS policy for LCSSB and requested that the policy be rolled out in conjunction with guidelines. The IASMN requested that both be submitted for approval as soon as possible and ideally at the 26th IASMN Session through the Steering Group, acknowledging that this is a tight deadline. The IASMN also agreed that the implementation of the guidance (to be approved at the next session) should start in 2018 or as soon as feasible.
7. The IASMN took note of the progress made by the First Responders Working Group, which will present guidelines to the IASMN at its June session.
8. The IASMN took note of the progress made by the WG on Residential Security Measures for Locally-Recruited Personnel and requested the WG to prepare two summaries: one of all the security options for local staff; and, the second, a summary on the broad cross-cutting issues for the USG/UNDSS to take to HLCCM and for submission at the 26th IASMN Session.

9. The IASMN took note of the progress made on the WG for Gender Considerations and that a draft manual would be presented to the IASMN in June, through the Steering Group.
10. The IASMN took note of the update and the suspension of work of the Governance WG. The IASMN recommended that PPCU/UNDSS collate potential amendments to the Framework of Accountability for eventual revision, and to draft an SOP or similar guidance on governance hierarchy.
11. The IASMN noted the update from the Security Training Working Group. The STWG will agree on the ToR and then circulate it to the full IASMN, for endorsement.
12. The IASMN agreed to establish a Working Group on Compliance. The IASMN reviewed and endorsed the approach for a new compliance management policy to be developed by the Working Group.
13. The IASMN agreed that the UNSMS Policies and Guidelines should be available publicly unless there is a strong justification brought to its attention on a specific policy.
14. The IASMN agreed on the 2017 priorities recommended by the Steering Group: transition from the Field Security Handbook; policy Q&A on UNSMIN; policy priorities including crisis management in security, compliance, locally cost-shared security budget (LCSSB), MOSS, and the Training-Needs Assessment and Training Strategy.
15. The IASMN established an IASMN Advisory Group on Technology to look at business needs and cross-cutting issues. CMISS/UNDSS will provide a paper on current capabilities and opportunities for consideration of the Advisory Group. The IASMN will spend ½ day on a strategic discussion on technology at the 26th Session in June.
16. The IASMN noted the request from the African Development Bank to join the UNSMS and noted that there was general principle support for inclusion of the AfDB. They agreed the way forward is to review the financing for this once the re-costing model is reviewed through the Finance and Budget Network.
17. The IASMN agreed to form a Working Group on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments which, among other activities to be described in its TOR, might review intelligence assessments that Member States may have regarding the use of CBRN weapons in their country.
18. The IASMN agreed that CRPs instead of verbal updates would be shared ahead of the next IASMN because it helps to identify a way forward more clearly.

New IASMN Working Groups

Working Group on Compliance		
	Representative	Organization
1	Mr. Christophe Boutonnier (Chair)	WFP
2	Mr. Valentin Aldea	DPA
3	Ms. Julie Dunphy	UNHCR
4	Mr. Paul O'Hanlon	UN Women
5	Mr. Majed Altwal	UNICEF
6	Mr. Damjan Zgajner	UNDP
7	Mr. Charles Kunza	UNRWA
8	Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison	IOM
9	Mr. Ken Payumo	UNDSS/DRO
10	Mr. Piergiorgio Trentinaglia	FAO
11	Ms. Suchada Kulawat	UNDSS/PPCU
12	Mr. Daniel Igartua	UNDSS/CEMS

Working Group on CBRN		
	Representative	Organization
1	Mr. Caspar Oswald (Chair)	IAEA
2	Mr. Valentin Aldea	DPA
3	Mr. Diarmuid O'Donovan	UNDSS/UNSSSIP
4	Mr. Anders Brynnel	DPKO-DFS
5	Mr. Kevin Mepham	OPCW
6	Dr. Soumik Paul	OPCW
7	Dr. Matthias Lademann (alternate)	OPCW
8	Mr. Jan Wuyts	OPCW
9	Ms. Carol Peterfi	OPCW
10	Mr. Nicholas Salitros	OPCW
11	Mr. Pierre Nazroo	WHO
12	Mr. Tripp Brinkley	UPU
13	Ms. Suchada Kulawat	UNDSS/PPCU

Advisory Group on Technology		
	Representative	Organization
1	Ms. Harriet Solloway (Chair)	UNDSS/FSS
2	Ms. Julie Dunphy	UNHCR
3	Mr. Dzenzn Viteskic	UN Women
4	Mr. Drew Donovan	ITU
5	Mr. PaePae Wiki	UNDSS/DRO
6	Mr. Andre Dehondt	UNDSS/CMISS
7	Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison	IOM
8	Mr. John Williamson (Alternate)	IOM
9	Mr. Tomislav Condic	UNDP
10	Mr. Christian Mbumba	UNDP
11	Mr. Werner Moil	UNFPA
12	Mr. Dewaine Farria	ADB
13	Mr. GP Marin	ADB