

Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN)
24th Session
Montreux, 21-23 June 2016

Final Report

Executive Summary

The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) conducted its 24th Session in Montreux, Switzerland from 21 to 23 June 2016, hosted by the Swiss Confederation. Fifty-eight participants from 37 members of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) participated in the session, including seven observers from the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the UN Medical Directors Working Group, the Secretariat of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), and staff associations, CCISUA and FICSA.

Mr. Peter Drennan, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG UNDSS) chaired the session with Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison, Head of Staff Security Unit for the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as Co-Chair. Ms. Florence Poussin, Chief of the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit (PPCU) for UNDSS served as Secretary.

Ambassador Mirjana Spoljaric, Head of the United Nations and International Organizations Division, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs opened the session. She expressed appreciation for the work of the IASMN and emphasized the importance of safety and security for the Swiss Confederation as it hosts 35 international organizations within its territory.

Global Security Development

The USG UNDSS shared the Department's assessment of the security environment since the IASMN last met in February 2016. IASMN members discussed how this is an era of new and unprecedented security challenges with a deteriorating security environment, particularly the threat of ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, North Africa and recently Europe as returnees of ISIS coordinate attacks in their home states. There was no indication of positive changes in the security environment in the next few years as the tactics and strategies employed by terrorist groups were constantly adapting.

In this context, the IASMN was also briefed on the outcome of the recent Policy Committee meeting on Safety and Security, and on UNDSS progress on its 2016 priorities, including, Integration, strategic Human Resources framework, reduction of vacancy rates, strategic review of the Threat and Risk Assessment Service, Gender Strategy, development strategy in support of the Designated Officials, and outcome of the client satisfaction survey.

New Guidance Approved

The IASMN approved a total of three guidelines: a guideline and manual for Unarmed Private Security Services; guidelines on Security Management of United Nations Common Premises; and, on PEP Kit Management. Guidelines will be incorporated in the Security Management Operations Manual (SMOM) following promulgation.

Update on IASMN Working Groups and Recommendations

The IASMN approved the Terms of References for five new Working Groups (WG) established in February 2016: Security Arrangements in OECD Countries, First Responders, Road Safety Strategy, Governance, and Locally Cost-Shared Security Budgets. It also established a new WG on Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) to be chaired by OCHA. The new WG will focus on MOSS integration to the Security Risk Management (SRM) process. Notably, the IASMN encouraged timely implementation of the SRM process, and strict implementation of the Residential Security Measures (RSM) policy.

With the concurrence of the CEB Secretariat, the IASMN approved a technical revision of the Security Policy Manual to ensure it accurately reflects the outcomes of newly-adopted UNSMS policies. In addition, the IASMN received updates on the progress made by the WG on Gender Considerations in Security Management, and is expecting a draft policy on Crisis Management for the next Steering Group meeting in November.

JFA Budget

In relation to budget, the IASMN discussed the draft preliminary JFA budget estimate and strategic framework for the 2018-2019 biennium. The IASMN agreed to the need for more resources in line with the deterioration of the security environment, and also required more details, justifications and prioritization on the preliminary budget. A revised budget paper will be circulated to the full IASMN in late August, ahead of the November Steering Group meeting.

Other Issues

The IASMN also received updates on Duty of Care, Compliance, Programme Criticality, Physical Security, Identity Management and Emergency Telecommunication. The IASMN agreed that UNDSS will develop a discussion paper for a new UNSMS policy on compliance assessment for the next IASMN Steering Group meeting in November 2016. Similarly, more progress is expected on emergency telecommunications and identity management for the next Steering Group.

Upcoming Meetings

The next IASMN Steering Group will be in November 2016 in Valencia, Spain hosted by DPKO-DFS. The next full IASMN meeting will be hosted by the World Bank in Washington, DC in the first week of February 2017.

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A. Introduction

1. Under the auspices of the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM), the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) meets twice a year with representatives of the 54 organizations of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), including United Nations Departments, Offices, Agencies, Funds and Programmes, to coordinate security policies and best practices across the UN-system.
2. The IASMN conducted its 24th Session in Montreux, Switzerland from 21 to 23 June 2016, hosted by the Swiss Confederation. Fifty-eight participants from 37 members of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) participated in the session, including seven representatives from the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the UN Medical Directors Working Group, the Secretariat of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), and staff associations, CCISUA and FICSA, who were present at the meeting as observers.
3. Mr. Peter Drennan, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG UNDSS) chaired the session with Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison, Head of Staff Security Unit for the International Organization for Migration (IOM), serving as Co-Chair. Ms. Florence Poussin, Chief of the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit (PPCU) for UNDSS served as Secretary.
4. Ambassador Mirjana Spoljaric, Head of the United Nations and International Organizations Division, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs opened the session. She expressed appreciation on behalf of the host country for the efforts of the IASMN in a challenging security environment. She noted safety and security are important elements for the Swiss Confederation as it hosts 35 international organizations, as well as many conferences in the country. She also noted it was important to promote mainstreaming of safety and security into all activities and support to the United Nations with its budgetary planning, decision-making and strengthening cooperation in the field.

B. Global Security Developments

5. As part of an overview on recent global security developments, Mr. Drennan shared UNDSS assessment of the security environment. He noted this is an era of new and unprecedented security challenges with a deteriorating security environment, particularly the threat of ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, North Africa and recently Europe as returnees of ISIS coordinate attacks in their home states.
6. There was no indication of positive changes in the security environment in the next few years as the tactics and strategies employed by terrorist groups were constantly adapting. It is likely that ISIS members will continue to carry out more attacks in Europe as a way to respond to coordinated actions against them in Iraq and Syria. These recent attacks, thwarted plots and increased security alert levels in many European countries have contributed to a sense of fear among United Nations staff. As a result, there have been more requests from Designated Officials (DOs) for UNDSS support.
7. The USG also noted concerns with social media, cyber threats and greater interaction between organized crime and terrorism while the ongoing weakening of states politically and economically led to more conflicts. UNDSS is looking at an increase in potential

election-driven violence in Africa, notably in the Gambia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon and Kenya. As more state actors use proxies, there are implications for national staff.

8. There is an unrealistic expectation that members of the UNSMS can deliver on all programmes, in all places at all times. The USG noted the need to understand specific situations and when a permissive security environment allows carrying out programmes and when it does not. He noted that the Threat and Risk Assessment Service of UNDSS has ongoing reporting on election analysis and the potential for violence. He called on participants to indicate if they were not receiving threat analysis reports.
9. Some IASMN representatives noted that UNDSS was becoming more action-oriented in its operations and supportive of UNSMS members. They also noted the importance of national and locally-recruited staff as resources and the importance of engaging them in decision-making related to their safety and security; particularly in situations where international staff are being evacuated. The example of Yemen was given, where national staff had expressed concerns of lack of engagement and consultation.
10. Mr. Drennan agreed in some cases national staff understand the dangers better than internationally-recruited staff. It is important for the UNSMS to involve them in the discussions of contingency-planning so they can make their own security decisions.

C. Adoption of the Agenda and Review of previous IASMN Recommendations

11. The IASMN adopted the Agenda for its 24th Session.
12. Ms. Florence Poussin, Secretary of the IASMN, reviewed the recommendations previously made in the 22nd Session from May 2015 and the 23rd Session in February 2016. As noted in the implementation matrix (CRP 1), 33 recommendations (82%) from the 22nd Session were completed with one recommendation, from the Board of Inquiry Report on the Kabul attacks of January 2014, still pending because of financial and technical difficulties.
13. Five recommendations related to crisis management, gender considerations in security management and the SRM process were ongoing. From the 23rd Session of the IASMN, 12 of the 26 recommendations (46%) were implemented with 14 recommendations ongoing. Those are related to the ongoing work in the IASMN Working Groups. The Secretary noted that, on a monthly basis, the Chair of the WGs would give a progress update with outcomes indicated on the IASMN tab on UNSMIN.
14. As a separate matter of meeting procedure, an IASMN representative proposed that prior to closure of each day, the IASMN Secretary summarize the outcome and recommendations under each topic discussed. The Chair agreed.
15. **The IASMN took note of the progress made in the implementation of recommendations from its last two sessions.**

D. UNDSS Integration Project Update

16. Mr. Craig Harrison, Chief of Policy, Coordination and Compliance Service, UNDSS and the United Nations Secretariat Safety and Security Integration Project (UNSSSIP) Project Manager, presented an update on UNSSSIP and integration of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and UNDSS Security Resources. Currently, emphasis has been on the United Nations Secretariat. The Agencies Funds and Programmes (AFPs) are not included in UNSSSIP. The UNDSS Division of Headquarters Safety and Security Services (DHSSS) will be addressed in a follow-up phase. The purpose of the update was to keep IASMN members informed of progress. It was noted that the project is on track.
17. A meeting at the Principals-level in March 2016 gave clear guidance on issues related to management integration and to the three main work streams: Human Resources, Finance and Management. Communication was expanding and would be enhanced with more Frequently-Asked-Questions to address concerns from the field staff and UNHQ. A memo from the Assistant Secretary-General of DFS was sent on 1 June to all Director or Chiefs of Mission Support calling on support for UNSSSIP. A human resources consultant will harmonize 56 security job descriptions based on 21 security titles, by the end of the year; and funding for a P5 and P4 post has been approved through June 2017.
18. Mr. Harrison advised that two meetings have taken place to date at the principal level with UNDSS, DPA, DM, DPKO, DFS, UNDP, and OLA to provide strategic guidance. Currently there are three sub-working groups for staffing modalities, financial modalities and review of Secretary-General Bulletin (ST/SGB) on UNDSS to formalize UNDSS authority and management control over all security-level elements for DPA, DPKO and DFS. A draft revision of the SGB to accommodate change is ready and it is hoped that it will be signed this year by the current Secretary-General.
19. A code cable went out on 2 May on the management arrangements with Chief Security Officers and Designated Officials/Heads of Mission in peacekeeping missions. There are four CSOs now under UNDSS management authority, although their salary remains under the mission budget: UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNFICYP and UNDOF with MINURSO postponed. In the future, CSOs in these missions cannot be recruited without UNDSS involvement.
20. A second code-cable will go out concerning missions where the Head of Mission is not the DO: UNMOGIP, UNTSO and for Special Political Missions. Analysts in DPKO will also be brought under Threat and Risk Analysis Service (TRAS) management or functional control and Close Protection Officers under DHSSS. An SOP on management for Close Protection is being developed. Management integration is proceeding ahead of contractual integration.
21. In terms of finances, UNSSSIP identified six funding streams: UNA, JFA, QSA (peacekeeping support account), missions' budgets (40 budgets separately funded by the ACABQ), extra-budgetary funding, and local cost-shared budgets. Streamlining the budget is an immense undertaking. A meeting on 10 June with senior management opened the discussion on the way forward for financial modalities for integration.

22. Human Resources integration is the most advanced work stream. The most important discussion involves the contractual basis for personnel and the mechanics for harmonizing staff selection and managed mobility. Eventually all security personnel will be under Secretariat contracts. All promotions and movements will be done through the Secretariat rules. This implies the use of Secretariat rosters and generic job openings on multiple grades to allow United Nations personnel who are not currently on rosters to obtain roster membership. The next step is alignment with staff selection and managed mobility through SAFETYNET.
23. An IASMN member asked if there would be indirect impact to the AFPs and inquired about the training capacity that will be needed to ensure that everyone is on the same level of capacity. The UNSSSIP Project Manager responded that all staff are already trained within their own existing capacity and all integrated security personnel would be trained to the same standard. He added that at the moment financial effectiveness is being pursued and not financial efficiency, which may come at a later state.
24. **The IASMN noted the update on UNSSSIP.**

E. Update on UNDSS Priorities

25. Mr. Drennan informed the IASMN on the outcome of the annual update on Safety and Security presented to the Policy Committee chaired by the Secretary-General in early June. There was strong support in general on the work of UNDSS and developments in the UNSMS. There was a recommendation for UNDSS to work with the Controller's Office and the Finance and Budget network to ensure that there is adequate, flexible and responsive funding, and to make recommendations for new funding models. As agreed during the session, the submission paper was circulated to IASMN members.
26. It was noted that the Department continues to work to reduce its vacancy rates from 15% to 5% by the end of December 2016. A first draft of the strategic HR framework and review of the TRAS were prepared and the USG will provide feedback on both. A training-needs assessment is being finalized in support of an overarching training strategy and this will be led by the new Chief of UNDSS/Field Support Service (FSS).
27. The Gender Strategy has established a Gender Coordination Team and three task forces on implementation, parity and communications. The team will present its first bi-annual report to the UNDSS Steering Group in July. A development strategy to support Designated Officials (DO) will be completed including a revision of the DO Handbook.

F. Unarmed Private Security Services (UPSS)

Presentation:

28. Mr. Adriaan Bezuidenhout, Chair of the UPSS Working Group, gave an update on its progress noting that the policy was approved by the 23rd IASMN in February 2016. The guidelines were now finalized and had been reviewed by Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). The manual and guidelines were shared with the Working Group on Mercenaries and two additional field missions for feedback, field perspective and buy-in. The WG ensured there was consistency between the policy, guidelines (operational) and manual (tactical).

29. Although it was not originally envisaged as a deliverable referenced in the WG's Terms of Reference, around version 6 of the guidelines it became clear the WG would develop a manual for use as a toolkit in the field. The manual has three pillars: 1) market research, 2) tools to develop a scope of work, and 3) tools for contracting the right security provider.
30. Earlier in the year, the WG participated in a meeting of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) supporting the International Code of Conduct Association (ICOCA). The United Nations was recognized within the community as a positive contributor for application of the Code. The WG has embedded the principles of the Code throughout the policy, guidelines and manual. The UPSS Manual is a reference document to guide practitioners in the field. It will remain a living document and will be updated as needed. Revisions to the manual will not go to the HLCM but once endorsed by the IASMN, it will be updated as needed.

Discussion:

31. The IASMN agreed that the use of private security companies has been a controversial issue in the general public and the adoption of the manual and guidelines show the serious work done by the IASMN to address concerns through appropriate guidance.

Recommendation:

- 32. The IASMN approved the guidelines and manual for Unarmed Private Security Services (CRP 10). Both the UPSS guidelines and manual will be promulgated after the close of the IASMN session and issuance of its Final Report. It will be promulgated along with the UPSS policy, which was approved in April 2016 by the HLCM.**

G. Governance

Presentation:

33. Mr. Craig Harrison, Chair of the Working Group on Governance, presented two streams of work: Section A (draft Chapter II for inclusion in the Security Policy Manual), which is a statement on UNSMS governance; and the ongoing work in Section D (the Terms of Reference for the IASMN) which will be further fleshed out for the IASMN Steering Group session in November 2016. The WG also put forward their TOR for endorsement by the IASMN.
34. The WG focused on creating an overarching policy document outlining the governance of the UNSMS by making use of Section A which had been unwritten so far in the SPM and to reinforce Section D, an expanded 'IASMN Roles and Functions.'

Discussion:

35. While some IASMN members requested more time for the draft Chapter to be viewed by their principals, other members asked clarifications on the organisations defined as 'other entities' in the definition of UNSMS in paragraph 4 of Section A and noted the need to discuss this issue with their legal department before considering endorsing the document.

36. Another representative asked if ‘Related Organizations’ would be included in paragraph 4 of the draft Chapter, as well as staff representatives and United Nations organs. The Chair of the WG noted that paragraph four was not drafted by the WG but taken from existing documents. Inputs from OLA would be needed for reviewing paragraph four. The OLA representative requested more time to make drafting suggestions to the presented documents as they need to look at paragraphs 4 and 5 more closely. The IASMN Chair agreed that more clarity was needed in regards to the definitions.
37. The Secretary of the IASMN was asked if the weekly Video Teleconferences (VTC) would fall under ‘IASMN Roles and Functions.’ She noted the VTC is not part of the policy development role of the IASMN, but serves as an informal operational update for information-sharing.
38. An IASMN member also stated that the frequency of the IASMN meetings should follow the HLCM schedule and be determined in consultation with the IASMN members.

Recommendation:

39. **The IASMN endorsed the Terms of Reference of the Working Group (Annex A). The IASMN noted that further clarifications and consultations were required from the WG for the draft Chapter II, Section A on Governance Policy, notably on its paragraph 4. A revised draft will be presented at the next IASMN Steering Group in November 2016 with a view to have the policy approved at the IASMN in February 2017.**

H. Security Risk Management (SRM) Implementation and Residential Security Measures (RSM)

Presentation:

40. Mr. Igor Mitrokhin, Deputy Director for UNDSS/DRO, gave an update on the implementation of the revised policy on the Security Risk Management (SRM) process (CRP 15), promulgated in April 2016. The launch of the new SRM was preceded by substantive preparation activities such as administering mandatory SRM-online training and technical briefings by the SRM Working Group. A hotline has been dedicated to address technical inquiries from SRM actors with members of the WG. This has been effective in bringing all the SRM actors to a common level of understanding of the implementation process. The SRM implementation process is now on the agenda of all five UNDSS regional workshops for DOs and Chief Security Advisers (CSAs) in 2016.
41. Currently, almost all UNDSS security personnel with roles in the implementation process have completed the SRM on-line training (98%). At the time, it was noted that SRM actions have been implemented in 30% of 1,061 SRM areas. DOs are the most satisfied clients of the new SRM to date. Of those that have completed the workshops, the DOs are comfortable with the SRM process and are confident in the decision-making process.
42. Since the SRM process is a tool for determining security risk management measures, there is a need for a new implementation policy on Residential Security Measures (RSM), as well as replacing other UNSMS abolished policies. RSM is not meant to be a continuation

of MORSS but a new approach and how to transition away from MORSS to the RSM is something that needed to be addressed.

Discussion:

43. An IASMN member asked if there was an alternative plan to complete the SRM process by the end of the year. Mr. Mitrokhin noted 31 December 2016 was the target date for full implementation in all field offices and missions. Implementation in the field is being done in phases depending on when current MOSS, MORSS and SRA documents expires.
44. Other IASMN members asked if specific questions keep being raised at the workshops on the new SRM process to be shared with IASMN members as it could be helpful for AFPs to know of any recurring issues; and if there will be a communication strategy by UNDSS for the implementation of the SRM process or a contingency plan for those who do not meet the deadline this year. Mr. Mitrokhin noted that guidelines were being given in the workshops for the SRM process to be initiated.
45. The former chair of the SRM WG, noted that while 30% of SRM implementation completed so far seems concerning it's only because it is taking a long time for security personnel to get started. He cited El Salvador as a good example on SRM implementation. There is a need to encourage security personnel to start their first SRM process preferably ahead of their next SMT meeting. Once the first iteration is done, it gets easier to do the following one. He further added that extending the deadline past December is not necessary. If security personnel have read the manual and completed the training, once the SRM process is started, an implementation can be finished in a month's time.
46. An IASMN member noted that the current SRM online model does not include a role for UNDSS/DRO to amend or revise in instances where the risks were not appropriately justified. The online model needs to factor the necessary revisions by the Desks. Another IASMN member asked how quality control was being taken into account in the SRM process since some countries need more focus to bring them up to a higher standard.
47. Mr. Mitrokhin noted the Division has a strategic framework for budgetary purposes where SRA is reflected. Each year UNDSS needs to ensure that 90% of SRAs are completed. He also supported the need for UNDSS/DRO to be able to review/edit SRM.
48. The IASMN Chair noted this was a transition from one system to another. There needs to be responsibility from the SMT and support for security professionals. The SRM process is robust enough that if all the SRM actors do their part there will be a strong output. This is the message that needs to be taken to the field when visiting SMTs. He did not support extending the deadline. The WG on SRM should remind DOs, CSAs and SAs of their obligations that implementation of the SRM process be completed this year.

Recommendation:

49. **The IASMN noted the update on the implementation of the UNSMS SRM Policy (CRP 15). In relation to the SRM implementation process and as decided by the Chair of the IASMN, UNDSS will write to the Designated Officials and SMTs to remind them of the timeline for completion and transition to the new SRM.**

I. MOSS

Presentation:

50. Mr. Simon Butt, the OCHA representative, noted he was tasked by the Steering Group to think about MOSS in relation to the new SRM process. From his perspective, one should consider the new SRM process and look at the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities to improve on MOSS. As it stands, MOSS has several strengths. It was important when it was first introduced for offering a baseline assessment before SRM existed. It has been a central tenet of United Nations security.
51. First, a weakness of MOSS is that there are very few United Nations locations where MOSS is genuinely the minimum security operating standard. Many United Nations premises offer much more than the minimum. Secondly, the current MOSS policy does not fit well with the new SRM process; many of the measures in the current MOSS have little justification under the SRM. Third, there is a lack of flexibility with the MOSS measures and MOSS requires a number of measures to be applied globally that are not relevant to the current situation.
52. The changes to the SRM process are a key opportunity to allow a direct link between all the measures approved by the DO and the reality of the security risk environment. As an ongoing process, the SRM allows for measures that are more flexible, nuanced and specific to the organizations. With the new SRM tool, an output exists in a way that is not dissimilar to what we have in MOSS. He recommended discussions on the weaknesses in the current system and establishing a WG that can address: moving away from the current MOSS, using measures approved by the DO through the SRM process, and removing globally-required measures.

Discussion:

53. Several IASMN members questioned a change of name for MOSS which may result in losing all the positive gains of the name recognition. There should not be a name change unless it can be used seamlessly with the SRM process. It was also noted that MOSS is deeply rooted in the security terminology and in relation to the compliance framework.
54. One IASMN member noted that a new system would not necessarily solve all problems currently confronted with MOSS. For example, during the Ebola outbreak, WHO rented over 200 vehicles and had WHO personnel located in different hotels throughout the country. All vehicles needed a UHF radio but there was no way for UNDSS to review all the vehicles and hotels to ensure that they were MOSS-compliant.
55. Another member explained that authorized or approved security measures are distinct from MOSS with different implications in the field. The SMT could identify one set of measures suitable for them at one United Nations premise, which might be different at another location. The member further noted if left as is, it could imply that additional efforts to control risks are not "approved" -which would have the unintended consequence of restricting rather than encouraging further prudent risk management. These factors suggested that further work is needed on how MOSS fits into the new SRM.
56. Other IASMN members asked that the replacement for MOSS remain connected to risk management and contingency planning and for the WG to look at making the new process more flexible, country-specific and to ensure that the delivery of programmes will be able

to take place in the safest way possible. An IASMN member followed up and asked if MOSS should be changed to become revised security measures and if an online self-assessment on MOSS would remain. This was instrumental for their Agency to conduct the voluntary self-assessment in order to identify gaps and support mitigation measures proactively.

57. The Deputy Director of UNDSS/DRO appreciated the possible directions of a replacement for MOSS, but noted that fifteen documents are issued under security risk management measures. While MOSS was originally a check-box exercise, security measures are linked to the SRM process. The SRM changes every time security measures change and with a new threat there will be different measures.
58. The IASMN Secretary stated that MOSS and MORSS are the most used acronyms in all of the Security Policy Manual (SPM) so it would have to be revised throughout the manual. She agreed that MOSS already has been changed, de facto, to the new SRM measures. If an SMT completes the SRM process, they will have their MOSS. What is in the global MOSS matrix and is not necessarily in the SRM measures can be addressed by the Working Group.
59. An IASMN member noted there is no baseline MOSS since the global measures can or cannot be recommended measures. Mr. Butt responded that the language of the MOSS policy actually makes a large number of the global measures mandatory. The IASMN Secretary confirmed there is a contradiction between the core of the MOSS policy and Annex. The spirit of the policy was to have MOSS fall in line with the SRA (at the time) with flexible global measures which could be incorporated or not to the MOSS.
60. An IASMN member requested that the WG take into consideration other policies superseded by the SRM, including the SLS, which are still being used within the UNSMS.
61. The Chair of the IASMN concluded there is a need for a WG to ensure the application of MOSS is globally coherent with the security environment. A duty station may focus on local issues for assessing risks and threats; but should not deal with security issues in isolation. The SAs should have a tool with a fail-safe mechanism where they can take into account the regional and global security environment as well.

Recommendation:

62. **The IASMN recommended a Working Group be established on MOSS (See composition in Annex E) to look at the implication of SRM implementation and other security policies with the idea of drafting new guidance for MOSS and possibly changing its name. It was noted that UNDSS will draft a communiqué to DOs and SMTs to inform them of the current status of MOSS.**

J. Programme Criticality

Presentation:

63. Mr. Simon Butt gave an update on Programme Criticality (PC). Earlier this year, the Policy Committee reaffirmed that the Programme Criticality Framework should be

implemented as a mandatory policy of the Organization in areas where residual security risks are high or above high.

64. While the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG) are always decision makers, the Resident Coordinator (RC) is now also the decision maker for the PC- levels. This is an important mindset change needed for RCs in this process. The PC policy is now mandatory in high or very high risk areas but, until the SRM process is fully rolled out, identifying countries as high-risk is hard. Oversight is now at the ASG-level.
65. There have been a number of briefings to United Nations senior managers. The PC team is providing introductory training on PC and videos to AFPs through their respective learning platforms. There will be a facilitators' workshop for staff of the offices of RCs and SRSGs and PC will be part of the regional workshops for DOs and SAs. There is also an ongoing technical revision of the PC framework to reflect the decisions of the Policy Committee and lessons learned after the independent review of PC. The PC team is also contacting countries where assessments are required to comply with the PC Policy. Lastly, PC is financially weak from the position of sustainability. It is supported by a "cost-share of the willing".

Discussion:

66. The Chair of the IASMN noted that there was a need to measure programmes against risks and discuss the implications in concrete terms: "how many people are we prepared to risk for how many lives we are aiming to save". If there isn't a robust tool for PC, the United Nations leaves its personnel exposed and cannot make informed decisions. With a robust SRM, a PC framework, and robust discussions with the DOs and SMTs, the UNSMS can be more confident in the security decisions. The more the UNSMS can support decision-makers in the field with robust processes, the better they can carry out their work. SRM and PC are crucial to those in the field.
67. One UNSMS member stated security professionals should not be involved in PC. They should be familiar with the process but not take ownership. It is not up to security professionals to decide which programme is critical. Instead, IASMN members should make sure that their principals understand this and take responsibility. Many UNDSS SAs and CSAs do not participate in the country team (UNCT) meeting when operations are discussed. The IASMN Chair asked to be informed if/when UNDSS personnel are not participating in UNCT meetings.
68. Another member noted that with PC 1 activities, the Heads of Agencies sign off on the eventuality that United Nations personnel lose their lives or are seriously injured and this is an important decision they make. He posed two questions which require further discussion: 1. what needs to be done so United Nations personnel fully understand the risk they are exposed to; and 2. can UNSMS personnel refuse to be exposed to these risks? The IASMN Chair agreed that United Nations staff members may not fully understand the risks they are being exposed to. Most United Nations personnel are making their own assessment and will not take the risk if it is not acceptable to them.
69. The USG also noted that some international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have a higher risk tolerance but they are willing to accept a higher risk of casualties. On one hand, humanitarian organizations may take greater risks than the United Nations. On the other hand, governments are far more accountable to their constituents so they are not

as willing to take on a greater risk. He also noted the United Nations today has more risk management measures and processes in place. INGOs' fatalities are spiking upward, whereas the United Nations has reached a plateau.

70. An IASMN member gave an example that 15 years ago, the ICRC was operating in very challenging environments where the United Nations did not have a presence. Today there is no place that the ICRC is operating where the United Nations is not also there. The United Nations has increased its acceptance to risk.

Recommendation:

- 71. The IASMN acknowledged the update on Programme Criticality.**

K. Physical Security Update

Presentation:

72. Mr. David Bongi, Director of UNDSS/DHSSS, gave an update via VTC on the Physical Security Unit (PSU) and the assistance provided to field locations in 2016. Examples of this include: overhead protection for containerized offices in Somalia; definitions of security requirements for UN houses in Dakar, Bujumbura and Dar-es-Salaam, a physical security assessment of UNICEF Geneva; specifications of equipment for peacekeeping missions, guidance on physical security requirements for the United Nations Office in Geneva; and comprehensive physical security (PS) assessment and recommendations to UNSMIL (Libya) and Yemen conducted in June.
73. It was noted that there are currently 27 outstanding physical security assessments in the field. Major projects for PSU include: draft proposal of physical security guidelines for United Nations Common Premises under review by the Task Team for Common Premises; reactivation of the blast assessment working group and defining its TOR and members; delivery of physical security training courses; overview of physical security to newly-appointed DOs; conduct training for security professionals in the field in order to generate a better understanding of PS within the system; and develop a physical security assessment tool as a smart phone app.

Discussion:

74. With regard to HMOSS, many IASMN members raised concerns that HMOSS which was supposedly abolished some years ago, continued to exist and asked clarifications including if HMOSS was being used for other United Nations sites around the world where SSS is operating. Mr. Bongi noted that HMOSS is not a policy. It establishes the minimum standards of security for the 11 Safety and Security Service (SSS) locations. DHSSS recently updated HMOSS and the USG signed it in 2015. HMOSS establishes a minimum baselines standard and it is a high minimum standard, however it also identifies alternate measures when the standard cannot be met (for example, UNHQ's underground garage is a "HMOSS violation", but Member States will never cease using the garage so every vehicle is screened as an alternate mitigating measure).
75. UNDSS/PPCU clarified that when the SRM policy was promulgated in April, three UNSMS policies were abolished: the MORSS, SLS and Acceptable Risk. The MOSS

policy remains as such, but it has been overtaken by events. HMOSS has been used continuously since 2003 and it was recently updated. Mr. Craig Harrison, the Chief of PCCS, noted the assurance given by DHSSS that HMOSS was always over and above MOSS. HMOSS was what the SSS' Chiefs of Security referred to instead of MOSS. Although the SRM process was applied universally, DHSSS has certain additional requirements for the SSS locations. From his perspective, the HMOSS should be applied as over-and-above the standard of MOSS for a particular country or duty station, as HMOSS is far more comprehensive for physical security than MOSS. The IASMN Chair and the Director of DHSSS noted that HMOSS is outside of the IASMN and there should not be any change to that.

76. An IASMN member expressed appreciation for support of DHSSS in undertaking a joint assessment mission for UNICEF Geneva and asked how the other locations where physical security assessments are being prioritized and why the existing security capacity in these locations cannot undertake these assessments. Mr. Bongi responded that all prioritization of physical security assessments is undertaken by UNDSS/DRO. In many cases, the existing security capacity is not able to conduct a technical physical security assessment.
77. An IASMN member asked how the app for assessing vulnerability would take into consideration the SRM process; and what did certification entail. He recommended not having a country-based organization do certification. Mr. Bongi noted the certification will come from an international security organization. DHSSS is currently running a trial curriculum. Hopefully by end of 2017, it will have a certification process that is recognized outside as well as inside the United Nations. The app does not circumvent the SRM. It is an electronic tool to guide a PS assessment. SAs in the field will be able to consider a menu of options for physical security measures. They will be able to see what the vulnerabilities are and what physical security measures can be implemented to reduce their risks.
78. The USG UNDSS added that the Department has been building capacity on physical security. They developed a knowledge database for security professionals in the field to support their work. He noted UNDSS has an obligation and a duty of care to provide the best security environment to enable UN operations and physical security advice is important in this capacity.

Recommendation:

79. **The IASMN acknowledged the update on physical security (CRP 17) and the increased demand for expertise in physical security.**

L. Security Coverage in OECD Countries

Presentation:

80. Mr. Luc Vandamme, Chair of the Working Group, noted there were challenges for UNDSS in addressing the needs of United Nations personnel in OECD countries, as they are not included under the headcount for shared resources and the JFA. Temporary arrangements can be made pending conclusion and recommendations from the WG.

81. The WG has started to populate an analytical matrix with a UNDSS/DRO desk officer as the focal point. UN Women also offered an intern to support the population of the matrix. The matrix would be used as an internal working document and not submitted as an Annex to the IASMN. The WG noted the importance of training for country-level Security Focal Points (SFPs) as this would increase the security capacity in the OECD countries and enhance the effectiveness of the in-country security management system.
82. There may be a requirement at a later time to review the tasks of CSAs and SAs in order to prioritize what is necessary based on the overall threat level and specific threat to the United Nations in an OECD country. The WG discussed the reduction in geographical coverage of the Chiefs of Security for SSS in Vienna, Geneva and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to see if there are any gaps in security coverage which was not factored in the original analysis, as they are now limited to the country of the SSS locations, and are no longer responsible for the regions. The USG UNDSS recently moved a post to Brussels to provide additional coverage in Europe.

Discussion:

83. An IASMN member said that Italy is a country without UNDSS coverage and the activities being conducted by the WG is a step in the right direction. The UNSMS has very valuable resources in Europe and the DO in Italy is satisfied with the mechanisms in place. In locations where there is no UNDSS coverage, the IASMN should invest in training those who are involved in security. It was also noted that the governments of OECD countries should be involved in the discussions as well. The security responsibility does not only belong to the UNSMS. In addition, other IASMN members asked the WG to look at how often or frequently the SMTs were meeting prior to the increase in terrorist incidents.
84. An IASMN member recalled a memorandum from the USG UNDSS to the Permanent Representatives stating they were responsible for the safety and security of UN personnel in their home country and each government should appoint a designated point of contact. This is something that could be added as a recommendation. Another IASMN member noted that any policy or guidance would require specific measures from the host government, and this will require more than a letter asking for a point of contact.
85. One IASMN member asked how the WG would go about deploying scarce security resources in Western Europe. He asked for more clarification and for more detail in the work plan. UNDSS/DRO noted that the UNSMS has never paid to provide security arrangements in OECD countries, but UNDSS in consultation with the IASMN has decided to establish security teams at some of the OECD countries. DRO relies on the best capacities from other organizations in the region (for example, UNESCO in Paris, WFP in Rome, etc.). There is a need for a dedicated security capacity whether its funding comes from the JFA or not.
86. He also noted that the IASMN needs to support DOs to discharge their functions so they are able to provide at least a minimum capacity in locations where there are no SSS services. An IASMN member recalled that although dedicated security positions were not included in the JFA, from the inception of UNDSS, Regional Security Advisers were expected to cover countries within their respective regions and had allocated additional travel budgets for this.

87. The USG UNDSS noted it is important to support OECD countries as best as the UNSMS can and the recent terrorist attacks have caused host government considerable angst. The host countries' resources are overwhelmed and they gravitate to protecting those things that are a higher priority. The Chair of the WG indicated that the WG will take into account the capacity of the host government and look to developing criteria on which mechanisms should be in place for the host government. The surge will be treated as separate capacity and not as part of the TOR.

Recommendation:

88. **The update on Security Coverage in OECD Countries (CRP 03) was noted by the IASMN and the TOR of the Working Group and its Work Plan was endorsed.**

M. Locally Cost-Shared Security Budget

Presentation:

89. Mr. Luc Vandamme as Deputy-Chair of the Locally Cost-Shared Security Budget (LCSSB) WG discussed the progress made in streamlining the preparation, submission, and approval of the LCSSB. As background information, he noted that some IASMN members have expressed concerns over the increasing budget, lack of operational guidance, transparency, delays in timely submission of the budget, overlap with JFA, and discrepancy between the allotted budget and actual expenditures.
90. The WG has developed TORs, reviewed existing documents, agreed to draft an overarching UNSMS policy on LCSSB and have capacity building and training of staff in the field. Its next steps include: developing guidance for the field, preparing a draft policy for input from IASMN members which will include definitions and categories of activities. A communiqué has been drafted stating this process should be underway for the 2017 LCSSB.

Discussion:

91. IASMN members noted there are rising costs in the field and there seemed to be a lack of awareness and knowledge on the financial implications in the field. It would be very useful to have templates, mechanisms or guidance on frequent expenditure reporting. They also noted that there is a lack of expenditure reporting and a budget mechanism which can lead to the LCSSB being 1/3 over the projected cost at the end of the year. They asked if AFPs could set up quarterly or bi-annual payments into the LCSSB and for the WG to also look into categories of budget items and budget lines as it is not currently in the TOR.
92. An IASMN member noted there needed to be a better understanding on aspects of how budget is spent. If a common security budget is directly related to the services provided by UNDSS, such as training or additional personnel this should be made clear as the LCSSB should come from locally-driven initiatives. Since 2013, a common security budget submission has been a required deliverable in order to promote oversight and transparency. He would like more oversight from UNDSS on these deliverables. Several

IASMN representatives supported having harmonization and clarification between the LCSSB and JFA to improve governance of both.

93. The Chair of the IASMN requested clarification from the WG Chair on LCSSB expenditures. He noted there are a number of aspects to consider with the LCSSB and want to make sure there was accurate data to work on. He noted that the LCSSB is quite definitive on what it is to be used for. He asked if the UNDSS communiqué sent last year to the DOs is being adhered to, was there a lack of discipline from DOs and SMTs on approving the LCSSB, and where is the breakdown in budget reporting occurring. The Chair of the WG indicated that they are looking into why the current process for LCSSB is not working and how this can be addressed. The guidance currently available is interpreted in different ways. The first step is to make sure that the guidance is solid and that there is correct accounting for budget reporting.
94. An IASMN member said there was lack of comprehension on budget reporting from the SMT level to the Head of Agency, and therefore hesitance to approve budget items related to security. There was also no mechanism in place to refer cases with inconsistencies in the budget back to UNHQ.
95. The Deputy Director of UNDSS/DRO inquired whether Country Directors consulted with Security Focal Points on country cost-shared security budgets. An IASMN member said security budgets for country operations are not generally centrally controlled at headquarters of AFPs. For example, in UNHCR the budget belongs to the country director and it is his/her responsibility to allocate for security. The country director may seek advice from the headquarters-based security service but is not obligated. The IASMN member added that the country director's responsibility for budgeting entails a requirement to plan around March for the coming year. For this reason the recent tendency for country cost-shared budgets to be agreed upon only well within the given year presents great difficulties as the requested/required amount may be more than what is budgeted.
96. The Chair of the IASMN noted a UNDSS communiqué to address budget reporting gaps is in the process of being finalized. The DO and SMT should be able to take charge of LCSSB as it is a significant amount of money and budget reports should go through a rigorous process before they are approved to avoid discrepancies.
97. The IASMN Chair said there is an ongoing issue between Missions' budget, but it is outside of where the IASMN can make a decision. He noted there is far more scrutiny in regard to mission budget on what they can and cannot pay. The budget responsibilities of the SMTs should be very clear with the understanding that they always will have support from United Nations Headquarters. The LCSSB responsibilities should be devolved to the local offices.

Recommendations:

98. **The IASMN noted the update on the Working Group for Locally Cost-Shared Security Budget (CRP 06), and endorsed the TOR. The IASMN requested that along with an UNSMS policy, the WG produce clear and definitive guidelines on what is to be paid for, and also what are the responsibilities of the SMT members directly.**

N. Gender Considerations in Security Management

Presentation:

99. Ms. Julie Dunphy, Chair of the WG, updated the IASMN on its ongoing work. She noted the UNSMS policy, 'Gender Inclusion in Security Management' and its Annex was endorsed by the HLCM and promulgated in April 2016. She thanked the Chair for taking time to promote the policy through the video available on UNSMIN which communicates the key points of the policy to security managers and security professionals. She noted the remaining gender guidelines to support the policy are under development. Some issues are beyond the responsibility of the UNSMS but the guidelines would provide security professionals with references where appropriate guidance can be found.
100. A Women Security Awareness Training of Trainers (WSAT ToT) will be hosted by the World Bank in August. This will be followed by a pilot Gender Considerations in Security Training of Trainers. The Training and Development Section (TDS) of UNDSS is also incorporating gender in SSAFE training. Ms. Dunphy elaborated on the need for support within DSS to manage a 'gender tab' on UNSMIN which will be a resource page for security professionals to utilize in addition to whatever support mechanisms they can access from their host countries. Currently the Gender Focal Point assigned does not have the time to dedicate to this work.

Discussion:

101. The Chief of UNDSS/PCCS asked if the scope of the guidelines for women would interface with PEP-kit management. He noted PPCU will streamline the content of the SPM and asked how gender guidelines should be incorporated into this. The WG Chair agreed that the PEP framework will be referred to in the gender guidelines.
102. An IASMN member made a request for the guidelines for women to give consideration for LGBT and to address social, religious-and cultural aspects. He asked for the 'gender tab' to give consideration to LGBT as a separate item. In response, the Chief of UNDSS/PCCS raised the point that there are many different cultural and social nuances and usages. It would be difficult to capture these in the guidelines, but it could be covered instead in travel advisories when a United Nations staff member registers for security clearance through Travel Request Information Process (TRIP). The WG Chair agreed that the guidelines should be generic and as with the policy also reflect security considerations for LGBT that they are intended to support all staff with respect to gender considerations. They will provide guidance for SMTs to look at their country-specific concerns and develop appropriate risk management measures. The revised 2006 Guidelines for Women will just be for women.
103. The Chair of the IASMN asked to add to the budget discussion a request from the IASMN asking UNDSS for resources to manage a 'gender tab' in UNSMIN.

Recommendations:

104. **The IASMN noted the update on Gender Considerations in Security Management (CRP 04). The IASMN noted the request for UNDSS to allocate resources to manage a 'gender tab' on UNSMIN.**

O. Road Safety Strategy

Presentation:

105. Ms. Florence Poussin, Chair of the Road Safety Strategy Working Group highlighted the progress made since the last IASMN session. In February 2016 World Food Programme (WFP) resigned as Chair. In the absence of any volunteers, UNDSS/PPCU accepted to chair with FAO agreeing to provide Secretariat support for the WG. The membership of the WG is made up of 13 different United Nations organizations and departments covering security, human resources and fleet management.
106. Every year, approximately 1.3 million people are killed and up to 50 million people are injured on the world's roads. The number of people killed by road vehicle accidents is comparable to the number of people killed by violence every year. The WG is almost done mapping out all the existing initiative on road safety within the United Nations-system. The data on road accidents is not homogenous and the WG created a sub-WG to develop taxonomy for the reporting and recording of road accidents. At the policy level, the WG realizes the need for better road safety coordination and propose a road safety strategy which will be aspirational considering the United Nations should lead by example.
107. In June, UNDSS issued a communiqué to request information on the existing policies on road safety in addition to human resources and medical aspects from IASMN members. Some UN organizations are well-advanced in the management of road safety, while others have very limited measures on road safety. The WG is developing a deep understanding of various responsibilities related to road-safety in the United Nations-system. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are responsible for the strategic and legal guidance to Member States with regard to road safety, but they do not have coordination responsibility within the United Nations-system.
108. In September, the WG will meet with Mr. Jean Todt, Special Envoy for Road Safety who will offer guidance. The UNSMS does not have the means to control the implementation of road safety, as there is no United Nations-system wide goal on road safety. The lead the WG will take is to be aspirational in its strategy and improve on data management and analysis of vehicular accidents and fatalities.

Discussion:

109. An IASMN member noted the challenges in the United Nations Secretariat with data management. He requested for the WG to look into centralized data collection or find a common system where data is recorded and made available. The Chair of the WG noted the data collection is best served through SSIRS as it is how the United Nations captures and records security incidents. The WG will take the lessons learned from SSIRs and have specific data on the lapses of safety that causes road traffic accidents.
110. UNDSS/PCCS noted that the SSIRS taxonomy includes a line for vehicular accident. However, if real data management of information is needed, SSIRS may not be the solution. Ms. Poussin indicated that based on responses from organizations, road safety data was very fragmented and there was no way to make comparisons. The WG will discuss taxonomy, but from the medical and human resources side there is under-reporting as well.

111. UNDSS/DRO noted that SSIRS captures the data on fatalities or injuries to United Nations personnel but an objective look at the causes of these incidents is missing. When staff is killed or injured due to terrorism attacks, crime, etc., the United Nations-system will have full-scale inquiries if not investigations. In terms of road accidents, there are only police reports and incidents recorded in SSIRS. The data captured should show the main causes of road accidents: reckless driving, negligence of road safety procedures and poorly-maintained vehicles. It is instrumental to collect the data and understand why these accidents keep occurring in these high percentages.
112. The Chair of the WG stated that the United Nations-system does not have the means at the moment to control the implementation of road safety operational or tactical strategies such as enforcing the speed limit or seat-belt compliance so the idea is to look at multidisciplinary strategy and aspirational goals.
113. The Chair of the IASMN reflected that the majority of those killed in vehicle accidents are national staff and noted that the UNSMS should try to get buy-in from Member States.

Recommendation:

114. **The IASMN noted progress and endorsed the TORs of the WG on Road Safety Strategy (CRP 08).**

P. Residential Security for United Nations Locally-Recruited Personnel

Presentation

115. Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison, Chair of the WG, noted the technical working group was created because the current residential security standards policy applies only to internationally-recruited United Nations personnel and security risks associated in the residences of locally-recruited personnel should be determined. The WG took a two-phase approach to look at the scope of residential security risks. Phase one was data collection, research and surveying. This was completed with assistance from OCHA and UNDSS/DRO on accessing the humanitarian network database and SSIRS, respectively.
116. As a result of the information collection process, 17 duty stations were initially identified as having the highest number of reported security incidents, to which high-risk missions such as Yemen, Somalia and Iraq were added as well as Timor-Leste at the request of one member of the WG. In all, 21 duty stations would be listed to take part in the survey process.
117. In order to complete the information gathering process, the WG with the assistance of DRO, issued a survey to locally-recruited personnel in the field. The survey was completed on 10 June after a two-week extension and the results are being analyzed. A report will be drafted by the WG and presented to the IASMN Steering Group in November. This report will be a pre-cursor to phase two of the process. The WG will draft guidelines for consideration by the IASMN Steering Group and possible endorsement by the IASMN at its February 2017 meeting.

Discussion:

118. A staff representative asked what happened in the case of relocations and evacuations and how would this be accounted for in the surveys. They receive inquiries from national staff on this issue. The WG Chair noted that relocation and evacuation was set aside because it is related to a human resources issue. Relocation and evaluation was something that needed to be looked at but it was not under the purview of the WG.
119. The Chair of the IASMN agreed. He gave an example of when he met with national staff in Sana'a, Yemen. The local staff understood the relocation and evacuation policies and did not have the expectation that they would be evacuated. Nonetheless, there needed to be more clarity on the issue.

Recommendations:

120. **The IASMN noted the update on the technical working group for Residential Security for Locally-Recruited Personnel (CRP 09). The WG will analyze information gathered to date through data collection, research and surveys to be presented to the IASMN Steering Group in November 2016 and with a view to finalize its work by February 2017.**

Q. Management of Safety and Security Crisis in the Field

Presentation:

121. Mr. Igor Mitrokhin, Chair of the WG, noted a draft UNSMS policy was developed based on the outcomes and recommendations of the crisis management exercise conducted by UNDSS/DRO and UNSMS organization with DOs participating in regional workshops. He also noted a range of different crises management working groups developing policies across the United Nations. The draft policy is overarching, covering major principles of crisis management as it relates to safety and security, and details the roles and responsibilities of the crisis management infrastructure. The draft policy is flexible enough for DOs or Heads of UNSMS organizations to reflect on specific distinctions in a crisis situation depending on the scope of the crisis.
122. The next steps for the WG is to distribute a draft policy to members of the IASMN Steering Group in August giving them two months for review/feedback for the November SG meeting with the intention to have it endorsed by full IASM in February 2017.

Discussion:

123. The Chair of the IASMN noted the absence of policy and, the need to support DOs who have various levels of experience in responding to security crisis. The IASMN does need to provide them with tools and templates. It is necessary to support those in the field to take a leadership role in security crisis.

Recommendations:

124. **The IASMN noted the progress of the Working Group for Management of Safety and Security Crisis in the Field (CRP 16). A draft policy will be circulated to the IASMN SG members for their feedback prior to their meeting in November 2016.**

R. First Responder (including Emergency Trauma Bags)

Presentation:

125. Mr. Adriaan Bezuidenhout, representing the Chair of the WG, noted in February the 23rd Session of the IASMN approved the Working Group to provide guidance on first response approaches in the field, including a review of the Emergency Trauma Bag First Responder Course (ETB FRC) training requirement and certification, and Individual First Aid Kits (IFAK). The purpose of the WG is to develop a draft policy for UNSMS on the level of first responder intervention appropriate in different country settings.
126. The Chair of the WG noted that DPKO-DFS will remain Chair of the WG but in the future Mr. Russell Wyper would brief on the technical aspects. He requested the IASMN to take note of the adjustments made and approve the TOR; and to take note that a draft policy would be presented to the IASMN Steering Group in November.

Recommendations:

127. **The IASMN noted the progress made by the WG and approved the TOR. It also noted that a draft policy would be presented in November.**

S. PEP Kits Framework

Presentation:

128. On behalf of UN Cares, Mr. Naqib Noory, the UNFPA representative, noted the progress made in developing PEP Kit Management Guidelines for the UN system. In collaboration with UNDSS and UN Cares, the distribution of PEP Kits became part of the MOSS requirement and part of the country plan, since 2007, and this was key in assuring the availability of PEP kits at the country level.
129. Through UNDSS' compliance audits, it was noted that ensuring the availability of PEP Kits was adequate in some United Nations field offices but substandard in others. In June 2014, at the IASMN's 20th Session, a draft PEP Kit Management Framework was circulated to the IASMN, the United Nations Medical Directors Working Group (UNMDWG), and the Human Resources Network (HRN) for input and approval
130. In April 2016, after further discussions, the UNMDWG agreed to the language in the PEP Kit Management Framework relevant to their role. The role of country-level security colleagues in the distribution of PEP kits also was adjusted and incorporated into the framework, based on feedback received.

131. The Chair of the WG asked the IASMN to endorse the Guidelines on the Management of PEP Kits, take note of the progress made, and approve the modalities and distribution of PEP kits.

Discussion:

132. An IASMN member recommended that the PEP Kit guidelines use the same formatting consistent among the UNSMS security policies and for the attachments to become part of the guidelines. UNDSS/PPCU took note of this request and will reformat the guidelines and annex, and distribute accordingly.
133. Another IASMN member noted that when PEP Kits were first introduced 10 years ago post-exposure prophylaxis therapy was not easily available in the field. This is no longer the case and the IASMN needs to determine which countries or field offices really need the PEP kits. In some countries, the PEP kits are readily available to the public.
134. The Medical Directors Working Group (MDWG) noted that they are looking into the cost-benefit of the PEP kits. They are mapping where the PEP Kits are most needed and where they are not. The MDWG noted it is important to keep access available to all United Nations personnel and their eligible dependents; however the number of PEP kits available in every field location has been reduced. There is a cost-issue to PEP kits.
135. In addition, the MDWG is still working on refining the role of the security personnel in PEP Kit management. They do not have enough feedback on the follow-up with distribution of the PEP Kits. In addition, they also require that the person who distributes the medication have a medical background. They are looking to provide this medical access by establishing a hotline and security personnel will oversee logistics, such as maintaining stock, checking expiration dates and noting when re-stocking of PEP Kits is needed.

Recommendation:

136. **The IASMN approved the PEP kit management guidelines (CRP 17). The approval of guidelines is subject to reformatting the document by UNDSS/PPCU.**

T. Security Management for UN Common Premises

Presentation:

137. Mr. Luc Vandamme, Chair of the Working Group, presented guidelines on Security Management for UNSMS Common Premises following the recommendations received on the draft guidelines from the Steering Group in May. The guidelines were also circulated to DHSSS.

Discussion:

138. IASMN members noted they endorsed the guidelines as part of the Security Management Operations Manual (SMOM). They asked if clearer wording could be found for 1.1 and 1.4 in the Matrix under the sub-heading 'Selection of Premises'. The WG Chair noted that point 1.4 on authorization to occupy the Common Premises for individual staff members,

it is the responsibility and accountability of the individual UN organization if their staff may reside in these offices or not.

139. An IASMN member said in the definition of common premises he did not see involvement of the security cell on the management of the security of premises. In many cases the senior-most person is from UNDSS. He noted perhaps within certain premises, it can be the senior security professional. He used the example that in Nairobi they have 40 annex buildings occupied by different organizations. The WG Chair noted that the revised guidelines allows for flexibility, especially in the case where the most senior person is not from UNDSS.

Recommendation:

140. **The IASMN approved the guidelines for Security Arrangements for UN Common Premises (CRP 02), with amendments as discussed.**

U. Duty of Care

Presentation:

141. Ms. Poussin gave a brief update on the Duty of Care. She noted an 18-month review of duty of care was completed in March 2016 and presented to the HLCM. The report was completed in two phases. In the first phase surveys were distributed to the field and many SFPs participated in the effort. A number of key issues related to duty of care were raised. The second phase consisted of distilling 100 recommendations made in the first phase and identifying what is already being addressed by the United Nations Organizations (UNO) and making strategic level recommendations.
142. This High-Level Working Group (HLWG) chaired by USG/UNDSS had a working definition for duty of care and the report highlighted the number of measures already being done by UNO. However there were also inconsistencies between the organizations and categories of personnel and a lack of coordination and cooperation within the United Nations-system.
143. Five areas of recommendations include: 1) Pre-deployment resilience briefing; 2) Enhanced communication through tools such as briefings, training of staff and IT support; 3) Strengthening of medical and psychosocial services; 4) Significant and consistent differences in the allowances, benefits and entitlements for internationally vs. locally recruited staff; and 5) Support for staff operating in high-risk environments should include more engagement, cooperation and coordination by all networks in the field and at the policy level.
144. The report called for an increased reporting mechanism and a follow-up on the recommendations of duty of care. When the HLCM approved the report in March, they requested a list of action points and deliverables. This concluded the work of the HLWG, the HLCM established a Task Force to address these issues.

Discussion:

145. An IASMN member noted that the HLCM made the decision to take the report findings forward to another Task Force to address areas in human resources, and medical and

psychosocial support. She indicated that UNICEF would be providing Secretariat support. She further informed that the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) may undertake surveys of the entitlements for national staff.

146. The UNHCR and CEB representative clarified that leadership of the Task Force is still under discussion.

Recommendation:

147. **The IASMN noted the progress on Duty of Care (CRP 18).**

V. Identity Management

Presentation:

148. Mr. Drew Donovan, the ITU representative and Co-Chair of the Joint Working Group on Identity Management in developing technical standards and recommendations for global identity management gave a progress update on “Global Identity Management”.
149. He indicated that the ITU has used the technical standards and recommendations of the WG in its security modernization project and is sharing its Requests-For-Proposal (RFP) procurement documents with other interested WG members for their own future or ongoing security modernization projects.
150. Mr. Donovan said that during the pre-procurement phase, three vendors were identified for the biometric reader-on-card and with public key infrastructure (PKI) technology within a single ‘smart-card.’ The proposed ‘smart-card’ system would eventually replace the grounds pass presently used, and could converge physical and logical access control through a combination of digital networks. ITU will continue to work with Organizations in Vienna, Rome and Geneva on proof of concept exercises for these recommended technologies and these outcomes will be shared at the 25th session of the IASMN.
151. Mr. Donovan showed a four-minute video of the most recent proof of concept exercises undertaken in Geneva using a single smartcard from an identified vendor that has both the biometric reader-on-card and PKI technologies embedded in it.

Discussion:

152. An IASMN member indicated that his organization continued to strongly support this project and noted the increase in security if multiple United Nations Agencies also supported it. The project would make electronic ID verifications much more secure in the future while encouraging other organizations to get on board.
153. An IASMN member requested more explanation on the card’s interoperability, how the smart-card would be used between different organizations, if the data collected would be managed centrally or decentralized, and for the first-time costs and maintenance costs. The representative also indicated that the project is a very good enhancement of security for Physical Access Control System (PACs) and Logical Access Control System (LACs) and would like ITU to share their procurement RFPs with their organization.

154. Mr. Donovan explained that the card currently works as a unique ID although it can be used differently. The advantage of the smart-card is that the owner of the biometric card will carry his/her biometric information with them on the actual card. No participating organization will centrally store or manage the biometric data. It reduces threats of cyber-attacks.
155. An IASMN member asked about the risks of a cyber-attack against the smart-card biometrics and the PKI; and the cost per unit for a Smartcard and a PKI Certificate. ITU indicated that any attack against the certificate authority (CA) will have limited impact given that the CA can be rapidly changed. Any attempt to grab biometric data from the card would also have limited impact because the biometric data are encrypted according to the highest security standards. In this context the smartcard would have a second digital certificate security key which would render any attempt at stealing biometric data unusable.
156. Another member asked if a security officer is able to see all the particulars or bio-data on the screen when a visitor enters the building with a smart-card, and is the smart-card technology adaptable because technology is always changing so fast? Mr. Donovan noted the smart-card has a life expectancy of about five years. Smart-cards can be used for personal data, for printing, for distribution of payment, etc. It would have many more multiple uses in the future compared to the current badge.
157. The MDWG representative asked if the future smart-card would protect sensitive data on them like Medical Records. Mr. Donovan indicated that several applications or data can be stored on the memory chip (8K), and will assist in protecting such sensitive data.
158. An IASMN member noted that this project was a major advancement in security enhancements when an organization is able to verify who is in front of their doors and computer systems. He indicated that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is one of the only United Nations Organizations that centrally manage biometrics of all its staff and visitors to their court room facilities. They operationally use hand vein reader technology to access isolated areas of the premises.
159. A staff representative noted the interoperability possibilities of the project, which would allow participating Organization's staff to be able to move across duty stations with only one United Nations smart-card in the future.
160. The Chair of the IASMN indicated his continued support for Global Identity Management, but before he proceeds with executive-level consultations (this was an action point from the 23rd session that is still pending), he will require a business case that entails the costs of the new smartcards, the cost of PKI United Nations Root Certificates (CA), other costs, e.g. changing access control barriers (if required) and card readers to respond to the PKI technology, in order to be able to implement Global Identity Management within an interested participating Organization's premises.
161. He also raised the notion of biometrics and privacy issues in regards to Member State delegates and United Nations-system staff. He noted at the last ACABQ meeting there was a question of using technology to reduce security costs. He indicated that biometrics for United Nations personnel is one issue and for the Member States and their delegates it

is another issue. He further indicated that in his opinion a physical security presence would still need to remain on United Nations premises as a deterrent measure.

Recommendations:

162. **The IASMN took note of the Working Group's progress. The IASMN requested more information on strategic, technical and budget implications to be shared with the IASMN in February 2016.**

W. Technical Review of UNSMS Policies

Presentation:

163. Ms. Poussin, the IASMN Secretary, discussed inconsistencies identified in UNSMS policies as the result of newly-adopted policies and the Security Policy Manual (SPM), referencing abolished policies. The IASMN had endorsed a number of new policies which need to be cross-referenced throughout the other policies of the SPM. She proposed for UNDSS/PPCU to review the SPM, make changes and replace references to the abolished policies. Once the revisions are made to the SPM, it is endorsed by the IASMN with the subsequent revision sent to the HLCM. She noted the CEB Secretariat confirmed that technical revisions of the UNSMS policies can be endorsed by the IASMN without approval of the HLCM.
164. There are three to four different categories where the technical review will be made: editorial, formatting, reference to abolished UNSMS policies, and reference to Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and Security Level System (SLS) which will be substituted to the Security Risk Management (SRM) process. In policies where SLS 4 served as a trigger, the SLS 4 would be replaced by high and very high residual risk. She noted on the 'Role of the Department of Safety and Security' policy (Chapter II, Section F of the SPM) which was endorsed in February 2016, changes to the policy will be made by UNSSSIP.

Discussion:

165. An IASMN member said since the HLCM confirmed that the IASMN can endorse technical revisions to UNSMS policies the date of promulgation should be kept the same in the SPM with a small footnote in the SPM on the date the technical revision was approved by the IASMN.
166. Another member noted for the technical review of the UNSMS policies to use consistent terminology, make the distinction between United Nations personnel and United Nations staff, and for consistent terminology to be used for all existing and future policy. The IASMN Secretary confirmed that UNDSS/PPCU will concentrate on consistency throughout the UNSMS policies. She noted 'UN personnel' and 'UNSMS Organizations' are used in the SPM but will check to make sure this is consistent throughout.

Recommendation:

167. **The IASMN approved the technical review of UNSMS policies (CRP 14) and the amendments that will be made to the policies in the Security Policy Manual. The**

IASMN Chair noted it was important maintenance work linked to developing good governance.

X. Emergency Telecommunications

Presentation:

168. Mr. Alpha Bah, a WFP representative, gave a presentation on Emergency Telecommunications via VTC. He explained the relationship and interoperability of the various technologies currently used by DFS and the AFPs. There are three different systems in use which are not entirely interoperable with one another. Interoperability of emergency telecommunication systems within the United Nations-system is a requirement, especially in times of crisis; even though there is the possibility of governments controlling or turning off the radio infrastructure.
169. The Emergency Telecommunication WG is looking at various technologies to improve radio compatibility. He noted they were exploring various options including: 1. migration of all to one agreed system; 2. a flexible option whereby once a certain system had been established by an agency in a given duty station and “gained traction” in that area, other organization should migrate to that system; and 3. a manual route, whereby equipment of both systems would reside in the radio room and the radio operator would transfer messages.
170. The needs for radios will continue to be there even if their use will be on a smaller scale. The idea is for there to be some centralization for emergency telecommunication. Action points for follow-up include: 1.create a global mapping of radio networks, which shows where are the different networks in place; 2. provide advice and guidance with regard to the three telecommunications systems currently in use; 3. define strengths and weaknesses with these systems and the potential for compatibility; and 4. ensure sufficient pre-positioning of the three radios systems so that they are all available during a time of crisis.

Discussion:

171. An IASMN member asked about the use of special devices to allow different systems that are normally not interoperable to communicate with each other. It was discussed that such devices existed but that in the current stage these were not entirely reliable – they frequently “dropped calls”; but he expressed hope for this approach in the future, noting that the United Nations is a large customer and has some influence in persuading companies to find solutions.
172. The Chair of the IASMN asked for Mr. Bah to look closely at where there is potential for compatibility within the radio systems and for the systems to cater to the different areas. For instance, when United Nations personnel are deployed for surge or in crisis mode, the UNSMS can support them from a stock of available radios for the different systems. He noted that although there may not be a single solution to this issue, the IASMN can still start to have some centralization for emergency telecommunication.

Recommendation:

173. **The IASMN noted the update and progress made on emergency telecommunications. WFP will presents their recommendations on interoperability and action points to the IASMN Steering Group in November 2016 with a view to have their guidelines endorsed by the full IASMN in February 2017.**

Y. Compliance

Presentation:

174. Mr. Harrison provided an overview of the new compliance approach (CRP 12). Following the endorsement of the UNDSS Strategic Review, PCCS reviewed their approach toward verifying compliance with policies, procedures and security risk management measures. An evaluation capacity was established in response to an Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) requirement and a best practices component was added.
175. The old compliance format used in the field was expensive and time consuming. There had been 101 compliance visits in the last 10 years to 86 duty stations or designated areas. Under the old compliance concept it would take 16 years to cover all countries with UNDSS field offices. Mr. Harrison noted that the four posts in CEMS have been allocated as follows: one to compliance, one to evaluation, and one to lessons learned and best practices; in addition to the Chief of the Section who is involved in all these functions.
176. Mr. Harrison also noted in the former compliance model there was an in-country self-assessment and MOSS self-assessment coupled with a desk review at HQ. The new compliance concept retains these and will still place the responsibility on the AFPs to complete the self-assessment for MOSS but it would not be done in isolation. Instead of compliance as an internal UNDSS concept, it was proposed to be converted to an UNSMS policy.

Discussion:

177. One IASMN member said that while the evaluation concept may be internal to UNDSS, the issue was much broader and applicable to the entire UNSMS. When an evaluation mission visits a country, they do not only review UNDSS internal policies and procedures, but they assess the UNSMS as a whole. He said it is necessary to include the roles and responsible of AFPs, as they monitor, guide and fund implementations of policies within their organizations. He welcomed the proposal for a dedicated compliance policy and offered to support this accordingly.
178. IASMN members asked if the UNSMS policy would make reference to compliance for budget or financial reporting and if it is to be used by all the UNSMS organizations. They also advised that input needed to be collected from the AFPs on the design.
179. Another member noted that UNDSS still needs to do internal compliance for policy checking and this would be an add-on from the old UNDSS compliance. The old compliance model had functional elements. He gave the example of the CIMS software as being useful when properly utilized. It was a good monitoring tool for informing the DOs on where they were in terms of implementation.

180. The staff representative referred to a statement (Annex D) circulated to IASMN members and expressed concern with the way the new compliance concept is being developed.
181. Mr. Harrison took note of adding a financial component to the compliance concept and an internal mechanism so UNDSS can do compliance on UNSMS policies. He noted there is support from IASMN members to develop a UNSMS policy and IASMN members want to be part of the conceptual development. He would put ideas on paper as the basis for a discussion. Afterward a WG can be established and work on a draft UNSMS policy for the Steering Group meeting in November.
182. UNDSS/DRO noted that Boards of Inquiry (BOIs) had determined that although levels of compliance had been assessed at 95% for the AFPs and UNDSS, they came to the conclusion that compliance did not address compliance of individual staff members and individual offices. UNDSS/PCCS noted the existing framework for compliance did not address security culture, but that this was assessed through evaluation. With the new SRM process in place, compliance should focus on the implementation of the SRM measures. Compliance is a collective responsibility and all actors of the UNSMS Organizations are responsible for implementing security measures.
183. USG UNDSS indicated the old compliance format relying on checking off boxes was not effective. The United Nations continues to suffer fatalities, this says compliance needs to be reviewed and other measures should be put in place. He agreed to the first option presented for a discussion paper to be developed by PCCS with a focus on the evaluation part. Once the discussion paper is circulated a group of interested parties will be convened and can form a WG if necessary.
184. IASMN representatives requested for the discussion paper to provide a way to have lessons learned, capture gaps and weaknesses in compliance, examine the level of detail that is appropriate for a policy; have some flexibility and consideration for internal compliance and the evaluation processes of the AFPs. The Chair agreed there needed to flexibility on what exists for the AFPs and what exists for UNDSS.

Recommendation:

185. **The IASMN agreed PCCS will develop a discussion paper for a new UNSMS policy on compliance assessment. The discussion paper will be circulated to IASMN members with feedback provided and intent to present a draft UNSMS policy to the Steering Group in November.**

Z. Budgetary Matters

Presentation:

186. Mr. Drennan introduced the discussion by noting the dialogue should focus on the issue of resources instead of budget funding or constraints, on the basis of the current security threats and projections for the next five years. He indicated that the strategic framework for the biennium 2018-2019 was approved and presented the paper circulated to participants "Preliminary JFA Security Budget Estimate – 2018-2019 Biennium". He indicated that under the current challenging security environment, UNDSS will constantly reprioritize and deliver more outputs to meet the increasing demands. Five areas were

identified and needed to be strengthened with additional resources: 1. threat and risk analysis; 2. physical security; 3. policy support; 4. administrative support; and 5. needs in OECD countries.

187. He noted there was a correlation between those five areas and the stabilization rate of fatalities, while other resources are also needed. There was an increased demand in the services of the Department driven by increased presence in the field. To respond to this demand with an adequate security protection, a preliminary estimate indicated that an 8.7% increase in funding was needed for the next biennium, for a total of \$9 million (US) annually. This estimate included additional security posts and upgrading of positions but did not yet comprise additional posts for OECD countries or additional resources for training. With a security environment that is most likely going to deteriorate in the future, there was pressure on the Department to deliver on security needs while the last increase in resourcing took place in 2010.

Discussion:

188. Several IASMN members supported the approach to not focus on increased funding only but look at reviewing resource requirements, while exposing their own resources constraints. They supported the approach to research alternative funding streams, identify what is available, and address gaps to ensure that the UNSMS is 'fit-for-purpose.' Others asked how the IASMN can support UNDSS to get the resources it needs.
189. They noted all IASMN members should take these documents back to the senior officials and give UNDSS feedback on what they would like to see differently in the priorities and what unanswered questions they might have ahead of the November deadline and the meeting with ACABQ. USG UNDSS agreed to the need to establish a timeline so that there is enough time to collect inputs from the AFPs. Ms. Menada Wind-Andersen, Executive Officer of UNDSS, noted the budget paper addresses the issue of resources and November is the deadline for the output level. The costing sheets portion of the budget paper will also be finalized for submission.
190. An IASMN member raised the issue of governance with respect to Jointly Funded Activities (JFA), noting that to endorse a budget proposal IASMN members must be provided with sufficient information and adequate time to allow a full review within their organizations. He noted that the process should not only be about informing, but a dialogue that allows for gathering inputs from client organizations and integrating these into the budget proposal. He noted the good work being done by the sub-group on governance of the Finance and Budget Network to develop such procedures and encouraged UNDSS to give this its full support. He suggested the role of the IASMN with respect to JFA governance should also be included in the policy on Governance currently being drafted.
191. An IASMN member noted that they should determine if the UNSMS will have the right skill set to deal with the unique security challenges ahead and was 'fit for purpose.' He also requested a more detailed budget – since the paper presented only highlighted additional operational needs, not the entire JFA budget. He recommended to strategically list UNDSS' security needs based on its priorities, what areas may be affected if requested funding was not provided and how the Department would then approach the Member States for additional funds or technical support.

192. One IASMN member noted most major countries are increasing their security resources and there has been an increase in military spending globally. He requested for the budget paper to have a clear and tangible criteria for the establishment of new posts and for reinforcement in some countries where UNDSS cannot increase capacity but AFPs may be able to increase security capacity. He noted the paper can touch upon the synergy between UNDSS and the AFPs so both can collectively carry out their mission.
193. Another IASMN member said the huge increase in the LCCSB could be a reflection of the increase in resources needed by UNDSS. He asked to conduct more discussions with the IASMN on resourcing. USG UNDSS agreed to have another VTC with the IASMN members on the budget issue.
194. An IASMN member noted that they are increasing humanitarian response in highly volatile areas. If the IASMN is not able to keep up with the increased demands for security needs, they are not moving forward.
195. One IASMN representative understood UNDSS' operational requirement for additional security resources and noted the high number of new posts proposed at the P4/P5 level and questioned the fact that from an operational and financial perspective, of the 35 newly proposed P-level posts, 40% would be based in New York,
196. Another representative noted that UNSMS organizations do not take the JFA in isolation but have to look at their internal funding and see what the impact is for meeting their deliverables. There was a need to strike the right balance in the paper because an increase for security funding will be taken from somewhere else. In that context, it was offered to work with UNDSS to identify key priorities for the UNSMS organizations. They are a decentralized organization and the resources allocated for their staffs' security and safety is also decentralized. They will need more comprehensive information in the budget paper so they can have a detailed discussion at the senior management level.
197. Another IASMN member responded he was unsuccessful the last two years in convincing his senior management to obtain an increase in security funding for UNDSS, and requested more information to justify an increase. He said in providing justification for resources, it would be helpful if UNDSS could demonstrate that the requested financial resources provide value for money and he needed more information on where efficiency gains can be found in the five highlighted areas. He said managers have been asking that security support be closer to their clients. If there is a request for more resources at UNHQ, UNDSS will need to make sure there is a balance between what is being requested for headquarters compared to what is requested in the field.
198. In addition, he noted the IASMN should look closely at who benefits the most from increased security resources, and consider whether a differentiated approach to covering the JFA costs is appropriate to cover the increase in costs. For example, UNSMS organizations benefitting most from the services should bear the additional costs. Another IASMN member remarked that it has proven difficult to justify programmes on value for their money. In the budget paper, UNDSS should strengthen the argument that these resources will enable UNSMS organizations to carry out their mandated programmes.
199. Another IASMN member added that a fair amount of AFPs are presently (some of them already for many years) under budget scenarios of 0% real growth, and this should not be

ignored by the IASMN when discussing ways to fund resource needs. In a context of growing security challenges, he posed the question if increases in security resource needs are structural or conjunctural. If they are deemed structural; then innovative avenues or structures for increased funding should be looked at. Consideration should be given to every possibility for achieving savings (such as, the expected efficiency gains from the Integration project) whose budgetary impact might balance the required funding increase.

200. UNDSS/DRO asked the IASMN members to look at the list of countries where security resources were allocated. UNDSS redeployed 30 posts in 2014 and 50 posts in 2015 to support the operations of IASMN members. JFA staffing in the field for UNDSS accounted for 700 posts. The third list comprises countries where the demand is still there but UNDSS has not been able to fulfil this, as they have exhausted the ability for further redeployment.

Recommendation:

201. **The Chair of the IASMN concluded that there was no opposition to adequate funding that may entail an increase of resources, although it was noted that members also expressed a strong desire to see additional information including on the overall budget request and exposed budgetary constraints. He thanked the IASMN members for their valuable and genuine comments which would support the effort to strengthen the information required.**
202. **He indicated that UNDSS will revise the budget paper and map out a timeframe to get feedback from IASMN ahead of meetings in November. The revised paper will include some statistical data to make it more comprehensive and it will reflect on some of the comments made by the IASMN representatives.**
203. **Depending on the feedback received, UNDSS may need to rework the paper again ahead of the November deadline for the General Assembly. The revised report will focus on security culture, finance, and crisis management. They have a target date to have a report for the GA in November. A revised budget paper and related documents will be sent to IASMN members in late August for consultations and feedback.**

AA. Any Other Business

204. **Joint Inspection Unit.** The USG updated the IASMN on his recent meeting with the Joint Inspections Unit. A draft report is expected for presentation to the General Assembly in the autumn and will be submitted for consultations to the AFPs and DSS in early September.
205. **Mandatory Security Training.** An IASMN member raised two concerns with respect to mandatory security training, following a recent audit by the OIOS of recurrent security findings in audits of UNHCR. The first concerned issues with SSAFE (Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments) training. The IASMN Chair agreed that this was a priority for the Department and indicated it will be addressed with the new Chief of Field Support Service (FSS). The second issue concerned the requirement to retake BSITF and ASITF every three years. It was suggested if a different approach for continuing security

training could be developed that would encourage greater interest and compliance. It was agreed this would be looked at by the new Chief of FSS.

206. **To be tabled at the Next Meeting.** Scheduled to be tabled at the next IASMN meeting in February 2017 are: Management of Safety and Security Crisis in the Field, Locally Cost-Shared Security Budget, Gender Considerations, MOSS, Road Safety Strategy, Governance and Compliance. As discussed at the IASMN in February 2016, a paper from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will be tabled at the next Steering Group meeting reviewing lessons learned from operations conducted in the biological, chemical and nuclear warfare environment, particularly after the experience in Syria.
207. **Next Meetings.** The next full IASMN meetings will be hosted by the World Bank in Washington, DC in the first week of February 2017 (tentative 7-9 February); and June 2017 in Montreux (tentative 20-22 June) with support from the Swiss Federation. The next IASMN Steering Groups are scheduled on 9-10 November in Valencia, hosted by DPKO-DFS, for May 2017 (tentative 10-11 May) in Rome hosted by FAO; and on 7-8 November 2017 in Copenhagen, hosted by WHO.

Agenda**Tuesday, 21 June 2016**

0900 – 0930 Welcome (USG/UNDSS)

- Opening Remarks by Ambassador Mirjana Spoljaric (Head of the United Nations and International Organisations Division, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs)
- Security Briefing (Jorge Villanueva, UNOG/DSS/SSS)
- Adoption of the Agenda
- Review of IASMN 23rd session Recommendations (PPCU)

0930 – 1100 Strategic Update from USG, UNDSS

- Integration of DPKO, DPA, DFS, and DSS Security Resources (PCCS)
- Update on UNDSS Priorities 2016

1100 – 1130 Break

1130 – 1300 Working Group Updates

- Guidelines for Unarmed Private Security Services (DPKO-DFS) – [CRP-10]
- Governance Framework (PCCS) – [CRP 11]

1300 – 1400 Lunch

1400 – 1530 Security Risk Management [CRP 15]

- Security Risk Management (SRM) Implementation (DRO)
- Residential Security Measures (RSM) (DRO)
- MOSS (OCHA)
- Programme Criticality (OCHA)

1530 – 1600 Break

1600 – 1700 Physical Security Update (David Bongi) [by VTC] - [CRP 17]

1700 - 1730 Working Group Updates

- Security Coverage in OECD Countries (UNDP) – [CRP 03]

1730 End of Day

Wednesday, 22 June 2016

0900 – 1030 Working Group Updates

- Locally Cost-Shared Security Budgets (UNDP) – [CRP 06]
- Gender Considerations in Security Management (UNHCR) – [CRP 04]
- Road Safety Strategy (PPCU) – [CRP 08]

1030 – 1100 Break

1100 – 1230 Working Group Updates

- Residential Security for Locally-Recruited Personnel (IOM) - [CRP 09]
- Management of Safety and Security Crisis in the Field (DRO) [CRP 16]
- First Response (incl. Emergency Trauma Bags) (DPKO-DFS) – [CRP 05]

1230 – 1330 Lunch

1300 – 1500 Other policy issues

- PEP Kits Framework (UNFPA) - [CRP 07]
- Security Arrangements for UN Common Premises (UNDP) – [CRP 02]
- Duty of Care (PPCU) [CRP 18]
- Identity Management (ITU) [CRP 13]
- Technical Review of UNSMS policies [CRP 14]

1500 – 1530 Break

1530 – 1630 Emergency Telecommunication WFP (by VTC)

1630 Close of Session

1730 IASMN social gathering

Thursday, 23 June 2016

0900 – 1000 Budgetary Matters (USG/UNDSS & EO/UNDSS)

1000 – 1015 Picture

1015 – 1045 Break

1045 – 1200 Any Other Business

- Compliance [CRP 12]
- JIU

1200 – 1230 Closing Remarks – Next meetings

1230 Close of Session

List of Participants

Chair	Mr. Peter Drennan (USG, UNDSS)
Co-Chair	Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison (IOM)
IASMN Secretariat	Ms. Florence Poussin (PPCU/UNDSS)

Agencies, Funds and Programmes and Other Entities of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) and other participants and observers

	Entity	Name of Participant
1	DPKO/DFS	Adriaan Bezuidenhout
2	DPA	Roselyn Akombe
3	EBRD	Ian Evans
4	FAO	Piergiorgio Trentinaglia
5	IAEA	Casper Oswald
6	ICAO	Michael Romerto
7	ICC	Lassi Kuusinen
8	ICJ	Maarten Daman
9	ICTY	Bonnie Adkins
10	IFAD	Claudia Fiori
11	ILO	Philippe Franzkowiak
12	IMF	James Blakeney
13	ITU	Drew Donovan
14	OCHA	Simon Butt
15	OHCHR	Abraham Mathai
16	PAHO	Rustam Ergashev
17	UNAIDS	Peter Koopmans
18	UNDP	Luc Vandamme
19	UNESCO	Mary Mone
20	UNFPA	Naqib Noory
21	UNIDO	Guillermo Jimenez
22	UNHCR	Terry Morel
23	UNHCR	Michael Dell'Amico
24	UNHCR	Julie Dunphy
25	UNHCR	Harry Leefe
26	UNICEF	Janie McCusker
27	UNODC	Dagmar Thomas
28	UNON/UNEP	Peter Marshall
29	UNOPS	Arve Skog
30	UNRWA	Timo Der Weduwen
31	UNV	Mituhiko Inaba
32	UN Women	Paul O'Hanlon

33	WFP	Christophe Boutonnier
34	WFP	Alpha Bah (via VTC)
35	WHO	Patrick Beaufour
36	WIPO	Olivier Bruyere
37	WMO	Carlo Tancredi
38	WMO	Martin Fuhr
39	World Bank	Jeffrey Culver
40	World Bank	Vikki Hollingsworth
41	UNWTO	Jose Garcia-Blanch
42	UNDSS-HQ	David Bongi (via VTC)
43	UNDSS-HQ	Craig Harrison
44	UNDSS-HQ	Igor Mitrokhin
45	UNDSS-HQ	Menada Wind-Anderson
46	UNDSS-HQ	Dina Daoud
47	CEB Secretariat	Remo Lalli
48	CEB Secretariat	Michael Rosetz
49	CCISUA	Guy Avognon
50	CCISUA	Gordon Brown
51	FICSA	Diab El-Tabari
52	UNMDWG	Dr. Martine Grigis
53	OLA	Luke Mhlaba
54	IOM	Maricar Purugganan
55	IOM	Adriano Goncalves

Summary of IASMN Recommendations

Unarmed Private Security Services (UPSS) [CRP 10]

1. The IASMN approved the guidelines and manual for Unarmed Private Security Services (CRP 10). Both the UPSS guidelines and manual will be promulgated after the close of the IASMN session and issuance of its Final Report. It will be promulgated along with the UPSS policy, which was approved last April by the HLCM.

Governance Framework [CRP 11]

2. The IASMN endorsed the Terms of Reference of the Working Group (Annex A).
3. The IASMN noted that further clarifications and consultations were required from the WG for the draft Chapter II, Section A on Governance Policy, notably on its paragraph 4.
4. A revised draft will be presented at the next IASMN Steering Group in November 2016 with a view to have the policy approved at the IASMN in February 2017.

Security Risk Management (SRM) Implementation [CRP 15]

5. The IASMN noted the update on the implementation of the UNSMS Security Risk Management Policy (CRP 15).
6. In relation to the SRM implementation process, UNDSS will write to the Designated Officials and SMTs to remind them of the timeline for completion and transition to the new SRM.

MOSS

7. IASMN acknowledged the update on MOSS.
8. The IASMN recommended a Working Group be established and look at the implication of SRM implementation and other security policies with the idea of drafting new guidance for MOSS and possibly changing its name.
9. It was noted that UNDSS will draft a communiqué to DOs and SMTs to inform them of the current status of MOSS.

Programme Criticality

10. The IASMN acknowledged the update on Programme Criticality.

Physical Security Update [CRP 17]

11. The IASMN acknowledged the update on Physical Security (CRP 17) and the increased demand for expertise in physical security.

Security Coverage in OECD Countries [CRP 3]

12. The update on Security Coverage in OECD Countries (CRP 03) was noted by the IASMN.
13. The IASMN endorsed the TOR and Work Plan of the Working Group.

Locally Cost-Shared Security Budget

14. The IASMN noted the update on the Working Group for Locally Cost-Shared Security Budget (CRP 06) and endorsed the TOR.
15. The IASMN requested that along with an UNSMS policy, the WG produce clear and definitive guidelines on what is to be paid for, and also what are the responsibilities of the SMTs.

Gender Considerations in Security Management [CRP 4]

16. The IASMN noted the updates on Gender Considerations in Security Management (CRP 04).
17. The IASMN noted the request from the WG for DSS to manage a 'gender tab' on UNSMIN and the WG will present a TOR on this scope of work to the IASMN Steering Group in November.

Road Safety Strategy [CRP 8]

18. Recommendations: The IASMN noted progress and endorsed the TORs of the WG on Road Safety Strategy (CRP 08).

Residential Security for Locally-Recruited Personnel [CRP 9]

19. The IASMN noted the update on the technical working group for Residential Security for Locally-Recruited Personnel (CRP 09).
20. The Working Group will analyze information gathered to date through data collection, research and surveys to be presented to the IASMN Steering Group in November 2016.

Management of Safety and Security Crisis in the Field [CRP 16]

21. The IASMN noted the progress of the Working Group for Management of Safety and Security Crisis in the Field (CRP 16).
22. A draft policy will be circulated to IASMN SG members for their feedback prior to their meeting in November 2016.

First Response (including Emergency Trauma Bags) [CRP 5]

23. The IASMN noted the progress made by the WG and approved the TOR.

24. The WG will present a draft policy to the Steering Group in November with a view for approval at the 25th IASMN Session in February 2017.

PEP Kits Framework [CRP 7]

25. The IASMN approved the PEP kit management guidelines (CRP 17).
26. The approval of guidelines is subject to reformatting the document by UNDSS/PPCU.

Security Arrangements for UN Common Premises [CRP 2]

27. The IASMN approved the guidelines for Security Arrangements for UN Common Premises (CRP 02), with amendments discussed with UNODC.

Duty of Care [CRP 18]

28. The IASMN noted the progress on Duty of Care (CRP 18).

Identity Management [CRP 13]

29. The IASMN took note of the Working Group's progress.
30. The IASMN requested more information on strategic, technical and budget implications to be shared with the IASMN in February 2016.

Technical Review of UNSMS Policies [CRP 14]

31. The IASMN approved the technical review of UNSMS policies (CRP 14) and the amendments that will be made to the policies in the *Security Policy Manual*.

Emergency Telecommunication

32. The IASMN noted the update and progress made on emergency telecommunications.
33. WFP will presents their recommendations on interoperability and the action point to the IASMN Steering Group in November 2016 with a view to have their guidelines endorsed by the full IASMN in February 2017.

Compliance

34. The IASMN agreed PCCS will develop a discussion paper for a new UNSMS policy on compliance assessment.
35. The discussion paper will be circulated to IASMN members with feedback provided and intent to present a draft UNSMS policy to the Steering Group in November.

Budgetary Matters

36. The Chair concluded that there was no opposition to an increase of resources and thanked the IASMN members for their valuable and genuine comments.
37. He indicated that UNDSS will revise the budget paper and map out a timeframe to get feedback from IASMN ahead of meetings in November. The revised paper will

include statistical data to make it more comprehensive and it will reflect on some of the comments made by the IASMN representatives.

38. Depending on the feedback received, UNDSS may need to rework the paper again ahead of the November deadline for the General Assembly. The revised report will focus on security culture, finance, and crisis management. They have a target date to have a report for the GA in November. A revised budget paper will be sent to IASMN members in late August for consultations and feedback.

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Statement from CCISUA

CCISUA Statement to the 24th Session of the Inter Agency Security Management Network (IASMN)

The Coordinating Committee for the International Staff Unions and Associations (CCISUA) notes that following the Algiers attack¹. Mr. Brahimi's report emphasised:

"That monitoring must result in information that permits objective comparison of results against targets and standards, covering, among other things, evidence that authority has been fully exercised but not exceeded. That is, managers have not sought to avoid decisions they are empowered to make and have referred decisions elsewhere if they are not empowered to make them; such as compliance with policies, values, regulations, rules and behavioural standards".¹

To this end, the GA established a dedicated compliance unit in DSS.

CCISUA supported this decision. The autonomous monitoring of the security management system, in our view, is central to the assessment, prevention and correction of errors or irregularities by decision makers whose primary duty is to ensure the safety and security of UN Staff.

Subsequent attacks on staff have shown the continuing importance of compliance with policies. CCISUA therefore regrets the recently instituted compliance concept, the management- evaluation framework", which eliminated objective compliance missions and replaced them with a model focused on self-evaluation. In our view this decision has weakened the ability of UNDSS to support staff security, will lead to conflicts of interest for UNDSS staff, and runs counter to the decision of the General Assembly as well as to recommendations of the Brahimi report on the Algiers terrorist attack.

This decision, in terms of compliance, places the head of UNDSS in the challenging position to have to be accountable for the adherence to the systems policies and procedures, without being able to have this assessed objectively. We believe that this is to the detriment of the organisation and potentially increases the risk to UN staff members' lives.

We would also like to note that this change was instituted in the absence of staff consultations and therefore further request that the IASMN consider this matter and its implications to the SMS and most importantly, the security and safety of UN personnel.

Independent and objective compliance of security policies and procedures is also one of the primary pillars of the framework of accountability.

Our second concern is that this decision has been taken without following the correct processes required by the General Assembly. We understand that the authority to change the allocation of functions to ensure compliance is the exclusive responsibility of the UN General Assembly through the advice of the Secretary-General. The compliance apparatus is a vital application that must be enhanced instead of diminished. In essence, compliance requires an independent monitoring system as was also envisioned by the General Assembly.

¹ A/55/270 Annex A

CCISUA therefore expresses its concern with the current management and oversight of the United Nations Security Management System.

It strongly believes that many of the tragedies suffered by the organisation could have been avoided or minimised should we have had a stronger and more robust compliance apparatus. Therefore, we call for the compliance process to be properly enhanced and not further eroded.

Montreux, 23 June 2016

<http://www.ccisua.org/2016/06/23/ccisua-statement-24th-session-inter-agency-security-management-network/>

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Members of Working Group on MOSS

OCHA (Chair)	Mr. Simon Butt
UNDP	Mr. Thomas Shannon
UNICEF	Mr. Majed Altwal
UNHCR	Mr. David Snider
IOM	Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison
UNWOMEN	Mr. Paul O'Hanlon
WHO	Mr. Angelito Bermudez
WFP	Ms. Victoria Andrews
WFP	Ms. Daniela Melillo
UNFPA	Mr. Naqib Noory
UNAIDS (FICSA Observer)	Mr. Jason Sigurdson
UNDSS/CEMS	Mr. Alexander Baranov
UNDSS/PCU (Secretariat)	Ms. Dina Daoud