

Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN)

22nd Session

Montreux, 23-25 June 2015

FINAL REPORT

Executive Summary

The 22nd Session of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) was held at the Eurotel in Montreux, Switzerland from 23 to 25 June 2015. Thirty-seven (37) United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) members participated in the session, with eight (8) other entities participating as observers. Mr. Peter Drennan, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG, UNDSS), chaired the session while Mr. Drew Donovan, Head of the International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) Safety and Security Division, served as Co-Chair. Ms. Florence Poussin, Chief of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security's (UNDSS) Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit (PPCU), served as Secretary.

On 22 June, some IASMN members also participated in a side event organized by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) in relation with its ongoing review of Safety and Security in the United Nations System. This session included a briefing on the JIU's findings from field missions' visits and a discussion on the JIU's Review of Safety and Security in the United Nations System.

Global Security Developments

The IASMN discussed global security developments, noting that there had been no positive change over the past few years. To the contrary, areas of conflict have only expanded, which has, in turn, only increased the demand on UNSMS organisations to operate in high-risk environments. In this context, the IASMN approved the establishment of a working group to draft a UNSMS policy on *Safety and Security Crisis Management in the Field*. The IASMN also took note of UNDSS' development of a Crisis Management Training Programme, with support from various UNSMS organisations.

Policies

The IASMN approved the Residential Security Measures (RSM) policy, as revised in-session, as well as its guidelines, pending the incorporation of feedback from one IASMN member. The RSM policy will replace the long-standing Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) policy once endorsed by the High-level Committee on Management (HLCM). The IASMN approved the Terms of Reference (TORs) for the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Residential Security Risks for Locally-recruited UN Personnel and recommended that the scope of work of the TWG be limited to reviewing security risks associated with locally-recruited personnel at their residence due to their employment with UNSMS organisations.

The IASMN also approved the Management of Stress and Critical Incident Stress (MSCIS) policy, which coordinates the provision of psycho-social services by the Critical Incident Stress

Management Unit (CISMU) and UNSMS Stress Counsellors. The policy also covers coordination with UNSMS security professionals and Security Management Teams (SMTs).

With regard to the arming of security officials, the IASMN agreed, in principle, that there is a need to have a policy governing the arming of security officials; however, some members expressed strong reservations for some elements contained within the draft policy. Some participants stressed the need to limit the arming of security professionals to those with protection roles. The IASMN agreed to submit critical feedback on the draft policy to the IASMN Secretariat within two weeks for further consideration.

With regard to Security Risk Management, the IASMN approved the finalized training for piloting in August-September 2015, along with the finalized e-tool for piloting in August-September 2015 and the timeline for rolling out the SRM process and e-tool no later than December 2015, with all countries using the SRM process by December 2016. With regard to Savings Lives Together (SLT), the IASMN approved the revised SLT Framework and noted the inclusion of DPKO and UNDP in the SLT Oversight Committee.

IASMN Working Groups – Updates and New Working Groups

With regard to the Gender Considerations in Security Management Working Group, the IASMN approved the working group's Mission Statement, changes made to its TORs, while taking note of its recommendation that a gender expert panel review existing and future UNSMS policies to ensure gender considerations have been incorporated. The IASMN also recognized the need for a UNSMS policy on gender and requested the working group to draft such a policy. It also recommended a gender "tab" or "page" be added to the UN Security Information Managers Network (UNSMIN) as well as the UNDSS website, which will serve as a repository for gender-specific agency programmes, documents, and advice. The IASMN also recommended that UNDSS' travel advisories include a gender-specific section while encouraging all security professionals to take UN Women's "I Know Gender" online programme or their organisation's equivalent programme with respect to gender awareness.

The IASMN also took note of an update provided by the Joint ICT Network/IASMN Working Group on Global Identity Management Standards and the addition of ICAO and IFAD as members.

The IASMN approved the establishment of a Road Safety Strategy Working Group in order to formulate a road safety strategy and, if necessary, revise the UNSMS policy on road safety, in recognition of Organisational and governmental initiatives in this regard. With regard to the Unarmed Private Security Companies (UPSS) Working Group, the IASMN approved its TORs and timeline for the completion of its work.

Board of Inquiry (BOI)

The IASMN discussed the recommendations of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) report on the 17 January 2014 attack in Kabul, Afghanistan and took note of its Implementation Plan. In connection with the BOI's recommendations, the IASMN approved a review of best practices

for ensuring the implementation of Basic Security in the Field (BSITF) and Advanced Security in the Field (ASITF). The IASMN also called on UNDSS to consider mechanisms for addressing non-compliance with UNSMS policies.

The IASMN is grateful for the outstanding support provided by the Swiss Government and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), in their capacities as host and facilitator, respectively, prior and during the 22nd Session. Such support ensured the effective participation of all IASMN members. The IASMN is also grateful for the support provided by UNDSS' Chief Security Adviser at the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), Mr. Andre Bouchard.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Final Report

Executive Summary.....	1-2
Table of Contents.....	3
IASMN Discussions.....	4-25
Introduction.....	4
Global Security Developments.....	5-6
Integration of DPKO, DFS, and DPA Security Resources.....	6-7
Crisis Management.....	7-9
Recommendations of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) Report.....	9-11
Policy on Arming Security Officials	11-14
Update: Physical Security.....	14-15
Residential Security Measures (RSMs).....	15-16
Residential Security Risks for Locally-recruited UN Personnel.....	16-17
Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group.....	17-18
Saving Lives Together (SLT).....	18
Road Safety Strategy.....	18-19
Unarmed Private Security Companies (UPPS).....	19-20
Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG).....	20-21
Budgetary Matters: Jointly Financed Account (JFA).....	21-24
Gender Considerations in Security Management.....	24-26
IASMN and ICT Effort on Identity Management.....	26-27
Steering Group Membership.....	27
Any Other Business.....	27-30
Update on Implementation of UNDSS Strategic Review.....	27-28
UNDSS Framework of Accountability.....	28
UNSMS Outreach to Local host Government Authorities.....	28-29
UNFPA Security Application.....	29
Nomination of IASMN and IASMN Steering Group Co-Chair.....	29
IASMN calendar of meetings.....	29-30
Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) Side Event.....	30-31
Annexes	
Annex A: Agenda.....	32
Annex B: List of Participants.....	33-35
Annex C: Summary of IASMN Recommendations.....	36-39
Annexes D and E: Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) PowerPoint Slides.....	See Attachment

A. Introduction

1. The 22nd Session of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) was held at the Eurotel in Montreux, Switzerland from 23 to 25 June 2015. Thirty-seven (37) United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) members participated in the session, with eight (8) other entities participating as observers (see Annex B to this report for a detailed List of Participants). Mr. Peter Drennan, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG, UNDSS), chaired the session while Mr. Drew Donovan, Head of the International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) Safety and Security Division, served as Co-Chair. Ms. Florence Poussin, Chief of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security's (UNDSS) Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit (PPCU), served as Secretary.
2. Ambassador Jürg Lauber, Head of the United Nations and International Organisations Division of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, welcomed IASMN members to Montreux, along with Ambassador Ralf Heckner, Head of the Crisis Management Centre of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Gerhard Ulmann, Host Country Policy Specialist with the United Nations and International Organisations Division of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Lauber underlined Swiss participation in the vast majority of international organisations and its position as a top twenty contributor to such organisations. In this regard, Switzerland has a vested interest in ensuring that such organisations operate efficiently and effectively.
3. Subsequently, UNDSS' Chief Security Adviser at UNOG, Mr. Andre Bouchard, delivered a brief presentation on the local security environment in Switzerland, including in and around Geneva. Mr. Bouchard surveyed all major threat categories, including criminality, civil unrest, and terrorism, noting that Switzerland and Western Europe in general was no longer immune to such threats.
4. USG, UNDSS then delivered his opening remarks, whereby he noted that UNDSS – and, by extension, the UNSMS – marked its tenth anniversary this year. Over the past decade, the security environment has changed drastically, with the rate of change accelerating every year. In this context, USG, UNDSS highlighted the Department's vision as one dedicated to protecting those who work for a better world and its mission as one dedicated to providing effective safety and security services to enable UN programmes and mandates.
5. USG, UNDSS continued on to express his appreciation to Mr. Drew Donovan for successfully concluding his two-year term as Co-Chair of the IASMN, adding that a new Co-Chair would be nominated at the end of the session. USG, UNDSS also expressed his appreciation to Mr. Stephen Gluning for his hard work and dedication to the IASMN, in conjunction with the completion of his appointment as Director of Field Security for WFP. Finally, USG, UNDSS expressed his deepest sympathies with, and condolences to, the family of Mr. Terry Davis, Principal Adviser for Security Coordination at UNICEF, upon his passing while reflecting upon Mr. Davis' unwavering commitment to the safety and

security of UNICEF and UNSMS personnel and his unparalleled contribution to the IASMN over the years. A moment of silence was observed by all IASMN members in his honor.

B. Global Security Developments (USG, UNDSS)

6. USG, UNDSS presented an overview of the global security environment, noting that there had been no positive change over the past few years. To the contrary, areas of conflict have only expanded, which has, in turn, only increased the demand on UNSMS organisations to operate in high-risk environments. In this regard, USG, UNDSS noted that Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen had all transitioned from family to non-family duty stations over the past five years.
7. USG, UNDSS stressed the fact that perception can differ greatly from reality. For example, in Kirkuk, Iraq, UNSMS personnel live and work while under a one-hour notice to evacuate. Although the UN is often perceived as a secondary or tertiary target around the world, it has arguably become a primary target in places such as northern Mali simply due to the fact that no one else is present.
8. USG, UNDSS highlighted the rise in violent extremism as a particular concern. Terrorism is used as a tactic to realize ideological goals. He also noted that many armed conflicts and instances of civil unrest around the world – whether in Afghanistan, Burundi, Egypt, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, or elsewhere – are linked to instability brought about by a transition in government or the removal or weakening of authoritarian leadership.
9. USG, UNDSS concluded his remarks by noting that recent statistics tied to the safety and security of UN and humanitarian personnel underline the risks faced by UNSMS personnel and the real impact such risks have had on their safety, security and well-being.
10. One member underlined threats from “lone-wolf” attacks, with a second member referring to such attacks as “crowd-sourcing terror.” USG, UNDSS noted that this phenomenon tended to impact developed countries, adding that such a threat will likely grow given the number of foreign fighters involved in various armed conflicts around the world, some of whom may eventually return to their home countries. The second member called on the IASMN to use existing mechanisms to influence high-level debates on such topics, most notably through the Emergency Directors Group (EDG), adding that UNDSS’ Division of Regional Operations (DRO) has a standing seat on the EDG.
11. In addition to the threats highlighted by USG, UNDSS, one member underlined emerging threats from vigilante, militia, and paramilitary groups, with indirect or direct backing from State actors, as well as threats from State actors themselves. One observer added that some State actors have sought to exploit populist homophobia for political gain.
12. One member called on IASMN members to remember that, overall, the world is “infinitely safer” than it was one-hundred or even twenty-five years ago. In this regard, the member

called on IASMN members to balance the negative outlook with respect to the global security environment with an appreciation for the fact that much progress in the realm of safety and security. While threats will persist, it is important that any response be measured so as to avoid creating new, unforeseen threats.

13. In response, USG, UNDSS noted that, unfortunately, the role of security professionals is to focus on the negative. At the same time, USG, UNDSS acknowledged that the UNSMS' and, even more broadly, the UN system's communications strategy needed to be strengthened, particularly with local communities at the field level. An example was provided whereby a statement put forth by a high-level UN body had a negative impact on the work of humanitarians in the field. In this regard, it is important for IASMN members to coordinate their messaging with UNDSS and their own executives while emphasizing the immense amount of good work that is carried out in the field.

C. Integration of DPKO, DFS, and DPA Security Resources (USG, UNDSS)

14. USG, UNDSS provided an update on the progress made in integrating DPKO, DFS, and DPA security resources. In this regard, he revealed that planning for integration has commenced, with efforts centered upon clarifying roles, functions, and priorities. Moreover, a project team is being formed to address budget and human resources concerns. In this regard, USG, UNDSS stressed that consultation among all concerned parties will be critical to ensuring a successful integration, adding that such integration would be implemented next year.
15. One member requested that a unified communique, signed by all four concerned USGs (i.e. USG, UNDSS, two USGs of DPKO-DFS, and USG, DPA) be circulated among all concerned personnel so as to inform them of the progress made thus far and the timeline leading up to implementation. USG UNDSS acknowledge and agreed with the request.
16. One member urged all concerned UNSMS organisations to harmonise their objectives, which will lead to harmonized competencies and standards and, in turn, better services to the broader UNSMS. The member urged all concerned UNSMS organisations to avoid a scenario where such competencies and standards sink to the lowest common denominator, whereby individuals who may not possess the requisite skill set with respect to UNDSS or the inter-agency Security Risk Management (SRM) process are empowered along the way. In this regard, the member noted ongoing discussions related to the future viability of integrated missions, with concern over whether integration will lead to a decreased level of services for humanitarian activities, including the establishment and maintenance of humanitarian space.

RECOMMENDATION:

17. **The IASMN agreed that a unified communique, signed by all four concerned USGs (i.e. USG, UNDSS, two USGs of DPKO-DFS, and USG, DPA) should be circulated among all concerned personnel so as to inform them of the progress made thus far and the timeline leading up to implementation.**

D. Crisis Management (UNDSS/DRO) (CRP 18)

18. UNDSS/DRO presented an overview of crisis management as it currently exists within the UNSMS and the broader UN system. UNDSS/DRO noted that various aspects of *security* crisis management within the UNSMS is under review, noting the need to harmonize various aspects of security crisis management following the outbreak of crises around the world, including in Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gaza, Iraq, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, among others in recent years. During these crises, security crisis management often varied depending on who was in charge of overall crisis management, which, in turn, depended on the nature of the crisis (e.g., medical, political, security).
19. UNDSS/DRO called upon IASMN members to approve the transition from *Security Planning in the Field*, as it currently exists under the *United Nations Field Security Handbook (FSH)*, to *Crisis Management in the Field* under the *United Nations Security Management System Security Policy Manual (SPM)*. Furthermore, greater clarity is needed with regard to roles and responsibilities in security crisis management and contingency planning at the field levels, despite previous efforts to spell out such roles and responsibilities in the *Framework of Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System* ("Framework of Accountability"). Finally, current training of senior UN managers in security crisis management is insufficient. Additional skill sets are required to manage crises in real-time, including those applicable to Designated Officials (DOs). In this regard, UNDSS/DRO also called upon IASMN members to take note of the development of a real-time, high-intensity security crisis management training course for DOs, with the ideal setting for such a course being Switzerland given the fact that it hosts a large number of UNSMS organisations, including those with a large, global footprint, coupled with the country's close proximity to other large UN duty stations in Europe.
20. UNFPA welcomed this initiative and recalled its request for discussion on crisis management in general and mass casualty in specific at the Steering Group in Colombia was based on the recent incidents in Belgium and Copenhagen, which required activation of the crisis management, plans in order to account for UN personnel. A basic element that is always necessary is to have a system in place to account of staff as soon as possible. UNFPA has been conducting table top exercises to strengthen its crisis management and to stress test emergency preparedness for the past two years and offered to share lessons learned in the development of crisis management plans.
21. Seven IASMN members voiced explicit support for the transition from the FSH to SPM as well as the development of a security crisis management training course for DOs. UNDP

noted that it has a Crisis Response Unit (CRU) and extended its support in developing table-top exercises as well as policies and training courses. Another member noted that a policy is clearly needed due to the lack of consistency in security crisis management policies and procedures around the world (e.g., some policies reference mass casualty incidents (MCIs) while others do not), which has led to unpredictable responses and decisions. The member added that the existing Framework of Accountability, although arguably sufficient with respect to crisis preparation and planning, is weak with respect to crisis response. A third member emphasized the need to incorporate locally-recruited personnel in any security crisis management policy or procedures. The member also recommended that the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) be referenced within any policy. A fourth member recommended incorporating host Government relations within any policy. Multiple members called for expanding the DO training course to security professionals at lower levels.

22. One member expressed explicit support, but questioned how any new policies or procedures would be viewed by the UN system given that a UN system-wide policy is currently being developed by a working group led by the Chef de Cabinet. In response, USG, UNDSS noted that the current draft policy on crisis management within the UN system simply states that UNDSS shall be the lead with respect to security crisis management. It does not provide details in this regard and thus any policy or procedures developed within the context of the UNSMS will not contravene nor contradict the UN system-wide policy.
23. One member enquired as to how this issue became a priority. In response, the Secretary of the IASMN noted that feedback was received from the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) on the need for clarifying crisis management in the field, coupled with similar feedback from Chief Security Advisers (CSAs) and Security Advisers (SAs) and recommendations made within Board of Inquiry (BOI) reports. The member subsequently expressed cautious support, but underlined the need to define the term “crisis” and clarify the scope of “crisis management,” adding that the role of UNDSS in various crises (e.g., refugee influx, humanitarian response) would differ from crisis to crisis. In this regard, the member expressed interest in clarifying what the roles and responsibilities of UNDSS would be in various crises. The member also noted that a substantial number of crisis management mechanisms already exist within the UN system and cautioned that establishing a new mechanism (i.e. new policy and procedures) may be counterproductive. The member expressed stronger support for the DO training course, adding that his organisation will seek to share materials on how best to conduct complex crisis management. Nonetheless, the member cautioned against using fictitious countries in any training course as doing so often removes sensibilities to local environments.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

24. **The IASMN approved the establishment of a dedicated working group to draft a UNSMS policy on *Safety and Security Crisis Management in the Field*; the working group will be**

chaired by UNDSS, with DPA, ICJ, IOM, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, and UNICEF serving as members.

25. **The IASMN took note of UNDSS' development of a Crisis Management Training Programme, with support from various UNSMS organisations, who shall confirm such support with UNDSS/PCU as soon as possible.**

E. Recommendations of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) Report on the 17 January 2014 Attack in Kabul, Afghanistan (UNDSS/DRO) (CRP 13)

26. UNDSS/DRO provided an overview of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) Report on the 17 January 2014 attack in Kabul Afghanistan, which was distributed in redacted form to IASMN members on 21 April 2015, in addition to the BOI Implementation Plan. UNDSS/DRO emphasized the significance of BOI reports, which often impact existing UNSMS policies, procedures, standards, and other arrangements or, alternatively, spur the development of new arrangements. For example, the development of a UNSMS policy on security premises was rooted in a BOI recommendation following the 2011 Abuja attack on the UN. In general, the BOI examines various factors, including the roles, responsibilities, and actions of Executive Heads and local personnel as well as the terms and conditions of service of such personnel, UNSMS policies and guidelines in effect, and specific safety and security arrangements and challenges. With respect to the Kabul attack in particular, the underlying implication of the BOI report was that the existing compliance mechanism was not working, with the need to implement existing safety and security policies and guidelines identified. Upon the conclusion of the overview, UNDSS/DRO confirmed that the UN would not be reducing its footprint in Kabul as a result of the BOI recommendations.
27. One member stated that his organisation conducted its own investigation into the Kabul attack and ultimately confirmed the BOI's findings that the existing compliance mechanism was not working and that there is a need to *implement* existing safety and security policies and guidelines, rather than a need to strengthen such policies and guidelines. The member noted that his organisation had nonetheless revised its own, internal Framework of Accountability and shared it with IASMN members for their review. Another member added that UNDSS/DRO's Desk Officers at UN Headquarters should play a greater role in ensuring compliance with existing UNSMS policies as well as reporting on the level of compliance in various contexts.
28. One member echoed similar sentiments, stating that there is a strong need to ensure compliance with existing UNSMS policies, procedures, standards, and other arrangements. The member asserted that seventy-eight percent (78%) of his organisation's personnel that are involved in safety and security incidents become involved as a result of failing to comply with existing policies and guidelines or other relevant rules and regulations or, in some cases, common sense. In this regard, the member stated that the BOI report somewhat downplayed this fact, thereby failing to reinforce a need to foster a "security

culture.” Another member stressed that the responsibility to follow existing policies and guidelines should first be demonstrated at the management level at the duty station.

29. One member stated that, for the moment, impunity exists for those who do not comply with existing safety and security policies. In this regard, language should be inserted into human resources policies and contracts to address such impunity. The member also recommended that any approval of official travel through the Travel Request Information Processing (TRIP) system be subject to the timely completion of Basic Security in the Field (BSITF) and Advanced Security in the Field (ASITF). The same member proposed that TRIP be equipped with a feature automatically notifying those UNSMS personnel whose BSITF or ASITF will soon expire as this would enhance completion rate.
30. Another member called on human resources officers or specialists to scrutinize the reasons why certain people are seeking – or are being – deployed to high-risk environments (i.e. so as to avoid sending certain individuals to high-risk environments for the wrong reasons). In response, one observer recommended providing personnel with sufficient notice with regard to what they can expect to encounter in a high-risk environment prior to their deployment.
31. One member noted that, by virtue of its limited mandate, the BOI report overlooks two, key points. The first is the roles and responsibilities of the host Government and the fact that it bears primary responsibility for the safety and security of UN personnel in-country. The second is the financial cost of each failing so that concerned parties can request additional resources to address such failings. In this regard, another member noted that the UN should focus on strengthening the capacity of host Governments to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel.
32. In concluding the discussion, USG, UNDSS noted that the Security Management Team (SMT) in Afghanistan expressed its support for the BOI recommendations as well as the Implementation Plan. USG, UNDSS added that the report makes clear that there existed a lack of a “security culture,” which requires leadership attention.

RECOMMENDATION:

33. **The IASMN took note of the BOI Report on Kabul and its recommendations.**
34. **The IASMN took note of the Implementation Plan, including its recommendations pertaining to the UNSMS.**
35. **The IASMN approved a review of best practices for ensuring the mandatory implementation of BSITF and ASITF, including linking the approval of official business travel requests to the timely completion of BSITF and ASITF through the Travel Request Information Processing (TRIP) system, and to capture lessons learned in this regard.**

36. The IASMN called on UNDSS to consider mechanisms for addressing non-compliance with UMSMS policies.

F. Policy on Arming of Security Professionals (CRP 14)

37. UNDSS/DHSSS presented a draft UNSMS policy on the arming of security officials via Video Teleconference (VTC) from New York. Overall, UNDSS/DHSSS noted that, prior to this draft policy, no overarching UNSMS policy existed governing the context under which security officials may be armed by their respective organisations. Noting the sensitivity of the issue, UNDSS/DHSSS stressed that the draft policy contains five, distinct sets of checks and balances, including coordination with the host Government, DO/SMT, UNDSS/DRO and UNDSS/DHSSS, UNDSS' Weapons Committee, and USG, UNDSS.
38. One member began the discussion by welcoming the policy, but expressing concern that it contained no reference to the role of individual UNSMS organisations in approving the arming of their respective security officials. The member objected to having to seek approval from the host Government in all cases, noting that there may be circumstances where seeking approval may not be practical or even possible. In this regard, UNDSS/DHSSS stated that this would need to be clarified within the policy. In its capacity as observer, OLA noted that clarifying this point would be important and offered to assist in drafting the necessary language.
39. The same member also sought clarification of two terms found under paragraph 21 of the draft policy – “functions” and “uniforms” – as well as clarification over who would be responsible for ensuring that appropriate background checks have been conducted, as required under the same paragraph. UNDSS/DHSSS responded by noting that the term “functions” would be defined in Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) while the term “uniforms” respects certain Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and Status of Mission Agreements (SOMAs) requiring that any armed personnel be in uniform. In this regard, UNDSS/DHSSS and UNDSS/PPCU are working with OLA to address this issue. Finally, with respect to ensuring that appropriate background checks have been conducted, UNDSS/DHSSS noted that there are multiple ways to achieve this goal (e.g., requiring it via local host Government authorities, third-party capacity) but funding for services to conduct such checks will first be required.
40. The same member also sought clarification on paragraph 38 as it seems to imply a blanket requirement for approving the arming of security officials, even for non-UN purposes. USG, UNDSS requested the phrase “for official UN purposes” be inserted after the word “firearms” in paragraph 38 in order to address this issue. The same member then sought to insert a reference to the role of security professionals employed by other UNSMS organisations, whereby such security professionals should, at a minimum, be part of a consultative process undertaken by the CSA/COS/CSO when determining whether to revoke a previously granted authorisation to possess or use firearms. USG, UNDSS agreed

in this regard, although it was noted that such details are spelled out in the *Manual of Instruction on the Use of Force Equipment, including Firearms*, last revised in May 2014.

41. One member noted that, although it is a contentious issue, he stated that the draft policy answers many questions, including that any decision to arm will be based on a Security Risk Assessment (SRA). However, the member called for greater clarification that UNSMS organisations are *not required* to arm their security officials. In short, the decision to arm security officials is necessary, but not sufficient, to arm such security officials. There must also be appropriate training, certification, and procurement of weapons. In this regard, the member suggested clarifying the applicability section of the policy to state that the policy in no way precludes Agencies, Funds, and Programmes (AFPs) from deciding not to arm their security officials, particularly when such a decision is consistent with their mandate.
42. The same member stated that his organisation's main concern was the potential for the proliferation of arms at the local level. Therefore, he suggested a strong statement, be inserted into the policy, stressing that the arming of security officials is generally foreseen for high-risk environments and close protection services and not in general. USG, UNDSS responded by noting that paragraph 5 and 31 already require a "high bar" in order to obtain approval, but perhaps the Introduction and Purpose of the policy could be clarified further (i.e. only to arm security officials for specific purposes and under specific circumstances).
43. One member called for inserting a requirement that all UNSMS personnel who could potentially be armed first undergo a background check for the purposes of exercising due diligence. The member added that a simple, criminal background check would not be sufficient and that there is a need to analyze personalities. The member then enquired whether the UN Medical Directors Working Group (UNMDWG) would be in a position to devise a proper assessment. Two other members noted that any additional background check should be the responsibility of the individual UNSMS organisation employing such personnel. In response, USG, UNDSS noted that such personnel already undergo pre-employment Organisational screening requirements and the feasibility or even possibility of requiring additional checks is unclear. The UNMDWG, in its capacity as an observer, stated that it was satisfied with the existing, organisational screening process and did not believe additional psychological screening would be of benefit. However, another observer expressed hope that additional screening for the sake of ensuring the safety and security of personnel could still be devised.
44. One member delivered a statement, on behalf of his organisation's legal and policy units, emphasizing that the option to arm security officials, as currently spelled out in the draft policy, constitutes a paradigm shift as to the roles and responsibilities of UNSMS security officials. While expressing support for the continued arming of SSS officers and close protection services, the member noted that the policy, as it stands, alters the profile of UNDSS and all civilian components of the Organisation and the General Assembly-approved *Framework of Accountability*. Should the policy be approved, the *Framework of*

Accountability would need to be heavily revised. The member also stated that the policy is not driven by the Security Risk Management (SRM) process and noted that, for many IASMN members, this was the first time they had seen this draft policy. The member cautioned that arming security officials could lead to more deaths and injuries and more costs to the Organisation. Finally, the member stated that the policy has the potential to jeopardize not only UN humanitarian principles, but also the ability of humanitarians to deliver on the ground. Therefore, his organisation was not in a position to approve the draft policy, as it stands.

45. Another member, although somewhat more supportive of the policy, suggested that it should only apply to security officials employed in a “primarily protection role.” In response, USG, UNDSS noted that the policy is explicitly aimed at those with a protection role and that the draft policy is indeed practical given the fact that the Organisation is already aware of instances where security officials have armed themselves in the absence of a policy. In this regard, a policy is imperative. OLA, in its capacity as an observer, stated that a clear, policy framework was essential and urgently required so that the Organisation could clearly determine the consequences for those who choose to arm themselves outside of such a framework..
46. One member expressed his support for the draft policy, noting that Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions have long had similar policies in place but, at the moment, the UNSMS simply has the UNDSS’ Manual of Instruction in place. The member opposed re-drafting the current policy in order to make it more restrictive as this would risk being interpreted as lack of support for security professionals in high-risk environments in which arming such individuals may be entirely justified. UNDSS/DHSS added that the arming of such individuals would undoubtedly have a deterrent effect. In response, USG, UNDSS noted that the fundamental purpose of the policy is to ensure that a clear framework for arming security officials – for specific purposes and under specific circumstances – is in place, thereby ensuring accountability via a rigorous approval process. USG, UNDSS emphasized that the goal of the policy was not to facilitate a proliferation of firearms across around the world as this would be contrary to the UN’s principles and would undoubtedly hinder its day-to-day work in a vast majority of duty stations.
47. Subsequently, eight additional members expressed support for the draft policy, with multiple members recognizing that it represents a major improvement over having no policy at all, particularly after having personally witnessed security officials armed in the field. Multiple members conditioned such support, however, on confirming that individual UNSMS organisations are not *obligated* to arm their respective security officials. In this regard, a representative of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) noted that, in general, UNSMS policies require endorsement by HLCM and approval by the CEB, but non-mandatory elements of a policy or a non-mandatory policy need not require such endorsement or approval.

48. Multiple members requested additional time to submit the draft policy to their respective policy and legal units for review. One member suggested excluding CSAs/COS/CSO's from being armed in particular. A second member suggested adding a clause permitting the use of firearms in self-defense.
49. In concluding the lengthy discussion, USG, UNDSS noted that a general consensus existed in support of the need for a policy, while noting the need to ensure that the policy is indeed specific and limited in nature. He requested all IASMN members to submit critical feedback on the draft policy, in writing, to the IASMN Secretariat (i.e. UNDSS/PPCU) within two weeks.

RECOMMENDATION:

50. **The IASMN agreed, in principle, that there is a need to have a policy governing the arming of security officials; however, some members expressed strong reservations for some elements contained within the draft policy.**
51. **The IASMN agreed to submit critical feedback on the draft policy to the IASMN Secretariat (i.e. UNDSS/PPCU) within two weeks for further consideration.**

G. Update: Physical Security

52. UNDSS/DHSS provided a brief update to the IASMN, via VTC from New York, on efforts to bolster UNDSS' physical security capacity. In this regard, UNDSS/DHSS noted that additional posts would soon be coming on-board and that a community of practice had been launched in order to strengthen knowledge management with respect to physical security. Moreover, UNDSS/DRO workshops in multiple duty stations will be covering various aspects of physical security. Finally, UNDSS/DHSS noted that blast assessment capacity is being reviewed, with a view to strengthening such capacity in the near future. In this regard, one member recommended closer coordination and collaboration between the UNDSS/DHSS' Physical Security Unit (PSU) and the WFP-led Blast Assessment Working Group, under the UNDSS-led Premises Guidelines Working Group, in order to ensure synergy between the two.
53. One member echoed support for strengthening such capacity, while adding that his organisation is one of only two UNSMS organisations with this capacity at the moment and thus has been overwhelmed with service requests. In this regard, he urged all IASMN members to ensure that such service requests are routed through the relevant Chief Security Adviser (CSA)/Security Adviser (SA) as well as UNDSS Headquarters.

RECOMMENDATION:

54. **The IASMN called for closer coordination and collaboration between the UNDSS/DHSS' Physical Security Unit (PSU) and the WFP-led Blast Assessment Working Group, under the**

UNDSS-led Premises Guidelines Working Group, in order to ensure synergy between the two.

H. Residential Security Measures (RSMs) (CRP 19)

55. UNDSS/PPCU presented the revised RSM policy, initially approved by the IASMN at its 20th session in June 2014, for final review following the incorporation of feedback from the Human Resources Network (HRN). UNDSS/PPCU also presented the draft RSM guidelines for approval.
56. One member began the discussion by taking issue with paragraph 22, noting that the Chief Security Adviser (CSA)/Security Adviser (SA) should always be responsible for conducting an on-site visit to the residence. In response, UNDSS/DRO as well as USG, UNDSS noted that some duty stations (e.g., Nairobi) have thousands of personnel and it would be onerous to require UNDSS to conduct an on-site visit to every residence before or after RSMs have been installed. Therefore, it was agreed that the term “whenever feasible” would be inserted in the paragraph. With respect to the guidelines, the same member volunteered to share his organisation’s residential safety and security survey for possible incorporation into the survey found in the existing guidelines.
57. One member took issue with paragraph 16(a), noting that parent organisations should not always be expected to provide their personnel – or, alternatively, direct their personnel – to RSM-compliant housing when the length of one’s deployment does not justify obtaining a residence at the duty station. For example, in a pandemic, personnel may be required to change residences every few weeks, thus making such a requirement impractical. In response, it was agreed to add the term, “shall, whenever feasible” prior to the term “ensure” in paragraph 16 (a).
58. One member took issue with paragraph 16(b), stressing that it is absolutely critical for any mandatory residential security measures be applicable to renters and owners alike. Other members and observers echoed similar sentiments, including one member who noted that owners constituted a small percentage of those receiving RSMs and one observer who denounced the emergence of a “cost-containment culture” within the Organisation. However, other members agreed with the argument that the Organisation should not provide owners with a “capital investment” on their residential properties through the installation of security enhancements in or around their residences (i.e. “cost-based elements”). OLA, in its capacity as observer, noted that this particular issue was discussed at length within OLA and it was determined that, indeed, any residential security measures deemed *mandatory* for renters, such measures should also be *mandatory* for owners under the “equal treatment” principle, although OLA was unaware of any legal dispute regarding RSMs having been submitted to the UN Dispute Tribunal. If the policy were to be mandatory, and if renters were to be reimbursed for all or part of the cost, then the “equal treatment” principle should apply equally to owners. This would also require deleting or altering paragraph 21 as currently stated (i.e. requirement to submit a copy of one’s lease

in order to obtain RSMs) and other, minor edits within the policy. In this regard, it was agreed that paragraph 16(b) should be altered to reflect equal treatment for renters and owners alike. It was also agreed that paragraph 21 should be deleted altogether, with the IASMN identifying human resources officers or specialists of each UNSMS organisation (i.e. through the Human Resources Network (HRN)) as best positioned to determine the financial and implementation modalities with regard to RSMs and to detail such modalities in their own policies.

59. One member questioned how the RSM policy would cut down on cost. In this regard, UNDSS/PPCU noted that the policy provides a strict framework for recommending, approving, and ultimately installing RSMs at residences, including, but not limited to, barring the Designated Official (DO)/Security Management Team (SMT) from recommending RSMs commonly furnished by owners or lessors at the duty station, creation of an RSM Review Group in cases where no agreement can be reached between UNDSS/DRO and Headquarter Security Focal Points (SFPs), as well as the institution of compliance and oversight mechanisms.
60. One member suggested that a strongly worded statement, emphasizing that residential security is a “shared responsibility” between UNSMS organisations and UNSMS personnel, should be inserted in the Introduction. In this regard, draft language was proposed and subsequently agreed upon by the IASMN on the last day of the session.
61. One member stated that the proposed oversight and compliance mechanisms may create a conflict of interest, whereby Security Management Team (SMT) members recommend a set of mitigation measures from which they directly benefit from. Therefore, the member recommended that this aspect be taken into account when establishing and implementing oversight and compliance mechanisms, suggesting the use of an external, third-party to perform this task.

RECOMMENDATION:

62. **The IASMN approved the Residential Security Measures (RSM) policy, as revised during the session and re-circulated to all IASMN members.**
 63. **The IASMN approved the Residential Security Measures (RSM) guidelines, pending consideration of ILO’s Residential Safety and Security Survey and potential incorporation into the draft guidelines.**
 64. **The IASMN agreed that human resources experts of UNSMS organisations should detail the financial and implementation modalities for RSMs through HRN.**
- I. Residential Security Risks for Locally-recruited UN Personnel (CRP 6)**

65. The Chair of the recently established Technical Working Group (TWG) on Residential Security Risks for Locally-recruited UN Personnel provided a brief update on the progress made by the TWG. The Chair of the TWG touched upon the draft Terms of Reference (TORs), scope of the TWG's work, and the fact that the TWG does not intend to review relocation or evacuation measures for locally-recruited personnel as such measures are already covered under the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual* while remuneration in this context falls under the purview of human resources officers or human resources specialists of individual UNSMS organisations through the Human Resources Network (HRN).

RECOMMENDATION:

66. The IASMN approved the TORs for the TWG on Residential Security Risks for Locally-recruited UN Personnel.

67. The IASMN recommended that the scope of work of the TWG should be limited to reviewing the security risks “associated with locally-recruited personnel at their residence due to their employment with the United Nations (UN), the Agencies, Funds and Programs (AFP) as well as International Organizations (IO) who are members of the UNSMS.”

68. The IASMN took note of the fact that the TWG will not review relocation or evacuation measures for locally-recruited personnel due to natural disasters, armed conflict or any other incidence as this is already covered under the UNSMS Security Policy Manual nor it will review remuneration in this regard as this is considered to be under the purview of the Human Resources Network (HRN).

J. Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group (CRP 5)

69. The Chair of the Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group (SRMIWG) provided an update on the progress made by the working group in relation to the roll-out of the new Security Risk Management (SRM) process and tool. The manual and the policy have been available for input since February 2015. Since that time, the working group has received feedback that the manual's chapter on programme assessment is too theoretical and thus it is being re-drafted to make it more practical for the field, with the most substantive feedback from the field having been received from two workshops in Africa. The Chair of the SRMIWG then demonstrated the e-tool for IASMN members, which had been finalised just prior to the session. Meanwhile, the related training is still being developed; a first draft of the training was put together just prior to the session, but the test questions and related graphics and animations are still being finalized.

70. Over the course of the demonstration, it was made clear that while the methodology was finalized in 2012, the way the methodology is reflected continues to be refined and will likely continue to be refined over the coming years. For example, in determining the “likelihood” of a threat scenario occurring, Security Advisers (SAs) are no longer being

asked to provide an educated guess in this regard, but rather to input a grading of descriptors (i.e. with respect to intent, vulnerability, inhibiting context, and the effectiveness of measures in place), thereby leading to a more “structured subjectivity” than in the past. Such an example highlights the extent to which the SRM process has been refined through the e-tool.

RECOMMENDATION:

71. **The IASMN approved the finalized training for piloting in August-September 2015, which includes a re-wording of the training concept, as requested by the IASMN Steering Group.**
72. **The IASMN approved the finalized e-tool for piloting in August-September 2015.**
73. **The IASMN approved the timeline for rolling out the SRM process and e-tool no later than December 2015, with all countries using the SRM process by December 2016.**
74. **The IASMN took note of the role of the Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group during the roll-out, including the provision of support to all implementing organizations and the collation of inputs for future enhancements and improvements.**

K. Saving Lives Together (SLT) (CRP 3)

75. **UNDSS/DRO provided an overview of the rationale and substantive changes to the revised Saving Lives Together (SLT) Framework carried out by the Saving Lives Together (SLT) Oversight Committee Working Group.**

RECOMMENDATION:

76. **The IASMN approved the revised SLT Framework.**
77. **The IASMN took note of the inclusion of DPKO and UNDP in the SLT Oversight Committee.**

L. Road Safety Strategy (CRP 12)

UNHCR presented on the need for a UNSMS Road Safety Strategy, particularly given the UN’s *Decade of Action* to enhance road safety reducing the numbers of persons killed and injured each year. Many organisations are implementing this initiative, in coordination with host Governments. The Secretary-General recently appointed a Special Envoy for Road Safety, in conjunction with this effort. With respect to road safety, individual UNSMS organisations initiatives are already under development, including in the context of fleet management, safe practices and procedures, and training. The working group should ensure that expertise beyond security, including human resources, fleet management,

occupational health and safety, is included in a way similar to how governments include various components in developing national strategies, ranging from prevention to response.

78. One member began the discussion by stressing the need to stress defensive driving as a key component of driver training. The UN Medical Directors Working Group (UNMDWG), in its capacity as an observer, expressed its concern that many road traffic accidents continue to involve alcohol use, while offering to play a part in formulating an overarching UNSMS Road Safety Strategy, with a focus on addressing this key issue.
79. One member stressed the need for driver training, including with respect to armoured vehicles. There is a need to appreciate the difference in the skills required to drive soft-skinned vehicles relative to armoured vehicles. A second member echoed similar sentiments, while adding that there is a need for security-related, evasive driving techniques, particularly in high-risk environments. The same member also stressed the need to address driver fatigue due to working long hours or traveling extensive distances. A third member noted the need to focus on not only the drivers, but also UNSMS personnel when in vehicles in general.
80. As a way forward, USG, UNDSS called for the establishment of a working group to formulate a strategy and, if necessary, review the existing road safety policy in order to address the issues discussed during the session, but also to tie in the various organisational, governmental, and individual initiatives of UNSMS organisations on this topic.

RECOMMENDATION:

81. **The IASMN approved the establishment of a Road Safety Strategy Working Group in order to formulate a road safety strategy and, if necessary, an umbrella UNSMS policy on road safety. WFP will chair the working group, with DPKO-DFS, IOM, ITU, UNDP, UNDSS, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNMDWG, WHO and the World Bank (WB) serving as members.**

M. Unarmed Private Security Services (UPSS)

82. The Chair of the Unarmed Private Security Services (UPSS) Working Group provided an overview of the rationale for establishing the working group while describing the purpose, scope, definitions, and modalities of work of the working group. The Chair of the UPSS Working Group added that a draft policy and guidelines is expected to be completed over the coming months, along with a survey of the number and types of unarmed private security personnel and services employed or contracted by various UNSMS organisations.
83. USG, UNDSS noted that he himself had met with the Working Group on Mercenaries on numerous occasions and expressed his satisfaction over the level of engagement with the working group and the positive results that such engagement has yielded with respect to

clarifying the Organisation's use of armed private security services. Perhaps unsurprisingly, attention has also turned to the use of *unarmed* private security services and the absence of a policy governing their use. Therefore, the work of the UPSS working group is vital in addressing this absence of policy and, more broadly, in ensuring that due diligence has been undertaken in this regard.

RECOMMENDATION:

84. The IASMN approved the Terms of Reference of the Working Group on UPSS.

85. The IASMN approved the Timeline of the Working Group on UPSS.

N. Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG) (CRP 10)

86. Liaising by VTC, the Chair of the Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG) provided a comprehensive overview of a finalized draft of the Management of Stress and Critical Incident Stress (MSCIS) policy for approval to the IASMN, noting that the input provided by the most recent Steering Group session, held in May 2015, was fully incorporated, along with additional input from individual UNSMS organisations.

87. One member began the discussion by asking why the term "stress" is used as a stand-alone term, in addition to critical incident stress, adding that perhaps stress, or even cumulative stress, does not belong in the same policy as critical incident stress. The Chair of the CISWG responded by noting that all UNSMS Stress Counsellors are generally qualified to engage in both stress and critical incident stress management and that both types of stress fall under the competencies of such individuals. In cases where either the qualifications or resources are not present to deal with one or both types of stress, the policy allows for coordination among CISMU and other UNSMS Stress Counsellors around the world to ensure that any need is met.

88. Another member noted the tremendous work that has gone into the policy and noted that his organisation does, in fact, employ Stress Counsellors capable of managing stress and critical incident stress. In this regard, the member expressed his support for the policy.

89. Another member asked whether headquarter personnel who are sent to highly stressful situations in the field are receiving stress or critical incident stress management upon their return to headquarters. The Chair of the CISWG responded by noting that this policy does, in fact, address this issue by allowing for coordination among CISMU and other UNSMS Stress Counsellors at the headquarter level, in addition to the field, in cases where an organisation's headquarter resources are insufficient to meet demand. Moreover, much attention is now being paid to those returning to the field in the form of follow-up by UNSMS Stress Counsellors who initially provided stress or critical incident stress management.

90. One observer requested that the policy explicitly state that personnel who have suffered stress or critical incident stress not be separated from the Organisation for this reason. The UNMDWG, in its capacity as an observer, responded that no separation should occur in such prior to a formal psychological or medical evaluation of such personnel. The Chair of the CISWG expressed his support for such personnel, but respectfully noted that such an issue would likely fall under the domain of human resources officers or specialists of respective UNSMS organisations and such an explicit statement should be inserted in their own policies. UNDSS/PPCU then stressed that this policy is primarily aimed coordinating the activities of UNSMS Stress Counsellors at the headquarters and field levels amongst themselves and, by extension, security professionals and the Designated Official (DO)/Security Management Team (SMT). However, UNDSS/PPCU noted that the Human Resources Network (HRN) will hold a special workshop on stress management at its next meeting and this point could be raised in that forum.

RECOMMENDATION:

91. The IASMN approved the Management of Stress and Critical Incident Stress (MSCIS) Policy.

O. Budgetary Matters: Jointly Financed Account (JFA)

92. USG, UNDSS presented an overview of the budgetary documents circulated by UNDSS' Executive Office to all IASMN members prior to the session. USG, UNDSS noted that these documents provide a breakdown of headquarter and field staffing levels and operating costs, including vacancy rates within the Department; key budgetary figures; and additional services provided by the Department, among other statistics. USG, UNDSS touched upon the re-costing method employed by the UN Secretariat's Controller, noting that he himself has no power to stop its use.

93. One member began the discussion by expressing his organisation's continued frustration with the re-costing method used by the UN Secretariat's Controller, stressing that such re-costing makes it extremely difficult for his organisation's finance and budget officers to ensure that the resources ultimately committed to security will be available. Other members echoed similar sentiments, with one member stressing that his organisation is bound by a "zero-growth" commitment. USG, UNDSS responded that he has exerted his utmost effort to address the re-costing issue, including meeting with the UN Secretariat's Controller and proposing to keep the budget unchanged, but the response received was that the re-costing method must continue to be employed in accordance with relevant General Assembly resolutions. However, USG, UNDSS reiterated his commitment to zero-growth in the budget once re-costed and allocated to UNDSS, adding that, in some years, savings are actually achieved as the entire allocated amount is not always spent.

94. One member requested a study on options to further decentralize Jointly Financed Account (JFA) posts to the field in order to increase efficiency. The member noted that

UNDSS has ten percent (10%) of its resources at the headquarter level, compared to three to four percent (3-4%) for Agencies, Funds, and Programmes (AFPs). In short, the member requested a justification for each JFA post at UNDSS Headquarters. USG, UNDSS responded by stating that UNDSS, as part of its responsibility to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel, undertakes a constant review of how its resources are allocated around the world. Therefore, no study would be forthcoming, with USG, UNDSS adding that the concentration of JFA posts at the headquarter level is, in fact, similar to AFPs. USG, UNDSS stressed that many posts at the headquarter are, in fact, funded from the UN's core budget (i.e. not the JFA), ranging from the Executive Office to the Policy, Planning, and Coordination Service (PCCS), incorporating the Compliance, Evaluation, and Monitoring Section (CEMS) as well as the Policy, Planning, and Coordination Unit (PPCU).

95. USG, UNDSS continued on to stress that there has been no increase in the JFA budget over the previous biennium, aside from increases directly tied to re-costing. This is despite the increase in demand for surge capacity; such demand (e.g., Yemen) is currently being met within existing resources. While any organisation would appreciate having more resources at its disposal, UNDSS remains committed to its budget, once allocated to the Department. This commitment explains, at least in part, why the Department is seeking to integrate DPKO, DFS, and DPA security resources. Finally, USG, UNDSS noted that the documents circulated to IASMN members at the session detail where and how resources are being spent, including with respect to physical security, hostage incident management, and threat and risk analysis, among other key components of UNDSS' services.
96. One member requested the documents circulated to IASMN members at the session be updated and circulated, in sequence with IASMN and Finance and Budget Network (FBN) sessions, with AFPs involved in a genuine consultative process. The member added that additional clarity on how resources are being spent would go a long way in allowing AFPs to justify existing and future costs to their constituencies and executive heads. Moreover, additional clarity is needed on the role of the FBN and its mandate with respect to the JFA. USG, UNDSS stressed that, unfortunately, the Department currently does not have any additional resources for undertaking a comprehensive study in light of competing priorities. In this regard, USG, UNDSS proposed pooling resources and hiring an external consultant to undertake such a study.
97. The same member continued on to stress the importance of understanding how local cost-shared budgets are being calculated, noting that data showing that such budgets are edging upward. The basis or formula upon which local cost-shared budgets are determined needs to be reviewed and clarified. The member expressed concern that wide gaps (i.e. millions of dollars) often exist between the total, estimated cost of local cost-shared budgets provided by UNDSS and what is actually spent, as estimated by AFPs as data is unavailable in UNSMIN for many countries. In this regard, perhaps a working group or policy is required given previous calls, made by various IASMN members, to examine this issue more comprehensively. Other members expressed support for the creation of a working group to address this issue. USG, UNDSS responded by stating that the concern

was very valid, adding that it is often difficult to calculate the total cost of local cost-shared budgets because such budgets are extremely fragmented, adding that the JFA constitutes only one of multiple sources of funding for various UNSMS organisations, including UNDSS.

98. One member expressed his frustration that the Strategic Review, which was initially requested from UNDSS in 2011, was only completed recently, adding that a 2007 General Assembly resolution required UNDSS to engage with AFPs to clarify JFA spending. The member continued on to state that his own organisation is required to justify the funding it receives from Member States within a timely manner or else it has to return the funding provided. Finally, the member stated additional clarity on the JFA would bring closure to long-standing issues and would avoid having the IASMN second guess the FBN and the FBN having to second guess the IASMN's field priorities (i.e. avoid having each side work in isolation). Another member questioned why a template provided by the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM) has never been used with respect to the budget. UNDSS' Executive Officer responded by noting that this issue was currently being discussed at the FBN's meeting in Montreal, by the Controller and UNDSS Chief Budget Officer, , with the understanding that a formalized, consultative process between the IASMN and the FBN on this issue is required.
99. One member expressed his appreciation for the documents circulated by UNDSS to IASMN members at the session and stated his organisation was happy to accept the budget as it is. He added that UNSMS organisations should, in general, not seek to blame UNDSS for the re-costing method employed neither by the UN Secretariat's Controller nor for their own budgetary constraints; instead, UNSMS organisations should hold internal discussions on how best to deal with the reality of re-costing amid budgetary constraints.
100. The representative for the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), in his capacity as an observer, urged all UNSMS organisations to work with their respective human resources focal points to ensure that their head count figures provided in response to the periodic CEB Census exercises are accurate, as this is the basis upon which UNSMS resources are ultimately cost-shared among member organizations. Secondly, the representative stressed that it is misleading to look at re-costing as a financial issue. Indeed, re-costing is a direct reflection of the reality of inflation and inherent fluctuations in exchange rates. If an organisation says it cannot accept re-costing of a maintenance-level budget, it is, in essence, saying it cannot accept a zero-real growth budget, and is instead advocating for a reduction of such a budget. Such an organisation should, in turn, consider the implications of such a reduction with respect to the substantive delivery of programmes. The same logic would apply to vacancy rates. Nonetheless, the CEB representative stated that the timing at which re-costed amounts are provided creates the main concerns among UNSMS member organizations. Accurate and reliable estimates of re-costed budgets should therefore be provided by UNDSS very early in the budget development process, so that organizations could reliably base their provisions on, without being faced to late and unexpected increases much later on in the process.

RECOMMENDATION:

101. **The IASMN expressed appreciation for the additional budget information provided by UNDSS. However, some IASMN members noted that such information was insufficient. In response, USG, UNDSS requested IASMN members clarify what additional information is required. UNDSS would provide such information to the extent possible. However, if such information could not be provided by UNDSS without external assistance, UNDSS requested that IASMN members fund the recruitment of a consultant to assist in providing such information.**
102. **Other IASMN Members agreed that the information was sufficient but could be presented more holistically. The USG, UNDSS agreed to reformat the presentation of the existing budget information to include information on the global security environment, safety and security services provided, requested budget, as well as where and how the budget would be spent (e.g., posts, operations). The location of international and national posts would also be provided. This was accepted by the IASMN.**
103. **The IASMN expressed substantive support for UNDSS' budget, including operating costs, posts, functions, and services provided, while agreeing that the issue of re-costing should be addressed between the FBN and the Controller.**

P. Gender Considerations in Security Management (CRP 7)

104. UNHCR, in its capacity as Co-Chair of the Gender Considerations in Security Management Working Group provided an overview of the progress made by the working group, including the adoption of a mission statement and revised Terms of Reference (TORs). The Co-Chair noted that various policies have already been channeled through the working group to ensure that such policies have taken gender issues into consideration, including the Framework for Accountability, which will need to be reviewed through a gender lens in its next revision.
105. The Co-Chair of the working group expressed gratitude to UN GLOBE, representing and supporting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and intersex (LGBTI) personnel for their contribution to the working group, in addition to UN Women for administration and logistical support as well as the engagement of their gender specialists.
106. The working group has recognized that there is limited gender awareness and proposed that security professionals be required to familiarize themselves with this issue by taking on-line programmes, developed by UN Women or UNSMS organisations, related to gender awareness. The working group has also developed a tool for improving the management of gender-related incidents by security professionals, including when to brief or examine personnel or consider mitigation measures. The working group is also developing guidelines for security professionals on how to assist UN personnel in the context of a

sexual or gender-based violent incident. Such a role will not replace the roles carried out by staff welfare, stress counselling officers, human resource officers, or other specialists. The working group is proposing a webpage or “tab” on the UN Security Managers Information Network (UNSMIN) and UNDSS website, which would also be linked to travel advisories, in order for personnel to be aware of certain duty stations where gender-based violence, stigmatization of LGBTI personnel, and other serious issues exist. Finally, the need for a support mechanism was discussed, including a “specialist unit” responsible for survivor support within the UNSMS. The Co-Chair of the working group concluded by noting that the working group intends to present a formal policy and guidelines for review by the 23rd session of the IASMN (February 2016).

107. Multiple members expressed strong support for the work undertaken by the working group. One member urged a review of the agenda, noting that it refers to HIV, which affects both men and women. The same member noted that, under the Safety and Security Incident Recording System (SSIRS), there exists only one category for crimes of a sexual nature. Moreover, there is a general lack of data on such crimes, which would make it difficult to develop region or country-specific travel advisories. The Co-Chair of the working group responded by stating that this issue is currently under discussion within the working group, noting that more detailed or categorized data would need to also respect confidentiality of personnel. However, it may be possible to work with UNSMS Stress Counsellors in gathering such data going forward.
108. Another member stated that cultural issues need to be understood by personnel prior to any deployment. On a separate note, the same member urged any policy and guidelines be based on best practices.
109. One observer stressed the importance of distinguishing between gender-based violence and homophobic actions, adding that UNAIDS has a programme in this regard that the working group may wish to rely upon going forward.

RECOMMENDATION:

110. **The IASMN approved the Mission Statement and changes made to the TOR tasks.**
111. **The IASMN took note of the comments on the Framework of Accountability (FoA) by Gender Focal Points; IASMN members will consider incorporating such comments in the next revision of the UNSMS FoA and FoA of individual UNSMS organisations.**
112. **The IASMN took note of the recommendation that, while developing or revising UNSMS policies, the IASMN convene ad-hoc gender review panels made up of gender experts from UNSMS organisations to advise throughout the process.**

113. **The IASMN recognised the need for a UNSMS Gender Policy and requested the working group to draft such a policy for review, in addition to the guidelines under development and a concept paper on a specialist support unit.**
114. **The IASMN approved the awareness tool, “Gender Based Security Threats and Potential Incidents.”**
115. **The IASMN recommended that a “Gender” page or tab be added to the UNSMIN and UNDSS websites as a repository for gender-specific agency programmes, documents, advice, etc., while recommending that the working group identify who shall be responsible for maintaining this page or tab.**
116. **The IASMN recommended that the UNDSS Travel Advisory include a gender specific section.**
117. **The IASMN strongly encouraged all security professionals to take the “I Know Gender” online programme or their organisation’s equivalent programme with respect to gender awareness.**

Q. IASMN and ICT Effort on Identity Management (CRP 16)

118. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), represented by Mr. Drew Donovan and Mr. Anders Norsker (Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Network) provided an update on the progress made by the Joint ICT Network/IASMN Working Group on Global Identity Management Standards.
119. ITU presented a PowerPoint briefing to explain key identity management and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technologies. ITU also presented a short video on the Proof of Concept (PoC) undertaken by ITU and IAEA, which yielded positive results in combining identity management and a PKI Certificate Authority onboard a smartcard in order to gain access to both physical premises and virtual resources (e.g., logging onto a computer).
120. ITU noted that the joint IASMN/ICT Network working group held its first meeting on 18th June 2015; the two Co-chairs were selected: (1) Mr. Anthony O’Mullane, UN-OICT from the ICT Network and; (2) Mr. Drew Donovan, ITU from the IASMN. There are currently twenty-three organisations from both the ICT Network and IASMN involved in evaluating and subsequently recommending standards for a UN-wide identity management system in order to assure interoperability. The working group identified the following three outcomes for September 2015: (1) two standards to be recommended for adoption (i.e. identity management and PKI technologies on one smart card), which would be subsequently implemented by another working group, most likely led by UNDSS; (2) encourage and extension of the Proof of Concept (PoC) to other ongoing projects and locations across the UN system; and (3) establishment of sub-working groups from both the ICT Network and the IASMN in order to draft policies and guidance procedures for

future operations of a “trusted” UN-wide shared Federal approach to ensure interoperability.

121. USG, UNDSS expressed his strong support for the working group’s outcomes and stated that UNDSS/DHSSS will provide coordination and support on behalf of the Department. Two additional members – ICAO and IFAD – agreed to join the working group.

RECOMMENDATION:

122. **The IASMN took note of the update provided by the Joint ICT Network and IASMN Working Group on Global Identity Management Standards and the addition of ICAO and IFAD to the working group.**
123. **The IASMN took note of the working group’s commitment to report back on its final outcomes at the 23rd session of the IASMN (February 2016).**

R. Steering Group Membership (CRP 15)

124. The Director of UNDSS’ Policy, Planning, and Compliance Service (PCCS) summarised the recommendations put forth by the most recent session of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) Steering Group, held in May 2015, with respect to the Steering Group’s membership.

RECOMMENDATION:

125. **The IASMN determined that the existing Terms of Reference (TORs) relating to the IASMN Steering Group, as found under Chapter II, Section D, paragraph 4 of the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual*, are sufficient.**
126. **The IASMN approved a cap of twelve (12) IASMN Steering Group members, including two seats to be occupied on a two-year, rotating basis. The IASMN agreed that IOM and the World Bank would occupy these two seats for the next two years.**

S. Any Other Business (AOB)

a. Update on Implementation of UNDSS Strategic Review

127. One member requested an update on the implementation status of UNDSS’ Strategic Review, noting that some benchmarks have been met, but others may have slipped past their deadlines (e.g., gender strategy, DRO internal review). USG, UNDSS provided a comprehensive update on the progress made on the UNDSS priorities for 2015: compliance has moved towards an evaluation framework; training has prioritized its functions; UNDSS will soon launch its client survey; each Division, Section, or Unit of the Department has submitted a “fit-for-purpose” evaluation; UNDSS/DHSSS is moving forward in developing a

pass ID strategy in order to address long queues at major events, among other issues; progress is being made by the HLCM High-level Working Group on Duty of Care in identifying key duty of care issues in five high-risk environments; the Justice Registry Working Group (JRWG) is progressing with the development of a mechanism to follow-up on serious crimes and acts of violence committed against UN personnel; and, finally, with respect to UNDSS/DRO, the division's regional desks will continue its realignment, with proper allocation of resources to regions such as the Middle East and Africa. On this point, multiple members requested UNDSS/DRO to formally incorporate Agencies, Funds, and Programmes (AFPs) with surge capacities within their surge responses. UNDSS/DRO agreed and stated that it would provide a formal update on the realignment of its regional desks at the next IASMN Steering Group session (November 2015).

128. The same member requested that an update on the implementation of UNDSS' Strategic Review be made a standing item on the agenda for IASMN Steering Groups and IASMN Sessions going forward. USG, UNDSS recalled that the Strategic Review had been finalized and endorsed by the IASMN. He then noted that the recommendations were accepted and endorsed by the Policy Committee, which was chaired by the Secretary-General. In this regard, the Strategic Review has been completed and its recommendations are being implemented. On a separate note, the member asked whether any review of the UNSMS would occur in the foreseeable future (i.e. whether the UNSMS, as a whole, is "fit-for-purpose"). In response, USG, UNDSS noted that his Department will await the outcomes of the Joint Inspection Unit's report in this regard. Finally, the member suggested developing a "reading list" for security professionals.

b. UNDSS Framework of Accountability

129. One member raised the fact that the Framework of Accountability calls upon each "agency" in the UNSMS to develop its own, internal framework of accountability, adding that UNDSS should not be exempt from this requirement. In response, UNDSS/PPCU noted that the roles and responsibilities of UNDSS, including specific divisions, offices, and units, as well as positions, are outlined in various legislative documents of the Organisation. Upon the request of UNDSS/PPCU, a majority of participants responded that they have an internal framework for accountability. USG, UNDSS noted the recent completion of the Department's Strategic Review, further detailed the structure of the Department and the roles and responsibilities of various actors. While USG, UNDSS did not rule out the development of a formal framework of accountability in the future, the existing documents made available to all UNSMS organisations, combined with the competing priorities of the Department, curb any urgency in developing such a framework over the coming months.

130. On a separate, but related note, another member offered to circulate their latest, internal framework of accountability with all IASMN members, which places a greater emphasis on personal responsibility for safety and security, in line with the concept that safety and security is a "shared responsibility" among personnel and their respective parent organisations.

c. UNSMS Outreach to Local Host Government Authorities

131. One member suggested the UNSMS, led by UNDSS, strengthen its outreach efforts to host Government authorities (i.e. local police, military, gendarmerie units), explaining the Organisation's work in the context of safety and security. Another member echoed similar sentiments, recalling his experience in conducting outreach to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops in Bosnia and the positive results in yielded in explaining to them his organisation's work, particularly with the local civilian population. In response, USG, UNDSS has said outreach efforts thus far have existed primarily at the Member State level and that he has been personally engaged in this effort. USG, UNDSS added that while broader outreach efforts may be possible in the future, existing resources are dedicated to strengthening outreach at the Member State level as well as internally within the UNSMS. This includes a focused outreach to female personnel, in an effort to not only increase the number of female personnel in UNDSS and the broader UNSMS in general, but also to ensure that such personnel find the work environment remains welcoming at all times.

d. UNFPA Security Application

132. UNFPA advised that two members of the agency's staff who had attended the UNICEF Female Security Training had developed a concept note for the development of a security application for UNSMS female personnel, with the aim of increasing access to security information and advisories for such personnel. After a brief, internal review of the concept note, UNFPA was of the opinion that the security application would benefit all UNSMS personnel, not just female personnel. The app also covers aspects of the discussion held earlier by the Working Group on Gender Considerations in Security Management as well as with ITU's project for streamlining the UN identification project. UNFPA invited input from IASMN members in the development of a UN system-wide security application, with, UNDSS agreeing to coordinate with UNFPA in this regard.

e. Nomination of IASMN and IASMN Steering Group Co-Chair

133. The IASMN nominated IOM (Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison) as the new IASMN and IASMN Steering Group Co-Chair for the next two years. The IASMN congratulated ITU's Mr. Drew Donovan for his serving as the IASMN and IASMN Steering Group Co-Chair since 2013 and his dedication and commitment to enhancing the safety and security of UNSMS personnel in this capacity.

f. IASMN calendar of meetings

134. With regard to venue and dates, the IASMN approved the following calendar:

- **11-12 November 2015:** IASMN Steering Group Session in Arusha, Tanzania with ICTR as host (note: after the session, this issue was revisited and it was

decided, by direct correspondence, that the venue will move to Nairobi, Kenya, and a host is being sought)

- **2-4 February 2016:** 23rd IASMN Session in New York, United States of America (host: TBD)
- **11-12 May 2016:** IASMN Steering Group Session in Paris, France (host: UNESCO)
- **21-23 June 2016:** 23rd IASMN Session in Montreux, Switzerland (host: IOM)
- **9-10 November 2016:** IASMN Steering Group Session in New York, United States of America (host: TBD)

T. Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) Side Event

135. On Monday, 22 June 2015, some IASMN members attended two presentations by the JIU: (1) JIU Review of Safety and Security in the United Nations System: “Findings from field missions;” and (2) JIU Review of Safety and Security in the United Nations System: Areas for Discussion (Annexes D and E, respectively).
136. The first presentation was led by Mr. Bill Masters, an external consultant hired by JIU to identify different practices and challenges of the UNSMS in East Africa (i.e. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda) in October 2014. Overall, Mr. Masters found UNSMS practices to be fragmented, with no apparent standardization in training. For example, in Entebbe, Mr. Masters found well-designed security features in place, with well-training locally-recruited security personnel maintaining a clear line of sight. In other duty stations, however, security features were not being used as intended and a fatalistic attitude was observed. Mr. Masters stressed the need to ensure that security personnel can deploy effective countermeasures to any attack within two seconds. He also stressed the importance of standardizing and improving training across the board, while ensuring three layers of security.
137. In the discussion that followed, USG, UNDSS stressed the importance of maintaining a “security culture” as well as strengthening oversight and compliance. One member stated that UNDSS/DRO Desk Officers should play a greater role in this regard. A second member stated that the “headquarters” or “capital” mentality in-country was hurting the Organisation in this regard. A third member admitted that while the UNSMS may be fragmented to a large extent, this fragmentation is inherent as accountability rests on the shoulders of 53 UNSMS organisations. The member continued on to identify resource and authority allocation as the real weakness, whereby greater coordination is required to overcome existing misallocations.
138. The second presentation was led by Inspector Jorge Theresin Flores Callejas. The presentation was largely aimed at fostering discussions among IASMN members. In this regard, one member called for a greater promotion of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel as a legal basis for enhancing the safety and

security of UN personnel. Another member lamented the lack of information sharing and communication among various UNSMS organisations. In this regard, USG, UNDSS noted the dearth of Security Threat Information (STI) and the reality that, often times, capability outstrips capacity. Moreover, STI doesn't exist in isolation; there needs to be a convergence of security with the political and economic environment.

139. One member highlighted the need to ensure that security personnel are appropriately trained in various aspects, commensurate with their roles and responsibilities, including the use of first-aid kits, emergency trauma bags (ETBs), and communication equipment, in addition to advanced safety and security techniques. Another member stressed the need for uniformed pass IDs and the increased use of technology (e.g., smart cards) with respect accessing physical premises as well as virtual platforms. Finally, multiple members called for fully incorporating security concerns into broader, Organisational initiatives (e.g., Organizational Resilience Management System, Crisis Management) as well as the need to address long-standing budgetary concerns. In the end, the JIU stated that it will share its preliminary report with UN organisations prior to its submission to the General Assembly.

*****END OF FINAL REPORT*****

Annex A: Agenda

Tuesday, 23 June 2015:

- 0900 – 0915 Welcome, Opening Remarks, Adoption of the Agenda (USG, UNDSS)
- 09:15 – 09:30 Welcoming Address by Ambassador Jürg Lauber, Head of United Nations and International Organisations Division of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.
- 0930 – 0945 CSA for Switzerland (Andre Bouchard, UNOG/DSS/SSS) Security Briefing
- 0945 – 1100 Global Security Developments (USG, UNDSS)
- Integration of DPKO, DFS and DPA security resources (USG, UNDSS)
 - Crisis Management (DRO)
- 1100 – 1130 *(ITU to also provide sundry info to participants) Break*
- 1130 – 1300 Recommendations of the 17 January 2014 attack in Kabul, Afghanistan BOI (DRO)
- 1300 – 1400 *Lunch*
- 1400 – 1530 Updates
- HLCM Working Group on Duty of Care (PPCU)*
 - Justice Registry (DPCCS)*
 - Programme Criticality (OCHA)*
- 1530 – 1600 *Break*
- 1600 – 1730 Update DHSSS (DHSSS by VTC)
- Policy on Arming of Security Professionals
 - Update on Physical Security
- 1730 *End of Day*

Wednesday, 24 June 2015:

- 0900 – 1030 Residential Security Measures (RSMs) (PPCU)
- Residential Security for Locally- Recruited Personnel (IOM, UNHCR)
- 1030 – 1100 *Break*
- 1100 – 1300 Security Risk Management (SRM) (OCHA)
- 1300 – 1400 *Lunch*
- 1400 – 1500 Saving Lives Together (DRO)
- 1500 – 1600 Road Safety (PPCU, UNHCR)
- 1600 – 1630 *Break*
- 1630 – 1730 Policy on Critical Incident Stress Management (CISMU by VTC)
- 1730 *End of Day*
- 18:00 – 20:00 **Montreux Riviera Convention Bureau, sponsored evening excursion – social event for the participants**

Thursday, 25 June 2015:

- 0900 – 1000 Working Groups updates
- Gender Considerations in Security Management (WFP)
 - Unarmed Private Security Services (DPKO-DFS)
- 1000 – 1030 *Break*
- 1030 – 1130 Budgetary Matters: Jointly Financed Account (JFA) (USG, UNDSS)
- 1130 – 1230 IASMN and ICT efforts on Identity Management (ITU)
- 1230 – 1330 *Lunch*
- 1330 – 1430 IASMN Steering Group Membership (DPCCS)
- 1430 – 1500 *Break*
- 1500- 1700 Any Other Business
- Next meetings (USG, UNDSS)

* Updates on these subject items were distributed through Conference Room Papers (CRPs) and were not formally discussed by the IASMN in the interest of time.

Annex B: List of Participants

Chair
Co-Chair
Secretary

Mr. Peter Drennan (UNDSS)
Mr. Drew Donovan (ITU)
Ms. Florence Poussin (UNDSS)

Agencies, Funds and Programmes and Other Entities of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS)

Asian Development Bank (ADB)	Mr. Andy Clinton
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	Mr. Piergiorgio Trentinaglia*
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Mr. Casper Oswald
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)	Mr. Michael Romero
International Court of Justice (ICJ)	Mr. Maarten Daman
International Criminal Court (ICC)	Mr. Lassi Kuusinen
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	Ms. Sarah M. Kilemi
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)	Ms. Bonnie Adkins
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	Ms. Christiano de Santis
International Labour Organization (ILO)	Mr. Philippe Franzkowiak*
International Money Fund (IMF)	Mr. Charlie Gleichenhaus Mr. Jan Van Hecke
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison*
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)	Mr. Drew Donovan*
United Nations AIDS (UNAIDS)	Mr. Peter Koopmans
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Ms. Nancy Osborne*
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Mr. Luc Vandamme*
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	Ms. Mary Mone*

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Mr. Michael Dell'Amico*
Ms. Julie Dunphy
Mr. Harry Richard Leefe

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

Mr. Guillermo Jimenez*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Ms. Dagmar Thomas*

United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON)

Mr. Peter Marshall*

United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)

Mr. Arve Skog*

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

Mr. Naqib Noory*

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

Mr. Mark Gibb*

United Nations Volunteers (UNV Bonn)

Mr. Svend Amdi Madsen

UN Women

Mr. Paul O'Hanlon*

World Bank (WB)

Mr. Jeffrey Culver
Mr. Derek Michael Erkkila

World Food Programme (WFP)

Mr. Christophe Boutonnier*

World Health Organization (WHO)

Mr. Patrick Beaufour*

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)

Mr. Dennis Murathaty*

UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)

Mr. Jose Blanch

Departments of the United Nations Secretariat/Subsidiary Organizations of the Security Council/Inter-Agency Bodies

Department of Field Support and Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DFS/DPKO)

Mr. Adriaan Bezuidenhout*

Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)

Mr. Peter Drennan
Ms. Menada Wind-Andersen*
Mr. Igor Mitrokhin*
Mr. Craig Harrison*
Ms. Florence Poussin*
Mr. M. Samer Budeir*

Department of Political Affairs (DPA)

Ms. Yasmin Fadlu-Deen*

Office for the Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	Mr. Simon Butt
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)	Mr. Abraham Mathai*
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	Mr. Christopher Stretton

Observers

Coordinating Committee of International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations System (CCISUA)	Mr. Gordon Brown Mr. Alberto Cabeia Chys
Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)/ High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM)	Mr. Remo Lalli
Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)/ Security and Safety Service (SSS)	Mr. Andre Bouchard*
Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations (FICSA)	Mr. Jason Sigurdson
Human Resources Network (HRN) Secretariat	Mr. Pieter Kraakman
Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)	Mr. Luke Mhlaba
United Nations International Civil Servants Federation (UNISERV)	Mr. Eusebio Leon-Aponte
United Nations Medical Directors Working Group (MDWG)	Dr. Jacqueline Hardiman

Logistical Support

International Telecommunications Union (ITU)	Mr. Mohammad Althaher Ms. Ilijana Cvetkovic
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*Attended Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) Side Event, held on Monday, 22 June 2015 from 9:30 to 13:00 at the Eurotel Montreux. The JIU Side Event was led by Inspector Jorge Theresin Flores Callejas, with support provided by the JIU Secretariat (Mr. Jesús Lara Alonso, *Senior Evaluation and Inspection Officer* and Ms. Mamiko Yukawa, *Evaluation and Inspection Officer*) and Mr. Bill Masters, in his capacity as a Consultant to the JIU.

Annex C: Summary of IASMN Recommendations

1. **Integration of DPKO, DFS, and DPA Security Resources**
 - a. The IASMN agreed that a unified communique, signed by all four concerned USGs (i.e. USG, UNDSS, two USGs of DPKO-DFS, and USG, DPA) should be circulated among all concerned personnel so as to inform them of the progress made thus far and the timeline leading up to implementation.
2. **Crisis Management (CRP 18)**
 - a. The IASMN approved the establishment of a dedicated working group to draft a UNSMS policy on *Safety and Security Crisis Management in the Field*; the working group will be chaired by UNDSS, with DPA, ICJ, IOM, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, and UNICEF serving as members.
 - b. The IASMN took note of UNDSS' development of a Crisis Management Training Programme, with support from various UNSMS organisations, who shall confirm such support with UNDSS/PPCU as soon as possible.
3. **Recommendations of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) Report on the 17 January 2014 Attack in Kabul, Afghanistan (UNDSS/DRO) (CRP 13)**
 - a. The IASMN took note of the BOI Report on Kabul and its recommendations.
 - b. The IASMN took note the Implementation Plan, including its recommendations pertaining to the UNSMS
 - c. The IASMN approved a review of best practices for ensuring the mandatory implementation of BSITF and ASITF, including linking the approval of official business travel requests to the timely completion of BSITF and ASITF through the Travel Request Information Processing (TRIP) system, and to capture lessons learned in this regard.
 - d. The IASMN called on UNDSS to consider mechanisms for addressing non-compliance with UMSMS policies.
4. **Policy on Arming of Security Professionals (CRP 14)**
 - a. The IASMN agreed, in principle, that there is a need to have a policy governing the arming of security officials; however, some members expressed strong reservations for some elements contained within the draft policy.
 - b. The IASMN agreed to submit critical feedback on the draft policy to the IASMN Secretariat (i.e. UNDSS/PPCU) within two weeks for further consideration.
5. **Update: Physical Security**
 - a. The IASMN called for closer coordination and collaboration between the UNDSS/DHSSS' Physical Security Unit (PSU) and the WFP-led Blast Assessment Working Group, under the UNDSS-led Premises Guidelines Working Group, in order to ensure synergy between the two.

6. Residential Security Measures (RSMs) (CRP 19)

- a. The IASMN approved the Residential Security Measures (RSM) policy, as revised during the session and re-circulated to all IASMN members.
- b. The IASMN approved the Residential Security Measures (RSM) guidelines, pending consideration of ILO's Residential Safety and Security Survey and potential incorporation into the draft guidelines.
- c. The IASMN agreed that human resources experts of UNSMS organisations should detail the financial and implementation modalities for RSMs through HRN.

7. Residential Security Risks for Locally-recruited UN Personnel (CRP 6)

- a. The IASMN approved the TORs for the TWG on Residential Security Risks for Locally-recruited UN Personnel.
- b. The IASMN recommended that the scope of work of the TWG should be limited to reviewing the security risks "associated with locally-recruited personnel at their residence due to their employment with the United Nations (UN), the Agencies, Funds and Programs (AFP) as well as International Organizations (IO) who are members of the UNSMS."
- c. The IASMN took note of the fact that the TWG will not review relocation or evacuation measures for locally-recruited personnel due to natural disasters, armed conflict or any other incidence as this is already covered under the UNSMS Security Policy Manual nor it will review remuneration in this regard as this is considered to be under the purview of the Human Resources Network (HRN).

8. Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group (CRP 5)

- a. The IASMN approved the finalized training for piloting in August-September 2015, which includes a re-wording of the training concept, as requested by the IASMN Steering Group.
- b. The IASMN approved the finalized e-tool for piloting in August-September 2015.
- c. The IASMN approved the timeline for rolling out the SRM process and e-tool no later than December 2015, with all countries using the SRM process by December 2016.
- d. The IASMN took note of the role of the Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group during the roll-out, including the provision of support to all implementing organizations and the collation of inputs for future enhancements and improvements.

9. Saving Lives Together (SLT) (CRP 3)

- a. The IASMN approved the revised SLT Framework.
- b. The IASMN took note of the inclusion of DPKO and UNDP in the SLT Oversight Committee.

10. Road Safety Strategy (CRP 12)

- a. The IASMN approved the establishment of a Road Safety Strategy Working Group in order to formulate a road safety strategy and, if necessary, an umbrella UNSMS policy on road safety. WFP will chair the working group, with DPKO-DFS, IOM, ITU, UNDP, UNDSS, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNMDWG, WHO and the World Bank (WB) serving as members.

11. Working Group Updates: Unarmed Private Security Services (UPSS)

- a. The IASMN approved the Terms of Reference of the Working Group on UPSS.
- b. The IASMN approved the Timeline of the Working Group on UPSS.

12. Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG) (CRP 10)

- a. The IASMN approved the Management of Stress and Critical Incident Stress (MSCIS) Policy.

13. Budgetary Matters: Jointly Financed Account (JFA)

- a. The IASMN expressed appreciation for the additional budget information provided by UNDSS. However, some IASMN members noted that such information was insufficient. In response, USG, UNDSS requested IASMN members clarify what additional information is required. UNDSS would provide such information to the extent possible. However, if such information could not be provided by UNDSS without external assistance, UNDSS requested that IASMN members fund the recruitment of a consultant to assist in providing such information.
- b. Other IASMN members agreed that the information was sufficient but could be presented more holistically. The USG, UNDSS agreed to reformat the presentation of the existing budget information to include information on the global security environment, safety and security services provided, requested budget, as well as where and how the budget would be spent (e.g., posts, operations). The location of international and national posts would also be provided. This was accepted by the IASMN.
- c. The IASMN expressed substantive support for UNDSS' budget, including operating costs, posts, functions, and services provided, while agreeing that the issue of re-costing should be addressed between the FBN and the Controller.

14. Gender Considerations in Security Management (CRP 7)

- a. The IASMN approved the Mission Statement and changes made to the TOR tasks.
- b. The IASMN took note of the comments on the Framework of Accountability (FoA) by Gender Focal Points; IASMN members will consider incorporating such comments in the next revision of the UNSMS FoA and FoA of individual UNSMS organisations.
- c. The IASMN took note of the recommendation that, while developing or revising UNSMS policies, the IASMN convene ad-hoc gender review panels made up of gender experts from UNSMS organisations to advise throughout the process.
- d. The IASMN recognised the need for a UNSMS Gender Policy and requested the working group to draft such a policy for review, in addition to the guidelines under development and a concept paper on a specialist support unit.

- e. The IASMN approved the awareness tool, “Gender Based Security Threats and Potential Incidents.”
- f. The IASMN recommended that a “Gender” page or tab be added to the UNSMIN and UNDSS websites as a repository for gender-specific agency programmes, documents, advice, etc., while recommending that the working group identify who shall be responsible for maintaining this page or tab.
- g. The IASMN recommended that the UNDSS Travel Advisory include a gender specific section.
- h. The IASMN strongly encouraged all security professionals to take the “I Know Gender” online programme or their organisation’s equivalent programme with respect to gender awareness.

15. IASMN and ICT Effort on Identity Management (CRP 16)

- a. The IASMN took note of the update provided by the Joint ICT Network and IASMN Working Group on Global Identity Management Standards and the addition of ICAO and IFAD to the working group.
- b. The IASMN took note of the working group’s commitment to report back on its final outcomes at the 23rd session of the IASMN (February 2016).

16. Steering Group Membership (CRP 15)

- a. The IASMN determined that the existing Terms of Reference (TORs) relating to the IASMN Steering Group, as found under Chapter II, Section D, paragraph 4 of the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual*, are sufficient.
- b. The IASMN approved a cap of twelve (12) IASMN Steering Group members, including two seats to be occupied on a two-year, rotating basis. The IASMN agreed that IOM and the World Bank would occupy these two seats for the next two years.