

**Inter-Agency Security Management Network  
20<sup>th</sup> Session - Montreux, Switzerland  
24 to 27 June 2014**

**FINAL REPORT**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) held its 20<sup>th</sup> regular session in Montreux, Switzerland from 24 to 27 June 2014. A list of participants is attached as Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by the IASMN is attached as Annex B.
2. Participants were welcomed by Mr. Kevin Kennedy, Acting Head of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), who chaired the meeting. The Chair began the meeting by introducing Ambassador Jürg Lauber, Head of the United Nations and International Organisations Division of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, who provided opening remarks to the IASMN. Ambassador Lauber began his opening remarks by welcoming the IASMN to Montreux on behalf of the Swiss Government. He then noted that the dangers faced by staff members of international organisations have changed dramatically over the years. He recalled that, as a peacekeeper in Namibia twenty five years ago, the most immediate safety and security concern was road accidents. In more recent years, however, staff members of international organisations have come to be viewed as targets in various locations, in direct violation of international law. Ambassador Lauber noted that the safety and security of staff was not only the concern of international organisations, but also of host Member States, including Switzerland. He noted that Switzerland is home to 35 international organisations and hosts 3,000 international meetings and conferences every year, with 220,000 delegates, including 3,000 ministers, in attendance. As a result, the Swiss government has spent significant sums of money on security in an effort to provide the safest conditions for staff of international organisations. Ambassador Lauber concluded his remarks by thanking the IASMN for coming to Montreux and stating his desire to see the IASMN back in Montreux following what he hoped would be a fruitful session.
3. Upon the conclusion of Ambassador Lauber's opening remarks, the Chair provided an overview of some of the topics to be discussed at the meeting, beginning with the Strategic Review. The Chair noted that, nine years after the Baghdad bombing, which precipitated the formation of the department, UNDSS was in need of a comprehensive review with regard to its allocation of resources, tasks and functions, and existing gaps in security that were unforeseen in 2005. The Chair noted that the security and threat environment today is worse than it was in 2005 and has worsened exponentially since 2010. In 2010, UNDSS was tackling only five security-related crises. While these crises have remained (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan), UNDSS has also had to tackle emerging crises in the Central African Republic, Mali, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen,

among others. Thus a comprehensive review is warranted in order to confirm the department's principles (e.g. "stay and deliver") while addressing the question of what can be improved, changed, added, or dropped. UNDSS' Strategic Review is timely given the High-Level Committee on Management's decision, to review whether the Organisation is providing sufficient support to its staff members in line with its duty of care.

4. Apart from the Strategic Review, the Chair noted that the IASMN would discuss the question of UNSMS membership, adding that seven organisations are currently seeking to clarify their relationship with the UNSMS or, alternatively, benefit from some or all of its services. In this regard, the Chair urged the IASMN to clarify the privileges and obligations of UNSMS membership. The Chair also cited the Safety and Security Incident Reporting System (SSIRS), Security Risk Management (SRM), Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS), and the Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) as topics to be discussed by the IASMN. With regard to CISM in particular, the Chair noted that, in 2005, the need for stress counselors within the Organisation was not entirely understood; today, however, the need for stress counselors is clear and their deployment has become a standard part of the emergency response package. Separately, the Chair notified the IASMN of the recent establishment of the Justice Registry Working Group (JRWG), which has been tasked with studying ways of ensuring that perpetrators of violent acts against UN personnel in the course of their duties are brought to justice, with a mechanism in place to follow-up with any investigation or prosecution while providing comfort to family members to the extent possible. In this regard, the Chair emphasized the need for comprehensive records of security incidents and a standardized method of reporting casualties within the Organisation. The Chair concluded his opening remarks by calling on IASMN members to engage in a frank and open discussion on all of the issues.

## **II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING**

### **A. Strategic Review (CRP 2)**

5. On 11 February 2014, the Chair established the UNDSS Strategic Review Working Group (SRWG). After almost 10 years in existence, the Department needs to refine the definition of its purpose and functions in light of the expectations that the UN system has of it and in response to the changing security environment globally. In addition, the IASMN has asked UNDSS to conduct such a review in the context of the jointly financed account (JFA) budget and decisions thereon. The goals of the Strategic Review are as follows: (1) identify the primary objectives of UNDSS, towards which all functions and activities delivered should contribute; (2) identify the needs for new functions and activities that UNDSS should commence based on operational needs; (3) align functions and activities so that they all support the overall objectives in a logical way; and (4) examine UNDSS' structure to match the logical alignment of functions and activities.
6. At its last session in May 2014, the IASMN Steering Group was briefed on the progress of the Strategic Review, including the progress so far including the logical realignment of

UNDSS strategic objectives, functions, outputs, and activities. The Steering Group was informed that further work is needed for the finalization of the framework to result in a proper logical structuring of UNDSS to maximize secure programme implementation on the ground. The Steering Group expressed its appreciation for UNDSS' focus on improving field delivery throughout its review process and while agreeing that UNDSS should continue with its Strategic Review ensuring that the broader UNSMS is consulted during its next phase, also looked forward to a written report being provided for the next regular session of the IASMN.

7. The Chair informed the IASMN that the strategic review was a bottom-up review of the tasks and functions carried out by UNDSS, adding that he wished to see a similar review of the entire UNSMS undertaken in the future. While noting that UNDSS is funded by four different revenue streams—core funding, the jointly financed account (JFA), the peacekeeping support account (QSA), and donor funding, the Chair stressed that the review is, at least in its initial phase, de-linked from budgetary concerns. The Chair then emphasized that a review is warranted at this time in light of the significant change in the global security environment, coupled with how the UN operates on the ground (i.e. “stay and deliver” approach). He cited one example in the past where the UN had withdrew all of its staff members from the country for six months due to the prevailing security situation at the time, adding that such a reaction would be highly unlikely today given the UN's commitment to stay and deliver on the ground, with Syria being the most extreme example. This, of course, has a direct impact on the operations of UNDSS and its security professionals responsible for the safety and security of UN personnel. In this regard, the strategic review aims to clearly map out the tasks and functions of UNDSS as well as its goals in the future, which, in turn, will articulate the need for additional funding and support. The Chair concluded his remarks by attempting to address concerns that the review, once completed, would lead to job losses within the Department, noting that, instead, he anticipated an expansion of the Department given its growing list of duties and responsibilities.
8. UNDSS then provided a formal presentation on the Strategic Review process. UNDSS' Division of Regional Operations (DRO), Field Support Service (FSS), and Executive Office (EO) established the UNDSS SRWG in February 2014. The Strategic Review stretches back to the inception of the Department, capturing the core functions of the Department as prescribed within relevant UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, in addition to subsequent changes within the global security environment that have required the Department to expand upon certain functions, including physical security and surge capacity. A results-based methodology was employed, mapping out all of the functions of the Department and subsequently creating an objective tree based upon the vision of the Department and the needs of stakeholders (i.e. United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS)). In this regard, five, core strategic objectives were identified: (1) in-country operations; (2) support to in-country operations; (3) specialized expertise; (4) leadership role; and (5) administrative role. Functional objectives (i.e. sub-objectives) were also identified down to the output level across all 165 countries (i.e. designated areas) in which UNDSS operates. UNDSS stressed that all of these functional objectives are aimed at strengthening programme delivery at the

country level. The Department will subsequently compare its functions as carried out today with its strategic and functional objectives and allocate its resources accordingly.

9. UNDSS emphasized that it began with a *tabula rasa* (i.e. blank slate) with regard to the Strategic Review, with a commitment to ensuring that the process remained substance-driven rather than number-driven in its initial phase (i.e. objective tree). UNDSS noted that it has consulted nearly 100 individuals at Headquarters and the field with regard to the initial phase. The next step would be for the SRWG to share its metrics after all input has been incorporated, adding that the SRWG expects to receive all input by 15 July 2014. Subsequently, UNDSS would engage in a Structural Review in order to assess whether sufficient resources exist within the department to carry out the tasks and functions identified in the Strategic Review. However, the UNDSS cautioned that any timeframe was subject to change in light of the fact that a new Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security would head UNDSS as of 1 July 2014. UNDSS concluded its remarks by emphasizing that it has sought to ensure a participatory and consultative process from the very beginning, stressing that it had already consulted with various IASMN members during the initial phase and that it intends to consult additional IASMN members as the Strategic Review progresses.
10. Following UNDSS' presentation, one member noted that, despite the general clarity of UNDSS' presentation, the role of UNDSS vis-à-vis host governments was not made clear within the presentation and, more importantly, within the Strategic Review. In this regard, the member stressed that host governments have the primary responsibility to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel, adding that the presentation only contained a single reference on the need for UNDSS to liaise with the host government under certain circumstances. The member stated that, of course, many host governments are unable to meet their responsibility in this regard; nonetheless, such a responsibility should be clearly noted whenever discussing how best to ensure the safe delivery of UN programmes on the ground. The member stressed the need for the Strategic Review to identify who is responsible for ensuring that host governments lend the best possible assistance to the Organisation on the ground (e.g. Designated Official). In this regard, the Chair agreed that the role of UNDSS vis-à-vis host governments needs to be clarified further within the Strategic Review. The Chair added that it is the Designated Official who would usually be responsible for ensuring that host governments lend the best possible assistance to the Organisation on the ground. Separately, the member reiterated his point, previously made at the IASMN Steering Group, with regard to the Strategic Review, whereby function should follow form and not the other way around (i.e. UNDSS should first examine what resources are available to the department moving forward and then prioritise its tasks and functions accordingly).
11. Another member noted his appreciation of UNDSS' willingness to examine all angles with regard to its work vis-à-vis the Strategic Review including reviewing its founding mandate and revising it accordingly based on present and future needs.
12. The member cited UNDSS' vision statement as a "critical starting point" in this regard and called for such a statement to include what AFPs are trying to accomplish on the

ground. The member then repeated a point made at the most recent IASMN Steering Group session, whereby he took issue with use of the word “best” or “optimal” within the proposed vision statement in reference to security risk management; the member explained that security risk management deals with both risks and critical programmes and one cannot simultaneously achieve the “best” or “optimal” result for both at the same time. Instead, one must seek the “best” or “optimal” *balance* between the two — a nuanced point that could be lost on many readers. In this regard, the member suggested that such wording may simply need to be removed. The member continued that UNDSS should determine the best way for AFPs to provide input into the Strategic Review, adding that while they do not constitute the only funding stream, AFPs are nevertheless the consumers of many of UNDSS’ products and services and, in this regard, perhaps a small working group could be established to ensure that UNDSS’ understanding of its own objectives aligns with the understanding of AFPs. Finally, the member noted his appreciation for UNDSS’ desire to remain “above and beyond” budgetary concerns during the initial phase of the Strategic Review, but added that such concerns should be kept in mind moving forward. The member concluded his remarks by expressing his hope that the Strategic Review will be completed before any formal discussion on the budget is held.

13. Another member echoed similar sentiments with regard to UNDSS’ proposed vision statement and, in particular, the need to take into account the various modalities under which AFPs operate, including with regard to acceptable risk. The member also echoed similar sentiments with regard to the budget, adding that although a limit of \$218.6 million was previously agreed upon, the budget was subsequently bumped up to \$234 million, thus creating an issue for the member’s organisation and its executive management in particular.
14. Another member asked to what extent UNDSS’ proposed vision statement reflected the personal vision of the Acting Head of UNDSS (i.e. to what extent is UNDSS’ proposed vision statement based on consensus versus need). Separately, the member echoed the preceding two members in noting the importance of concluding the Strategic Review prior to the start of any formal discussion on the budget as the product of the Strategic Review will drive such a discussion. In this regard, the member sought clarification as to what the actual product will be (e.g. strategic ideas versus suggested staff levels). On a related note, another member inquired as to the expected timeline for such a product.
15. Another member stated that it may not be sufficient for the Strategic Review to simply list UNDSS’ current tasks and functions without also including what UNDSS’ current tasks and functions *should* be. Moreover, any outcomes identified by the Strategic Review should be driving what UNDSS’ tasks and functions should be in the future. In other words, there needs to be a “quality check” with regard to UNDSS’ current tasks and functions in order to formulate a “gold standard” for UNDSS’ tasks and functions. Budgetary constraints can be addressed at a later stage, along with the implications of failing to achieve the “gold standard” as a result of such budgetary constraints.

16. Another member sought to remind the IASMN that is the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) is currently examining safety and security issues on a global scale, with a report due to be released in 18 months. The member expressed concern that the output of the Strategic Review may not align with the subsequent output put forth by the JIU. Similarly, the member expressed concern that the output of the Strategic Review may not align with the output put forth by the current working group examining technology-based security issues. With that said, the member expressed support for the Strategic Review and noted that his organisation was perhaps one of only a few to have “outsourced” their entire operational bloc to UNDSS with regard to security. In this regard, the member stated that he looked forward to providing input to UNDSS in bilateral meetings during the next phase of the Strategic Review.
17. Another member commended UNDSS for enabling the objectives and responsibilities of the department during the initial phase of the Strategic Review. However, the member urged UNDSS to identify gaps and duplications, particularly with regard to technology, as well as the priorities for the department. Moreover, the member stated that greater emphasis should be placed on physical security within the context of the Strategic Review.
18. Another member expressed concern over the fact that not all UNSMS stakeholders have a field presence (i.e. apart from missions or meetings). In this regard, UNDSS should ensure that the input of “two-dimensional” stakeholders is taken into account. A third member sought to distinguish between organisations with a large field presence and organisations with a small field presence, noting that levels of risk faced by the former substantially differ from the levels of risk faced by the latter.
19. Another member commended UNDSS’ most recent focus on “how to deliver” (i.e. rather than “when to leave” or “how to stay”), including within the context of the Strategic Review. The member then emphasized the role of locally-recruited personnel in this regard, while noting that his organisation also employs approximately 30,000 area staff in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria. In this regard, the member noted that such staff should be included in any discussions pertaining to the safety and security of locally-recruited personnel (i.e. even if they fall outside the UNSMS’ definition of locally-recruited personnel), including within the context of the Strategic Review.
20. Another member expressed appreciation for the fact that the Strategic Review was being undertaken absent the occurrence of a tragic event, which often skews the approach of any review. The member noted that her organisation completely relies on UNDSS to provide security expertise to its personnel. The member then expressed hope that UNDSS will take into account those organizations that completely rely on UNDSS for ensuring the security of their personnel within the context of the Strategic Review.
21. One staff federation urged UNDSS to place greater emphasis on the responsibility of host governments to protect UN personnel within the context of the Strategic Review. In this regard, the staff federation noted that standard agreements with host governments, many of which have become obsolete, should be amended to emphasize this responsibility on

the part of host governments. More broadly, the staff federation noted that greater communication between UNDSS and host governments should be emphasized within the context of the Strategic Review, particularly in light of the lessons learned from the 2007 Algiers bombings.

22. One member of UNDSS, speaking in his personal capacity, commended the Department's leadership for launching the Strategic Review, noting that such a review has not occurred since the Department was founded in 2005. The member acknowledged that not all tasks and functions currently carried out by UNDSS are essential to the field and, in this regard, it is important for the Department to ensure that the needs of the field take priority moving forward and to allocate resources accordingly. The member then stressed the importance of working together with AFPs within the context of the Strategic Review, adding that many have, in fact, already been consulted.
23. Another member of UNDSS, speaking on behalf of the Department, predicted that the Strategic Review would be completed by September 2014. With regard to the Structural Review and the broader question of the 2016-2017 budget, the member stated that it is too early to predict the outcome until all input has been received. With regard to the JIU's pending report regarding safety and security worldwide, the member noted that, while its outcome would be important for UNDSS, the report would not be finalized until 2016 and thus should be viewed as impacting the Strategic Review in any way. However, the member cautioned that any deadlines are subject to change given the fact that a new Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security is scheduled to take over in July 2014.
24. The Chair confirmed that it has always been UNDSS' intention to work with AFPs and incorporate their respective input. Moreover, the one of the main goals of the Strategic Review was to clarify the terms of reference for personnel, regardless of their location. The Chair then noted that while he has not micromanaged the Strategic Review, he has worked to ensure that it maintains a high degree of clarity and transparency, with the goal of enabling operations on the ground while providing the highest level of security. The Chair acknowledged that some UNSMS organisations do not maintain a presence in the field, adding that such organisations still benefit from training sessions as well as UNSMS products and services (e.g. TRIP). The Chair agreed with various members who emphasized the need to identify current gaps and not simply list the Department's current tasks and functions. The Chair also agreed with various members who cited the Organisation's duty of care towards its staff, adding that such a duty extends to locally-recruited personnel. The Chair then confirmed the need to clarify the role of host governments and their responsibility to protect UN personnel while also agreeing with the need to capitalize on technological advancements so as to allow the Organisation to better protect its own personnel. More broadly, the Chair expressed his confidence in the Strategic Review, stating that such a review was necessary given the fact that the UN maintains a relatively small security budget while simultaneously operating in some of the most dangerous environments in the world.

25. **The IASMN took note of the progress made on the strategic review and requested continuous involvement in the review, noting that UNDSS intends to complete the review, any proposed changes to UNDSS structure and correlated budgetary aspects for the 2016/2017 biennium by the end of November 2014, subject to concurrence by the new leadership of UNDSS.**
26. **The IASMN further agreed that a preface document is to be prepared to set out the threat environment in which the UN system operates and clearly identifying the gaps in addressing the safety and security of UN personnel.**

#### **B. Information Management (CRP 14)**

27. UNDSS presented a CRP intended to provide the IASMN with an update on the information management activities of the Department. At its last session in May 2014, the IASMN Steering Group took note of this update, including with respect to the Accountability Management Tool, the Staff List System and the use of Geographic Information Systems, and endorsed this update for its presentation to the next regular session of the IASMN. The IASMN was requested to take note of the information contained in the CRP.
28. With regard to the Accountability Management Tool, UNDSS noted that AFPs are now able to manage input in the UNDSS.SMS database by entering personnel with the following security responsibilities: Head of Agency at designated area level (SMT Member), Agency Field Security Advisor (AFSA), Agency Country Office Security Focal Point (ACOSFP), and Agency Local Security Assistant (ALSA). These functional titles provide corresponding levels of access to UNSMIN and an ability to submit input based on one's respective title. With regard to the Staff List System, UNDSS has developed a prototype system to manage staff lists by using the UNSMS personnel profiles. The UNSMS personnel profiles are used in TRIP and the current Safety and Security Incident Reporting System (SSIRS) to capture information on UN personnel. By providing AFP country offices access to these profiles through UNDSS' Website, such offices would be able to generate accurate personnel list, which has historically been a challenge. UNDSS noted that this system was successfully piloted in Panama. With regard to the use of Geographic Information Systems, UNDSS noted that it can now conduct an analysis of personnel travel patterns using security clearance information from TRIP. This provides the UN with an overall picture of UN activities within the given country, which is important for security planning and operations. UNDSS concluded its presentation by stating its willingness to offer Skype or Webinar sessions to any members requiring further assistance at any time.
29. Upon the conclusion of UNDSS' presentation, one member requested a brief demonstration of the Accountability Management Tool while requesting that a similar demonstration be offered at the country level. UNDSS agreed to provide a brief demonstration to any interested IASMN members while promising to package a similar demonstration that would benefit those at the country level.



30. Another member inquired whether it would be possible to incorporate data on individuals who do not fall under the UNSMS' definition of "UN personnel," particularly members of military contingents or formed police units, for the purposes of SSIRS or, alternatively, a justice registry, if ultimately established. UNDSS responded by confirming that data on such individuals could be incorporated, but one would first need to determine what degree of access such individuals should be permitted. Separately, the member inquired as to why TRIP data appeared to show two million trips in the preceding year and whether such a number was accurate. UNDSS noted that the two million "trips" actually constituted two million legs; TRIP breaks down a given trip by the number of legs to ensure that the security clearance requirement has been met for each leg. UNDSS' added that it believed the figure of two million legs was almost certainly an underestimation of the actual number of legs flown by UN personnel.
31. One staff federation asked if it would be possible to send country-wide text messages to staff members. He then asked if it would also be possible to use tracking chips for staff working in a high-risk duty station, particularly in duty stations where kidnapping is common. UNDSS responded that it has not yet developed such capabilities, but noted that one UNSMS organisation has successfully used tracking chips, and was currently working with one organisation in this regard as such chips have already saved lives.
32. Another member asked whether it would be possible to hyperlink core UNSMS documents (e.g. SRA, MOSS,) in various electronic communications for the purposes of convenience, rather than having to dig up and attach such documents each time. UNDSS responded that it would, in fact, be possible moving forward.
33. Another member raised the issue of access rights and to what extent data was protected online. UNDSS responded by assuring the member that, at least with regard to staff lists, only those who require such information (e.g. Country Security Focal Point (CSFP), Head of Agency (HOA)) can access such data.
34. Another member praised the level of detail collected by TRIP, adding that it may be useful in allowing health-related organisations to have information on staff exposed to an infectious disease in the midst of an epidemic. UNDSS responded by stating that it was willing to work with health-related organisations in this regard.
35. Another member stressed the need to ensure the accuracy of UNDSS' data. In this regard, the member urged UNDSS to work with AFPs on the ground to ensure that data is exchanged in a timely manner so as to ensure that it remains up-to-date. Another member echoed a similar sentiment, stating that while UNDSS' information management systems were quite useful, the actual data arguably means little without sufficient data checks for accuracy. UNDSS responded by stating that it is constantly working with UN personnel to ensure data is inserted properly and stressed that while the Department does conduct data checks (e.g. number of profiles in TRIP), with monthly automated reports sent to UN personnel, the level of quality control needs to be strengthened further.

36. **The IASMN took note, with great appreciation, of the information contained in CRP 14.**

### **C. Compliance, Evaluation, and Monitoring Policy (CRP 4)**

37. At its 15th session in June 2011, held at IFAD Headquarters, Rome, the IASMN approved the step-by-step transition of the *Field Security Handbook* (FSH) to the *Security Policy Manual* (SPM). As part of the transition, the IASMN agreed to the development of the UNSMS policy on “Compliance with Security Policies and Procedures” as Chapter V, Section D of the SPM.
38. The purpose of the draft policy is to establish a common policy framework for the evaluation and monitoring of security management programmes and activities to ensure compliance with existing policies and procedures. The policy reaffirms the UNSMS’ commitment regarding the use of evaluation and monitoring in ensuring effective security management and promoting accountability. The policy outlines the framework for the evaluation and monitoring function, the objectives of evaluation and monitoring of security management programmes, and the roles and responsibilities of key security management actors in evaluation and monitoring.
39. At its last session in May 2014, the IASMN Steering Group agreed that it would provide input to UNDSS on the draft policy prior to the next regular session of the IASMN in order that a revised version would be available for the 20th session. The Steering Group also called for a VTC session with interested members prior to the next IASMN regular session in order to establish a framework for the policy’s guidelines, with the expectation that UNDSS would present draft guidelines to the next Steering Group meeting, tentatively scheduled to be held in November 2014.
40. Based on the pertinent comments made by Steering Group members in the May session, the policy includes changes to clarify these main issues: 1) the use of terms for security management “programme” and “activities”; 2) the criteria for selecting duty stations for evaluation; 3) reference to the guidelines to accompany this policy; 4) clarification on the “accountability” in line with the *Framework of Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System*; and 5) the need to focus more on monitoring and evaluation rather than “compliance.”
41. In addition, in line with the Steering Group’s recommendation, UNDSS held a VTC meeting on 6 June 2014 with the participation of interested IASMN Steering Group members (i.e. DPKO-DFS, FAO, UNDP and WHO). The meeting’s purpose was to review the revised draft policy and discuss the framework for guidelines to be developed following approval of the draft policy on “Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring.” Participants in the VTC agreed, in principle, with the revised draft and added inputs on the following main points: UNDSS’ role; clarification on possible resources for the thematic evaluation; the need for response and follow-up by UNSMS actors following the evaluation; and the need to include a reference on the methodologies in implementing this policy, with details in the guidelines which will accompany the policy. The draft

policy as presented to the IASMN as its 20<sup>th</sup> regular session incorporated these main inputs.

42. Regarding the framework for the draft guidelines to be presented to the next Steering Group meeting, UNDSS highlighted to the participants in the above-mentioned VTC the following main elements: the framework for evaluation and monitoring guidelines; process and methodology on information flow, including the sharing of evaluation reports and implementation of the recommendations; and methodologies for the conduct of centralized and decentralized evaluation, including peer reviews.
43. The IASMN was requested to endorse the draft policy on “Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring” to be included as Chapter V Section D of the Security Policy Manual (SPM).
44. One member began the discussion by noting that his comment at the last IASMN Steering Group session did not seem to be taken into consideration. In particular, the member pointed out that, under Section E of the draft policy, the policy framework still refers to the fact that the policy will ensure the effective and efficient implementation of security management *policies*. In this regard, the member stressed that there are certain elements within security management that are not covered under any policies (e.g. security information analysis), but that should still warrant evaluation in the field. The draft policy still appears to only refer to the evaluation of security management *policies*. In response, UNDSS noted that paragraph 14 makes clear that policies are merely one of many elements subject to evaluation. Separately, the member noted that paragraph 30 states that the Country Security Focal Point (CSFP) will be responsible for assisting with evaluations; in this regard, the member noted that multiple entities (e.g. DPKO-DFS, DPA) outsource such functions to UNDSS entirely and thus perhaps a footnote should be added noting that UNDSS will be wholly responsible for conducting evaluations whereby entities have fully outsourced such security functions to UNDSS (e.g. DPKO-led or DPA-led missions). The request for a footnote was echoed by another member. In response, UNDSS agreed to add a footnote in this regard.
45. Another member expressed regret in that his organisation has yet to see great value in compliance reports as such reports do not provide substantive and, more importantly, actionable information that would allow the organisation to move ahead. The member stressed that this was not a criticism of UNDSS’ Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit, noting that his own organisation’s internal compliance mechanism has also struggled to figure out how best to capture failures in the field. In this regard, the member questioned what the exact role of compliance should be in the field and whether additional tests, drills, or exercises should be carried out. Therefore, he suggested the IASMN not rush to endorse this policy, but rather take the proper time to address the question of what specific monitoring, evaluation and compliance activities would be the most beneficial to UNSMS organisations.
46. Another member recommended including the term “compliance” in the title of the draft policy as ninety-percent of the draft policy deals with internal UNDSS compliance issues.

The member noted that technological advancements have allowed UNSMS organisations to implement their own, internal compliance mechanisms; this calls for clarifying the roles of UNDSS and AFPs, respectively, with regard to compliance. There is also a need to clarify the roles of those below the Designated Official (e.g. Chief Security Adviser (CSA)/Security Adviser (SA)) with regard to compliance. It was suggested that such clarification should perhaps be tackled as part of the Strategic Review.

47. Another member echoed support for not rushing to endorse the draft policy, stressing that what is needed is greater monitoring and evaluation of security programmes and activities. He regretted that much of the draft policy is still focused on compliance. Unfortunately, he noted that compliance missions have come to be viewed as “ticks in the box,” with little added value to UNSMS organisations, particularly in light of the fact that many UNSMS organisations currently maintain their own, internal compliance mechanisms. Therefore, the member suggested that UNDSS revise the policy to ensure a greater emphasis on monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the security management process, whereby lessons learned would be compiled to help organisations move forward.
48. Another member, however, stated that his organisation still benefits from compliance missions as his organisation does not maintain a robust, internal compliance mechanism. He stated that, whenever notice of a compliance missions is communicated, there is a substantial change among staff members, whereby individuals ensure that staff lists are up-to-date, along with core documents (e.g. SRA, MOSS country tables). At the same time, he had also witnessed poorly-timed compliance missions, recalling one particular mission in Somalia that was carried out despite the fact that AFPs were not present in Mogadishu at the time (i.e. due to the security situation). In this regard, the member called on UNDSS to ensure that criteria exist as to how and when compliance missions are carried out so as not to disrupt operations or otherwise waste resources.
49. Another member noted that the issue of compliance has been discussed for years, adding that he supported the recent shift in focus from compliance to monitoring and evaluation (i.e. shift from quantitative to qualitative measurements). While the draft policy is not perfect as it is still heavily references compliance, thereby confusing the intent of the policy, it is still moving in the right direction and maintains the proper tools (i.e. checks) for ensuring monitoring and evaluation are carried out properly.
50. Another member, while agreeing that the draft policy is moving in the right direction, stated that the policy is not yet ready for endorsement. He suggested that a discussion was first needed with regard to how compliance, evaluation and monitoring activities are currently being carried out by different UNSMS organisations. In this regard, UNDSS confirmed that it would take stock of best practices as well as lessons learned and incorporate them into the existing draft policy.
51. Another member also suggested not rushing to endorse the draft policy, noting that the Strategic Review was already underway and, in this regard, hoped that it would examine the current and future role of compliance, evaluation, and monitoring by UNDSS relative

to AFPs so as to guide the draft policy to its successful endorsement. At this time, the draft policy simply has too many gaps for it to be endorsed (e.g. use of the term “cluster,” which has a very specific meaning within the humanitarian community).

52. At the end of the discussion, UNDSS sought to clarify a few points with regard to the draft policy. It was noted that the draft policy had already been reviewed by the Steering Group at its last session and subsequent changes made and reviewed via VTC. Moreover, it emphasized that the draft policy is focused on what compliance, monitoring and evaluation should be in the future, rather than what compliance, monitoring and evaluation look like today or what they looked like in the past. UNDSS cautioned that it would be difficult to conduct proper monitoring and evaluation activities without a policy framework and cited the fact that the policy calls for centralized and decentralized evaluations, with the opportunity to monitor decentralized evaluations from Headquarters, as evidence of its flexibility. UNDSS agreed that perhaps a greater emphasis could be placed on monitoring and evaluating security management activities, rather than simply security management policies, adding that it was willing to work with AFPs in drafting the appropriate language. UNDSS concluded by calling for the establishment of a working group or alternate coordination mechanism to ensure all substantive comments and suggestions are taken into consideration moving forward.
53. The Chair concluded the discussion by noting that further consultation with and input from AFPs was required to move the draft policy forward. While there was general approval of the shift in focus from compliance to monitoring and evaluation, the policy arguably needed to be more specific and subjective as to how monitoring and evaluation activities would be carried out.
54. **The IASMN did not approve the draft policy on Monitoring and Evaluation, preferring instead to provide further input to incorporate the concerns expressed during the discussion. In this regard, it is the intent to hold further consultation with IASMN members.**

#### **D. Brahimi Matrix**

55. The 2008 Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide (IPSS), known as the “Brahimi report,” undertook the most recent and thorough evaluation of the UNSMS. CRP 16 (“Brahimi Matrix”) provided an inventory of the Brahimi report’s recommendations as well as the status of implementation of the recommendations as of June 2014.
56. The Chair began the discussion by noting that the Brahimi report, which remains a “live document” and serves as a “blueprint for UN security,” contains recommendations at the strategic and operational levels, many of which have already been fulfilled. With that said, the Chair stated that some recommendations may not have been fully implemented over the past few years, while acknowledging that some recommendations fall outside the purview of UNDSS.

57. In this regard, UNDSS noted that while suggestions have been made to move beyond the Brahimi report, the Brahimi report continues to resurface in various forums, including most recently in the Secretary-General's 2013 *Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel* report. Moreover, some Member States have recently inquired as to the status of the Brahimi report and whether its recommendations have, in fact, been fully implemented. As a result, UNDSS decided to revisit the Brahimi report once again and found that perhaps some recommendations, identified within the CRP, may be implemented to a greater extent (e.g. advocacy by Executive Heads for integrating security into programme management, institutionalizing programme criticality, integrating SSS' Offices Away from Headquarters (OAHs) within the UNSMS, expanding stress counseling capacity, development of a Host Country survey, further development of rapid response teams by the Human Resources Network).
58. One member noted that he believes this issue is arising as a direct result of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU)'s interest in ensuring these recommendations have, in fact, been implemented. In this regard, the member noted that substantive work has already been done to implement the recommendations contained within the Brahimi report. The member added that his organisation reviews the status of the recommendations every year in order to ensure that the recommendations have and continue to be carried out. In response, the Chair agreed and stated that he made similar comments to the JIU inspection team and that perhaps it would be useful to provide the JIU with a copy of the updated Brahimi Matrix. Nonetheless, the Chair welcomed the JIU inspection team's work as UNDSS is dedicated to implementing the Brahimi report to the fullest extent possible. In this regard, the Chair stated that the JIU inspection team's work may prove helpful in uncovering specific recommendations that have, in fact, been overlooked. The Chair then cited one recommendation in particular, whereby the Under-Secretary General for Safety and Security should engage Member States to review and propose the best option available for converting UNDSS' budget to the UN regular budget and subsequently recommending such an option to the General Assembly, as one that UNDSS is keen to implement, but that has been met with stiff resistance by some Member States within the *Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions* (ACABQ), as well as the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly.
59. Another member noted that many of the recommendations contained within the CRP are always going to be relevant, (e.g. effective use of technology), adding that many have already been implemented and, in some cases, subsequently implemented to a greater extent due to changing circumstances. As a result, the IASMN should prioritise any outstanding recommendations as well as those requiring greater implementation rather than focus on the recommendations as a whole in light of the JIU inspection team's work. Another member added that the Brahimi report should not serve as the basis for the JIU inspection team's work as the IASMN does not necessarily agree with every recommendation or, alternatively, changed circumstances with regard to security have mitigated the need to implement at least some of the recommendations in the manner prescribed. Another member sought to remind the IASMN that, in response to the Brahimi report, HLCM had set up a Steering Committee, chaired by Ms. Susana Malcorra, precisely to implement its recommendations.

60. **The IASMN took note of the update of actions relating to the Brahimi report and suggested that while there will always be recommendations in the matrix that require continuous reporting and feedback, it would be useful to extract those recommendations requiring priority action.**
61. **Further noting that many of the Brahimi recommendations under the remit of the UNSMS have been addressed, including by the HLCM Steering Committee that was established to oversee the implementation of the Brahimi recommendations, the IASMN expressed reservations about using the Brahimi report and its corresponding recommendations as the basis for any future studies of safety and security in the UNSMS.**

#### **E. Residential Security Measures (RSMs)**

62. In order to ensure efficient and cost-effective MORSS arrangements, the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), in collaboration with the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and World Food Programme (WFP), agreed to undertake a review of current MORSS arrangements and policy, including relevant security management policies and procedures related to MORSS.
63. To this end, the Acting Head of UNDSS established and chaired a small Technical Working Group (TWG) on MORSS in June 2013, to consider multifaceted issues related to MORSS implementation. The TWG sought to address certain key issues, including the following: 1) MORSS' principle, purpose, and criteria; 2) high MORSS expenditures in certain duty stations; 3) scope of MORSS coverage; 4) oversight and accountability for MORSS implementation; and 5) whether the applicability of MORSS should be extended to locally-recruited personnel.
64. However, over the course of the TWG's deliberations, it became evident that such issues could only be adequately addressed by proposing a new residential security policy for subsequent consideration by established inter-agency mechanisms, including the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) and the Human Resources Network (HRN). The MORSS policy, as found in Chapter V, Section H of the United Nations Field Security Handbook (2006), paragraphs 5.54-5.63 ("Security of Residences of Internationally-recruited Staff members (aka MORSS)"), entered into force nearly a decade ago and, at the very least, a new policy was needed to update the structure and terminology found in the MORSS policy. More importantly, however, substantive changes, ranging from applicability to purpose to compliance and oversight necessitated the drafting of a new residential security policy.
65. As a result, in November 2013, the TWG began drafting a new Residential Security Measures (RSM) policy to supersede not only the MORSS policy, but also all previous

communiqués, memoranda, and other communications related to residential security measures and, in so doing, addressed the key issues outlined above.

66. A new draft policy on Residential Security Measures (RSM), as well as a CRP providing a comparative analysis of the MORSS policy and the proposed RSM policy, was presented to the IASMN Steering Group at its last meeting in May 2014. The Steering Group agreed that the RSM policy should be presented at the next regular session of the IASMN for further consideration, incorporating feedback from the Steering Group on certain elements of the draft policy. The Steering Group also requested that the TWG continue to develop draft guidelines for review by the IASMN. It is the intention of the MORSS TWG to present draft guidelines to the Steering Group and to IASMN members prior to the next meeting of the IASMN Steering Group. These guidelines will seek to address the practical application of the RSM policy “on the ground,” with detailed guidance provided on a wide-range of issues referenced within the RSM policy, (e.g. defining “customary” RSMs, determining the content of the security briefing) as well as unique circumstances that may arise, (e.g. determining whether Personnel shall be eligible for RSMs if assigned to a given duty station for only a few months, determining whether eligible family members of Personnel at a parent duty station shall remain eligible for RSMs while Personnel are assigned to a non-family duty station).
67. The IASMN was requested to endorse the attached Residential Security Measures (RSM) draft policy for inclusion as Chapter IV, Section O of the UNSMS’ *Security Policy Manual* (SPM).
68. The discussion began with UNDSS emphasizing the highlights of the draft RSM policy. UNDSS first noted that the TWG consisted of a mixture of human resources and security professionals as MORSS had originated in the Human Resources Network (HRN) as a way to provide internationally-recruited staff members with stronger residential security measures when deployed outside of their country of nationality or recruitment. UNDSS then noted that the RSM policy reaffirms the original purpose of MORSS, (i.e. to provide internationally-recruited staff members with stronger residential security measures when deployed outside of their country of nationality or recruitment), due to increased criminality at the duty station, regardless of the underlying cause for such criminality. However, it was pointed out that the draft RSM policy extends RSMs to internationally-deployed personnel to incorporate locally-recruited personnel when deployed outside of their country of nationality or recruitment. The draft RSM policy also applies to eligible family members, including those installed at an Administrative Place of Assignment (APA). Unlike MORSS, it also makes clear that RSMs customarily furnished by the landlord may not be recommended by the DO/SMT. It also makes clear that RSMs do not apply in cases where UN personnel purchase their accommodation at the duty station so as not provide such personnel with a capital investment on their property, with an exception built-in for guard services. More broadly, the draft RSM policy makes clear that no baseline measures exist, (i.e. no minimum standards), and that RSMs do not constitute an entitlement or allowance; however, once approved, such measures must be implemented, with such implementation de-linked from Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS). The draft policy also recognizes that RSMs may include non-cost-



based measures, including residential security advice. With regard to the approval of RSMs, the policy establishes a RSM Review Group for resolving a potential impasse between UNDSS/DRO and appropriate headquarter Security Focal Points (SFPs). Finally, with regard to compliance and oversight, the draft RSM policy requires UNDSS to submit an annual report to the IASMN summarizing where RSMs have been approved and implemented, in addition to any observations or trends.

69. One member suggested that the policy's guidelines clarify that RSMs will be implemented proportionally, (i.e. with regard to shared, leased accommodations). The member suggested that the need for such proportionality be noted in paragraph 5 or 18 of the policy.
70. Another member suggested that the policy's guidelines clarify that those who live outside a clearly-defined security perimeter will not be eligible for RSMs. Separately, the member asked whether UN personnel were required to sign a contract for a minimum period of time before being eligible for RSMs. In this regard, UNDSS responded by stating that the MORSS TWG decided that requiring a minimum period of time would likely jeopardize the life of UN personnel based solely on the length of their respective contract and thus violate the Organisation's duty of care to such personnel. Finally, the member suggested that, with regard to oversight and paragraph 22 of the policy in particular, such oversight should only apply in the context of ensuring that recommended RSMs for the duty station have been implemented and not in the context of ensuring that any allocated funds were used appropriately, stating that financial auditors exist for such oversight.
71. Two other members praised the policy, with one member adding that it addresses the "bureaucracy and corruption" that have come to be associated with MORSS. However, the same member noted that the policy appears light with regard to safety measures (e.g. fire safety measures), adding that linking RSMs to increased criminality at the duty station may be too narrow of a focus. In response, UNDSS noted that while the approval of RSMs remained linked to increased criminality at the duty station, the policy does not discriminate with regard to the underlying cause for such criminality (e.g. armed conflict, natural disaster, terrorism). The member continued to state that the policy is still "procurement-based," with insufficient focus on training, and the need for personnel to take responsibility for their safety and security to one extent or another. Such training and other non-cost-based elements can be applied universally, including to locally-recruited personnel. In response, UNDSS noted that UNDSS simply did not have the capacity to train UN personnel at every duty station around the world, but would consider alternative methods, (e.g. videos, other electronic formats) ,to ensure the highest level of training possible in this regard. With regard to safety, UNDSS stated the term "safety" was rather broad, with the UNSMS currently responsible for specific safety activities (aviation, road and fire safety) all of which arguably fall outside the scope of RSMs and which are addressed in separate UNSMS policies.
72. One Staff Federation called for extending RSMs to locally-recruited personnel as such personnel are often deployed to unfamiliar environments, even within their respective

country of nationality or recruitment. Furthermore, locally-recruited personnel are statistically at a greater risk for harm or injury. The Staff Federation added that while he understood that expanding eligibility to locally-recruited personnel may be cost-prohibitive, it is important to note that excluding such personnel automatically excludes the majority of UN personnel across the world. Another Staff Federation once again called for a case-by-case review of requests to extend RSMs to locally-recruited personnel at the DO/SMT level. In response, UNDSS noted that internationally-recruited or internationally-deployed personnel would be eligible for RSMs, with locally-recruited personnel deployed internationally included within the latter category. Moreover, the MORSS TWG is continuing to discuss what more can be done to ensure the safety and security of locally-recruited personnel in general in line with the Organisation's duty of care. Such an issue arguably extends well beyond RSMs (e.g. relocation) and even beyond security. Another member agreed, noting that the Organisation cannot require locally-recruited personnel to live in certain residential zones, much less certain residences, within their respective country nor would it be advisable to send the message to the respective host government regarding its own ability to ensure the safety and security of its own citizens. The Chair informed IASMN members that issues impacting locally-recruited personnel would also likely be discussed by HLCM's soon-to-be-established Duty of Care Working Group.

73. Another member stated that he was satisfied to read that the approval of RSMs will be linked to the latest Security Risk Assessment (SRA) in order to ensure objectivity with regard to the approval process. However, the member noted that the role of residential safety surveys appears to have been diminished, adding that such surveys should be conducted, even if UNDSS does not have the capacity to conduct such surveys in every duty station. UNDSS responded by stating that such surveys may be considered for inclusion within the policy's guidelines. Finally, the member questioned to what extent the policy addresses concerns over the "double-dipping" of resources (i.e. ensuring one or more RSMs are not already covered under specific entitlements and allowances). In this regard, UNDSS responded by stating that the policy makes clear that RSMs do not constitute an allowance or entitlement and shall not include elements covered under specific allowances or entitlements governed by the International Civil Service Commission.
74. Another member recognized the fact that, although the MORSS TWG was requested to "think outside the box" when drafting a new policy, it had largely stayed "within the box" when drafting the RSM policy, thus affirming that fact that MORSS, despite its unintended consequences, was unquestionably well-intentioned. Separately, the member questioned whether the RSM policy's applicability extends to United Nations Volunteers (UNVs), contractors, and other UN personnel. In this regard, UNDSS confirmed that the RSM policy applies to all internationally-recruited or internationally-deployed UN personnel as defined under the applicability policy of the UNSMS' *Security Policy Manual*, including UNVs and contractors. Finally, with regard to paragraph 12, the member called on UNDSS/DRO to implement the policy as drafted, whereby UNDSS/DRO is expected to first review the DO's proposal and make a reasonable determination in this regard, thus saving AFPs significant time.

75. Another member asked whether the DO/SMT would need to re-calculate the financial cap for a given element due to a small increase by one supplier at the duty station. UNDSS responded by noting that flexibility, which would be noted within the policy's guidelines, may be granted in this regard. Separately, the member stated that eligible family members should be required to attend the security briefing upon their initial arrival at the duty station. UNDSS responded by noting that while the Organisation can encourage eligible family members to attend such a briefing, it cannot require them to attend. Finally, the member noted that the minutes of the previous IASMN Steering Group Session, held in New York via VTC in May 2014, noted a concern over UNVs and their ability to afford accommodation in safe neighborhoods within the duty station given their relatively modest compensation. The member stated that no concern should exist in this regard as UNVs were adequately compensated.
76. Another member questioned whether there was a need to define "customarily furnished" in paragraph 11(a) (i), whereby the DO/SMT cannot recommend any cost-based elements customarily furnished by the owner of a residence. In response, UNDSS noted that the term would be further defined within the policy's guidelines. The member also took issue with the distinction between male and female Personnel in paragraph 10(b), whereby the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) could be supplemented by information relating to residential security at the duty station, including the number of internationally-recruited or internationally-deployed male and female Personnel, among other categories of Personnel and eligible family members. Separately, another member took issue with the fact that RSMs, once approved for the duty station, would become mandatory, rather than simply advisory.
77. Finally, one member noted that many of the points made by other members (e.g. the need to incorporate safety surveys, training, factoring locally-recruited personnel into the policy) could potentially water down the policy as it stands. The member stated that many of these issues fall outside the scope of RSMs and security more broadly, adding that he did not wish to see the policy "watered down" and that, if one particular issue is ultimately deemed relevant by the MORSS TWG, such an issue could be noted within the policy's guidelines.
- 78. The IASMN approved the policy on Residential Security Measures as Chapter IV, Section O of the Security Policy Manual (SPM).**
- 79. The IASMN further noted that more detailed issues relating to the implementation of this policy will be addressed in Guidelines that will be presented to the IASMN Steering Group at its next session.**
- 80. The IASMN fully supported the further efforts by the TWG and HLCM to address in a holistic manner issues related to measures to strengthen the security of locally-recruited personnel.**

#### **F. Security Risk Management (CRP 9)**

81. The Chair introduced the topic of Security Risk Management (SRM) by noting that it has been re-energized as a priority for the IASMN, with the need to develop a more useful, flexible document. One member, who serves on the Security Risk Management Working Group (SRMWG), provided a brief update on the SRMWG's progress and what still needs to be accomplished. The member noted that the SRM methodology has already been completed and approved by the IASMN. As of today, the SRM has reached the implementation phase. In this regard, a Security Risk Manual is urgently needed as currently only a "baseline" manual exists. There is also a need to incorporate the Security Level System (SLS) policy within the SRM policy. Moreover, the SRM e-tool (i.e. online tool) must be developed, which will apply the SRM methodology so as to inform security managers on the appropriate course of action. In this regard, there is a corresponding need to develop a training module for using the SRM e-tool. Subsequently, a support system must be developed to ensure that security managers are accurately and consistently implementing the SRM methodology over the long-run, with UNDSS' Division of Regional Operations (DRO) serving as the lead in this regard. Finally, there is a need to ensure that the resources exist to carry out all of these activities.
82. The member continued on to review a proposed timeline for completing the work to implement the new SRM methodology. The SRMWG aims to have the final draft of the SRM policy and related manual submitted for review by the IASMN Steering Group at its next session, tentatively scheduled for November 2014. At that time, the SRMWG also envisions having the SRM e-tool up and running, although not necessarily available for widespread use. After incorporating any feedback received from the Steering Group, the SRMWG hopes to submit the SRM policy and related manual for review by the IASMN at its 21<sup>st</sup> regular session, tentatively scheduled for February 2015, with a view towards adoption. Endorsement is crucial in order for the SRMWG to submit the SRM policy and related manual for endorsement by the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) in April 2015 and subsequently to begin to "train the trainers" and roll-out the SRM methodology in full. Shortly thereafter, the SRMWG hopes that every designated area will have applied the new SRM methodology to the latest Security Risk Assessment (SRA).
83. As a result, the IASMN was requested to endorse renaming the SRMWG to the Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group (SRMIWG), the Terms of Reference (TORs), and the proposed timeline in order to ensure no further delays occur with regard to SRM.
84. Upon the conclusion of the member's presentation, several members expressed support for continuing to view the work of the SRMWG as a priority. One member asked whether there was an estimate of how much it will cost to carry out all of the activities highlighted by the SRMWG and whether trainers have already been identified. The member of the SRMWG responded by noting that the current projected cost is \$180,000, with an effort to obtain donor funding already underway. With regard to training, UNDSS' Field Support Service (FSS) would be the lead in this regard, although trainers

from other UNSMS organisations could take part, particularly given the fact that the majority of the training will be carried out via webinars and workshops.

85. Another member asked whether the output produced by the SRM methodology will be standardized, particularly given the fact that many different outputs may be produced. Moreover, the member questioned whether the quality and quantity of the output would be tailored in any way to an organisation's operations and whether AFPs would play a role in tailoring such output. In other words, the member asked to what extent the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) would constitute a "baseline" upon which organisations may build upon. In response, the member of the SRMWG noted that the output would be standardized via a "structured subjectivity" approach. AFPs will need to input the output levels of their programmes, (i.e. SRM measures put in place, but not the cost or number of personnel dedicated to such programmes), in order to subsequently map out SRM measures implemented throughout a given duty station.
86. **The IASMN approved the formation of the SRM Implementation Working Group to replace the SRM Improvement Working Group and approved the terms of reference and the proposed timeline for actions as set out in Annexes 1 and 2 of CRP 9.**

#### **G. Safety and Security Incident Recording System (SSIRS) (CRP 5)**

87. Since last reporting to the full IASMN at its 19th session in September 2013, the Security Incident Reporting Working Group (SIRWG) has neared the conclusion of its work by completing the following tasks: 1) determined the workflow, processes and personnel involved in incident recording, including the steps needed to complete and endorse an incident record; 2) written a draft policy that describes these processes, as well as detailing accountability and applicability of the Security and Safety Incident Recording System (SSIRS); 3) developed a user manual to provide guidance on how to use the new SSIRS; this user manual is still in development; its Table of Contents is provided for review; 4) developed a new weapons taxonomy; and 5) reviewed and validated the incident and impact taxonomies previously endorsed by the IASMN at its 19th session.
88. Importantly, the name of SSIRS has been changed from a reporting system to a recording system. This change reflects the true nature of the system, which is a tool to store incident data in the form of records that can be used for security management decisions. Reporting is considered to be the act of notifying stakeholders of an incident, which is an action separate from storing data and remains within the purview of each organization's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).
89. The SIRWG has added a new term to the UNSMS vocabulary; "Reportee" is used to describe those individuals for which a SSIRS record is required. These are UN Personnel as defined by UNSMS Applicability Policy (Chapter III of the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual*) as well as members of national military contingents and members of Formed Police Units (FPU). The SIRWG also met with the Security Risk

Management Working Group (SRMWG) to ensure that there are no inconsistencies in terms and definitions used.

90. SSIRS only covers incidents that impact the UN; however, it is understood that other incidents occur that affect the security environment in which the UN operates and having knowledge of these incidents could improve situational awareness. Therefore, the SIRWG is recommending that a complementary dataset and recording tool be developed to capture data on other relevant safety and security incidents to improve the overall situational awareness of relevant threats in each designated area.
91. As its last meeting in May 2014, the IASMN Steering Group provided its qualified endorsement of the SIRWG's submissions for review at the next IASMN regular session provided that its concerns expressed during the meeting were sufficiently addressed, particularly with regard to some terms requiring amendment. The work of the SIRWG is almost complete. Work remaining includes developing the new system by revising the current Significant Incident Reporting System, revising and formatting the User Manual to incorporate the look and utility of the new SSIRS, further revising and formatting the documents submitted to this session of the IASMN, and developing training material and a training implementation plan for the new system. It is to be noted that in further revising the material referred to above that it is not intended to make further substantial changes, unless directed by the IASMN.
92. The IASMN was requested to consider and endorse the following: 1) the draft policy on Security and Safety Incident Recording System (SSIRS) as Chapter V, Section B of the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual* (SPM); 2) changes to the previously endorsed SSIRS Incident Taxonomy, as an Annex to the SSIRS policy; and 3) SSIRS Weapons Taxonomy, as an Annex to the SSIRS policy. The IASMN was also requested to review the Table of Contents for the SSIRS User Manual.
93. UNDSS began the discussion by expressing concern over the word "UN Reportee," noting that the current UNSMS applicability policy makes clear that members of military contingents and formed police units are not considered to be "UN personnel" for UNSMS purposes and creating a new term incorporating such members may cause confusion. Instead, UNDSS suggested that SSIRS refer to "UN personnel and members of military contingents and formed police units" so as to avoid the potential for confusion, regardless of whether such a reference is made within the policy or in a footnote. In this regard, the SIRWG member responded by stating that the term "UN Reportee" was simply a shorthand for such a reference; nonetheless, the SIRWG member agreed to use the term "subject" within the policy while referencing the UNSMS' applicability policy and the distinction between UN personnel and members of military contingents and formed police units in a footnote. On a related note, UNDSS asked whether safety and security incidents involving eligible family members of those belonging to military contingents and formed police units would also be recorded as such family members also fall outside the scope of the UNSMS' applicability policy. The SIRWG member responded that such incidents would not be recorded. As a follow-up, UNDSS requested that such a fact also be clarified, whether within the policy or in a footnote.

94. One member then asked if it would be possible to filter safety versus security incidents. The SIRWG member responded that it would, in fact, be possible. The member then asked whether the reporting of safety and security incidents extended to eligible family members in general. In response, the SIRWG noted that only incidents involving eligible family members covered under the UNSMS' applicability policy would be recorded. Lastly, the member noted that SSIRS would be an excellent tool to use in following up on security incidents (i.e. investigations, prosecutions). The SIRWG agreed, adding that the Justice Registry Working Group (JRWG) has already discussed the possibility of using SSIRS' data for this very purpose.
95. Another member suggested that the SSIRS policy call on the Designated Official (DO) to appoint a senior security officer to record incidents so as to avoid confusion in duty stations where the Country Security Focal Point (CSFP) of an AFP and UNDSS' senior security officer are relatively equal in seniority. In this regard, the SIRWG member clarified that the reporting officer need only endorse a recorded incident for it to be entered into SSIRS; they need not record it themselves. Nonetheless, the SIRWG member agreed to clarify that the DO will, in fact, appoint a senior security officer to endorse incidents, with support for such clarification expressed by UNDSS and other members. Separately, the original member called for distinguishing between sexual intimidation and sexual assault within the SSIRS policy, stressing that sexual assault is a criminal offense involving any physical contact. A second member echoed similar sentiments while suggesting that a third category – exclusively identifying incidents of rape – be created for statistical purposes. The SIRWG member responded by stating he would revert back to the SIRWG on this issue, whereby it would consider alternative or additional categories based on the gravity of the sexual offense. After a substantial discussion regarding the appropriate terminology, the IASMN recommended that, at least with regard to physical contact, a broad category of “sexual assault” be adopted for a trial period of one-year.
96. Another member noted that while he agreed SSIRS would function best as a *recording* system, a *reporting* system would still be beneficial to many UNSMS organisations, particularly those who do not employ a large number of security professionals in the field. In this regard, the SIRWG member responded by noting that SSIRS does not replace existing *reporting* systems, including flash-reporting systems, relating to safety and security incidents around the world, while emphasizing that SSIRS was never intended to be a flash-reporting system. The member also called on the SIRWG to clarify whether the recording of safety and security incidents is, in fact, mandatory. In this regard, the SIRWG member stressed that the recording of such incidents is, in fact, mandatory. Finally, the member called on the SIRWG to address apparent contradictions within the policy; for example the policy states that SSIRS is meant to “support an effective response” to safety and security incidents while, at the same time, stating that it is “not a response mechanism”. General references to altering the security risk management process as well UNSMS security professionals should also be clarified.

97. Another member questioned Annex C's definition of "incident," whereby an incident requires a malicious act. In this regard, the member questioned whether certain incidents would be deemed malicious and thus recorded (e.g. burglary, removal or seizure by host government authorities). UNDSS and a third member echoed similar sentiments, arguing that the term "malicious" is arguably too narrow, with the third member suggesting the term "intentional" be adopted. The SIRWG member agreed and stated his intention to revert back to the SIRWG in this regard.
98. One member then asked whether SSIRS would distinguish between duty-related incidents and non-duty-related incidents. In response, a second member cautioned against allowing a reporting officer to make an essentially legal determination as to whether an incident occurred in the course of one's duty. The SIRWG agreed with the second member in this regard, adding that the details of the incident would nonetheless be recorded (i.e. without identifying whether it as duty-related or non-duty-related).
99. One member then asked whether the SIRWG has considered the inherent sensitivity in recording incidents involving host government authorities. Separately, a second member called for distinguishing between *explosive* improvised devices and *non-explosive* improvised devices within the weapons taxonomy. The SIRWG member agreed and stated his intention to revert back to the SIRWG in this regard. A third member drew attention to the need to ensure that the privacy of individuals is protected and that the data collected remains confidential whenever incidents are reported. In this regard, the SIRWG member agreed, promising that the need to ensure the confidentiality of data will be incorporated into the SSIRS policy (i.e. through a confidentiality clause) and noting that AFPs will only be able to record incidents involving their own personnel while Designated Officials (DOs) will only be able to record incidents occurring within their designated areas. Finally, a fourth member called on the SIRWG to engage his organisation in an effort to align terminologies related to occupational health and safety. The SIRWG member agreed, adding that such an effort will be undertaken during the next developmental phase of SSIRS.
- 100. The IASMN approved the draft policy on Security and Safety Incident Recording System (SSIRS) as Chapter V, Section B of the Security Policy Manual (SPM), with amendments as agreed, to be reviewed after one year of implementation.**
- 101. The IASMN approved changes to the previously endorsed SSIRS Incident Taxonomy and the SSIRS Weapons Taxonomy, as Annexes to the SSIRS policy.**
- 102. Further, the IASMN took note of the Table of Contents for the SSIRS User Manual.**

#### **H. UNSMS Membership (CRP 3)**

- 103.** The need to develop consistent criteria for membership in the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) has grown in recent years as the UNSMS has expanded its size and services. Presently, there are 51 distinct UNSMS members, including UN



departments and offices, agencies funds and programmes, subsidiary bodies and other UN system entities, as well as related organizations and non-UN entities via MOUs. Seven organizations are currently seeking either clarification vis-à-vis their relationship within the UNSMS, UNSMS membership, observer status at the IASMN, or limited access to the UNSMS' services (Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)/CGIAR Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers, International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Development Law Organization (IDLO), International Seabed Authority (ISA), Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and United Nations Federal Credit Union (UNFCU)).

104. Between 2006 and 2011, five IASMN Steering Group reports discussed the need to limit UNSMS membership through the development of consistent criteria for admission. The question was last discussed at the IASMN's 15th Regular Session, held in Rome in June 2011, whereby the IASMN recommended that UNSMS membership be limited to "UN entities" and "current members of the IASMN". At the time, the IASMN did not define what constitutes a "UN entity," only stating that it would seek guidance from the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) whenever doubt existed over the status of an organization.
105. Over time, however, the diverse nature of current and prospective UNSMS members, combined with the lack of a clear, legal definition of a "UN entity," has made it necessary for the IASMN to define what constitutes a "UN entity" or otherwise develop new criteria for admission. Furthermore, given the fact that some prospective UNSMS members are only seeking observer status at the IASMN and/or limited access to the UNSMS' services, the IASMN must determine whether different categories of UNSMS membership should exist, (e.g. full versus partial membership), and whether such categories should result in different levels of benefits and obligations, (e.g. financial, operational, logistical). Such questions are inextricably linked to broader, underlying questions related to the role of the UNSMS, the nature of the UNSMS' services, the capacity of the UNSMS to provide such services, funding mechanisms for such services and the obligations of UNSMS members.
106. At its last session in May 2014, the IASMN Steering Group was requested to consider what criteria should determine admission to the UNSMS. More specifically, the IASMN Steering Group was requested to discuss whether UNSMS membership should remain limited to "UN entities" and "current IASMN members" and, if so, what constitutes a "UN entity" for the purposes of UNSMS membership. In so doing, the IASMN Steering Group was also requested to consider whether different categories of UNSMS membership should exist, (e.g. full versus partial membership), and if so, whether such categories should result in different levels of benefits and obligations, (e.g. financial, operational, logistical). Finally, the IASMN Steering Group was requested to consider the extent to which criteria for UNSMS membership should differ from existing criteria for IASMN membership and the impact substantially different criteria for UNSMS membership would have on the relationship between the two.

107. Following its deliberations, the IASMN Steering Group agreed that the IASMN regular session would be informed of its consensus for the application of a case-by-case approach when considering requests for membership or information-sharing with the UNSMS. In this regard, the Steering Group stressed the need for clear criteria for UNSMS membership to be developed upon which a case-by-case approach can be applied. The Steering Group also clarified that there should be only one category of UNSMS membership, whereby members are expected to abide by all UNSMS policies, procedures, standards, and arrangements, with a grandfather clause inserted only to address past exceptions to this rule.
108. The IASMN was requested to consider the aforementioned issues as well as the recommendation of the Steering Group made at its last session and decide whether to uphold this recommendation, including the establishment of clear criteria for UNSMS membership to be developed that would serve as the basis for applying a case-by-case approach or to propose alternative or additional means of addressing UNSMS membership issues.
109. The discussion began with one member by stating his organisation was not opposed to new members so long as their entry does not burden existing members with any additional costs. Another member stressed that, regardless of whether the UNSMS accepts new members at this time, it should stress to existing and prospective members alike that they are either fully in the UNSMS or out of it entirely. While some flexibility may be granted to each UNSMS organisation (i.e. via the Security Risk Assessment (SRA)) in order to carry out their respective mandate, the UNSMS' *Framework of Accountability*, including the decisions taken by the DO/SMT, must be respected at all times. In this regard, the member suggested doing away with any grandfather clauses that do not require certain UNSMS organisations to fully abide by the *Framework of Accountability*. The member then stressed that an organisation's mandate alone does not entitle it to entry into the UNSMS, adding that there is an existing mechanism for non-UNSMS organisations to coordinate with UNSMS organisations via the Saving Lives Together (SLT) policy.
110. Another member stated that UNSMS membership should equal IASMN membership and vice versa, but that membership in either body should first be cleared with the Chief Executives Board (CEB) as both ultimately report to the CEB. Another member stated the need to clarify whether any of the prospective UNSMS members would represent themselves at the IASMN or, alternatively, through existing members.
111. Two members whose respective organisations were admitted into the UNSMS via a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreed with the argument that every UNSMS organisation should abide by the *Framework of Accountability*. One member added that prospective members should adhere to the principles and philosophy of the UN and should emphasize the extent to which their admission would add value to the UNSMS.
112. Another member drew attention to the fact that even though his organisation was a member of the UNSMS, the UNSMS' applicability policy did not cover a special

category of personnel employed by his organisation, known as “area staff,” with the member adding that this issue (i.e. the need to cover the various types of personnel employed by a member organisation) should also be addressed.

113. Another member agreed with the call to establish criteria for admission to the UNSMS, but noted that the question of whether the UNSMS has the capacity to absorb additional members must first be considered.

114. Another member stated that while there is no legal definition of what constitutes a “UN entity,” it is relatively easy to determine whether an organisation is part of the UN system. Separately, the member cautioned against setting further precedents for admitting organisations that clearly fall outside the UN system via a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

115. Another member expressed opposition to the idea of limiting membership to CEB members, noting that the UNSMS already includes non-CEB members and that his organisation in particular employs personnel from different organisations within the UNSMS, including non-CEB members.

116. Another member expressed concern that the UNSMS’ resources were already stretched, with little potential existing for adding new members. A second member suggested that a scoping exercise be conducted to determine the UNSMS’ capacity to absorb new members, adding that perhaps new members would have to be subject to a one-time entry fee.

117. Another member then asked how admitting additional members into the UNSMS would impact UNDSS. In this regard, UNDSS responded that it would have to dedicate an ever-larger portion of its resources to keeping additional UNSMS personnel safe (e.g. hostage incidents), taking into account that at least some of the personnel covered by the UNSMS may operate in high-risk areas or new areas altogether.

118. The Chair noted that the IASMN did not appear ready to propose specific criteria for admission. He hoped that the Strategic Review would address the question of UNDSS’ capacity and resources and the impact of accepting additional members within the UNSMS. With that said, the Chair clarified that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has always been a member of the UNSMS. The Chair also confirmed that the International Seabed Authority (ISA) is a member of the UNSMS, despite the fact that the organisation’s contribution to the jointly financed account (JFA) does not yet appear within UNDSS’ breakdown of the annual budget.

**119. The IASMN confirmed the membership of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Seabed Authority (ISA) in the UNSMS.**

**120. Having considered the additional information set out in CRP 3, with particular reference to considering the greater expansion of membership in the UNSMS, the IASMN concluded that it was not yet ready to pronounce on this issue, pending**

**further information from UNDSS on the impact an expanded UNSMS would have on current UNDSS capacity. In this respect, it was recognized that the current strategic review would feed into this determination. Further, in considering an expanded UNSMS membership, the IASMN confirmed that membership in the UNSMS must entail the full and unequivocal subscription to all UNSMS policies and procedures.**

### **I. Critical Incident Stress Management Update (CRP 11)**

121.UNDSS' Critical Incident Stress Management Unit (CISMU) provided an update on the Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) activities during the past year. In 2013-2014, while responding to the psychosocial needs of UN staff during emergencies, CISMU continued to build the capacities and preparedness of UN country offices on Critical Incident Stress Management and Prevention (CISMP). At the individual level through the training of staff on stress management and stress-related fields. Globally, CISMU has trained 5,154 staff on stress management and stress related issues in order to strengthen staff resilience and build the preparedness of country offices on CISP. CISMU has also conducted 5,804 counselling sessions and deployed counsellors to respond to 28 major crises in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, including, inter alia, the floods in Indonesia, the earthquake in the Philippines, the hostage incidents and political unrest in Syria and South Sudan, the terrorist attack at the Westgate Mall in Kenya, the attack of the UN compound in Mogadishu and political and social unrest in Mali.

122.CISMU then noted that, although it was conceived as a small operational unit of six professionals with the goal of supporting security officers in managing the human factors in critical incidents on a UN system-wide basis, CISMU has evolved into a center of reference for CISMP, whereby it provides the following functions: (1) technical supervision to 65 counsellors UN system-wide; (2) technical advice on staff psychosocial issues and wellbeing to UN system senior officials ranging from Under-Secretary-Generals at Headquarters to Special Representatives of the Secretary-General to Designated Officials, in addition to Directors and Chiefs of Missions Support as well Chief Security Advisers (CSAs) and Security Advisers (SAs) in the field; (3) guidance and coordination of the interventions of a network of 340 mental health focal points composed of CISMU trained external mental health professionals operating in 95 countries worldwide; and (4) developing policies and guidelines through the IASMN Critical Incident Stress Management Working Group (CISMWG) and different high level task forces within the Organisation.

123.CISMU then recalled that, at its 17<sup>th</sup> regular session, the IASMN supported the formulation of a critical incident stress management policy. Subsequently, at its last session in May 2014, the IASMN Steering Group endorsed the CISWG efforts to finalize a draft policy on CISMP for submission to the 20<sup>th</sup> regular session of the IASMN.

124.Although it was CISMU's intention to present the draft policy to the 20<sup>th</sup> regular session of the IASMN, IASMN members were informed that there is a need for further consultations among the members of the CISWG. As such, a draft policy will be

submitted to the next IASMN Steering Group session, tentatively scheduled for November 2014. The IASMN was requested to note the update on CISM activities during the past year, as well as the efforts to finalize a draft policy on CISM for submission to the next session of the IASMN Steering Group.

125. One member began the discussion by noting that his organisation's stress unit felt that, while CISMU's CRP summarized well its range of services to staff, it failed to fully acknowledge the huge role played by various AFP counselors. The member noted that such counselors are also providing emergency critical incident stress services, and coordinating such services amongst themselves and with CISMU without the proper credit. Another member stated that his staff welfare section expressed similar sentiments, adding that additional information regarding how work is divided among CISMU and AFP counselors would be helpful to ensure that priorities are being addressed. The member added that his staff welfare section had confirmed that their cooperation with CISMU is, in fact, increasing, particularly in duty stations where the section is unable to meet the demand for its services, (e.g. Central African Republic (CAR)). The member asked if CISMU has anyway to gauge demand at a given duty station at any particular time. In response, CISMU noted that it is continuing to work on developing standards and ratios and to insert such details in its draft policy for review by the IASMN. The draft policy will also cover how CISMU can best coordinate its efforts with other colleagues on a global level. CISMU reminded IASMN members that the purpose of its CRP was to provide an update on CISMU's activities with regard to critical incident stress management, adding that its work in the Central African Republic (CAR) illustrates how CISMU effectively works with AFP counselors in crises.

126. Another member welcomed CISMU's report while asking for a breakdown of internationally-recruited versus locally-recruited personnel treated by CISMU, as well as trauma versus non-trauma cases, if possible. The member also asked if there is a central database that deploys CISMU counselors accordingly; in this regard, the member inquired as to CISMU's ability to respond to the demand for psycho-social support. The member stated that the scientific literature is increasingly against CISMU's current model of delivery of these two services, suggesting that CISMU's current model of delivery be reviewed as part of the Strategic Review. CISMU responded by noting that CISMU employs a holistic and comprehensive approach to critical incident stress management, which includes providing psycho-social support.

127. Another member thanked CISMU and AFP counselors for their hard work and assistance while repeating an offer from her department (DPA) to provide CISMU with additional resources while its budget cycle remained open until July 17<sup>th</sup>, 2014.

128. Another member noted that the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) is currently reviewing the need for psycho-social support and recommended that CISMU colleagues work with the Human Resources Network (HRN) to answer specific questions or take part in any surveys to assist JIU in its review. In this regard, CISMU confirmed that it is part of the assessment and would offer its assistance.

**129. The IASMN commended the excellent work done by UNDSS' Critical Incident Stress Management Unit and took note of the update on the Critical Incident Stress Management activities during the past year, as well as the efforts to finalize a draft policy on Critical Incident Stress Management and Prevention (CISMP) for submission to the next meeting of the IASMN Steering Group.**

**130. In this regard, it was suggested that the report on staff activities should also reflect the work of AFP staff counsellors in providing emergency stress services, in coordination with CISMU.**

#### **J. Gender Consideration in Security Management (CRP 8)**

131. At its last session in May 2014, the IASMN Steering Group considered a CRP entitled Gender Inclusion in Security. Following discussions regarding the issues raised in the paper, the Steering Group, in supporting the formation of a working group, requested that draft Terms of Reference for the proposed working group be presented to the next regular session of the IASMN. Furthermore, the Steering Group stated that separately from the work to be considered by the working group, there might be an immediate need for guidelines delineating the role of security officers in sexual assault cases.

132. Accordingly, and following consultation with several organizations, as well as within UNDSS, draft Terms of Reference, were subsequently produced for a proposed working group on Gender Consideration in Security Management. The proposed TORs reflect the interest indicated by some Steering Group members in participating in this working group, namely DPKO/DFS, FAO, UNFPA and UNICEF. UNDSS intends to follow up with the Steering Group's second request to produce guidelines delineating the role of security officers in sexual assault cases. Accordingly, the IASMN was requested to consider and subsequently endorse the TORs for the Gender Consideration in Security Management Working Group (GCSMWG).

133. The discussion began with nine members supporting the formation of the GCSMWG and requesting to be part of it. One member noted that while the number of reported sexual assaults involving not only UN personnel, but also those of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is relatively low, the overwhelming majority of female personnel polled within his organisation agree that there needs to be a stronger focus on gender issues in relation to security management. The member added that sexual orientation issues affecting the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) as well as the questioning, asexual, and intersex (QAI) communities need to be addressed. One staff federation echoed similar sentiments while offering to reach out to UN Globe, a UN staff group representing LGBT employees, for consultation and collaboration on behalf of the UNSMS. Separately, a third member stressed the importance of training (i.e. of all UN personnel) in addressing many of the issues facing women as well as LGBT/QAI communities in the field.

134. Another member argued that the document being discussed deals almost exclusively with female issues, not men's issues. Thus, the member suggested that the working

group be renamed to the Female Consideration in Security Management Working Group. Two other members and one staff federation echoed similar sentiments, with one member suggesting that the scope of the working group be more clearly defined and with the majority favoring a broad scope incorporating female as well as LGBT and AQI considerations in security management.

135. Another member noted that both the UN General Assembly and Security Council have passed numerous resolutions concerning gender, suggesting that the GCSMWG should work to incorporate such resolutions and adopt at least some of the specific goals found within them.

**136. The IASMN agreed to the formation of a working group on gender consideration in security management, to include both women and LBGT issues. In this regard, the IASMN approved the draft TORs for the working group to be further reviewed by its members with the intention of honing the TORs to match the expanded scope of the WG.**

#### **K. PEP Kit Management Framework (Information Paper) (CRP 13)**

137. UN Cares, the UN system-wide workplace programme on HIV, has convened a small working group, comprised of UN Cares, the medical services units of UNHCR, WHO, UNECA and UNDSS' Policy, Planning and Co-ordination Unit (PPCU), to develop a document clarifying the details of current good practice in PEP Kit management.

138. At its last session in May 2014, the IASMN Steering Group took note of this development and stated that it looked forward to additional information being provided at the next regular session of the IASMN. The IASMN was requested to take note of the fact that the document referenced above, which shall serve as a PEP Kit Management Framework, is expected to be ready for electronic review by IASMN members prior to the next IASMN Steering Group session following further consultation with the UN Medical Directors Working Group (UNMDWG) and the Human Resources Network (HRN), with a view to subsequently obtaining the endorsement of all three bodies.

139. The discussion began with one member noting his organisation's involvement in endorsing various changes to PEP Kits in the field beginning in November 2013, including switching from a three-drug regimen to a two-drug regimen, with initial treatment (i.e. found in the starter PEP Kit) extended from five to thirty-one days. However, the member his organisation's expressed strong concerns regarding a number of issues, ranging from a lack of definitive of guidance from one health-related UNSMS organisation to a lack of evidence-based data regarding the effectiveness of the programme. The member then read a formal Statement of Concern from his organisation's leadership in this regard (see Annex C to this report). Nonetheless, in the interim, the member acknowledged the need to replace the PEP Kits prior to their expiration and the work of UN Cares in this regard while expressing support for strengthening the reporting function (i.e. of when PEP Kits are disbursed, received, and used), particularly in the field.

140. Another member expressed his organisation's strong support for the use of PEP Kits and the development of a PEP Kit Management Framework. At the same time, the member expressed concern regarding the requirement that management of PEP Kits be placed as a standing item on the Security Management Team (SMT) agenda as noted in the latest UNDSS' Communique regarding PEP Kits, released in April 2014. The member added that Chief Security Advisers (CSAs) in the field have tried this in the past, with everyone on the SMT wondering why the issue was continuously raised; eventually, the Designated Official (DO) requesting that it be taken off the agenda. In this regard, UNDSS responded that UN Cares had received reports of PEP Kits being reported missing and believed it was good practice to have the issue as a standing item on the SMT's agenda. Nonetheless, UNDSS promised to consult others on this requirement and make any necessary adjustments.

141. One staff federation expressed strong support for all UN staff members having access to HIV protection measures, including PEP Kits. In this regard, the staff federation emphasized its strong partnership with UN Cares and its push to ensure PEP Kits are widely available and properly administered, including in cases where a sexual assault is alleged to have occurred.

**142. The IASMN took note of the working group established to develop a document clarifying the details of current good practice in PEP kit management and looks forward to reviewing the draft document prior to the next meeting of the IASMN Steering Group.**

**143. The IASMN also took note of the comments of the representative from the Medical Directors Working Group, attached as Annex C.**

#### **L. Crisis Management (Information Paper) (CRP 12)**

144. At its 19th regular session held in Montreal in September 2013, the IASMN "did not agree on the need to develop common UNSMS guidelines or a policy on field-level crisis management." The IASMN agreed, however, on the need to consolidate "best practices and lessons learned on crisis management at the field level, noting the need to link existing Headquarters-level policies and guidelines with field-level guidelines."

145. In August 2013, an inter-departmental Crisis Management Guidance Working Group (CMGWG) was established, comprising representatives from the UN's DPKO-DFS, DPA, UNDSS, and UNOCC. The CMGWG's aim is to produce policy guidance on crisis management applicable to and in support of Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, covering crisis management both at UN Headquarters and the field. The development of policy guidance has been a collaborative undertaking to facilitate a consistent organisational approach to crisis management while recognizing that many elements of crisis management would be common for both PKOs and SPMs.



146. Earlier this year, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG)'s representatives subsequently joined the CMGWG) to ensure consistency between this policy guidance on crisis management with the 'Rights up Front' initiative led by the UN's Deputy Secretary-General. It has been the EOSG's intention to develop, based on the draft policy guidance developed by the (CMGWG), a generic UN system policy guidance for crisis management in non-mission setting. It is the view of the EOSG that this UN policy guidance on crisis management should be "generic" so as to allow different UN entities (individual UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes) to maintain and/or develop their own individual and internal standard operational guidelines for crisis management.
147. As part of its efforts in developing the above-mentioned draft policy guidance on crisis management for peacekeeping and special political missions, the CMGWG has noted the review of good practices and lessons learned undertaken by key members of the CMGWG (UNOCC in cooperation with DPKO) based on After Action Reviews and related reports on various crises in mission and non-mission setting (i.e. Abuja attack) during 2008-2013. A paper was developed summarising the key findings from the review of 16 reports on the UN's crisis management responses in different types of crises between 2008 and 2013. In doing so, it identified a number of significant policy and operational gaps in the way the Organisation manages crises.
148. At its last session of the Steering Group meeting in May 2014, UNDSS presented to the Steering Group the summary containing main points of the above-mentioned review of lessons learned and best practices (2008-2013) compiled by members of the CMGWG. Also, UNDSS informed the Steering Group of the developments. The IASMN Steering Group agreed that there should be a broader discussion at the 20<sup>th</sup> regular session of the IASMN on the role of the UNSMS with regard to the development of a crisis management policy, taking into account the distinction made by some Steering Group members between crisis management and critical incident management.
149. The IASMN was requested to have a broad discussion on policy issues related to crisis management and to agree on the following: 1) whether there is a need for UNDSS, in collaboration with all UNSMS organizations, to compile further information on crisis management lessons learned and best practices of UN entities, agencies, funds and programmes and other organizations across the UNSMS; and 2) the need for UNDSS (PPCU/DRO) to update and transfer the 2006 *Field Security Handbook's* Chapter V on Security Planning in the Field, which contains certain elements on security aspects of crisis management, to the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual* and ensure coherence with other policy guidance and initiatives of the Organization.
150. One member began the discussion by calling for the creation of a repository in order to share lessons learned. More broadly, the member stated that one of the difficulties with crisis management is that organisations remain directly accountable to their own managers and trying to have UNDSS put everything into place may be rather difficult; instead, organisations should simply be advised as to what should be in place and what needs to be done in a crisis.

151. Another member agreed with the underlying argument that there should be no overarching crisis management policy. He noted that crisis management at the headquarters and field levels differ dramatically, with the later reflected primarily in the 2006 *Field Security Handbook* (FSH), which lists all contingencies and relevant procedures. In this regard, there is a need for UNDSS' Policy, Planning, and Coordination Unit (PPCU) to review any outdated procedures within the FSH as they relate to the security plan. Within the FSH, one will find what already constitutes a framework for crisis management and response, with little need for the UN Secretariat to develop new, overarching procedures for crisis management applicable to the entire UN system. The Chef du Cabinet has already made it clear that the UNOCC is, in principle, to manage crisis situations, but not serve as a substitute for other departments, offices, or AFPs. Each department, office, and AFP will handle various components of a crisis depending on the nature of the crisis itself. If it is a complex crisis, multiple or even all departments, offices, and AFPs may be involved. A second member echoed similar sentiments. Finally, the member noted that a greater effort needs to be undertaken to extract lessons learned from various crises at the operational level. In this regard, the Chair responded by noting that UNDSS would benefit from the formation of a Best Practices Unit in the future.

152. Another member noted that lessons learned should feed into evaluation and monitoring activities. Unless one has best practices and lessons learned compiled, one cannot properly evaluate what is effective and what is not.

**153. The IASMN agreed to the need for UNDSS to update and transfer the 2006 *Field Security Handbook's* Chapter V on Security Planning in the Field (which contains certain elements on security aspects of crisis management) to the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual*, taking account of best practices and lessons learned.**

**M. HLCM Document: "Reconciling Duty of Care in the UN's Operating Environment" (CRP 15)**

154. The Chair provided an update on the HLCM document, "Reconciling Duty of Care in the UN's Operating Environment," noting that it was extremely well received at the HLCM's last session in April 2014. He noted that the purpose of the document was to call on all UN departments and offices as well as AFPs and other UN entities to strengthen their respective support systems for UN staff working to support the UN's goal of "stay and deliver" across the globe.

155. Such support can range from entitlements to promotions to psychological screening to emotional support, among others. It was noted that the issue relates to various ongoing discussions such as career mobility and employer responsibility. In this regard, the Duty of Care Working Group (DOCWG) will soon convene to consider the various issues. Following the HLCM's 27<sup>th</sup> session, it was deemed that the DOCWG, to be chaired by the USG, DSS would include various AFPs representatives from the Human Resources

Network (HRN) Finance and Budget Network (FBN) as well as representatives of the staff federations. In response, WFP requested to be a part of the DOCWG.

156. One member began the discussion by emphasizing his organisation's support for the underlying issue (i.e. promoting duty of care), particularly with regard to locally-recruited staff members. However, the member recommended that the DOCWG not be security-led given the human resources and administrative issues that must be addressed. The Chair responded confirming that the USG, DSS had been designated as the Chair of the WG due to the fact that it was UNDSS that had initially proposed the topic at HLCM, presenting this in a holistic manner to encompass security as well as other multi-disciplinary concerns. As such, it was an HLCM decision to have the USG, DSS lead the working group, with a co-chair from one of the AFPs, while it was recognized that those issues requiring human resources and other specialized input (e.g. medical), would subsequently be handled by the appropriate persons within the remit of the working group.

157. A second member urged the DOCWG to reach out to staff members in identifying areas where the Organisation's duty of care has gone unfulfilled (e.g. psycho-social services). The Chair responded that the DOCWG would likely examine best practices in both the public and private sector in this regard.

158. One Staff Federation noted that the formation of the DOCWG was timely and necessary to sound the alarm regarding existing gaps with regard to the Organisation's duty of care towards its staff members while delivering its mandates and thanked the USG, DSS and UNDSS for this initiative. A second Staff Federation echoed similar sentiments. One member added that this is the first time a working group has been formed to define an acceptable level of exposure for all UN staff members, stressing that staff members need to be psychologically prepared and subsequently debriefed after employment.

159. Another member called on the DOCWG to adopt a holistic approach to the issue. In particular, he noted the value of post-assignment debriefings from medical professionals, basic training, peer support, and an option to request leave or reassignment whenever necessary. A second member stressed the need to go beyond Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) training for those sent to very challenging environments, with stronger pre-screening required. The Chair expressed his agreement in this regard. A third member urged the DOCWG to focus on fairly assigning accountability, reminding IASMN members that the UNSMS *Framework of Accountability* holds host governments primarily responsible for the safety and security of UN personnel, adding that perhaps Designated Officials (DOs) are overburdened in this regard. Ultimately, it is the Organisation, rather than any individual, that is responsible in this regard.

**160. The IASMN took note of UNDSS' submission to the last session of HLCM on "reconciling duty of care for UN staff in the UN's Operating Environment" and the subsequent HLCM decision to establish a working group to be chaired by the USG, UNDSS, with a Co-Chair to be selected among other HLCM members, to undertake**

**a comprehensive review of the issues raised in the paper, “Reconciling duty of care for UN personnel while operating in high risk environments.”**

#### **N. Aviation Risk Management Office (ARMO)**

161. UNDSS’ Aviation Risk Management Office (ARMO) has supported over 4,500 aviation-based field requests since being staffed. These requests/questions have varied greatly with issues including airline categorizations, guidelines/policy interpretation, aircraft inquiries, flight scheduling and others. Considering approximately 366,000 flights are requested for official travel per month within the UN system, the relevance of the ARMO becomes evident.
162. At the 19<sup>th</sup> regular session of the IASMN, the United Nations Personnel Air Travel Policy, including Terms of Reference for Air Travel Focal Points (ATFPs), an Air Operational Guidelines Introduction and the Air Travel Operational Guidelines Template, were endorsed subject to suggested amendments. Amendments were made and the policy was refined for ease of reading and incorporation into the larger UNSMS *Security Policy Manual* (SPM).
163. The ‘Cooperation Agreement (CA)’ between the UN and ICAO expired on 31 January, 2014. At its last session in May 2014, the IASMN Steering Group took note of the progress and preparation related to the promulgation of the United Nations Personnel Air Travel Policy and the additional support ARMO has been able to provide to other projects within UNDSS through its information, data sharing, and integration that support the safety of UN Personnel worldwide. The Steering Group also looked forward to an update with regard to the approval of the United Nations Personnel Air Travel Policy by the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM).
164. The UN Personnel Air Travel Policy was presented to HLCM members on 22 May 2014 for endorsement prior to promulgation. Comments were received by six UNSMS members (IFAD, ICAO, WFP, WIPO, ILO, and UNICEF). The majority of the comments requested general clarifications, while other comments addressed more specific issues. In order to support the promulgation of this policy when endorsed by HLCM, the ARMO has been developing a comprehensive online training programme for Air Travel Focal Points (ATFPs) and security professionals. Additionally, updates to an inclusive communication plan, as well as the establishment of a collaborative environment to deliver uniform information, are in progress.
165. Upon subsequent endorsement of the policy by the HLCM, UNDSS will utilize the methodology developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to provide safety categorizations (i.e. Acceptable, Questionable, and Restricted) for the assessment of air operators to replace the use of FlightSafe. The ARMO will provide supplemental information for those air operators with a less-than Acceptable ranking (i.e. additional details to provide supportive advice to ATFPs and security professionals), which is referred to as the Aviation Risk Management Assessment Programme (ARMAP).

166. For air operators where sufficient supplemental information is not available or need dictates, a ground assessment may be facilitated using the UN Commercial Airline Assessment Framework (UNCAAF). To support this assessment, UNDSS has an agreement with a recognized third-party audit organization. Results from an UNCAAF assessment may provide supplemental information to support ARMO advice.
167. Aviation data used by the ARMO is also being integrated for use in other UNDSS applications. This data has proven to provide valuable linkages between TRIP profiles (UN Personnel) and travel (movement) during specific times (mission requirements) and geographical locations to enhance and maximize the efficiency of resources and the capabilities of UNDSS as a whole.
168. The IASMN was requested to take note of the update on the United Nations Personnel Air Travel Policy and to approve the changes made in the policy for resubmission to the HLCM for endorsement. The IASMN was also requested to take note of the additional support ARMO has been able to provide to other projects within UNDSS through its information, data sharing and integration that support the safety of UN Personnel worldwide. Furthermore, the IASMN was also requested to approve the use of all funds allocated for the operation of ARMO to continue the work of ARMO, including the hiring of necessary staff. In this regard, noting the progress made, UNDSS informed the IASMN that it intends to use the funds already allocated for the operation of ARMO within UNDSS, including the redeployment of the existing resources towards the hiring of two additional staff and the support to operations.
169. The discussion began with one member stating that the UNDSS' methodology and policy had not been reviewed by UN aviation professionals and requested a 90-day review. UNDSS responded by noting that the Aviation Technical Advisory Group (ATAG), which includes ICAO, UNDSS, and WFP, met in Toledo, Spain in May 2014, where members were provided with a comprehensive briefing from UNDSS ARMO, as well as provided with the policy document prior to the 20<sup>th</sup> session of the IASMN for comments. No concerns regarding the policy or methodology were voiced by participants at that time. However, both ICAO and WFP representatives noted that they were not aware that their respective organisations attended the meeting in Toledo and, in any case, believe any outstanding issues should be addressed at the meeting proposed for September 2014. In this regard, both members noted that it would not be wise to endorse the policy or its guidelines prior to the outcome of the proposed September 2014 meeting.
170. Another member stated that important questions remained with regard to the policy as the policy and related guidelines essentially request organisations to devise their own policies while failing to address who will provide the "supplementary information" referenced within the policy. The member added that he has previously asked for an annex to be created clarifying what is expected of ARMO as well as from the AFPs, particularly with regard to donor and charter flights. A second member echoed similar sentiments while praising the progress made with regard to the categorization of airlines.

A third member also agreed, adding that his organisation has had its own air travel policy for years and was hesitant to revise it.

171. In response, ARMO noted that the policy is not a one-size-fits-all policy. While drafting the policy, ARMO was advised that not all AFPs have the same restrictions (e.g. how many individuals can fly in a particular aircraft at a given time (i.e. due to the fact that AFPs do not all have the same insurance)). It was reaffirmed that the policy will incorporate individual AFP operational guidelines that address individual organisations' requirements to have sufficient flexibility with regard to their own internal policies. With regard to the categorization of airlines, ARMO provides the categorization of a given airline to the appropriate focal point. The focal point then uses the information for decision making, in accordance with Programme Criticality.
172. Another member expressed concern over paragraphs 33 and 34 of the draft policy in particular. With regard to paragraph 33, the member questioned why it should be up to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security of UNDSS to decide whether the employees of a given UNSMS organisation can use government provided aircraft. ARMO responded by noting that such a requirement is part of the Malicious Acts Insurance Policy (MAIP), adding that such a function should be delegated to the Designated Official (DO). The member responded, however, that MAIP only applies to incidents involving a malicious act and not all incidents. With regard to paragraph 34, he expressed concern that the 72-hour deadline for a decision to be made may be too long and, in this regard, urged ARMO to review these two paragraphs. Additionally, he requested that security focal points be given access to the database to further enhance security. ARMO declined the member's request. Another member also took issue with paragraphs 33 and 34, while also requesting that the wording as found in paragraphs 32 and 35 be further clarified.
173. Another member expressed his concern over the "questionable" category with regard to airlines, questioning to what extent such a term would be useful to an organisation. In response, ARMO noted that the term "questionable" allows ARMO to inform the security focal point why it is, in fact, deemed questionable in order to allow for an informed decision to be made. Separately, a second member asked whether the ICAO methodology, which ARMO intended to use, had the ability to categorize helicopters, in addition to commercial jets. ARMO responded that it could, in fact, categorize helicopters in a similar fashion to commercial jets. A third member stated that there was a need to clarify ICAO's role vis-à-vis ARMO. At the moment, ICAO's role remains unclear. In this regard, every effort should be made to clarify its role given its expertise in global aviation.
174. Another member asked about the implications, financial and otherwise, of failing to endorse the draft policy for the time being. ARMO UNDSS responded by first noting that a provision in the budget had been earmarked for services to be provided by ICAO. Since those services will not be rendered prior to the scheduled meeting between ICAO and UNDSS this autumn, UNDSS would like to use the resources to redeploy the current system already in place at no extra cost; however, such a rearrangement requires the

endorsement of the IASMN. Separately, ARMO noted that, after submitting its CRP, the owner of FlightSafe was no longer updating the data, instead focusing his energy on another database used by oil and gas producers, which is very subjective and region-based. Thus, ARMO stressed that if advice was to continue to be based on FlightSafe moving forward, it would knowingly be providing advice on outdated – and potentially inaccurate – information. At the same time, ARMO cannot employ the methodology spelled out in its draft policy until the policy has been endorsed because it constitutes a new methodology developed by ICAO with supplemental information provided to better address the needs of the UNSMS. Thus, as an alternative, ARMO suggested that it can categorize individual airlines based on ICAO's methodology, as created and delivered by ICAO to UNDSS if desired, or at least until the proposed September 2014 meeting between ICAO and UNDSS that is aimed at resolving any outstanding issues.

**175. The IASMN, in providing further comments with respect to the update on the status of the draft United Nations Personnel Air Travel Policy and guidelines, endorsed the suggestion that ICAO and UNDSS' ARMO meet in September 2014 together with the relevant experts, to address the recent HLCM comments on the policy and guidelines with a view to reporting back to the IASMN on the way forward. At the same time, the IASMN agreed that the proposed meeting also examine the delineation of roles between ICAO and UNDSS' ARMO with respect to aviation risk management.**

**176. The IASMN took note of the additional support the Aviation Risk Management Office (ARMO) has provided to other projects within UNDSS through its information, data sharing and integration that support the safety of UN Personnel worldwide.**

**177. While the IASMN requested revisiting the policy, it confirmed that the ICAO methodology was accepted. As an interim measure, the IASMN agreed to redeploy the resources needed to maintain the function of the present system.**

#### **O. Security Training and Development (CRP 6)**

178. UNDSS' Training and Development Section (TDS) provided an update on the security training and development activities it has undertaken since the last update provided to the 19<sup>th</sup> regular session of the IASMN, held in Montreal in September 2013. The Security Training Working Group (STWG) is the IASMN forum for addressing inter-agency security training concerns. Members of the STWG met in Rome in January 2014 to discuss concerns presented during the IASMN's 19<sup>th</sup> regular session, held in Montreal in September 2013, along with additional topics.

179. At its last meeting in May 2014, the Steering Group endorsed the following recommendations of the STWG for submission at the 20<sup>th</sup> session of the IASMN. Accordingly, the IASMN was requested to endorse these recommendations from the STWG: a) the development and establishment of the UNSMS Learning Catalogue as a mechanism for information exchange about UNDSS' TDS course options; b) the

continuation of the UNSMS Learning Database; c) expansion of on-line testing and evaluation methodologies; d) consultation and mobilisation of STWG-approved learning interventions before core or specialist learning programmes are outsourced (for example, Emergency Trauma Bag training (ETB), Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE)); the inclusion of partners in core and specialist programmes contingent upon support and/or sponsorship by an AFPO; establishment of a pool of Joint Venture Trainers and the formalization of Security Training Officer Core Certification (STOCC) as a core programme.

180. Multiple members expressed their full support and endorsement of the STWG's recommendations. One member asked if it would be possible to have an experienced Chief Security Advisers (CSAs) or Security Adviser (SAs) serve as mentors. In response, TDS agreed to take up the issue at the upcoming STWG meeting, scheduled for September 2014. Another member stressed the importance of translating TDS' training materials (e.g. CD-ROMs) into as many other languages as possible and as quickly as possible.

**181. The IASMN endorsed the recommendations from the STWG as contained in CRP 6, including the creation of an STWG sub-committee on the design of an Agency Country Security Focal Points (ACSFP) Learning Programme (WFP-OCHA-UNDP-ILO-FAO-UNDSS) to be initiated and coordinated by UNDSS/TDS.**

#### **Any Other Business**

##### **P. Any Other Business**

#### **UN Guard Units**

182. The Chair provided opening remarks on the issue of Guard Units that was raised by one member, noting that, in the past eighteen months, the UN has sought to address gaps in security and, in particular, situations whereby UN peacekeepers or mission security personnel are not available and whereby armed private security companies are not the best fit. The Chair recalled how the UN faced such a situation in Iraq in 2004. At that time, certain Member States agreed to deploy guard units, which were viewed as a "mid-point" between UN peacekeepers and armed private security companies. More recently, similar situations (i.e. the need for guard units) arose in the Central Africa Republic (CAR), Libya, and Somalia. With regard to CAR, a guard unit has been deployed and tasked with ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel and premises as well as to assist with mobile security. In Libya, the government ultimately did not permit the use of guard units. With regard to Somalia, guard units have been deployed. More broadly, the Chair noted that some receiving Member States are very skeptical when it comes to the use of UN guard units, viewing them as "peacekeeping through the backdoor". With regard to the command structure, UN guard units report to the most senior UN official in-country, often the Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG). Nonetheless, UN guard units receive guidance and support from UNDSS. In



general, despite being viewed with a certain degree of skepticism by some Member States, UN guard units are often preferred over armed private security companies.

One member noted that given the concerns expressed by some Member States and AFPs with regard to the use of UN guard units, there has been an initiative by the Secretary-General to develop a policy position regarding the use of such units. In the last few months, a working group, led by DPKO-DFS and consisting of UN Secretariat departments and offices, has developed a draft paper, still currently under discussion, that permits the use of UN guard units as a measure of last resort whenever host governments are unable or unwilling to provide security and whenever armed private security companies would not be the best fit. The draft paper also appoints UNDSS to lead a discussion for developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or guidelines for the use of UN guard units by the end of 2014. The SOPs or guidelines would specifically address a variety of issues, ranging from command and control concerns to seeking authorisation from the UN Security Council or UN General Assembly to interacting with AFPs on the ground to the type of uniforms such units should wear. With regard to uniforms in particular, the starting position is that such a decision should be taken on a case-by-case basis depending on the local context.

183. UNDSS then sought to confirm the highlights of the draft paper, noting that the need for guard units must be based on the latest Security Risk Assessment (SRA). With regard to command and control arrangements, any arrangements must be in accordance with the *Framework of Accountability for the UNSMS*, whereby the Designated Official or Head of Mission or, otherwise, the most senior UN official in-country has oversight authority. With regard to the question of what uniforms the guard units should wear, UNDSS confirmed that such an issue should be addressed on a case-by-case basis depending on the local context. UNDSS added that best practices and lessons learned from the field, including peacekeeping operations and special political missions were being incorporated.

184. One member then expressed concern that the viewpoints of AFPs will not be adequately reflected in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or guidelines as such organizations are not part of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee. The member added that the SOPs or guidelines deal directly with the safety and security of UNSMS personnel and yet the Policy Committee is not found anywhere within the UNSMS' *Framework of Accountability*, which has been approved by the HLCM. In response, UNDSS stressed that AFPs have the opportunity to provide their input at the DO/SMT level, with such an opportunity highlighted within the *Framework of Accountability*.

185. Another member expressed concern over drafting SOPs or guidelines when UN guard units have only been discussed in four cases (i.e. Central African Republic, Iraq, Libya, and Somalia) and deployed in only three. More broadly, the member questioned whether the IASMN should even review such SOPs or guidelines, noting that they are usually developed at an operational level, rather than a strategic level. In response, one member stated that she did not see any particular harm in having SOPs or guidelines reviewed by the IASMN as they do, in fact, affect AFPs and, in some cases, raise expectations that are

best clarified at the IASMN level. UNDSS added that such SOPs or guidelines should be reviewed at the IASMN level and, in fact, at even higher levels because they deal with legal and political issues beyond the purview of the IASMN (i.e. security).

186. One member then expressed concern over the current arrangements in Somalia, whereby UN guard units will only be or have already only been stationed within the confines of the safe perimeter (i.e. encompassing the Mogadishu International Airport), with no mandate to protect AFPs operating outside of the safe perimeter. The member stressed that the IASMN should have been involved in the discussions to deploy UN guard units to Somalia and regretted that such units appear only mandated to protect UN Secretariat personnel within the safe perimeter. In response, one member clarified that two missions were dispatched to Somalia to discuss the issue with the Security Management Team (SMT) on the ground. After some AFPs objected to the deployment of UN guard units, it was agreed upon that such units would only protect the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) personnel within the safe perimeter and would, only in extreme circumstances, reach out beyond the safe perimeter to protect non-UNSOM or non-UNSOA staff. The member then stated that the need for consensus among all actors on the ground, including within the SMT, is noted within the draft paper regarding the use of UN guard units. The member concluded by noting that, in the Central African Republic, consensus was, in fact, reached among the SMT with regard to the deployment of UN guard units and thus the units had a mandate to protect all UN personnel, including those of AFPs.

187. One staff federation regretted that his organisation was not involved in the working group on UN guard units and expressed his organisation's belief that the best way to protect UN personnel is with UN personnel, adding that his organisation had long promoted the idea of deploying UNDSS SSS officers to various field locations on a rotational basis, noting that such officers come from police and military backgrounds and would be able and willing to do the work. With regard to the use of UN guard units, the staff federation asked whether various issues had been discussed by the working group, including the rules of engagement, training, involvement in close protection services, in addition to the selection process of such units (i.e. among Member States). Nonetheless, the staff federation stressed that the use of UN guard units was "one step up" from the use of armed private security companies. One member expressed reservations to the idea of employing SSS officers, noting that additional training to SSS officers stationed at headquarter locations would be required before sending them to the field.

188. Another member suggested that a "one-size-fits-all" approach need not be adopted with regard to UN guard units, adding that flexibility may be granted (e.g. level of access, services) in accordance with the local context. A second member stressed that this was an important discussion, adding that the use of UN guard units is another option for the security risk manager to consider. He then noted the sensitivity that exists in using armed private security companies, despite the fact that many market themselves as security professionals, adding that UN guard units come with an inherent legitimacy as a result of being part of at least one Member State's armed forces. Nonetheless, he called for further discussion on various issues relating to UN guard units, ranging from training

to capacity to weaponry. The outcome of such a discussion should be the development of practical guidelines for the use of UN guard units in the field. In this regard, UNDSS replied that the working group would consider the need for guidelines beginning in July 2014.

189. In providing closing remarks on this issue, UNDSS noted that the deployment of guard units requires the agreement of the UN Security Council and acceptance by the host country, with the selection process subject to vetting by Member States. Standards for equipment are developed by DPKO's Division of Military Affairs, while the UN, in most cases, subsidizes the equipment through DFS. Moreover, the tasks and functions of such units may range from physical protection to static or mobile security, depending on the local context. One member added that cultural and religious sensitivity will be exercised with regard to the selection process, while stressing that the deployment of guard units would only take place in exceptional circumstances (i.e. whereby UN peacekeepers or mission security personnel are not available and whereby armed private security companies are not the best fit).

**190. The IASMN took note of the information on guard units and that UNDSS had been designated as the policy lead on this issue, in consultation with relevant departments of the UN Secretariat. As such, UNDSS confirmed that it welcomes input from IASMN members that may be impacted by the use of guard units whenever that situation arises.**

#### **Remote Radio Rooms**

191. WFP, as leader of the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC), sought to inform the IASMN about an initiative involving remote radio rooms. The member noted that one of the most expensive costs incurred by his organisation was the cost of staffing a fully functioning radio room at a given location. The member revealed that technological advancements have now made it possible to set up a radio room without having to staff such a room; instead, any and all communications are re-routed to a single station. This allows organisations to enjoy significant savings unless an emergency or crisis occurs, in which case it is best that all radio rooms are, in fact, staffed. The member noted that such an arrangement has been successfully tested in the Darfur region of Sudan. The member concluded by stating that, if the concept of remote radio rooms is formally adopted by the UNSMS, it would require changing the current Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) policy, which requires all radio rooms to be fully staffed.

192. One member expressed support for the initiative, adding that he knew of at least four countries that could benefit from such an arrangement due to cost restrictions. He called on WFP, as leader of the ETC, to follow up in this regard. A second member echoed similar sentiments, adding that the ETC was already following up on other, related issues. A third member noted that his organisation could benefit from such an arrangement in Nigeria in particular, where it currently has fully staffed and functioning radio rooms in

Abuja and Lagos, respectively. The member called on WFP to form a working group to implement the proposed initiative as soon as possible.

193. One staff federation expressed caution with regard to the initiative, calling for additional testing to be conducted to ensure that communications would function in a reliable manner, particularly if remote radio rooms are ultimately relied upon during crises or emergencies. WFP responded by noting that communications are guaranteed within one second (i.e. little to no time lag), but that this would need to be tested further. The staff federation also asked about the cost of implementing such an initiative. In this regard, WFP noted that the standard setup cost was approximately USD \$1,000. Nonetheless, the staff federation emphasized that the staff members he represented were, in general, proponents of new technology.

194. The IASMN supported that WFP moves forward with the proposed initiative via the ETC.

### **Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)**

195. One member, in his capacity as representative of the Finance and Budget Network, sought to resolve a long-standing concern over the Asian Development Bank's bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UNDSS and the fact that it exempts ADB's headquarter personnel from the head count for budgetary purposes. Concern was expressed that the Organisation may be "subsidizing" ADB's headquarter personnel costs. In this regard, the member requested an explanation of the MOU and its terms. In response, ADB first noted that all headquarter personnel worldwide are exempted from the Chief Executives Board (CEB) head count as long as an organisation's headquarters are located in an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country. ADB's headquarter personnel, located in Manila, are thus technically not exempt from the head count. However, ADB's MOU with UNDSS includes the proviso that since ADB's headquarter personnel constitute the only headquarter personnel of any UNSMS organisation that are located outside of an OECD country and since ADB is self-sustaining with regard to its own security, (i.e. is not drawing on UN funds), ADB's headquarter personnel are, in fact, exempt from the head count. ADB expressed concern over any effort to use the OECD application as a way to garner additional funds from ADB, particularly as there are several UNSMS organizations falling under the OECD application and thus exempt from paying for their Headquarter personnel. In this regard, ADB highlighted the fact that the only other UNSMS organisation with headquarter personnel located outside of the OECD is UNEP in Nairobi, but that UNEP was exempt from counting their HQ personnel into the CEB headcount as they are considered an Office away from Headquarters and as such fall under the UN's regular budget. Overall, ADB confirmed that it does not receive any disproportionate benefits relative to other UNSMS members and requested that the IASMN take note of its comments in order to bring the issue to a close. One member expressed support for ADB's stance on this issue. Another member, however, questioned whether UNDSS had the right to enter into an MOU with ADB containing terms that conflict with previous decisions made by the CEB with regard to the head count.

196.The IASMN took note of the discussion while recognizing that the issue is linked to the broader issue of UNSMS membership.

### **Cyber Security**

197.One member reminded the IASMN of the ongoing collaboration between UNSMS organisations and the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Network in the field of cyber security following the presentation of Mr. Anders Norsker (Chief, ITU Information Services Department).to the 19<sup>th</sup> session of the IASMN. Members were informed that UNDSS and the ICT Network are working together to identify key areas of collaboration and to share best practices in an effort to strengthen cyber security.

198.Another member noted that the nature of threats to the Organisation and its personnel have evolved over time (i.e. physical threats to cyber threats), with threats delivered via e-mail now considered as “the norm”.

199.One Staff Federation expressed its general support for such collaboration and sharing while simultaneously noting that many online activities are benign in nature. At the same time, it was recalled how electronic communications were shut down during the “Arab Spring,” with some host governments knocking all mobile providers offline. In this regard, UNDSS and the ICT Network were urged to promote technologies with a lower susceptibility to interference, (e.g. satellite phones).

200.Another member recommended that UNDSS and the ICT Network collaborate on internal cyber security concerns, particularly with regard to those willing to “leak” information outside the UN system, including information from closed-door or otherwise private meetings and messages.

### **Fire Safety Policy and Guidelines**

201.One member (UNFPA) raised concern over the UNSMS policy and related guidelines on fire safety, which were promulgated approximately two years ago. The member noted that their implementation at the field level was proving to be a challenge due largely to the fact that individuals interpreting them do so in the context of complex office structures, similar to those found at headquarter duty stations (e.g. structures with multiple stories). In this regard, the member noted that his organisation had developed its own, simplified guidelines over the past two years that take into account the realities of deep field locations, adding that these guidelines have been well-received by his organisation’s country offices. The member then volunteered to share the relevant documents in order to assist other organisations in implementing the aforementioned policy and guidelines. Other IASMN members welcomed this initiative and requested that such documents be uploaded onto the United Nations Security Managers Information Network (UNSMIN).

202. One Staff Federation noted the enormous efforts it had taken to produce a fire safety policy and reminded members that it is important to ensure that guidelines are operationalized, particularly where personnel are required to live in mission housing or share rental accommodation. One member noted that fire safety is, in fact, covered in DPKO and DPA-led missions. The Chair noted that UNDSS' Strategic Review will examine existing capacity and future needs to ensure such guidelines are operationalized, particularly in the midst of crises and emergencies.

### **Standing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) at the Country Level**

203. One member sought advice from the IASMN as to whether a standard template for a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with a host government existed, particularly with regard to conferences scheduled to be held in a given country, in order to avoid drafting or negotiating new language each time. One member responded by stating that her organization has default clauses, (i.e. related to the host government's primary responsibility to ensure the safety and security of attendees) that would be useful in this regard. At the same time, the member noted that some host governments are hesitant to sign on to such clauses. A second member argued that such MOUs are only required in cases where the UN hosts a conference at a non-UN venues but, for the purposes of a specific conference, the venue is considered a UN venue, (e.g. a UN General Assembly meeting). A third member noted that some organisations have basic host government agreements, but these must still be fully drafted or negotiated each time, (i.e. such agreements can only be used as a template). Finally, a fourth member clarified that model host country agreements for conferences do, in fact, exist, but not every organisation may be familiar with such agreements. Nonetheless, such an agreement must still be presented to the host government for acceptance and, quite frequently, negotiation that may last for some time.

### **Family and Non-family Classifications**

204. One member sought to discuss the process of classifying a family or, alternatively, non-family duty station. In this regard, the Secretary of the IASMN clarified that such a determination is wholly dependent on security considerations—other factors do not play a role. This decision on the criteria was taken by the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), which reports to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). IASMN participants were informed that UNDSS briefs a tripartite group consisting of the ICSC, staff representatives, and human resources managers biannually, whereby it has an opportunity to advise the group regarding whether family restrictions for security reasons are in place with regard to select duty stations. UNDSS also has the opportunity to advise the ICSC and members of the Human Resources Network at any time with regard to whether family restrictions for security purposes are in place via communique at the moment the security environment would justify such advice (e.g. evacuation, relocation, creation of a new duty station). The final decision as to whether a duty station is classified as family or non-family rests with the Chairman of the ICSC.

205. Separately, the member noted that non-security considerations – in addition to security considerations – should play a part in determining whether a duty station is designated as a family or non-family duty station.

206. Another member then stated that his organisation was having difficulty recruiting personnel to non-family duty stations. Yet another member argued that relying on security considerations alone for determining the designation of a duty station as family or non-family is not appropriate because the DO/SMT on the ground are fully aware of non-security considerations that, in the past, would have justified one designation over another. Other members echoed similar sentiments.

**207. The IASMN took the view that using only security as the key consideration for the determination of family and non-family duty stations was neither acceptable nor realistic.**

### **Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) Policy**

208. UNDSS drew attention to the current Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) policy, arguing that it needs to be re-written as it is causing substantial confusion among security professionals. Much of this confusion is resulting from outdated terminology (e.g. reference to the Security Phase System), coupled with a lack of clarity as to what is mandatory and what is not mandatory as well as whether a “global mandatory MOSS” exists or whether MOSS is entirely dependent on the latest Security Risk Assessment (SRA) for a given duty station, among other issues. There was general agreement among members that MOSS needed to be revised.

### **Budgetary Concerns**

209. One member sought to briefly discuss budgetary concerns by citing the disparities between the UN Controller and the Finance and Budget Network (FBN) with regard to the size of the 2014-2015 budget (i.e. \$235 million as submitted by the Controller to the UN General Assembly versus \$226 million as calculated after the re-costing capability was eliminated versus \$218 million as agreed upon by UNDSS and the AFPs, with exchange rates and inflation also helping to destabilize the final figure). The Chair confirmed that, unfortunately UNDSS finds itself in the middle of this disparity that it has no ability to resolve on its own as the Department has no control over how the budget is calculated. The Chair stated that he would alert his predecessor and the UN Secretariat’s Chef du Cabinet of the issue.

210. Another member stressed the importance of the Strategic Review in allowing AFPs to make a stronger argument to their respective Executive Heads regarding the need for additional funding. The Chair agreed in this regard. Another member emphasized the importance of setting a firm deadline for the completion of not only the Strategic Review, but also the Structural Review for this very reason (i.e. to allow AFPs to make a stronger argument for additional funding based on current and future security needs).

## **Prioritisation of Issues**

211. One member stressed the importance of clarifying what issues were deemed a priority by the IASMN, i.e., what can and should be realistically accomplished over the coming months, whether prior to the next IASMN Steering Group session or the next full IASMN. The Chair highlighted seven priorities: 1) Strategic Review; 2) Security Risk Management (SRM); 3) Guidelines for Residential Security Measures (RSMs); 4) Aviation Risk Management; 5) Duty of Care Working Group (DOCWG); 6) Gender Inclusion in Security Management Working Group (GISMWG); and 7) Compliance, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy. Two other members called for making the completion of the Strategic Review, along with substantial progress on SRM and the Safety and Security Incident Recording System (SSIRS) the highest of priorities. In this regard, one member of the Security Incident Reporting Working Group (SIRWG) noted that it hoped to have a functioning e-tool for SSIRS by the end of 2014.

## **Statements from Staff Union Representatives**

212. The Chair of the IASMN set aside time at this session to afford the three Staff Federations (FICSA, CCISUA and UNISERV) the opportunity to present statements touching on the concerns of their respective constituents. The first Staff Federation stressed the importance of the UNSMS and a single, unified approach to the security of UN personnel. While noting that budgetary constraints will always exist, the UNSMS should think twice before engaging in a detailed cost-benefit analysis when it comes to security as people's lives are at stake. It praised the inclusion of gender considerations in security management and lauded the UN's stance following one country's passage of a law targeting the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) communities. It also drew attention to concerns over career development within the Organisation, noting that many staff members serving in high-risk duty stations are finding it difficult to be reassigned. Support was expressed for UNDP colleagues, calling current staff cuts "unjustified," and adding that action by the staff to address such cuts were being addressed through the proper channels. The Staff Federation then called on all UNSMS organisations to ensure that staff responsibilities are clearly defined so as not to avoid unforeseen expectations and to clarify the applicability of UNSMS policies, procedures, and arrangements to non-staff (e.g. contractors).

213. The second Staff Federation noted his federation's history of being highly supportive of UNDSS and security professionals in general, adding that the federation seeks to assist rather than hinder the implementation of security policies, procedures, and arrangements. He noted that his organisation had been invited to join a working group on armed private security companies (APSCs), adding that such an invitation had allowed the organisation to voice its opinion in a constructive manner and as such, welcomed invitations to join other working groups in a similar manner. Even in the capacity of a staff federation, such opportunities allowed staff to better understand the issues at play, which in turn allows their representatives to better explain any decision made to their constituents. He then called on IASMN members to better explain to staff why they should report to security professionals whenever they had been victims of crime as



sometimes reporting criminal activity may seem to be insignificant and, in a majority of cases, such activity simply goes unreported. The Federation also requested the establishment of a central e-mail address that staff may send their concerns to (e.g. hazardous driving, concern over an intoxicated pilot), even if they are now able to contact their Country Security Focal Point (CSFP) with such concerns. Moreover, with regard to the mobility scheme, staff need to know how the selection of candidates works. The Federation also called on IASMN members to support the work of the Justice Registry Working Group (JRWG) and its focus on ensuring follow-up on incidents involving the death of UN personnel while in service to the Organisation and acknowledging the rights of family members of such personnel under such circumstances. Finally, the staff federation noted the need to address risks and threats to the safety and security of locally-recruited personnel, particularly for those locally-recruited personnel from one ethnic, racial, religious, or political group that needed to be relocated for safety or security purposes.

214. The third Staff Federation stated that efforts to ensure cost-containment and proper head counts were hurting the UNSMS' focus on security. He called on the IASMN to dedicate its efforts to better ensuring the safety and security of locally-recruited personnel. More broadly, he called for greater access to stress counseling and psychosocial support, recognition of diversity, including with regard to women and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) communities, adding that homosexual relations are criminalized in almost eighty Member States. He expressed concern that staff are being asked to work at night and after hours. He also voiced concern with regard to the slow process of reimbursing some staff members for implementing residential security measures. He continued to stress the importance of ensuring the occupational health and safety of staff, including the need to better address medical issues ranging from obesity to diabetes. He noted that staff members' family obligations might extend beyond those individuals recognized as dependents by the Organisation. Additionally, the Federation called for the designation of family and non-family duty stations to be based on a multitude of factors and not only on security concerns. Finally, he called for a comprehensive review of staff members' compensation packages, with the assertion that risks and threats to staff members' safety and security are not being properly taken into consideration when it came to the compensation package.

215. Multiple members voiced support for the issues noted by the Staff Federations. One member emphasized the need to recruit and retain more women in the field, coupled with the need to address the cultural issues and security concerns that exist in many field locations. With regard to locally-recruited personnel, the member stated that such personnel were becoming ever-more prominent as organisations expand deeper into the field. The need to better ensure their safety and security should be a priority. Another member called for greater stability in contractual arrangements, noting that, in recent years, many staff members have been given no expectation of a continuing contractual relationship. Another member stressed the need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of various security professionals, beginning with the Designated Official (DO). Another member praised the UNSMS as the first system not to distinguish between staff members and other UN personnel (e.g. contractors) or dependents and other eligible family

members, adding that the UNSMS continues to wait for the Organisation's administrative arms to "catch up" in this regard. ( The same member noted that there was indeed a push to designated family and non-family duty stations based on a multitude of factors, not only security. The Chair concluded the meeting by suggesting that the opportunity for the Staff Federation representatives to present statements at all IASMN regular sessions be a standing practice and included on the agendas of all IASMN regular sessions.

### **IASMN Steering Group and IASMN Regular Sessions**

216.The IASMN decided to hold the next session of the IASMN Steering Group in Dakar, Senegal from 12 to 14 November 2014.

217After considering the kind invitation from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the IASMN decided to hold the next (21<sup>st</sup> session) of the IASMN, in Manila, Philippines from 3 to 6 February 2015.

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