

**Inter-Agency Security Management Network
19th session, ICAO HQ, Montreal
10 to 13 September 2013**

FINAL REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the Headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Montreal from 10 to 13 September 2013. A list of participants is attached as Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members is attached as Annex B. This was the 19th session of the IASMN since its first meeting in Vienna in 2000.
2. The conference was chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Safety and Security, Ms. Mbaranga Gasarabwe, with Ms. Magda Landry, Field Security Coordinator of UNESCO's Bureau of Field Coordinator serving as Co-Chair. Ms. Anne Marie Pinou, Chief of UNDSS' Policy, Planning, and Coordination Unit, served as Secretary.
3. The ASG began the meeting by expressing gratitude to ICAO for hosting the meeting and for all the support provided. Gratitude was specifically extended to Mr. Raymond Benjamin, Secretary General of ICAO, for addressing participants at the start of the meeting, with the ASG highlighting the fact that aviation risk management was on the IASMN's agenda.
4. The Secretary-General of ICAO thanked IASMN members for their collective efforts in setting up strategies and tactics to help improve the safety and security of UN staff at the international, regional, and local levels. The SG stressed that greater vigilance, determination, and ingenuity was required on the part of security officials given rising global instability and the threat posed by terrorists around the globe. He emphasized the need for increased awareness and application of the latest security procedures and the establishment of effective security policies needed to keep UN staff secure. The present situation in Syria is a good example where these policies are at work and where well-planned and well-executed cooperation and coordination between agencies has delivered dependable and effective protection for officials operating in the most high-risk environments, based on the understanding that the UN cannot simply withdraw from such environments. The SG cited the advice, updates, and guidance provided to UN staff during the recent presidential elections in Senegal as another example of how UN security approaches have improved under DSS and the UNSMS more generally. He also thanked IASMN members for their work in both Cairo and Dakar, two cities where ICAO maintains regional offices. More generally, the SG noted the movement to create sustainable security solutions while urging increased data sharing among UN agencies so that security risks can be tackled in a less obtrusive and more targeted manner over the coming years.

5. The ASG noted that the IASMN is currently facing multiple challenges to the question of how best to protect UN staff. The first challenge is determining what more can be done to protect national staff, with one of the staff federations having recently sent a letter to the Secretary-General in this regard. The ASG recalled that the UN had been criticized in the past for evacuating international staff from a country as soon as its security situation deteriorated, leaving national staff stranded in an unstable environment. The ASG stressed that the UN's mandate is to protect lives, including during times of crises. In light of such a mandate, there is a need to do more to protect national staff.
6. The second challenge is determining the extent to which the UN will continue to operate in a chemical weapons environment, particularly given the recent situation in Syria. The ASG noted that various UN system organizations continue to operate in Syria and thus there is a need to speak as one security family with regard to the circumstances under which the UN would continue to operate in a chemical weapons environment.
7. At the same time, the ASG urged the IASMN not to forget other crises around the world, including the ongoing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. The ASG emphasized the need to strengthen communication, leadership, and management at the headquarter and country levels and empower security officials on the ground in order to ensure that the UN is prepared to protect its staff as well as their eligible family members across all duty stations.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING

A. Security Risk Management Working Group (CRP 3 (b))

8. The Chair of the Security Risk Management (SRM) Improvement Working Group provided the IASMN with an update on the Working Group's progress. The update focused on the results of the field testing of the new SRM concepts and tool, as well as the issues identified during the field testing and drafting of the SRM Manual. These issues included the roll-out of the new SRM process and tool, changes in some key terms, integration of the Security Level System (SLS), and differentiation between security and safety within the SRM model.
9. The IASMN was requested to take note of the progress of the SRM Improvement Working Group and support the drafting of the SRM Manual. The IASMN was also requested to discuss and identify the inter-agency modalities that will support the roll-out of the new concepts and tool, ensuring that all security professionals and other security managers (i.e. Security Cells, Designated Officials (DOs) and Security Management Team (SMT) members) are competent in using the new system.
10. At the beginning of the discussion, one member emphasized the amount of work it takes to create a manual that genuinely explains not only the overview of the concept of SRM, but also the methodology of how it is carried out in a manner that can be understood by anyone involved in the SRM process. The member

stated that if the Manual is going to become the basis for all future work on SRM, then it must be the best it can be and the IASMN should address how it is going to ensure that is the case. Otherwise, the training and roll-out of the new SRM process and tool will be unsuccessful and there will be confusion in the system again.

11. Another member sought clarification regarding a previous recommendation that had been made to the IASMN to abolish the aggregate security level because of the confusion it caused. The member noted that the aggregate security level seems to have been retained, but that individual threat categories also seem to have been re-emphasized. In this regard, the member questioned how the SRM Improvement Working Group intends to avoid similar confusion when an aggregate security risk level is determined under the new SRM tool. Separately, the member wondered whether the SRM Improvement Working Group intended to remove hazards from the overall SRM model given the model's differentiation between security and safety. Overall, support was expressed for the idea that the Manual must be the best it can be and for committing resources from his organization to complete the Manual, if necessary.
12. Another member questioned whether the role of vulnerability had been minimized within the SRM model. Separately, the member expressed concern that, by building a professional and systemized tool, the SRM model may be leading security professionals to believe that conducting a Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is an inherently lengthy and structured process. Such a belief may lead a security official to forego an SRA in an emergency situation, believing that there simply isn't enough time to complete one. The member confirmed that such a scenario had been reported in Syria. The member stressed that such a belief ignores the fact that an SRA is merely a concept that can be applied under any circumstances. For example, an SRA may be carried out in as little as thirty-seconds in a case where a security official must decide whether to run into a burning building. More broadly, the member stressed the need to encourage mental agility among security officials while avoiding the creation of bureaucratic tools. Finally, the member supported the differentiation between security and safety within the SRM model according to whether an act is "deliberate" or "non-deliberate".
13. Another member urged the IASMN to retain an aggregate security level in some form because this proved to be useful in briefing Member States who are unaware that multiple security level areas exist within a country. Member States tend to view a country as a whole and do not have the time, resources, or inclination to appreciate that multiple security level areas may exist within a country. Separately, the member suggested that any attempt to differentiate security and safety within the SRM model should not be based solely on whether the act is "deliberate" or "non-deliberate," but also whether the act is also malicious. The member noted that a deliberate, non-malicious act (e.g. driving a vehicle with unsafe tires, which results in an accident) might still justify a safety assessment, rather than a security assessment.
14. Other members inquired about the flexibility of the SRM process and tool in particular. One member asked whether the SRM tool, which is designed primarily

for security professionals, is also capable of producing an executive summary for the DO/SMT. Another member asked if the SRM tool could be used for special (e.g. VIP) or short (e.g. three-day) missions to the field across multiple countries. Finally, one of the staff federations asked if the SRM tool could incorporate local staff affiliations (e.g. political, tribal).

15. The Chair of the SRM Improvement Working Group provided feedback on the points raised by the various members. With regard to the concern over any confusion that may result from the use of an aggregate risk level as produced by the SRM model, the Chair stated that any risk model must be able to produce an “aggregate” risk level in order to make acceptable risk decisions, ie, balancing a risk with programme criticality. For example, any mission to the field will likely face multiple threats with various risk levels and one needs to determine the “aggregate” risk facing the mission in order to make decisions related to acceptable risk. The Chair stated that, after studying how best to determine the “aggregate” risk level, the only plausible solution was to use the highest risk level. Therefore, the highest risk level serves as the basis for acceptable risk decisions by having something to balance with programme criticality. The Chair then explained that reliance on the highest risk level means that, technically, an aggregate is not actually calculated. Moreover, the Chair clarified that the term “aggregate” has never been used by the SRM Improvement Working Group and it would be inaccurate for anyone to do so; instead, the term “weighted” should be used when referring to the Security Level.
16. With regard to the question of whether hazards are still incorporated into an SRA, the Chair confirmed that hazards are still part of the general threat assessment, even though the SRM Manual differentiates between security and safety and that technically, any mention of “hazard” within “security” is not correct. The Chair noted that leaving hazards as part of the general threat assessment isn’t particularly harmful at the moment given its low weight. With that said, the Chair stressed that hazards should be removed from a General Threat Assessment (what is now termed the Structured Threat Assessment of the SLS) for the sake of conceptual clarity. Once the hazards category is removed, there may be some minor work required to reassign the weights of the remaining four categories for the purpose of calculating the Security Level.
17. With regard to the concern that the role of vulnerability has been minimized in the security risk process, the Chair of the SRM Improvement Working Group stated that the role of vulnerability has not been minimized; rather, vulnerability remains the crucial step of the security risk process and is found within the likelihood and impact assessments. Every little change in vulnerability automatically changes the security risk within the model, whether in the context of prevention or mitigation.
18. In responding to the concern that the SRM model may have the unintended consequence of creating a bureaucratic tool to the extent that security officials may actually forego its use in emergency situations, the Chair of the SRM Improvement Working Group responded by stating that the model serves an important function by putting the elements of SRM in the proper order and that,

over time, security officials could conduct an SRA without even having to use the e-tool.

19. The Chair of the SRM Improvement Working Group then addressed the broader issue of the SRM model's distinction between safety and security. The Chair emphasized that certain aspects of safety (i.e., road, aviation and fire) remain part of the UNSMS and should not be given to anyone else. The distinction between safety and security exists solely in the context of the SRM model, whereby safety is not part of the present development of the "Security" Risk Management tool.
20. The Chair of the SRM Improvement Working Group then clarified that, with regard to an aggregate – or, more accurately, a weighted – security level, such a level usually exists for a security level area within a country, rather than the country as a whole. The only exception is when an entire country is viewed as one security level area (e.g. The Gambia, France). However, with regard to peacekeeping areas (e.g. UNDOF), such an exception does not exist.
21. Finally, in responding to questions related to the flexibility of the SRM process and tool in particular, the Chair of the SRM Improvement Working Group confirmed that the SRM e-tool will be capable of providing an executive summary to the DO/SMT who may not have time to tackle the tool's technical aspects. The Chair noted that the Working Group is working on determining what such a summary will contain and how it can best be visualized. The Chair also confirmed that the tool can be used for special or short missions to the field across multiple countries. The Chair also revealed that the SRM tool can incorporate staff affiliations and other identifiers and that the Working Group was first working on incorporating gender identifiers into the SRM tool before working on others. The Chair added that such identifiers might not serve as independent variables as they may be too complex to capture, but they can at least be factored into the assessment.
22. Several members urged that the on-going development of the SRM process and tool be made a priority. One member stated that the SRM model is a way forward as to how security risks are to be managed within the UNSMS. The same member called for the dedication of additional resources to put together the SRM process and tool in a more rapid fashion and that failure to do so may be seen as negligent in the long-run. The member stated that he himself had penned a letter from his USG to the USG, DSS in this regard. The member added that if additional resources would be beneficial, then details should be put forward in this regard so that funding may be allocated accordingly. Another member reiterated that completion of the SRM process and tool should be a priority given that SRM is vital to humanitarian operations, among others. The same member stated that his USG would be keen to search for additional resources. Separately, it was emphasized that there is a need to ensure that the terminology developed in the SRM and SSIRS working groups be aligned in order to ensure consistency.
23. DSS stressed that the necessary time, effort, and resources must be dedicated to completing the SRM process and tool properly. It also expressed hope that other agencies and WFP in particular would be willing to assist going forward while echoing other members by stating that its continued development should be a

priority. DSS also noted that, at least from a DSS perspective, any additional resources would likely come from FSS, whether for software development or training. However, while a discussion on the need for additional resources was welcomed, members were reminded that the development of training programmes and manuals is a “natural process,” whereby any development, testing, re-testing, writing, editing, and publishing will take time, regardless of the amount of people assigned to the tasks; dedicating additional manpower may make the process go faster, but not too much faster.

24. The IASMN endorsed the SRM methodology that had been developed and agreed that this should be rolled-out as a priority. In so doing, the IASMN also agreed to the changes in some key terms, the differentiation between security and safety, i.e. the SRM methodology would only apply to security, and to integrating the SLS into the SRM process. In order to support the roll-out, the IASMN requested that DSS examine what internal resources may be devoted to finalizing the SRM Manual, training in the new process and to developing an e-tool. At the same time, the possibility of IASMN members providing additional resources for the roll-out should also be explored.

B. Update on Programme Criticality (CRP 7)

25. The Chair of the Programme Criticality Coordination Team (PCCT), (which is currently held by UNICEF), provided an update on the roll-out of Programme Criticality (PC) and lessons learned to date and on the inter-agency process and engagement with Member States. In accordance with the recommendations endorsed by the HLCM in October 2011, a guided roll-out of PC to UN teams in the field has been in place since January 2012. To date, PC assessments following this methodology have been conducted in Afghanistan, Sudan, Mali, Mauritania, Yemen, Syria, Central African Republic, Niger, Pakistan and Somalia. Further support is envisaged, based on demand from UN teams in the field. A letter, which emphasizes the importance of PC, was sent to field presences in 27 countries. The letter was co-signed by the UNDG Chair, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the USGs for DSS, DPKO, DFS and DPA, and sent in January 2013. As requested by the HLCM, based on the initial experience and lessons learned in the roll-out, a revised PC Framework was developed and approved by the HLCM in March 2013. The revised PC framework clarifies several aspects concerning the approach and conduct of PC assessments, including accountability, the links between PC and the SRM, as well as a few detailed updates to the methodology.

26. The Chair of PCCT emphasized the need for programme managers to distinguish between risk and threat with regard to PC. The Chair reminded IASMN members that the underlying objective is to manage risk and that there is no benefit to accepting “unacceptable” risk. Programme managers should only accept “residual” risk when their respective programmes outweigh such risk. Since risk can never be truly eliminated, it is the duty of programme managers to determine what level of residual risk is acceptable.

27. The discussion began with IASMN members expressing strong support for the work done on PC, with one member noting that the roll-out phase appears to have been completed and that it was perhaps time to implement the process. However, another member questioned the extent to which the PC1 category has been properly defined and cautioned against adopting a rigid definition. It was noted that while some activities may not be technically “life-saving,” they may nonetheless be vital to the mandate of an organization and thus warrant a PC1 label. The member expressed support for a peer-review process in this regard and recommended that an organization’s Executive Head first approve the labelling of any activities, particularly “reputational” activities. Another member echoed such a sentiment, cautioning that an overly restrictive definition of PC1 activities may limit an organization’s critical work. For example, an organization may need to have an envoy located on the ground, but he or she may not always be “providing water” or other technically life-saving activities. The member also noted that PC remains a framework, not a policy and that it was important when explaining PC assessments to Member States that it be made clear that this does not impact on established mandates. She added that it is important to determine what activities are truly vital. Yet another member suggested that a clause be added to the definition of PC1 activities to incorporate vital or reputational activities that are not technically “life-saving”.
28. On the other end of the discussion, one member noted that organizations often have a “knee-jerk” reaction in identifying their activities as PC1, while stressing that the category should be used more sparingly. In noting the need to clearly define PC1, among other categories, the member praised the Syria Team for identifying four layers of activities – communication, leadership, support of national staff, and life-saving activities – that are relevant to the work of the UN in Syria. Another member echoed such a sentiment, while adding that one needs to distinguish between all risks, and security risks in particular, and that the focus should be only on security risks.
29. The Chair provided feedback on many of the points raised by IASMN members. With regard to the suggestion that the roll-out phase has been completed, it was clarified that there is still a need to “build up the process”. In this regard, it was noted that some field offices still dismiss the framework and that USG-level support may be required on this front as it cannot be viewed as only being applicable at the headquarter level. Additional progress needs to be made with regard to providing baseline guidance and training to programme managers and security professionals across AFPOs in the absence of dedicated budgets. Thus, it is too early to say that the process has been mainstreamed. The Chair stated that the goal is to conclude all independent assessments, including with regard to how the framework is perceived and used in the field, by June 2014. This would mark the end of the roll-out phase. The overarching goal is to ensure that PC assessments do not stay on the shelf. Finally, with regard to the issue of how best to define the PC1 category, the Chair supported a more restrictive approach, whereby PC1 activities should not be linked to importance or priority within an organization but should rather be a very rare occurrence.

30. The IASMN:

a. took note of the update on Programme Criticality and expressed its appreciation for UNICEF’s role in leading the Programme Criticality Coordination team (PCCT);

b. noting the concerns expressed regarding the definition of PC1 activities and its uneven application in programme criticality assessments, requests that the PCCT look carefully at how PC1 activities are defined;

c. emphasized the need for security risk assessments and programme criticality assessments to be undertaken in a more robust manner and

d. noting the concerns about the way in which programme criticality is perceived by Member States, requests that further work be done to explicitly clarify that programme criticality assessments are not questioning legislative mandates.

C. Critical Incident Stress Management (CRP 8)

31. DSS (FSS) introduced an update on the global deployment of critical incident stress counselors across the UN system (approximately 100 from multiple funding sources and multiple AFPOs).
32. DSS noted that there was a request at the last IASMN to present a policy on critical incident stress management, but that such a request could not be met at this time due to human resources constraints within DSS’ Critical Incident Stress Management Unit (CISMU).
33. DSS reminded IASMN members that CISMU coordinates the global response with regard to the deployment of stress counselors and that one of CISMU’s challenges is that the vast majority of stress counselors deployed outside of headquarter duty stations are cost-shared. Furthermore, the perceived need of stress counselors by an SMT tends to be approximately four months after a critical incident, after which an SMT no longer wishes to fund stress counselors. If another critical incident takes place soon thereafter, however, respective SMTs begin demanding that stress counselors join the mission responding to the critical incident, which places substantial strain on the system.
34. Therefore, DSS requested the IASMN to support cost-shared counselors at the highest-risk duty stations that are locally funded by the SMT. DSS noted that it is ambivalent as to whether such counselors are internationally or locally-recruited, noting that some issues exist with regard to locally-recruited counselors, particularly in countries with strong ethnic divides. DSS subsequently highlighted the areas where CISMU believes there should be counselors. For example, DSS noted that there is no UN counselor in North Africa. Also, there is no cost-shared counselor in Syria, although a unilaterally-funded counselor exists, courtesy of UNFPA. Overall, the IASMN was requested to take note of this update on the inventory of CISMU field stress counselors and to consider taking further action in addressing remaining gaps.

35. One member began the discussion by suggesting that a more coordinated approach should be adopted with regard to the placement of staff welfare counselors. The member noted that staff welfare counselors exist in countries such as India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka, yet are absent in countries such as Myanmar and minimally present in countries such as Syria. In this regard, a more coordinated approach needs to be adopted by respective organizations based on priority.
36. Several members, in addition to the representative of the Medical Directors Working Group (MDWG) and one of the staff federations, stressed the need for predictability within the system, particularly with regard to the funding and availability of stress counselors in high-risk duty stations. The representative of the MDWG emphasized that mental health care should not be perceived as a luxury item that can readily be cut amid the onset of budget shortfalls, adding that a lack of mental health care decreases productivity and efficiency among UN staff. Furthermore, it was suggested that mental health care should not be provided solely in the aftermath of acute events, but rather on a more consistent basis to combat the chronic stress that often results from seemingly routine activities over the long-term. Another member echoed the need to provide stress counselors to staff working in both catastrophic and long-term environments, while pointing out that it will remain difficult to do so if the overwhelming majority of stress counselors remain cost-shared at the country-level. Yet another member added that the current ad-hoc, cost-shared structure creates an incentive for staff counselors to leave rather than stay on assignment. Other members called for the development of formal career paths for stress counselors within DSS or, as suggested by one member, within a larger body involving human resources professionals.
37. There was a consensus among IASMN members that mental health is vital to the health of UN staff members. One of the staff federations stated that mental health can sometimes be even more important than physical health while noting that the UN has become a target over the years and will likely remain a target over the foreseeable future. Therefore, the need for additional mental health professionals will likely only grow over time. With that said, one member pointed out that the UNSMS is responsible for critical incident stress management, but that in some cases it was also engaging in regular stress management at high-risk duty stations, even in the absence of a critical incident. The member called on the Human Resources Network and the MDWG to become more involved if such management is to be sustainable over the long-run. Such involvement becomes even more pressing when one considers the mental health needs of national staff, many of whom are placed in even greater danger than international staff. In this regard, one member stated that UN staff working in Syria should be regarded as working in a critical incident environment and thus should fall under the umbrella of the UNSMS with regard to critical incident stress management.
38. DSS (FSS) agreed that a more coordinated approach should be adopted with regard to the placement of stress counselors. FSS would see to it that CISMU organize and supervise routine conferences for counselors to boost preparedness. However, it was acknowledged that internationally-recruited stress counselors

were burnt out, with one member noting the involvement of stress counselors in ongoing, months-long hostage negotiations in Syria. As a result, DSS must often recommend the services of local stress counselors to UN staff, if available. However, it was pointed out that sometimes national staff members decline to seek the assistance of local counselors, particularly if strong divisions exist within the local community. Although another member suggested that a formal peer-helper system be developed among staff as an alternative, DSS noted that such a system would require trained professionals.

39. The IASMN took note of the update on the inventory of CISMU field stress counsellors and:

a. affirmed that the UN system’s ability to continue to operate safely and securely is also dependent on the health and welfare of its staff. In this regard, the IASMN recognized the necessity and value of stress counselling, in both critical and non-critical situations and also on a long-term basis;

b. supported that the provision of stress counselling, including critical incident stress counselling, requires predictable and sustainable funding and

c. noted that this is an issue warranting further consideration by the Human Resources Network and the Medical Directors’ Working Group, with a view to preparing a joint statement for submission to the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) to support the case for predictable and sustainable funding.

D. United Nations Personnel Air Travel Policy (CRP 5)

40. DSS’ FSS presented a progress report on efforts by its Aviation Risk Management Office (ARMO) to finalize a formal air travel policy for the UNSMS. In 2006 the IASMN endorsed the ‘Commercial Passenger Air Travel Guidelines,’ which, *inter alia*, suggested all AFPOs use FlightSafe as a method to research and, using a UN defined scoring system, categorize relative safety amongst commercial scheduled airlines. In 2011, ARMO was established and the first function of that office was to evaluate both the ‘Commercial Passenger Air Travel Guidelines’ and FlightSafe. In so doing, errors were found in FlightSafe and it was learned that many members of the UNSMS had adopted and treated the Guidelines as policy.

41. Incorporating suggested comments from the IASMN Air Travel Working Group and the IASMN Steering Group Meeting in May 2013 in New York, the ARMO completed a draft UNSMS policy entitled “United Nations Personnel Air Travel”. In order to address existing internal constraints (such as legal, operational, and insurance) within individual UNSMS members, the intention behind the policy is to have each member develop their own internal ‘Air Operational Guidelines’ in which to apply their own respective requirements. The draft policy addresses topic areas, including requirements for UNSMS members, air charter agreements and travellers, use of donated flights, training and compliance.

42. The ARMO has worked collaboratively and directly with other entities dealing with aviation issues within the UN. This includes participation in the Aviation Technical Advisory Group (ATAG) and joining aviation professionals from DFS and WFP Air Transport Sections to participate in the first UN Joint Evaluation (JE) Inspector Training Programme in July 2013. Following agreements with ICAO and in consultation with OLA, ARMO will rely on ICAO to provide risk categorizations (Acceptable, Questionable, Do Not Use) for the assessment of air operators. In cooperation with ICAO, the ARMO will provide supplemental information for those air operators with a less-than Acceptable ranking (i.e. additional details to provide supportive advice to air travel focal points and security professionals). This will be referred to as DSS' Aviation Risk Management Assessment Programme (ARMAP) and will use criteria comparable to methodologies currently accepted/in use by ATAG members.
43. Should the need exist, DSS will identify a recognized audit organization (the Flight Safety Foundation is currently being considered) to conduct a ground assessment to gather further data. This is addressed through the UN Commercial Airline Assessment Framework (UNCAAF). It is the intention that the processes set out in the UNCAAF will support ARMO advice. In order to link to other DSS safety and security processes, the use of aviation risk data is to be fully integrated into TRIP and potentially into travel systems. Integrated data would be used to maximize the efficiency of resources and the capabilities of DSS as a whole.
44. Moreover, the UN and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) signed a Cooperation Agreement that established a "UN DSS ARMO Analysis Unit" within ICAO. Discussions are underway as to whether this agreement should be extended or replaced with a new Memorandum of Understanding to better reflect the evolution of the ICAO/UN DSS partnership. The IASMN was requested to endorse the UNSMS policy on United Nations Personnel Air Travel, including Terms of Reference for Air Travel Focal Points (ATFP), the Air Operational Guidelines cover letter and the Air Travel Operational Guidelines Template. Pending completion of a new MOU and review by OLA, the IASMN is requested to endorse the move from providing advice based on FlightSafe to providing advice based on the methodology developed by ICAO. The IASMN was also requested to take note of the progress report from the Aviation Risk Management Office and endorse its proposed ARMAP and UNCAAF. Finally, the IASMN was requested to take note of ICAO's report.
45. The discussion began with one member asking how the risk categorizations fit into the SRM decision-making process. For example, a "questionable" rating likely required analysis of further information whereby the SRM decision-making process may be useful. This is particularly true given the fact that approximately one-third of air operators are currently deemed questionable. Moreover, the member claimed that the Do-Not-Use category implies that an unacceptable risk exists and that it could be very likely that mass casualties will result. The member questioned whether such an implication is accurate. In short, the member recommended that, instead, DSS rename the three risk categories from Acceptable, Questionable and Do-Not-Use to Unrestricted, Conditional, and Restricted. Similarly, another member questioned whether the Do-Not-Use category went so far as to imply that there would be a "banned list" and whether

such a categorization would be accurate. In this regard, DSS confirmed that the “Do-Not-Use” category would not amount to producing a “banned list,” but agreed to consider the recommendation that the categories be renamed.

46. Another member called attention to specific points contained within the draft policy, namely the definition of “official travel” and the requirement to request approval from DSS for military/police flights 72 hours in advance contained within the draft. With regard to the definition of “official travel,” it was recognized that this needed to be clearly defined in the policy. With regard to the 72 requirement for certain flights, the member noted that its application is unclear, particularly its reference to “on-the-spot decision making” given the absence of a mechanism for on-the-spot decision-making. The member recommended that the policy be clarified, perhaps in consultation with the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLA).
47. Another member asked for clarification as to the role played by ICAO in its collaboration with DSS, urging that any air operator country sheets be based on technical criteria established by ICAO that is recognized as the technical expert in this regard. DSS responded by confirming that ICAO is, in fact, the technical expert in this regard and that any questions about air operators would be answered in coordination with ICAO. DSS also reiterated that ICAO will formulate a list of every commercial airline operating in a given country and categorize these appropriately according to the three risk categories previously referenced, with ICAO maintaining ownership over such a list. However, DSS noted that ICAO will not be involved in the daily decision-making process.
48. DSS then took the opportunity to clarify the purpose of ARMAP, which is to serve as a backup to a DSS desk review by creating a feedback system for evaluation by ICAO. No recommendation would be made on the part of DSS; instead, information would simply be fed back to ICAO for consideration, thereby allowing for updates to existing annotations on questionable airlines. Meanwhile, DSS will be responsible for carrying out flight reviews of commercial and donated aircraft. With that said, DSS emphasized that both ICAO and DSS have been asked to do something that has never been done before. With regard to a follow-up question by the same member as to whether ATAG had any comments concerning this new policy, DSS stated that ATAG had no further comment and appeared satisfied with the new policy.
49. One member asked whether there is a policy as to how many individuals are permitted on one aircraft. DSS responded by stating that different organizations have different policies and should be driven by business continuity needs. Moreover, there are different insurance policies based on one’s destination, airline, number of staff, and existing personal insurance. Another member suggested that guidelines should be drafted that specifies how many individuals should be permitted on a given aircraft, instead of leaving it up to the organizations to decide. Such guidelines could at least recommend an appropriate percentage of staff permitted on any one aircraft.
50. Another member pointed out the ambiguity over what constitutes a “donor” flight, particularly when a basic charge is incurred for such a flight. DSS responded by

stating that the definition of a commercial flight is found in the draft policy, whereby any flight that is open to the general public is considered a commercial flight and all others are deemed “donor” flights. Similarly, another member inquired about the nature of “charter” flights and chartering agreements, including in the context of an NGO offering a flight on a one-time basis. The member also asked about the extent to which charter flights require international regulation, particularly those operating within the United States or the Caribbean region, which already heavily regulate charter flights within their respective territories. DSS responded by acknowledging that a large amount of confusion exists as to how best to define a “charter” flight, particularly when some charter flights, including in the Caribbean region, can still be purchased by the general public with a scheduled departure time. DSS also noted that the term “charter” was inserted into the new policy at the request of ATAG, while simultaneously clarifying that any chartering is organized through DPKO/DFS or WFP. Separately, the same member asked what added value exists in having the USG approve government/military flights, rather than the DO/SMT. DSS responded by clarifying that the USG has the authority to review those flights; however, the USG will sometimes delegate such authority to the DO/SMT. Normally, if the DO/SMT requests a specific flight, the review will first be routed to the USG and the DO informed by the respective regional desk. In other cases, if an organization requests a flight review directly, the review will be addressed to that organization and the regional desk will simply be copied

51. Referring specifically to TRIP, DSS confirmed that a list of who is travelling at what time is incorporated into the profile in the TRIP clearance process. It had been decided to include such information in order to better integrate flight safety information within the TRIP software, which will subsequently be able to verify whether an individual has selected a “questionable” airline, the requirements needed for a particular flight, in addition to alternative flights. DSS highlighted the significance of integrating such flight safety information by recalling an incident whereby a fire broke out at Nairobi’s airport and DSS had difficulty determining whether individuals who were supposed to be in Nairobi were actually in Nairobi and at what airport they had actually arrived.
52. DSS reiterated its request that the IASMN endorse the new air travel policy, which would replace FlightSafe, and endorse the concept of ARMAP and UN CAAF, in conjunction with ICAO. Moreover, DSS requested that the IASMN take note of the partnership between ICAO and DSS, the integration of ICAO’s aviation technical expertise and DSS’ security risk management expertise, in addition to the contributions of ICAO. While members appeared ready to make such endorsements, one member suggested the addition of a proviso regarding the extent to which it would be possible to refund ICAO and how such a refund would sit with current obligations. The suggestion was supported by several IASMN members. DSS responded by stating that the new policy will be implemented within existing resources and without increasing the budget.

53. **The IASMN expressed its appreciation and support to DSS' FSS, including ARMO, as well as to ICAO for all the work undertaken so far.**
54. **The IASMN endorsed the UNSMS policy on United Nations Personnel Air Travel, including Terms of Reference for Air Travel Focal Points (ATFP), the Air Operational Guidelines cover letter and the Air Travel Operational Guidelines Template, subject to the amendments suggested and to further legal review for consistency before submission to HLCM for its endorsement.**
55. **The IASMN took note of the partnership between ICAO and DSS to be formalized in a new MOU, which provides for a provision by DSS and ICAO of a methodology to replace Flightsafe.**
56. **The IASMN endorsed the concept of ARMAP and UNCAAF. The IASMN made special note that ICAO's methodology and the ARMAP and UNCAAF concept should be responsive and client oriented in meeting the needs of the organizations within reasonable time limits and within existing budgetary resources. The IASMN also added that they did not want to lose any functionality (in response time and services) that is currently provided by the ARMO.**

E. Saving Lives Together (CRP 4)

57. DSS' Policy, Planning, and Coordination Unit (PCCU) updated the IASMN with regard to the draft UNSMS policy on Saving Lives Together. Over the past years, there has been a critical requirement for humanitarian organizations operating in complex threat environments to establish a more robust and integrated approach to address common security concerns. Since 2001, the IASC has examined best practices for security collaboration between the UN and international non-governmental organizations, which are UN implementing partners. Those best practices have formed the basis for Saving Lives Together, a framework that outlines the areas of collaboration on security issues between the UN and its non-governmental organization implementing partners.
58. Although the Saving Lives Together framework was cited in General Assembly resolutions and endorsed by the IASMN, HLCM, and CEB, the framework has yet to be articulated as a UNSMS policy on collaboration between the UN and its implementing partners. However, the IASMN has made progress on the development of this policy, as well as on the operational aspects in carrying out the Saving Lives Together framework. The IASMN was recommended to approve the draft UNSMS policy on Saving Lives Together that was endorsed by the IASMN Steering Group at its session in May 2013 and to take note of the update on the operational aspect of the Saving Lives Together framework.
59. Noting that the policy highlights the IASMN's commitment to the SLT framework, the policy was endorsed by the IASMN, with some amendments, and at the same time, it was noted that operational guidelines would need to be developed to provide clear guidance to the field on the implementation of the policy.

60. **The IASMN endorsed the draft UNSMS policy on Saving Lives Together for inclusion in the Security Policy Manual, with some amendments, noting that an additional footnote specifying SLT operational guidelines will be added to paragraph 7 of the policy once the guidelines are finalized.**
61. **The IASMN took note of the update on the implementation of the Saving Lives Together Framework.**

F. Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) Technical Working Group (TWG) (CRP 10)

62. DSS' Policy, Planning, and Coordination Unit (PCCU) updated the IASMN with regard to the progress of the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) Technical Working Group. In order to ensure efficient and cost-effective MORSS arrangements, DSS, in collaboration with OHRM, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP agreed to undertake a review of current MORSS arrangements and policy, including relevant security management policies and procedures related to MORSS.
63. In this regard, DSS established a small Technical Working Group on MORSS, under the chairmanship of the USG to consider the multi-faceted issues related to the implementation of MORSS. The Technical Working Group aims to address the following key issues: 1) MORSS principle, purpose, and criteria; 2) high MORSS expenditures in certain countries; 3) the need to streamline MORSS coverage for international staff and improve oversight and accountability for MORSS implementation; and 4) MORSS implications for national staff.
64. The outcome of the TWG's deliberations and recommendations will be considered by senior officials of the UN and may later contribute, through the established inter-agency mechanisms, including the IASMN and the Human Resources Network, to the revision of relevant policies. The IASMN was requested to take note of this update on the work of the Technical Working Group on MORSS.
65. The discussion began with the recollection that ADB had done a lot of work on the issue of residential security and that a preliminary working group consisting of ADB, UNICEF, UNFPA, DSS, ITU, UNEP/UNON, and CCISUA had been established during the 18th session of the IASMN in Rome to examine MORSS measures. It was clarified that this initial, informal working group had been superseded by the TWG.
66. One member suggested that MORSS measures should be abolished. The member stated that the concept behind MORSS was sound, but that the subsequent "procurement" approach had failed and that MORSS measures were now viewed as 'entitlements' not necessarily aimed at the protection of life. The member noted that MORSS measures have been implemented in Vietnam at times when staff members were on leave. MORSS measures have also been implemented in Cambodia in areas where criminal activity was low and MORSS was not supported by an SRA. Some had even requested MORSS measures, including

armed guards, because they feared mobs would threaten them given the fact that the UN did not take part in a country's election process. Meanwhile, there have been reports of break-ins simply caused by a failure to lock one's doors; in such incidents, MORSS measures would not have served as a deterrent. The member cited one example where \$435,000 was spent on slightly more than one hundred staff members, amounting to \$4,000 on MORSS measures per staff member. Moreover, the member added that the DSS desk officer responsible for approving MORSS measures is often stuck between a "rock and a hard place" to support staff in the field and to defer to the DO/SMT with regard to assessing their respective security situations. Meanwhile staff members in the field are often not properly trained as to why MORSS measures exist. The member stressed that MORSS should focus on education (i.e. how one can stay safe inside his or her residence) and not on procurement. Attacks on residences can and do still take place even with bars, guards, and alarms in place. In response, another member supported that perhaps the Technical Working Group should consider more "radical" approaches to MORSS, including the abolishment of the current MORSS scheme.

67. Another member asked whether a timeline has been set for when the Technical Working Group will conclude its work. DSS responded by stating that the Technical Working Group aims to have its work completed by the next IASMN session.

68. The IASMN took note of the update on the work of the Technical Working Group on MORSS and requested that it be kept apprised of developments. The IASMN further encourages the TWG to think beyond the box in its deliberations in considering alternatives to MORSS.

Budgetary Issues

G. Update: Budgetary Issues (CRP 2 (a))

69. DSS provided the IASMN with an update on budgetary matters. DSS noted that the proposed programme budget for 2014-2015 has been presented to the General Assembly and has recently been reviewed by its Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). As presented to the Steering Group at its meeting in New York in May 2013, the proposals are at maintenance level with zero real growth in staff and non-staff costs. Also as presented to the Steering Group in May, in spite of maintaining zero real growth in staff and non-staff costs for 2014-2015, the total JFA costs are expected to increase to \$235.9 million when factoring in the realistic vacancy rate of 7.5% and 7.2% for international and local field staff, respectively, the estimated inflation and exchange rate fluctuations for 2014-2015, and revisions to staff compensation. In order to absorb the impact of these increases in the face of the AFPOs making it clear that a global expenditure ceiling of US\$218.6 million for the biennium 2014-2015 cannot be exceeded, DSS highlighted several measures put in place. The IASMN was requested to review and take note of DSS' update.

70. One member began the discussion by noting that, over the past few years, the IASMN has come a long way in terms of its attempt to break down costs. In this

regard, the member referred to MORSS spending as a “red herring” and added that the focus should be on support costs. The member stated that there are some items that have been agreed upon in this regard, but have yet to be delivered. The member also expressed disappointment that a 14% vacancy rate is initially set for staff members in the field, noting that it creates an unequal playing field at the outset. The member argued that the paper on Budgetary Matters failed to address whether the Comptroller will continue with this method of budgeting over the coming years. In this regard, DSS clarified that the Comptroller is currently seeking to maintain only a 7% vacancy rate for staff members in the field, with any additional posts to be funded by AFPOs.

71. With respect to the reporting of locally cost-shared budgets, another member noted improvements in the UNSMIN portal and its ability to deliver timely data. However, the member regretted that, even after multiple IASMN discussions on this subject, challenges remain. More specifically, the member pointed out that the latest data noted a discrepancy of more than \$10 million in various financial accounts (e.g. Iraq, Israel, and Liberia). The member noted that DSS desk officers had visited these places and examined the deliverables and questioned why, after four years, the IASMN’s instructions have not been followed. There is a need to strengthen accountability and to tailor DSS’ services to outcomes. The member noted that he had shared the missing links with the IASMN, which he hoped could be shared on UNSMIN. The member concluded by highlighting the fact that a \$34 million shortfall exists in 2013. DSS responded by stating that the last time a desk officer brought up the issue, the figures were updated on UNSMIN. DSS added that many countries do not have cost-shared budgets and, in any case, only that which is above the threshold of \$150,000, is required to trigger an examination. It was stressed that DSS does not have the capacity to force everyone to present their local cost-shared budgets to DSS’ Executive Office and that the \$150,000 threshold for examination is reasonable. Another member responded that Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine have yet to submit their 2012-2013 budget cuts, thus making it difficult to fully assess current gaps.
72. Another member raised the issue of extra-budgetary funding, specifically asking what countries are the primary recipients of such funding. DSS identified Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), Sudan (Khartoum) via USAID Saving Lives Together), Syria, and Yemen as the recipients, with Somalia receiving the “lion’s share”. That member highlighted the fact that Kenya and Somalia have international staff on cost-shared budgets, which should not happen given the fact that extra-budgetary funding has reached approximately \$11 million. It was noted that organizations are often too quick to write off extra budgetary funding as an unreliable source of funding, but stressed that it can be reliable and can even be relied upon over multiple years. Many entities are keen to fund security, not simply shelter and education, and IASMN members have not fully exhausted this option. Finally, the member noted that it is willing to help in this regard and continues to offer donor relations training, Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) and Consolidated Appeal (CAP) training, and related briefings. IASMN members were urged to collaborate in order to elect persons with the right skills to secure additional, extra-budgetary funding.

73. Another member stated that, in indicating cost savings, DSS seemed to be emphasizing limited travel, high vacancies, and unreliable extra-budgetary funding. In the member's opinion, such emphasis is rooted in an "old business model," whereby more funding was sought amid consistent expansion. However, the member stated that the IASMN has been arguing over the past few years, through a strategic review, that such a model should change. More specifically, the member noted that if one reviews the JFA closely, options to implement cost-saving measures appear to exist with regard to how the budget is spent. DSS responded by reminding IASMN members that the last time DSS had a substantial increase in staff was in 2010-2011. Since that time, DSS has not put in a request for a new position, with the exception of one position in the Aviation Risk Management Office (ARMO). No new security advisor positions have been requested and no non-post requests (e.g. travel, equipment) have been made. However, DSS noted that it cannot control certain elements within the budget, particularly inflation and currency exchange rates, which contribute to a steady increase in the budget year after year.
74. Another member expressed frustration with the idea that little can be done to curb additional increases in the budget year after year. The member urged the IASMN to reshape the way it conducts business and stressed the need to understand both operational and strategic positions. More specifically, the member urged that a strategic review be used to make budget cuts. Another member proposed that, without prejudice to a strategic review, a simple way to cut costs is to reduce the number of international staff and increase the number of national staff positions, including for some DSS security officers.
75. Another member emphasized that it was impossible to discuss budgetary issues without discussing the JFA paper (CRP 2 (b)), whereby the strategy for the budget is laid out. The member expressed frustration with the initial argument that it is sufficient to merely stabilize the budget, only to subsequently be told that budget cuts are needed. It is quite difficult to determine what post should or should not remain by simply examining a basic spread sheet outlining existing posts and no organization wants to be micromanaged. The member then expressed disappointment over the progress made up to this point. The member recalled that a discussion was first held and many ideas were exchanged and recorded during the meeting of the JFA working group, but that such ideas did not constitute a strategy. Subsequently, DSS moved the IASMN forward through the JFA document (CRP 2 (b)), which helped outline standing deliverables. However, the member stated that he would like to see DSS identify existing priorities and key deliverables. The member added that DSS cannot collectively keep using Somalia and Syria, among other conflicts, as an excuse from doing so; DSS needed to start factoring in the unexpected.
76. Two members then sought to clarify specific points concerning the budget. One member asked how a \$6 million shortfall can exist when more than \$11 million in extra-budgetary funds also exists. DSS responded by stating that the \$11 million in extra-budgetary funds is earmarked for specific funding to avoid using DSS' general funds; therefore, a shortage would still have existed, as DSS is not free to allocate such funds as it sees fit. Such funds only take away the need for a surge or supplement in funding. Another member asked whether extra-budgetary

funding is ever allocated for non-staff costs to which DSS responded that such funding can and often is diverted to cover non-staff costs.

77. One member expressed concern that a previous request to cap at \$219 million had not been followed and that now a substantially greater budget of more than \$235 million is headed to the GA. The member stated that this was unacceptable as no one wishes to revert back to micromanaging the entire system or face heavy staff cuts. The member recalled when regional security officers, rather than country officers, existed under UNSECOORD and added that no one wishes to return to such a time. In this regard, the member endorsed the previously mentioned idea of replacing some international staff with national staff. Another member agreed that no one wishes to return to the days of UNSECOORD, whereby a regional security officer was responsible for covering five to six countries, stating that it would be a “complete disaster”. The member recalled a recent incident in Kazakhstan whereby the country’s security officer responded in a timely manner after the member’s office in Astana was threatened and the son of a diplomat was attacked, adding that such a timely response would likely not have occurred absent a security officer at the country level. The Chair added that the reliance on regional security officers was particularly problematic in Europe and Latin America and that, today, DSS’ remains committed to having security officers at the country level, relying on UNDP to administer the relevant contracts given their extensive presence across more than 112 countries. However, the plan is to move towards a more integrated system, although local security assistants would remain under UNDP.
78. One member sought to clarify the dilemma that his organization and perhaps others were encountering. The member acknowledged that the value of the budget is approximately \$235 million (“fully re-costed and adjusted”) according to the Comptroller, with “politics having come into play” by the end of the biennium. With that said, the member stressed that AFPOs do not have a “political budgeting system” and it was previously agreed that the budget would be capped at \$218 million. The Finance and Budget Network (FBN) can and, in fact, decided to push through with a cap of \$218 million for 2014-2015, and DSS reviewed how it can operate in that environment. At the same time, DSS has to “elastically” work with the Comptroller’s figure of \$235 million.
79. Another member understood that the \$218 million cap was for all costs. The member recalled that a similar dilemma arose in 2010-2011 and it was very clear there were no options available at that time. Today, again, while IASMN members are being “guaranteed” a cap (i.e. \$218 million), concern was expressed that six months later, DSS will state that expenditures exceeded the cap (i.e. \$235 million). DSS responded by stating that it fully acknowledges the \$218 million cap and that the structure of the budget is presented with adherence to the cap. However, DSS also explained that it is subsequently put in a position to navigate the ceiling target. If the IASMN wishes to account for the Comptroller’s figure, then DSS will have to re-adjust its figures accordingly.
80. Another member stated that, leaving the cap aside, the issue is that the strategic review is still missing from the equation and thus the cap serves simply as a control measure; the strategic review may indicate further changes are required.

81. Another member took issue with the practice of using the budget of a given year as a baseline for future budgets as costs naturally increase over time. Frustration was expressed that the budget had been re-costed to more than \$235 million and he questioned the purpose of the strategic review given the fact that the \$218 million cap agreed upon in the strategic review was not maintained.
82. Another member suggested that, procedurally, the IASMN should try to correct why the budget is presented to the Finance and Budget Network and the IASMN at different times. It was suggested that the timing of these processes, including the necessity for the IASMN to have sufficient time to examine the deliverables sought, be changed in order that a single authorization is not sought at two different times. It was added that perhaps the reluctance of the IASMN to endorse the budget was not foreseen by DSS. He reiterated his request to see the deliverables for 2014-2015, even if the budget cannot be altered. Another member echoed the same sentiment, stating that the whole process is “backwards”, i.e. a figure is given to IASMN members and then the IASMN needs to decide what they are going to do with that figure and how it will fit into their operations. He noted that the role of the IASMN is to strategically review operations, including their costs, against any foreseeable financial and operational changes. If the role of the IASMN is to remain the same, then a strategic review is needed for the 2016/2017 biennium by the end of the next budget cycle; otherwise, IASMN members will have no choice but to continue determining what they can do with the funds allocated to them as opposed to determining how much funding should be allocated to them in the first place. With that said, the member acknowledged that the \$235 million figure was put forth by Member States, who seemingly recognize that IASMN members require more funding than \$218 million. Looking ahead, DSS stated that an initial budget proposal for 2016-2017 will likely be put forward in September 2014. Therefore, a strategic review would need to be carried out before September 2014 in order to give the IASMN sufficient time to determine whether it will endorse the 2016/2017 budget proposal.
83. Finally, one member stated that although the concerns raised by FAO during the 18th session of the IASMN were addressed in the updated paper provided for this session, he would like to see the FAO’s concerns properly considered by the Steering Group at its next session, with a view to reporting on actions taken against the recommendations at the next (20th) session of the IASMN.

84. The IASMN took note of the update on JFA and locally cost shared budget issues that was provided by DSS. The IASMN reiterated that greater use of national staff and the review of the current distribution of field staff should also be taken into account when examining ways to optimize the existing jointly-financed resources of DSS and that further efforts should be made in mobilizing extra-budgetary resources.

85. The IASMN recalled that it had never had the opportunity to endorse the 2014-2015 programme of work related to the JFA for the 2014-15 biennium and expressed its dissatisfaction with the timing and coordination of the consultative processes between the various inter-agency networks (Finance

and Budget Network (FBN) and IASMN), as well as within the UN secretariat. Furthermore, the IASMN, while reaffirming the cap of US dollars 218.6 million for the 2014-2015 biennium, also reaffirmed that this cap had been established without a thorough examination of DSS deliverables. As such, the IASMN agreed to examine this cap for the 2016-2017 biennium strictly contingent on a strategic review of the activities of DSS to identify the needs, priorities and options for 2016-2017, to be completed no later than 31 December 2013.

86. Further, the IASMN reiterated that all locally cost shared budgets be uploaded on UNSMIN in a timely manner and adhere to the already agreed upon timelines for submission, in accordance with the guidance that had already been issued by DSS in this regard.

H. Budgetary Matters: Jointly Financed Account (JFA) (CRP 2 (b))

87. DSS' Acting Head of Department, USG Kevin Kennedy, joined the IASMN via video teleconference for the discussion on the Jointly Financed Activities (JFA) budget. Many of DSS' security programmes and operations in the field and headquarters are budgeted on a cost-shared basis by UNSMS organizations under the JFA. The JFA Budget is structured to reflect the three components of DSS programmes and operations, including the Division of Regional Operations, the Field Support Service and Field Security Operations.
88. The USG began the discussion by expressing appreciation for the efforts put forth by the JFA Working Group and hoped that its contributions were noted in the paper presented to the IASMN, also noting that such collaboration only serve to strengthen security management.
89. The USG noted that the UN continues to face active threats around the globe. Of course, the UN has sadly already dealt with such threats in the recent past, whether in Abuja, Algiers, or Baghdad. This trend will be with us for the foreseeable future and the UN must adjust its planning and strategy amid an ever-increasing demand for security and the adoption of a more sophisticated security approach. It was noted that today, having a security analyst is an expectation, whereas it was once viewed as a luxury. Stress counsellors have become part and parcel of the critical response and security infrastructure. The addition of such sophisticated and comprehensive services has changed how the UN operates from a security perspective.
90. With regard to day-to-day operations, the USG informed the IASMN of the approval of an armoured bus for the purpose of relocating those at Camp Ashraf to Camp Liberty in Baghdad. Their movement was primarily a security issue and the local government had reached out to the UN for assistance in this regard. With regard to Syria, the USG noted that a whole new round of discussions had recently been held as to how best to address the on-going chemical weapons threat while attempting to continue with the UN's political and humanitarian efforts. The USG stated that one must wait to see what the Security Council will decide on the issue and stressed that DSS hopes to be involved in shaping any discussion, as it will undoubtedly involve demands on security.

91. More broadly, the USG noted that there has been a degree of recognition among UN system organizations that there exists an institutional imperative to deliver assistance, whether political, human rights, or humanitarian, even when the security risk is high. The USG recalled when the UN relocated its staff to Islamabad for six months after cruise missiles were fired on Khost, Afghanistan, stating that it would be hard to envision a similar reaction by the UN today, i.e. that the UN would decide to relocate its entire staff out of a given country.
92. The USG addressed the issue of national staff by explaining that historically, there has been patronizing talk directed towards national staff. Although some measures have been provided to national staff in an effort to reverse the view that they operate as a so called 'B team', much more needs to be done on their behalf, including in the context of security. He noted that twenty staff members have been killed in recent violence around the globe, nineteen of whom were national staff.
93. Addressing current budgetary arrangements, the USG noted that there exists a very convoluted financial arrangement, split between the JFA and the UN regular budget. This arrangement creates different dynamics for how people are deployed and how security works. The USG noted that the UN itself does not understand how much is spent on security annually. When one considers MORSS, locally cost-shared budgets, and the budgets of AFPOs, the total cost likely approaches the \$500 million mark and may be even higher. Given such costs, it is important for the GA to understand more about UNSMS activities, with the USG noting that he hoped to make progress on this front over the coming year.
94. The USG also noted that UN security across the globe is dramatically better than what it was ten years ago, especially given the fact that the UN continues to work in a number of dangerous countries. The SRM system was praised, noting that it continues to be improved upon in light of lessons learned in the field; the SRM tool should continue to be enhanced in order to make it as flexible as possible. Additional training for security professionals and staff at large is required from the ground-up. Regarding DSS' CISMU, the USG noted the unit's proven ability to leverage its network, with dozens of stress counsellors scattered throughout the UN system. The USG also praised the work of the Hostage Incident Management (HIM) system, including the HIM courses, and noted its contributions to what has become the longest-running hostage case. The USG also praised the Framework of Accountability, which requires further refinement. Recalling a meeting with officials of one member state to study best practices in security in the wake of the Benghazi attack, IASMN members were informed that the officials were highly impressed by the UN's approach to security, including the SRM system, the extent to which senior security officials are involved in the decision-making process and particularly with the Framework of Accountability. As a result, the officials may be likely to adopt similar measures. The USG also praised and cited the importance of DSS' Policy Unit in capturing the formulation of vital security policies in a clear and coherent manner, particularly given the large number of players within the IASMN and the complexity of the issues at hand. In this regard, the USG stressed the importance of formulating and promulgating a

common approach. He also noted the significance of communication, including the communication of sophisticated data in a timely and secure manner.

95. With regard to formulating an outlook for the future, the USG emphasized that strengthening the security of national staff will require fresh thinking and innovative approaches, coupled with the need to put aside approaches as to what cannot be done. The USG noted that the MORSS Technical Working Group was currently discussing the issue of national staff and the need to do more with regard to their security. The discussion has opened the door for considering more generous measures aimed at ensuring the security of national staff. The USG also highlighted the lack of an organized approach to physical security in the UN system, noting that even 12 years after the 11 September 2001 attacks, physical security professionals remain scattered throughout the UN system in a non-systemic way. The USG recalled how he recently spoke with the UN secretariat's Chef de Cabinet and ESCWA about the physical security of the ESCWA building in Beirut and how the office has had to go outside the UN system and contact a consulting firm on the matter. Also, questions are asked as to why blast engineering expertise is not sufficiently present within the UN system. The USG envisioned the creation of a physical security network similar to CISMU in this regard.
96. The USG pointed to the need to further professionalize DSS and the UNSMS. It was emphasized that, while on a recent trip to Somalia, high praise was expressed for DSS' work and professional skill sets. However, there is a need to improve upon how DSS interacts with UN country teams and others in order to quickly gain acceptance on the ground, with a particular need to respect the work of UN country teams. There are also certain skill sets that need improvement, including how to write appeals in the CAP and participate in CERF. Overall, a more professionalized and integrated approach to security should be adopted. As an example, he noted that DPKO/DFS has at least 1700 security officers and yet not all are fully integrated within the system. There should also be a focus on standardizing the qualifications of security officers and local security assistants in the field, to the extent possible.
97. With regard to the efficiency and effectiveness of DSS, the USG noted that the TORs of security advisors are out of date and need to be updated to reflect the current skill sets required as well as the current expectations of DSS officers. There is also concern about field business processes, with DSS officers required to submit thirty-one separate reports. He informed members that DSS' Acting Executive Officer will be heading to the field to examine business practices at DSS offices. The USG also noted his concern about career development within the security sector, having recently discussed the issue with the ASG for Human Resources Management at the UN Secretariat. There needs to be greater communication with those in the field about possible career paths. Moreover, gaps in contractual arrangements, including transfers between DSS and AFPOs, need to be addressed. The USG concluded his brief by stating that DSS continues to be hobbled by the archaic employment system that exists within the Secretariat, with little flexibility available for those on Secretariat contracts and that such a system is in need of reform.

98. The discussion began with one member thanking the USG for outlining a strategic, operational plan going forward, including a vision for the coming years and key priorities, which the member stated was somewhat missing in the JFA paper that was presented to the IASMN. The member noted the USG's comments regarding the need to do more for national staff, adopting a systemized approach to physical security, increasing professionalization among security officers, boosting training, and improving communication within the broader system. With that said, the member brought up the issue of how IASMN members have been asked to approve the 2014/2015 budget, yet how difficult it is to do so with just a detailed spread sheet. The member urged the IASMN to conduct proper due diligence in this regard so that a sound decision can be made. Updating the TORs of security advisors would be a good place to start so that organizations can show their respective principals how their money is being spent. The member noted that, even in this constrained budgetary environment, while he is currently winning the battle for more funding, the strategic vision outlined by the USG should be concretely placed in a proposal, in conjunction with smart objectives and a commitment to hold DSS accountable in two years, even while taking into account spending in places such as Syria and Somalia. The USG responded by stating that while some information was included in the JFA paper, more probably could have been added. Moving forward, however, he confirmed that such activities would be financed through core funds and not through JFA funds. The USG noted his desire for the establishment of a single source of funding as called for in the 2008 Brahimi report recommendations.
99. DPKO/DFS expressed its agreement with the USG that it needs to bring its approximately 2,500 security personnel closer to DSS, noting that its personnel are already included in the selection process. DPKO/DFS urged that staff at the Field Service (FS) level also be accommodated in future, even if it may not be possible at the moment because AFPOs do not maintain equivalent staff grades for this category of staff. Moreover, DPKO/DFS stressed the need to make better use of national professional officers, rather than general service staff, who are almost never used in a security context. The need for additional training was also stressed and in this regard, it was pointed out that all DPKO missions had already been requested to put forth a comprehensive spreadsheet identifying to what extent staff are not properly trained to perform their duties. DPKO/DFS noted that its personnel are not trained in an equitable fashion when compared to their DSS colleagues and that there is a need to produce Security Certification Programme (SCP), Security Analysis Process and Practice (SAPP), Local Security Assistant (LSA), and HIM (Hostage Incident Management)-trained personnel in the next two to three years. There is also a need to work closely with DSS' FSS to help close this gap as quickly as possible. Finally, DPKO/DFS informed the IASMN that it had worked with the UN secretariat's OHRM to create two new sub-families, with career paths for analysts and occupational safety officers. The USG praised the collaboration that had been demonstrated with respect to training and added that a recent agreement with OHRM gave DSS greater flexibility with regard to educational requirements for security officers. In particular, work experience would be considered in lieu of an advanced university degree, which will open the door to a substantial number of security officers. The USG agreed that national professional officers are not utilized enough with regard to security and that the pay grade for such officers needs to change. The USG recalled an

incident in Afghanistan, where one local security assistant funded by the local cost-shared budget remained at the same pay grade for eleven years, which was patently unfair and demoralizing. Such incidents should never occur and a far more robust budget is required to ensure that this no longer happens.

100. Another member commented on the need to improve the “soft skills” of security officers. Moreover, the member sought to clarify an issue related to field security operations. The member pointed to paragraph 53 of the paper, whereby CSAs and SAs are identified as the strategy advisors for country operations, yet without an operational arm. In other words, CSAs and SAs appear responsible for giving advice on how to do things (e.g. running convoys, PSD teams, campsite visits), but not what to do. The member questioned if this was the role envisioned for CSAs and SAs and, if so, whether AFPOs will have to take a more active role in “operationalizing” the security of their own operations.
101. The USG agreed that CSAs and SAs are often too bogged down in providing strategic advice relative to running actual security operations, thereby leaving DSS far too back in headquarters and not far ahead enough in the field. For this reason, it is imperative that DSS review the TORs of all security officers. The USG added that, as an example, he expects that if and when a convoy leaves Damascus, it may be a WFP convoy and it may be primarily escorted by WFP security officers, but a DSS SA should be expected to know how to operationalize such an event. The USG added that coverage from AFPOs can be very spotty and that a team effort is envisioned.
102. Another member stated that other areas may also warrant closer scrutiny, including self-imposed restrictions by DSS. For example, with regard to compliance, it may not be necessary to invest several weeks to determine what kind of compliance is required when compliance is already in place, particularly when SAs are already on the ground. Even though DSS’ Compliance Unit is funded from the regular budget, it was suggested that perhaps funds can be diverted elsewhere in such an instance. Separately, the member stated that it is disappointing when IASMN recommendations are not operationalized, whether via DRO or the EO. As an example, the member highlighted existing discrepancies in the figures available on UNSMIN. Finally, the member urged DSS and AFPOs to complement each other in the field and expressed hope that DSS desk officers would share their experiences with the IASMN in this regard. The USG responded by stating that, in general, there is room for improvement with regard to DSS operations and noted that the Compliance Unit must keep up with measures being implemented or withdrawn and that more discussion needs to be held with regard to the operationalization and best practices in particular, with support from the IASMN. Regarding the e JFA versus the regular budget, the USG stated that it is important to remember that DPKO/DFS also sometimes supplements funds as well (e.g. \$5 million in Syria), whereby such supplements need to be taken into consideration.
103. Another member cautioned that while advocating for greater mobility, training, and inter-operability, one should be careful not to create processes where SAs are doing largely administrative work, rather than their primary function in the field. With that said, there should be a push for training and inter-operability

in particular, whether for national professional officers or professional level officers. Concern was expressed regarding HR regulations that impede one's movement from headquarters to the field because part of career development comes from gaining substantive exposure in the field, not merely being sent to a single location for two weeks. The USG reiterated that DSS is hobbled by Secretariat rules when compared to organizations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP and called for greater rotation between headquarters and the field among staff.

104. Another member questioned why there are so many security officers in OECD countries, with roughly the same number as in developing countries (e.g. Sri Lanka), noting that some countries such as Syria would benefit from additional security officers. More broadly, the member asked about DSS' strategic review with regard to posts in the field. It was clarified that, with regard to Latin America, while such a statement may be true, one must remember that Chile only just became an OECD country and security support there is not JFA-funded, but rather funded by the UN's regular budget. The other country with a notable concentration of security officers is Mexico, but most would likely agree that such a concentration is justified. In Europe, it was clarified that there are no professional security officers that are JFA-funded in any OECD countries. With regard to Russia, it was noted that it is not an OECD country and, in any case, the number of professional security officers has been downgraded significantly, although a mission in the North Caucasus still exists wherein a security advisor is required. Finally, it was explained that Israel has professional security officers, but it only became an OECD country in 2010.
105. Another member agreed with the USG's earlier statement that, overall, UN security has been significantly strengthened over the past decade, particularly with regard to effectiveness and timeliness in response. More importantly, the policies needed to carry out one's duties and responsibilities now exist, even though further adjustments may be necessary. With that said, the key point is that there must be an improvement with regard to operationalization. Effective emergency response has a disproportionate effect on lives in need and also on the UN's reputation; the UN must respond more quickly and effectively to emergencies. The USG noted that Libya is one place where he would agree with such a statement and expressed his frustration with cases where one officer who has been repeatedly cited for bad behaviour in one country is simply transferred to another country as a reprimand, stressing that such cases must be addressed. Nonetheless, the USG expressed confidence that the UN was on the right path in this regard.
106. One of the staff federations recalled the USG's earlier point concerning the need for stronger career development for security officers and noted that the ICSC was looking at the total compensation package to ensure that adequate compensation was being provided in a timely manner while adding that the HLCM and the HR Network may also examine similar issues. In this regard, one of the staff federations asked the USG if he felt there was sufficient communication with those bodies and whether any aspects could be improved. The USG responded by stating that he was always ready to meet with staff federations and discuss any pressing issue, even if no agreement can be reached. It was difficult to comment on the extent to which those bodies coordinate on certain

issues and in this regard, the USG noted at such a question was probably best addressed to those organizations directly. In any case, he added that he was pleased to see flexibility on certain issues, particularly the educational requirements for security officers.

107. Another member suggested that perhaps a senior national officer should be invited to IASMN meetings whenever the IASMN discusses national staff issues (e.g. relocation of national staff within a country, movement of national staff outside a country). The member also suggested that perhaps one or two Designated Officials (e.g. one from a large country, one from a small country) should also be invited to IASMN meetings whenever the IASMN discusses how to do “more with less,” including the possibility of “nationalizing” international staff (i.e. leaving only one international security officer post in the country). The USG responded that it is worth looking into the possibility of hiring more national staff and even replacing international staff with national staff, though it was acknowledged that some designated officials resist having national security officers. The USG also provided clarification on an earlier point, i.e. that roughly 80-85% of JFA monies are used to support staff in the field, but that physical security requires both JFA monies, as well as funding from the UN’s regular budget.

108. Finally, one member asked about the format of the budget as found on page 25 in the annex of the report presented to the IASMN. The member noted that the budget was now broken down country-by-country, as well as the number of posts, and the amount of funding proportionally given to each country. The member noted that in the last IASMN meeting in February 2013, such a breakdown had been provided in a table that also showed a breakdown of locally cost-shared budgets and the number of locally-funded posts. It was proposed therefore that the table used at the IASMN meeting in February 2013 be used as the standard for the IASMN going forward as it provides a full picture of the budgetary issues at hand. The USG agreed with the member in this regard.

109. The IASMN took note of the report on the Jointly Financed Account (JFA) and agreed that DSS moves forward with operationalizing its strategic vision, improving efficiency on the ground and seeking ways by which its Headquarters could add more value to better serve the field, including the key priorities set out by the Acting Head of DSS, i.e. devising innovative approaches to enhance the safety and security of national staff, putting in place a systemized approach to improving physical security, further professionalizing security officers and more effectively addressing surge requirements.

I. Security Training and Development (CRP 9)

110. DSS’ Training and Development Section (TDS) presented the IASMN with feedback on the issues cited by the IASMN Security Training Working Group that were brought to the attention of the IASMN at its last meeting in February 2013, providing an update on training activities conducted by TDS from July 2012 to July 2013. The IASMN was requested to take note of the feedback provided. The IASMN was also requested to take note of the overview of support the UNSMS

receives from DSS' Security and Safety Services (SSS) at Headquarter locations and to consider the use of JFA travel funds to fund professional staff from DSS/SSS to attend SCP/Intermediate Training Programmes (ITP)/CSA /HIM, and other security training courses, as well as to supplement Close Protection Officers Course (CPOC) expenses. Lastly, the IASMN was requested to take note of the Emergency Trauma Bag First Responder Course discussion paper that had been prepared to facilitate discussions between the UN Medical Services and DSS.

111. One member began the discussion by emphasizing that the Emergency Trauma Bag First Responder Course is important and its standardization is vital for procurement purposes and for rolling it out to local security assistants (LSAs). The member also noted that interest in the security officer training course exists, but that his organization did not have the capacity to commit people to it at the moment given their primary job responsibilities in countries such as Afghanistan and Syria. The member also suggested that something in between the Emergency Trauma Bag First Responder Course and the First Aid Course is needed because staff members are not kept up-to-date on the relevant issues and yet are still liable for this training. Finally, the member questioned the extent to which training courses can be offered online rather than face-to-face.
112. Another member welcomed the TDS training initiatives and stated that while his organization was sad to note the departure of the former head of training, it is looking forward to working with the new Chief. With regard to the 'Train the Trainer' course, the member stated that his organization had a staff member who was well suited for the course, but that his organization had received late notice of the course's offering. The member noted that his organization also received late notice for SMT training. In this regard, the member kindly requested that the new Chief works towards providing a clear schedule of training in advance. Finally, with regard to the SSAFE programme, the member noted that his organization's director and executive for the region asked why the course was required for Iraq, but not for countries such as Afghanistan or Syria. It was later understood that the training was put in place in the aftermath of the Hotel Canal bombing and thus was a "legacy training;" the training has been subsequently "watered down" from five days to two days to two hours. Nonetheless, the member questioned whether persons travelling to a high-risk duty station should be required to undergo five days of training. The member also questioned whether a staff member who has completed SSAFE training in one location must repeat the programme if deployed elsewhere.
113. Another member asked what effect a change in the TORs of CSAs would have on competency-based training. The member also urged anyone able to undergo the next security officer training course to do so and recommended that DSS/TDS send out the schedule as early as possible. Clarification was sought regarding the future of HIM training, both with respect to the process and the training capacity available. The concern over having a common approach to SSAFE training was echoed. Regarding the Emergency Trauma Bag First Responder Course, the member stated that two to three days of general training may be more feasible than five days. Regarding JFA funding, it was asked to what extent funding is spent on joint learning programmes. The member noted that staff members of AFPOs must pay for their own courses while, on the other hand, security officers

take part in JFA functions. The member stated that it may be useful to quantify to what extent JFA-funded positions have acted in a general funds capacity. In short, it may not be fair that AFPOs must fund their functions in this regard.

114. Another member recommended that, with regard to obtaining translations for training courses, priority be given to Arabic, French, and Spanish. The member welcomed flexibility with regard to developing SMT training for security advisors and echoed the previous concerns over HIM training capacity in light of the departure of the former Chief of training. Moreover, the member supported the expansion of the Emergency Trauma Bag First Responder Course and welcomed the input of the UN Medical Services in helping determine how best to save lives while minimizing costs. The representative of the MDWG responded by stating that it has the technical and medical expertise in this regard and would be interested in exploring both face-to-face and online course options, with a focus on interpreting and learning from incident data. Separately, another member called for all UN staff members to undergo a basic course in first aid (i.e. 1-2 days).

115. DSS sought to provide feedback to the questions raised by members to the extent possible. TDS confirmed that discussions have begun to standardize the Emergency Trauma Bag First Responder Course. DSS informed IASMN members that it offers very few online courses and that, in general, online courses serve as a precursor to face-to-face roll-outs. However, while face-to-face courses are preferred, online courses continue to be considered as a way to cut down on costs. With regard to SMT training, DSS stated that it is trying to move away from offering such training as it is best provided at the country level. DSS stated that, in general, face-to-face training is conducted by DSS' DRO, but recalled an "egregious" case where SMT training was given to the SMT in the Niger Delta, although only four of nineteen SMT members attended and only two hours of instruction was provided. With regard to the standardization of SSAFE training, DSS noted that Iraq now has a hybrid SAIT programme, although DSS maintains no visibility or oversight over the programme. In response to a concern over the future of competency-based training, DSS noted that it will likely remain, but will continue to evolve. In noting departure of the former Chief of Training, DSS confirmed that the concern was not over the HIM process, but rather HIM training capacity. Finally, with regard to concern over JFA funding, DSS made it clear that it was not requesting any additional funding in this regard and would make use of funds already allocated to it. In this regard, DSS' TDS thanked IASMN members for their flexibility in allowing DSS to use such funds as it believes it best serves the UNSMS.

116. The IASMN took note of the feedback provided on the issues cited by the IASMN Security Training Working Group (STWG) as detailed in CRP 9.

117. The IASMN took note of the overview of support the UNSMS receives from UNDSS' Security and Safety Services at Headquarter locations and agreed that DSS could exercise flexibility in allocating any existing funds already earmarked for training [travel] from the JFA to fund the cross sectoral training of security staff within the UNSMS, as well as to supplement CPOC expenses.

118. The IASMN further took note of the Emergency Trauma Bag First Responder Course discussion paper that had been prepared to facilitate discussions between the UN Medical Services and DSS.

J. Update: Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Activities (CRP 14)

119. The Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (CEMU) provided an overview of the activities it has undertaken and a summary of the substantive results from the evaluation of the Security Programme since the last submission to the IASMN. Throughout the reporting period (2010 to 2013), CEMU completed 50 compliance assignments, 43 of which were of a Compliance Evaluation nature and evaluated the status of the Security Programme in 1,874 out of 2,496 UN Organizations and MOU Partner locations. The Security Programme was assessed overall as “Very Good” in 11 duty stations, while 21 resulted in a rating of “Good” and in 11 countries “Needs for Minor Improvements” were indicated. Regarding the results of the MOSS Compliance Assessment, 14 duty stations overall operate in compliance with the requirements established in their country specific MOSS, while the vast majority present limitations in complying with those requirements. Of the 43 Duty Stations evaluated, 11 required minor improvements overall, while in just one duty station, the need for minor improvements was identified in one or more components of the security programme. The review of 379 findings recorded during the Compliance Evaluation Missions completed between 2010 and 2012 indicates that the Security Management Structure accounts for the largest number of the findings (32%), followed by Security Plans and Arrangements (27%), Security Training (23%) and Security Procedures (18%). The Compliance Evaluation process resulted in the issuance of 618 recommendations at the policy and non-policy levels, 523 of which were reported as implemented while 95 (15%) are either being implemented or the implementation remains overdue.

120. One member began the discussion by asking whether any macro-analysis had been performed with regard to the data provided for the purpose of making system-wide improvements. Moreover, the member asked how often AFPOs participate in CEMU missions and how CEMU was perceived in the field, whether as inspectors, managers, or support staff. CEMU responded that, during compliance evaluation missions, CEMU teams meet representatives and security professionals from all AFPOs present in the duty station, collectively as part of the SMT and also individually at each agency location. As far as how CEMU is perceived in the field, CEMU noted that any initial misperception or expectations are clarified during the opening meetings with the SMT.

121. Another member inquired whether CEMU provides any guidance to its counterparts in the field when an emergency arises whereby new measures must be implemented. CEMU clarified that its teams consist of staff from compliance and the desk officer for the country who conduct the evaluation in an integrated and balanced manner. While CEMU staff provides advice on how to improve the compliance status, operational guidance rest with the Desk Officer

122. Two other members noted that the most pressing question with regard to compliance is not whether checks are being carried out, but rather whether the checklist makes sense in the first place. For example, the member questioned whether MOSS compliance checks are carried out with security risk management in mind. In response, CEMU noted that the evaluation tools for the assessment of MOSS reflect the mandatory and country specific requirements identified for the duty station as supported by the SRA. On the other hand, evaluation surveys for the Security Programme are updated every time a new policy is issued. Separately, one member noted that his organization carries out semi-annual, internal reviews of MOSS and revealed that the primary reason for non-compliance is simply the amount of time it takes a new office to comply (i.e. 12-18 months). Once transition time is excluded from the equation, only a small group of laggards is left behind. The other member added that there is likely some role for compliance on a routine basis, perhaps with regard to checking MOSS or SRAs, while simultaneously stressing the need to notify security focal points when compliance information is updated on UNSMIN.
123. Finally, another member brought up the issue of mandatory self-assessments, which are to be done whenever SRAs are changed (i.e. at least once a year). The member noted how his organization was only 12% compliant in this regard and that it did not have the resources to maintain security advisors to address the situation. The member stated that perhaps his remark should be addressed by DSS in general as a 12% compliance rate seems unacceptable. In response, CEMU expressed its willingness to support DRO in addressing the situation.

124. The IASMN took note of the information provided on the activities of DSS' Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (CEMU) and requested that a report on lessons learned be provided by 1 January 2014. Furthermore, the IASMN requests the operational implementation of the Mandatory Self Assessments in line with previous IASMN decisions and guidance already sent to the field.

K. ITU's Experience Concerning Cyber Threat/Attacks at an International Conference (CRP 11)

125. Mr. Anders Norsker, Chief of ITU's Information Services Department, delivered a presentation to the IASMN regarding ITU's experience in battling cyber threats and attacks. The presentation stressed the need for better cooperation and coordination between physical safety and security on the one hand and information security groups on the other, based on recent examples of direct and indirect threats that the ITU experienced while managing an international Member State event in Dubai, United Arab Emirates in 2012. This event was subject to unprecedented destabilization campaigns launched from social media platforms and cyber-attacks by groups such as Anonymous. The event was attacked via interruptions in proceedings, threats to delegates and individual staff members. Finally, there was a concerted effort to manage a sustained disinformation campaign to influence media and create an overwhelming and hysterical atmosphere on the Internet. The IASMN was requested to consider the information put forth by ITU in the CRP and the presentation.

126. The presentation focused on how ITU has built the contingency plans; in a worst-case scenario to allow the service continuity should a major cyber threat happen. ITU presented how they built a temporary incident management team to respond quickly to any incidents and to activate the contingency plans. ITU noted that physical security is dealing also with incident management and contingency planning and therefore, there is an opportunity to join the efforts by integrating cyber security. ITU stressed how the “security perimeter” has changed and is no longer confined to the physical sense. In this regard, ITU emphasized the need to avoid creating multi-layer security levels that can be individually exploited. Instead, one extensive security level should be employed, beginning with the use of a single identification (identity management) and access card, containing “biometric data on the card”, for UN system organizations. The same smartcard would provide access to premises and organizational ICT services. The use of a single smartcard would lead to enhanced security (e.g. duress functions, proper identification), increased efficiency and cost savings, while facilitating a wide-range of activities, ranging from fast-tracking access to conferences to managing cash distributions in the field. ITU noted that the cost of producing such a card would be relatively inexpensive and more importantly, it would require no network access to verify biometric data as they would not be stored centrally but only stored locally on the smartcard. However, legal issues surrounding the management of biometric data would need to be considered.
127. One member agreed that a single card containing biometric data would be very helpful. The member recalled a recent incident whereby an individual used a fake identification card, identifying himself as a member of ECOWAS, to gain access to a conference at UN Headquarters; the member noted that the individual’s photograph was properly affixed to his identification card, thus granting him access to the conference and that such a scenario would not have likely occurred if biometric data had been required for entry. Another member also agreed that a single card containing biometric data would be helpful, noting that its own Chief Information Officer had been pushing the idea within the organization. The member also noted that such a card would be helpful in identifying refugees, tracking food rations delivered to refugees, among other actions in the field. On a separate note, the same member questioned the extent to which data found on an organization’s network as well as data communicated by e-mail or telephone is secure.
128. With regard to one member’s recollection of a security breach at a recent conference held at UN Headquarters, ITU noted that such a breach likely resulted from a breakdown in protocol (the first level of identity management) and agreed that reliance on biometric data, such as an individual’s iris or fingerprint, would have likely staved off the breach. With regard to another member’s question as whether data found on an organization’s network, as well as data communicated by e-mail or telephone, is secure, ITU noted that it records more than 20,000 attempts to infiltrate its network each month. With regard to e-mail communications in particular, ITU stated that such communications operate according to a “store-and-forward” protocol and are unlikely to be secure as they bounce across different countries. Seemingly cloud services such as “Drop box” are also unlikely to be sufficiently secure and inadequately protect the United Nations Immunities and privileges. The Legal Network recommended recently,

that cloud services not be used for sensitive data. ITU noted that some UN organizations seem to return to use of the diplomatic pouch if they need to communicate strictly confidential information. Overall, ITU stressed that UN system organizations need the technology to recognize abnormal or dangerous information contained within data that they normally receive as there is simply too much data to sift through manually. ITU noted that legal issues surrounding the movement of data to “the clouds” remain and should be addressed, including the extent to which jurisdiction can be exercised in “the cloud.”

129. Other members brought up various concerns related to cyber threats and attacks. One member noted his concern over threats to staff via e-mail, telephone, or Internet postings. The member questioned whether DSS security officers should serve as intermediaries between the individual staff member and local law enforcement authorities in this regard, including by providing close protection services. Another member cited the need to protect victims and other witnesses testifying before international courts by video. The same member also cited concerns over internal threats and attacks by disgruntled staff members, such as the deletion of internal data. Moreover, the same member questioned what measures can be taken when a Member State shuts down or otherwise impedes or, alternatively, infiltrates electronic or cyber communications. A third member expressed concern over the reliability of back-up networks, noting that an urgent e-mail from DSS headquarters to the field was once delayed by four hours because the back-up network in New Jersey had been shut down as the result of a storm.

130. With regard to future coordination between physical security personnel and information technology personnel charged with information security, one member noted that the decision to coordinate is a management decision. Another member asked about the extent to which there has been resistance to such coordination and what can be done about it. A third member questioned the amount of resources that would be required to coordinate information security activities. In responding to this particular concern, ITU noted that, at a recent conference in Mexico, it employed over one hundred local ICT staff to coordinate ICT support and information security-related activities. ITU urged IASMN members to play a proactive role in fostering coordination by contacting their information security officers and asking them how best to coordinate their activities. More broadly, ITU urged IASMN members to work with the ICT Network to promote awareness of cyber threats and attacks and clarify governance and reporting lines. Subsequently, it may be possible to report jointly to the HLCM and CEB on such issues. A fourth member, recalling that information security standards have already begun to be developed, asked if the time had come to draft a common information security policy.

131. The IASMN thanked ITU for the very informative presentation on cyber threat/attacks. Noting the multi-faceted aspects of cyber security, the IASMN recognized that there is a need for increasing awareness on this issue, as well as clarifying governance and reporting lines within the respective organizations. The IASMN supported that there be synergy between the ICT Network and the IASMN on this issue and that this be communicated to the Chair of the ICT network.

L. Update: Security Incident Reporting Working Group (CRP 3 (a))

132. The Chair of the Security Incident Reporting Working Group (SIRWG) presented an update with regard to its progress leading up to the IASMN meeting. The SIRWG aims to ensure that an incident reporting system suits the incident reporting needs of all UNSMS stakeholders, including the specific objectives of individual UNSMS entities. Since its inception in October 2012, the SIRWG has made several notable changes to security incident reporting, including distinguishing between Safety Incidents and Security Incidents; security incidents are those that have malicious intent, and safety incidents do not have a malicious component and are classified as accidents, hazards or occupational safety events. Moreover, the name of the system has been changed from the *Significant Security Incident Reporting System* to the *Safety and Security Incident Reporting System* to better reflect the requirements of the system and to fortify the distinction between Safety incidents and Security incidents. Finally, the SIRWG has developed a new taxonomy of incidents that better reflects incidents that occur and to accommodate the specific needs of individual UNSMS stakeholders. Categories of incidents, intended to specify urgency and appropriate response are also being considered by the Working Group. While focusing on the universal goals of a global incident reporting system, the SIRWG accommodated the needs of individual UNSMS stakeholders by providing mechanisms for each to continue to adhere to their own reporting processes. The new taxonomy was field-tested by the SIRWG using real-world incidents to ensure it is comprehensive and can be consistently interpreted and applied. The IASMN was requested to note the progress of the Security Incident Reporting Working Group. It was also requested to endorse the new SSIRS taxonomy and take note of the costs associated with proposed changes to SSIRS.
133. The discussion began with multiple members endorsing the taxonomy put forth by the SIRWG. One member stressed the importance of having taxonomy that would be properly interpreted and applied by all staff. Another member questioned if dual systems will be required, with one recording UN incidents and the other recording non-UN data. The SIRWG responded by stating that the system will record only incidents against the UN, leaving it up to the country to “flesh out” any incidents not directly impacting the UN.
134. Another member sought clarification about paragraph 1(c) of the paper in particular, whereby it is implied that the source codes for the system may not be immediately available, but will be in time. Another member then asked about the system’s ability to share its source codes given the fact that AFPOs will be able to enter incidents directly. A third member then urged that, assuming the source codes will not be immediately available, the taxonomy should not remain static, but rather evolve according to needs.
135. The representative of the Medical Directors’ Working Group (MDWG) stated that, from a safety aspect, the UN system has no consistent data collection method concerning safety events other than through this mechanism. She stated her desire to see the system be able to “siphon off” safety issues and feed them to others who may benefit (e.g. those dealing with occupational health). It was then noted that

there has been a decision to exclude some natural deaths and added that most reporting systems do not rely on the reporter to determine whether a death is “natural,” but rather rely on medical personnel to make such a determination. The Chair of the SIRWG responded by stating that many issues with regard to occupational health exist that still need to be brought to the attention of UN Medical Services and that the SIRWG, and DPKO in particular, is in contact with the UN Medical Services in this regard.

136. Some members then debated whether suicides should be recorded by the system. Several members, in addition to the representative of the MDWG and staff federations, stated that the cause of death should not be recorded, but rather that a death occurred, with medical personnel to be subsequently responsible for determining the cause of death. A second member agreed that, at the very least, the death should be recorded, which would allow the system to serve as a repository for that information if ever needed in the future. A third member argued that a suicide and other “natural” deaths do not constitute a security incident and thus should not be recorded in the system. A fourth member added that, in general, there needs to be an improvement in how quickly deaths are reported within the system.

137. Another member pointed out that entering data into the system will require a lot of work on the part of security officers in the field and it is important to be mindful of how well security officers will be able to balance this responsibility with their already long list of duties. The member stressed that the analytical purpose of the system needs to be balanced with the amount of data that will be entered into the system, with another member suggesting that the data entry platform used in other systems be used by this particular system as well.

138. The IASMN noted the progress of the Security Incident Reporting Working Group and endorsed the new SSIRS taxonomy, on the understanding that this must be viewed as a living document, able to accommodate evolving needs. The IASMN also took note of the costs associated with proposed changes in SSIRS and the fact that this would be absorbed within existing resources.

M. Crisis Management (CRP 12)

139. DSS’ Policy, Planning, and Coordination Unit (PPCU) provided the IASMN with an update regarding the possibility of developing UNSMS guidelines for field-level crisis management. DSS noted that the IASMN Steering Group, at its last meeting in May 2013, considered a previous recommendation to develop a draft UNSMS policy on field-level crisis management and the need to harmonize this policy with existing frameworks, policies and procedures related to crisis management. The Steering Group also considered the recommendation on the need for DSS, in consultation with Secretariat departments and all IASMN members, to ensure the cohesiveness of UNSMS policy guidance on field-level crisis management. Following extensive discussion, the IASMN Steering Group recommended that DSS (PPCU) develop UNSMS guidelines, instead of a UNSMS policy on crisis management at the field-level. Meanwhile, DSS (PPCU) continued to coordinate with DPKO/DFS and DPA to ensure the cohesiveness of

policy guidance on field-level crisis management for peacekeeping or special political missions. DSS has engaged in DPKO/DFS' recent effort in reviewing and developing policies and guidelines on crisis management for DPKO/DFS and DPA led missions. In view of the above-mentioned recommendation of the IASMN and that of the Steering Group, the IASMN was requested to endorse the recommendation to develop UNSMS guidelines for field-level crisis management.

140. One member began the discussion by stating that he has no objection to the recommendation and will look carefully at existing guidelines. The member noted that while it is stated that these guidelines will be field-specific, there is a very strong relationship between what exists at headquarters and what exists in the field. For example, in Syria, the UN's Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and DSS have both convened meetings with the same players. The DO in Syria is overwhelmed with political and security issues (e.g. chemical weapons) and yet is expected to attend multiple meetings whereby he is subject to being pulled "left, right, and centre". Therefore, it is important to come up with practical guidelines that do not overstretch those in the field.
141. Another member stated that one of the problems is trying to define a "crisis". At the moment, a DPA/DPKO/DSS Working Group exists and the group is finding that many elements are coming together with regard to crisis management, many of which are not directly related to security. The member stated that perhaps it is not for the IASMN to produce policies on how the UN manages a "crisis" because it encompasses so many fields. However, the member expressed his support for the development of consolidated guidance for the security family. Nonetheless, one must still define a "crisis" in order to draft guidelines on the issue.
142. Another member echoed such a sentiment, stating that the word "crisis" is used excessively and in a multitude of contexts. The term really refers to any situation whereby the management system in place is unable to cope with developments. The member then asked if the guidelines should address "day-to-day" crises or, alternatively, emergencies that exceed existing capacity. Moreover, the member emphasized that any guidance cannot be solely for the field because the field and headquarters are linked, with control exercised by headquarters. In any case, any guidelines should draw from best practices in the field, whereby crisis response and emergency response plans already exist. Separately, another member expressed similar sentiments, adding that he would have preferred to have seen a simple draft of the best practices in the field that could or should be operationalized.
143. Another member stated that "crisis management" means different things to different people, but the point is to ensure that a process or management structure exists to deal with a crisis. The member noted that a distinction should be drawn between crisis management and critical incident management (e.g. mass casualties). The member also stressed that guidelines were needed, not a formal policy. Separately, another member sought to clarify whether the previous paper called for guidelines related to security or guidelines tied to crisis management in partnership with other crisis management bodies. A third member echoed the desire for clarification, adding that any guidelines developed should only focus on

best practices based on the last 18 months of crisis management in the field. The member added that crisis management is, in fact, part of the larger process of “organizational resilience” that exists within the UN Secretariat.

144. DSS responded by stating that, as multiple IASMN members have pointed out, no specific guidelines for the DO/SMT currently exist and that is why the possibility of developing “crisis management” guidelines is coming up before the IASMN. DSS agreed that any guidelines ultimately developed should reflect best practices from the field as such practices are not currently being applied by everyone in the field. Any guidelines would focus on the role of the DO/SMT and other high-level security professionals in the field. In this regard, however, some members responded by asking how such guidelines would differ from those already being discussed by the DPA/DPKO/DSS Working Group. Other members reiterated the fact that “crisis management” incorporates too many non-security elements and thus it may be too difficult to narrow the scope of any guidelines ultimately developed.

145. In noting that DSS’ DRO already has an SOP in place across most of its offices, with headquarters dedicated to supporting such offices, it was suggested that guidelines could be developed based on best practices in the field. Another member, however, suggested that DSS should put together a matrix for crisis management based on best practices in the field and simply do away with the development of guidelines.

146. The IASMN did not agree on the need to develop common UNSMS guidelines or a policy on field-level crisis management. The IASMN agreed however on the need to consolidate best practices and lessons learned on crisis management at the field level, noting the need to link existing Headquarters-level policies and guidelines with field-level guidelines.

N. United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) Policy on Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Affected Areas (CRP 15)

147. The USG addressed the IASMN via VTC concerning the UNSMS’ need to devise a policy as to whether and, if so, to what extent the UN operates in nuclear, chemical and biological contaminated environments. Actual or potential nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) emergencies are serious security concerns. In recent years, nuclear, biological and chemical related incidents resulting in contamination and hazardous conditions have posed challenges for the protection of UN personnel and assets.

148. In its meeting in May 2012, the IASMN Steering Group discussed the existing policy on operations in nuclear, biological and chemical affected areas and decided to abolish Annex T of the *Field Security Handbook* (FSH). While the IASMN agreed on the abolishment of Annex T, the Chair and certain members of the IASMN expressed the view that it could be beneficial to have a UNSMS policy concerning operations in contaminated areas, as reflected in the report of the Steering Group meeting held in May 2012.

149. At its 17th session in June 2012, the IASMN discussed the above-mentioned policy. One member reminded the IASMN that in 2003 just before the Iraq conflict began no one had thought of the need for a policy on operating in NBC environments. He underlined that it had turned out that there was a need for such a policy. A representative of the staff federations questioned whether a policy was needed in view of threats involving NBC material. Noting the Steering Group's view, the IASMN, however, agreed not to retain Annex T, "*Policy with regard to Operations in a Nuclear, Biological or Chemical Warfare Environment*" in the *Security Policy Manual*.
150. In view of the current reality of chemical, biological and nuclear contamination and emergencies affecting the protection of UN personnel, it was considered timely for the UNSMS to devise a policy stating that the UN should not operate in areas determined to be NBC affected or contaminated areas. The NBC emergencies imply severe disruption, which greatly exceeds the coping capacity of the affected communities and host governments to mitigate the potential impact, including mass casualties resulting from these emergencies. As such, NBC contamination should mark one of the thresholds for which the UNSMS indicates clearly that UN personnel should not operate in known affected areas, regardless of the cause of the contamination. The exception, as cited in the FSH's previous Annex T, should be only for those UN personnel of specialized agencies mandated to operate in these affected areas.
151. As the UNSMS has no expertise in risks associated with NBC contamination, a UNSMS policy on this issue should not be linked to the security risk management framework and tool. Instead, the policy should simply make clear that UN personnel are not to operate in determined contaminated areas. This is the rationale that prompted the development of the draft policy submitted to the IASMN at this session, which aims to protect UN personnel from exposure to NBC contamination.
152. In essence, the attached draft policy reaffirms the principle of the FSH's former Annex T that the UN should not operate in areas determined to be NBC affected areas. The draft policy underlines these concerns for the protection of UN personnel while recognizing that it is not within the remit of the UNSMS to determine the level of risks or impact of NBC in the areas where there are UN operations. In light of the above, the IASMN was requested to reconsider the need for a UNSMS policy on operations in NBC affected areas and to consider the attached draft policy.
153. The discussion began with the USG noting that this is a very topical subject. The UN has already faced this threat in Syria, where chemical weapons have been used to some extent. The USG noted that the UN is currently awaiting a report from the chemical weapons team in Syria, with results from its investigation into alleged chemical weapons use expected in the coming days. The USG reminded the IASMN that a former UNSMS policy barring operations in a chemical weapons environment was abolished. With that said, the USG emphasized that the UN is currently not operating in any areas inside Syria where chemical weapons have been allegedly used. The USG then welcomed any input on the matter, urging the IASMN to engage in an open discussion on the issue.

154. One member noted the need to define an “NBC environment” and questioned whether simply having chemical agents used in a country means the UN must leave the country as a whole. “Environment” may depend on geography, history of use, presence of chemical weapons in a country, standard of government of controls, transparency of government stockpiles, use of chemical weapons, types of delivery systems, types of agents at play, or an assessment of who is most likely to use them. An assessment may be required using all of these points to determine the risk in a given “environment”.
155. Another member stated that it was clear that gradations would exist in a general policy regarding whether the UN operates in an NBC environment and, if so, to what extent. The UN would benefit from a common approach on this matter as a dilemma arises when different agencies respond in different ways, often based on different information. The member added that his organization is willing to forgo some autonomy on the matter for the sake of forging a common approach.
156. Another member echoed such sentiments, but noted that the UN has already gone beyond a general policy of not operating in “NBC environments” in general with regard to Syria, even if the UN is currently not operating in areas where chemical weapons have allegedly been used. A precedent has been set in this regard, whereby organizations have relied on the SRM process to steer clear of such areas. The member noted that a Technical Working Group composed of ICRC, OPCW, and WFP have been working to develop expertise in crisis management in NBC environments. More generally, the member stressed the need to link policy with security risk management and stated his approval on how the current situation in Syria has been managed, which could serve as a blueprint for a future policy.
157. Another member concurred with previous members, particularly with regard to developing a common approach and linking any policy with security risk management. The member noted that the issue was critical from a reputational point of view and the UN cannot afford to have different approaches among AFPOs. More generally, there must be a value placed on human lives and staff must be adequately informed of any policy formulation, with the understanding that any policy may not cover every eventuality. Separately, the member asked a technical question with regard to how the use of chemical weapons will be detected and by whom.
158. Another member noted that any policy would extend to all entities that serve as principal advisors to the USG. The member cautioned against potentially giving staff a false impression of the environment in which we they are operating as the capacity to detect the use of chemical weapons may be severely limited or entirely unavailable (e.g. equipment may be blocked at the border).
159. Another member cautioned against use of the word “environment” in any policy, favouring use of “area” and reliance on security risk management. Moreover, the member cautioned that there appear to be multiple groups with self-

professed expertise in chemical weapons and it is important to determine who are the true experts and advisors on this issue when it comes to formulating a policy.

160. Another member stated that, from a field perspective, the problem with the old policy was that the definition of environment was rooted in a threat-based concept. However, any policy should be rooted in security risk management. In this regard, scientific feedback is crucial to developing such a policy.
161. One of the staff federations asked what measures, if any, are being implemented to keep staff safe. The deployment of protective equipment may cause confusion among staff or, alternatively, lead to a false sense of security.
162. Another member noted that the primary responsibility to protect UN staff lies with the host government, but asked what does such a statement in the context of chemical weapons serve and whether the UN is in contact with host country authorities in this regard. Separately, a second member asked where one should draw the line when host country authorities state that a decision on whether to allow equipment into the country is still pending.
163. Another member suggested that “NBC” should be changed to “NBCR” in order to incorporate radiological weapons threats and use, noting that the same issue arose with regard to Iraq.
164. The representative of the Medical Directors’ Working Group (MDWG) noted that few people in the world can validly claim expertise with regard to chemical weapons used on a mass scale against a civilian population. Thus, one should exercise caution in labelling one or more individuals or entities as experts given the responsibility to protect staff. Moreover, the representative stressed that one should not only seek out technical expertise, but also biomedical and psychosocial expertise. More generally, the representative stated that complex issues are at play and thus gave support to putting forth a united position in order to stem rising anxiety among staff members. More specifically, the representative noted that her organization supported the intent of paragraph 8 of the draft policy as proposed and stressed that the MDWG’s position has unambiguously remained that if one is at the point of handing out protective suits and other protective equipment, then one has reached the point of needing to withdraw staff as their lives are genuinely at risk. Separately, a member noted that there was no common approach on equipment that should be distributed in an NBC environment. The same member also noted the need to clarify the extent of coverage for staff members under the Malicious Acts Insurance Policy (MAIP).
165. The USG, in responding to the comments put forth by various IASMN members, emphasized the need to de-link a general policy with events in one country, despite the fact that extensive overlap exists. The USG stressed that any policy must consider the various types of chemical weapons agents that exist, in addition to nuclear and biological agents, all of which have different effects when used. The point is to draft a policy on which everyone can agree. In drafting a policy, one should rely on experts to the extent possible, noting OPCW and WHO are viewed as possessing the greatest expertise on NBC weapons. As an example, the USG noted that the two organizations have been working on providing

guidance in English and Arabic to those on the ground in Syria. The USG agreed with the principle that staff members should be withdrawn if they are about to be exposed to NBC weapons. With regard to the deployment of protective equipment, in Syria in particular, the USG noted that a standard has been established for how and what equipment will be used and it is generally followed.

166. The USG clarified that OPCW and WHO should, in fact, be viewed as the technical experts when it comes to chemical weapons and that an OPCW and WHO-led working group should take the lead with regard to providing technical advice needed to formulate an NBC policy. The representative of the MDWG added that it has someone with experience that it can nominate to also contribute to this.

167. The IASMN agreed that the draft UNSMS policy on Operating in NBC Environments requires further review by an expert working group (to be further clarified).

O. Discussion Paper: Strategic Issues within the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) (CRP 13)

168. In the meeting of the IASMN Steering Group, held in May 2013, the Chair underscored the need to "encourage discussions" on strategic issues within the UNSMS. These issues include UNSMS' strengths, weaknesses or gaps, ways forward, and other key priority issues that the IASMN should focus upon. As a result, DSS' PPCU requested members of the IASMN Steering Group to provide inputs on the above issues and suggest major points to be incorporated in a "discussion paper" for the 19th session of the IASMN. The IASMN was requested to discuss the above-mentioned four strategic issues, identify priority issues, and agree on a plan of action to address identified topical issues.

169. The USG began the discussion by opening up the floor for comments for those with particular concerns. Two members echoed the USG's previous statement made earlier in the session, whereby the primary focus areas for the UNSMS should be determining what more can be done for national staff, adopting a systemized approach to physical security, increasing professionalization among security officers, boosting training, and improving communication within the system. One of the two members added that these focus areas should be concretized in the form of objectives so that they can be operationalized. The member also urged the IASMN to adjust dates accordingly with regard to the strategic review in order to maximize its impact on the budget in the future.

170. Two other members stated that the current discussion needs more form or structure to it as a discussion of the issues at hand cannot be properly completed within the time allotted. One of the two members added that the template for the JFA paper could be applied to this paper as well. A third member echoed a similar sentiment, noting that the larger discussion taking place is focused upon the deliverables with respect to the JFA. The member added that the question is how one can facilitate movement on these issues from a policy perspective.

171. Another member stated that the UNSMS discussion paper was all encompassing, and suggested that it might be useful to break it down into components, perhaps between operational and strategic issues.
172. On a somewhat separate note, another member expressed a desire to bring fresh thought into the discussion, perhaps moving beyond a 'New York centric' focus. The member noted there were hundreds of people in the field who could perhaps inject new creative ideas and solutions into the discussion, even though the larger AFPOs should continue to play the driving role in the discussion, given not only the size of their budgets, but also the extent to which they are affected by the decisions made.
173. The USG agreed that the paper covered a lot of ground and that it was very detailed, but also very philosophical in its approach. The USG said that he would like to remain focused on the priorities outlined earlier in the session and is not keen on undertaking more strategic reviews until one fully appreciates the issues that have been recently discussed and the decisions that have been taken to address these issues. The USG stressed that while there is always so much capacity to follow-up, events usually overtake such an effort and, often times, unrealistically high expectations are created relative to what can actually be achieved. With that said, the USG stated that although his primary reporting line is to the Secretary-General, he very much values the input provided by IASMN members. In this regard, the USG echoed a previous statement whereby he urged smaller members to boost their involvement in working groups. Perhaps just as importantly, the USG urged the IASMN to adopt a more structured approach to determining membership within such groups, perhaps based on a formula, as current membership appears to be decided on an ad-hoc basis. Finally, the USG noted that the IASMN should decide exactly how many times per year it should meet and in what capacity.

174. The IASMN took note of the discussion paper and requested that the strategic issues identified in the paper, while addressed in part by the JFA report submitted as Annex I of CRP 3 (b), should also feed into the wider strategic review to be undertaken by DSS for submission to the IASMN no later than 31 December 2013.

P. Report on the 25th session of the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) (CRP 6)

175. The Secretary of the IASMN presented participants with a summary report on the 25th Session of the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM), which was held at the Headquarters of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in Rome of March 2013. The information contained in the paper had been provided to the IASMN Steering Group at its last meeting in May 2013 whereby, given the HLCM's reformed work processes, clarification was sought on what the IASMN would need to bring to the HLCM for approval and what could move forward without explicit approval. It was explained that while the IASMN would still be expected to keep the HLCM apprised of all of its policies, the determination of what policies would need to be brought to the HLCM for approval would be made on a case-by-case basis. Essentially, this

aspect did not differ from past practice. The difference lay in the process, whereby policies could now be virtually approved without having to formally present such policies before the HLCM. It was noted that the USG would still be able to address the HLCM although perhaps not with the same frequency, unless circumstances dictated otherwise.

176. In the context of the discussions about the reformed work processes of the HLCM, the suggestion was made that the IASMN examine the frequency and timing of both its steering group and regular sessions which is currently linked to the HLCM meeting schedule. The IASMN was also requested to take note of the update on the 25th session of HLCM that was held in March 2013.
177. Addressing the frequency of IASMN regular and steering group sessions, one member stated that the one issue the IASMN must absolutely revert back to the HLCM on is the budget. Therefore, noting that the HLCM meets in full session in the fall and that any document needs to be sent to the HLCM at least thirty days in advance, the member suggested that a meeting is required no later than June of the same year.
178. With regard to IASMN regular sessions in general, most members supported maintaining two meetings per year. Two members suggested that one session should be shorter and focus solely on budget and strategic issues while a second, longer session should focus on other specific issues. Another member, while in support of maintaining two meetings per year, urged the IASMN to choose locations beyond the primary hubs (e.g. New York, Geneva), i.e. particularly in countries or regions where there is a large concentration of staff members working in the field.
179. Another member stated his preference for holding additional steering group meetings to allow the IASMN to focus on two or three items of significance. The member suggested that additional meetings could take place via VTC. Multiple members echoed the view that the option of holding sessions, whether regular or steering group sessions via VTC should be explored further, particularly in light of the Secretary General's recent ST/AI on travel.
180. Although a minority overall, multiple members stated their preference for having only one IASMN regular session per year. While some members cited the Secretary General's ST/AI on travel as well as their own travel budgets as the reason for their preference, others recalled that, historically, one intensive four-day regular session was held when the IASMN was chaired under UNSECOORD, but that a shift to two regular sessions had been made when DSS was created rapid changes were occurring at that time with regard to security. Given the fact that such an environment no longer exists, it would make sense to revert back to holding only one regular session per year. Still other members noted that the IASMN is meant to be a purely policy setting body and that it may be more productive to have an intensive policy setting meeting once a year without having to consider extensive updates on non-policy related issues that could be communicated virtually. One member, in favour of holding two regular sessions per year, responded that the IASMN is also a governance and oversight body, particularly with regard to budgetary matters and that it would not make sense to

scale back to one regular session per year until some of the outstanding budgetary issues have been addressed.

181. The IASMN was further informed that TORs did not formally exist for the IASMN Steering Group, other than a reference in the existing TORs for the full IASMN. One member requested that DSS look more closely at this issue with a view to drawing up TORs for the Steering Group that would also address and clarify membership.

182. The IASMN noted the update on the Report of the 25th session of the HLCM.

183. While the IASMN agreed overall that the agenda of the IASMN should drive the timing and frequency of IASMN meetings, there was no firm agreement at this time as to whether regular sessions of the IASMN should be held annually or bi-annually. It was further agreed that DSS canvas all IASMN members for their views on the frequency of IASMN meetings.

Q. Any Other Business

Chemical Weapons Preparedness

184. Following upon the issues discussed regarding the need to draft an NBC policy (see paragraphs 147 to 167), IASMN members reiterated the dangers and difficulties in dealing with the current chemical weapons threat in Syria and reconciling such a threat with continuing operations. Members re-emphasized that the UN would benefit from a common approach in this regard, noting that confusion results when agencies respond in different ways, particularly when agencies rely on different sources for information. Moreover, members agreed that OPCW and WHO should be considered the technical experts with regard to chemical weapons and should be included in any subsequent discussions on this issue.

185. The IASMN requested, as a matter of urgency, clarification regarding the identification of a single advisory group with an approved mandate for advising on safety and security with respect to chemical weapons, including agreed equipment specifications with respect to CW preparedness. The IASMN further emphasized the need for clear coordination and communications on this issue amongst the organizations and staff.

Blast Assessment/Premises Guidelines Working Group

186. The IASMN requested that the already established Premises Guidelines Working Group resume its work on an urgent basis, (to also include the participation of DPKO/DFS and to also take up the issue of seismic assessments). It was reaffirmed that the WFP-led Blast Assessment Working Group is a sub group of the DSS-led Premises Guidelines Working Group. Furthermore, the IASMN requested that DSS examine the qualifications for blast assessment advisors.

Election of Co-Chair of the IASMN

187. Mr. Drew Donovan, ITU, was elected, by acclamation, as the Co-Chair of both regular and steering group sessions of the IASMN for a two-year term.

Date and venue of IASMN meetings:

188. Steering Group – It was decided to hold the next session of the IASMN Steering group in Dakar, Senegal (hosting organization to be determined). *Subsequent to the IASMN meeting, after consultation with the Chair of the IASMN, it was decided to propose that the next Steering Group meeting be held in early February 2014(exact dates TBD).*

189. The IASMN decided to hold its 20th session in May/June 2014 in Geneva (hosting organization and exact dates TBD).

FINAL