

**Report of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network
18th Session, WFP HQ, Rome
5 to 7 February 2013**

INTRODUCTION

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the Headquarters of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome from 5 to 7 February 2013. A list of participants is attached at Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members is attached at Annex B. This was the 18th session of the IASMN since its first meeting in Vienna in 2000.
2. The IASMN members wish to express their gratitude to WFP and to FAO for hosting the meeting and for all the support provided. Gratitude is also extended to Mr. Amir Mahmoud Abdulla, Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer of WFP and Mr Daniel Gustafson, Deputy Director General Operations, FAO for addressing participants during the course of the meeting.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING

A. Budgetary Matters

Status of the Deployment of JFA-Funded DSS field-personnel (CRP 11)

3. This agenda item was introduced by DSS, who referred to the fact that DSS had begun a review of all its DSS field posts, (international and locally recruited personnel). The annex to CRP 11 detailed all current DSS positions globally and intentions for changes, an exercise that is hoped to assist in determining who is suitable for surge capacity, but also to ensure that DSS remains client orientated. It was also confirmed that there would be a working group constituted, as decided at the Steering Group's last meeting in October 2013, to include a number of AFPOs and for which TORs would be developed.
4. It was noted that some CSA positions had already been moved around and where possible DSS will 'regionalise' certain areas, an idea which met with approval. DSS also proposed a great number of analysts globally and noted that the numbers of DSS staff at HQ were relatively low, compared to many other departments.
5. One member noted that it had been decided in one IASMN meeting that all posts should be justified by a proper SRA, taking into account the nature and scope of operations in the field and asked where DSS stood on this. DSS stated that their own internal review of staff positions should be conducted first, to identify resources. Another pointed out that when the discussion arose at the last IASMN meeting about the services DSS provides in the field, the assumption was that the IASMN was going to be consulted on host country capacity in those countries and that this had not yet been done. Had this been done, it would have provided the rationale behind some deployments that were questionable.

6. Further, while DSS' renewal of 'service provision' was welcomed, it was also pointed out that unfortunately information was still not sufficiently forthcoming regarding DSS resourcing and that the increase in security officers in certain locations was not commensurate with the risk. A greater understanding was sought of how the IASMN would be consulted for these changes. It was also noted that local security costs in countries was not captured and there needed to be a review of security costs in total. DSS replied however that this had never been part of the intended review.

7. Several members thanked DSS for the documentation and its efforts towards transparency, noting that DSS's focus was similar to that raised by another member, i.e. that it was based on the understanding of risks globally, which are clearly not evenly distributed. The members both reminded the IASMN that the ability to move staff quickly when the need arose was critical, and as a system it was necessary to improve the ability not only to deploy rapidly, but also to identify the right staff for the deployment, (i.e. those able to enable, and not just those who are available). It was noted that over the last 3 to 4 years, that the former USG, DSS had cultivated security officers as an enabler, using security risk management processes and the concept of programme criticality.

8. One member believed that the exercise to identify positions, with a view to bettering resource management, had adopted a tactical rather than a strategic approach and that the issue of replacing international security professionals with national officers had not been considered. As the credibility and client orientation of DSS officers had improved, now was the time to consider replacing some international staff with national officers to achieve more, (e.g. there could be one international security officer with one to three national officers providing support). In this respect, it was noted that DSS was examining both sub regional and national officer approaches. It was the also the intention to discuss deployments with DPKO/DFS as DSS intended to replace some FSCOs with mission personnel, (who would also need to be trained accordingly).

9. Concern was raised that there was not enough flexibility in the system to allow for rapid deployments or to respond quickly enough regarding slowly developing security concerns in countries. The Chair agreed that surge capacity was, in general, poorly defined and needed attention, both within DSS and the UNSMS as a whole. DSS noted that in some cases, deployment had been delayed by secretariat rules or visa issues more than the lack of available and suitable resources, but that in others, the right profile had not always been available. Further, members noted that DOs are often (understandably) reluctant to release security officers for surge capacity as they depend heavily on them, but that a solution needed to be identified to resolve this issue.

10. It was suggested that as security staffing is centrally funded, security officers should be considered a global unit and given the flexibility to be redeployed when necessary, particularly when the redeployment of an officer from a low risk post would not significantly impact the provision of security, lending support to the idea of regionalization. It was noted that when there was a big expansion in DSS, an expectation was also created that countries would have security officers in place. As such, it needed to be made clear to DOs that there are not security officers specifically attached to one country, but rather global security officers. At the same time it was understood that the reason many DOs are reluctant to relinquish their security officers is because

of the Framework of Accountability for the UNSMS that prescribes their own accountability for security issues. As persons who are not security professionals, it was understandable that DOs do not wish to see their security officers leave.

11. In response to an alternative solution, DSS noted that the issue with back-filling positions and sending the 'right' staff for surge had significant financial implications that could result in double payment to staff one position. The Department needed to work with the resources it had and due to the lack of additional resources, one could only shift posts around to best meet needs. While it was considered paramount to have the right profile in place, what was also needed was further training of security officers but even for this, resources were lacking. It was suggested that duplication could be avoided and more could be done if DSS and AFPO assets were pooled. AFPOs were urged to assist in mapping resources by providing details of their staff deployments to DSS. It was also proposed that it made sense to capitalize on the expertise within certain AFPOs, (such as on convoy management or access), to better use the skills within the system and to, where possible, harmonize how security officers are recruited, trained and deployed. The SFPs of the AFPOs were requested by the Chair to exercise due diligence in recruitment.

12. It was noted that a strategy was needed to address the points raised. While the IASMN had before it a review of global deployments and the IASMN should have some role in determining the methodology that DSS used for the identification of positions, DSS should be left to make the final decisions about where its officers are placed. In view of the fact that the SLS had become a more reliable tool that provides information about the threats, one proposal was that the SLS level help determine how resources are deployed.

13. The issue of talent management was raised, and how best the IASMN can ensure that the right profile of staff is recruited, their performance managed internally and that staff are deployed sensibly and fairly from one duty station to another, to manage stress and work/life issues effectively. On the issue of staff profiles and skills more generally, it was recognized that many of the issues that arise with security advisors concern interpersonal conflict and not their technical abilities. In this respect, there was a need to maintain quality control and examine, in the recruitment process, the emotional intelligence of candidates. Given that recruitment does not sufficiently revolve around these soft skills, the system will continue to face the same issue. IASMN members also noted a shortage of suitable staff with the right languages. Performance appraisals were briefly discussed in this respect, noting the fact that the UN culture does not often support the use of constructive criticism. Members were informed that DSS had recently conducted a performance appraisal of all CSAs and SAs and that DSS was now more involved with DO appraisals, which may help to enhance security awareness and encourage accountability to some extent. It was acknowledged that there had been an improved knowledge of CSAs and SAs about the mandates and programmes of the AFPOs.

14. It was noted during the discussions that DSS was still tasked with conducting a client survey and a strategic review and that the work undertaken to examine the status of deployment of JFA-funded DSS field personnel was just a beginning. It was proposed that there was a need to discuss JFA posts at the Headquarters level and to revisit relocating DSS regional desks to the field, which was viewed as both, logical and an aid to increasing surge capacity. Concern was expressed about the composition and the scope of the working group proposed by the IASMN

Steering Group. In this regard, it was noted that the proposed working group is not meant to replace the business review requested by the IASMN and that there was a need for a more ambitious review before decisions could be made on the decentralization of certain services or charging other services. It was suggested that the strategic review could be conducted in parallel with the working group. While there was support for scoping TORs to progress incrementally with the working group, there was little support for a huge comprehensive review of the UNSMS, which was simply not practical. For the working group, deliverables needed to be defined. For some members, the working group needed to be linked with the preparation of the 2014-2015 budget. DSS clarified though that the intention was that the working group was meant to be separate from the strategic review and the AFPOs urged to provide DSS with a list of all their global security officer deployments in all their locations. The Chair urged the working group to begin its work as soon as possible with a view to reporting back to the IASMN's 19th regular session. DSS would be open to others joining the WG and scoping TORs would be produced for the strategic review, with input from the IASMN. It was added that DSS' initial staffing review was necessary to establish a starting point from which the working group could pick up to continue to review staffing issues, recognizing that the remit of the WG was smaller than the remit for an overall strategic review of the UNSMS and of DSS .

15. However, the remit of the review required definition. There needed to be clarity as to whether this would be a review of the UNSMS as well as of DSS and whether this would be a functional or strategic review. In any case, it was made clear that DSS would require a minimum of 6 months to conduct the review, with a progress report possibly being provided within 3 months. DSS believed it was logical for the strategic review to be undertaken in consultation with the working group.

16. DSS confirmed that other AFPOs were free to join the working group and confirmed that there was a need to clarify the working group's TORs. While there had been some support for regionalization of DSS in the past, it was not certain that this would work everywhere. This was something to be considered on a case-by-case basis, preceded by a thorough analysis.

17. The IASMN agreed to the formation of the working group to review staff deployments globally, as proposed by the IASMN Steering Group at its last session, and to include other interested organizations not previously listed. While the aim of the working group was already set out in paragraph 2 of CRP 11, specific TORs of the working group could be developed to also include an examination of the sub regional approach to DSS staffing and the resources of security personnel of other AFPOs in the overall review of security personnel. In this respect, All AFPOs were requested to provide information on their global deployments to DSS as soon as possible.

18. IASMN members confirmed that this working group, to be chaired by DSS, would only deal with staffing issues and that a strategic review, as recommended by the 17th session of the IASMN, would also be conducted by DSS. While noting that the input from the 18th session of the IASMN would aid the input into the strategic review, IASMN members requested that scoping TORs be developed for this review.

Update on DSS Jointly Financed Budget for 2014-2015

19. DSS provided to IASMN members via VTC an update on expenditure for the 2012-2013 biennium. Members were reminded that both the IASMN and FBN had agreed to a maximum ceiling under the JFA of \$218.6 million for the 2012-2013 biennium. In terms of expenditures, to stay on target with that sum, DSS had to leave some field posts vacant. At present, 20 international field posts and 45 local posts were vacant, which resulted in a savings of \$4 million. There was a need to look for other savings in non-staff costs. Although DSS is on target in terms of expenditure, members were informed that there is a need to make further savings this coming year because the budget is running a million over. If DSS was to keep to the same level of expenditure (now running at \$219.8 million), it would be increasingly more difficult to make ends meet, taking into account the need to reinforce Syria, Mali and possibly other countries in the Sahel.

20. It was asked how surge capacity may be addressed and whether there is a way for the AFPOs to advocate with their respective governing bodies that projects are charged for security requirements and needs. Noting the need to mainstream security into programs, one member noted that in principle, funds should be made available for local security measures to cover operations. However, funding security from project costs was difficult, as this would mean having to find additional funding at the country level to support surge requirements. Having said that, it was noted that most of the surge requirements fall within emergencies and the best way forward would be to harness the opportunity to also obtain money from the CERF or the CAP. With increased advocacy, and particularly with a cluster approach (whether that be the IASC or another entity or whether security is embedded in different clusters), it should be possible to overcome this. It was also suggested that DSS consider setting up a trust fund to be used for emergency activities.

21. DSS informed participants that attempts had been made over the last six months to improve its ability to lock into funding systems such as the CAP and CERF and that work is ongoing to ensure there is clarity in flash appeals and what security measures might be required. A slow improvement was noticeable in tapping into extra-budgetary resources to fund surge and other emergency responses. Regarding the CAP, as a percentage of funded projects, security has been one of the highest funded. That said, very small figures were requested for security, compared to other parts of the CAP. The Chair added that DSS was in the process of processing its first CERF request and hoped this would be approved shortly. He expressed a keen interest in developing security surge capacity within the wider UN system and urged members to provide ideas on how this may best be achieved.

22. DSS expressed concern about the quality of persons surged. In some places the quality was so poor as to elicit negative feedback, thus inhibiting DSS' efforts to raise donor funds. In other places, some security advisors were generally not experienced nor did security advisors have the time or feel comfortable writing donor proposals to secure XB funding. There was a need therefore for dedicated persons to deal with donors. Without those dedicated persons, the approach to donors would remain small scale and likely ineffective.

23. Improving rosters of those available for surge was something that needed to be addressed with both DSS and the AFPOs. At present, there are a number of retirees on rosters and it was noted that often the same persons are deployed for surge assignments. While it was expected, to a certain degree, that AFPOs would always seek to employ their favourites when needed, the scope of available roster candidates that could be deployed needed to expand.

24. It was noted that all the AFPOs are chasing the same donors which made securing XB funding that much more difficult. Further, while one organization moves forward to access and spend any donated funds, some AFPOs were becoming more self reliant. One positive way forward would be for all AFPOs to get behind one concept of operations to be clear about where the funding will be spent.

25. Emphasizing the point that clarity in decision making in the UNSMS was critical, participants' attention was brought to the fact that while the Framework of Accountability for the UNSMS made security managers accountable for certain things, that very accountability was hard to uphold when there are no funds to support activities. This undermined the role of security managers and is a deep systemic issue that needs to be addressed, i.e. there is a need to define what a lack of funding means for fulfilling accountabilities on the ground.

26. The discussion turned to the practicalities of using existing security officers deployed elsewhere to fulfil surge requirements. In some cases a two-month absence of a security officer from his/her normal posting would be very feasible, particularly in a low to medium risk country. In other cases however, this would not be so easy and would have a more significant impact for security management for that country. Much is dependent on garnering DO support. It was noted that it is very difficult to get persons to part with security assets, perhaps easier in the short term, but certainly not in the longer term. DSS was urged to examine its internal capacity to provide surge for a one or two month period.

27. DSS also informed the meeting that the last USG, DSS had made it very clear that DSS would have a profile of security officers that would, at a minimum, have completed a university education (preferably at post graduate level) and have two official languages, as it was important to expand the language capacity of those to be deployed on surge. In addition, while there are some very experienced persons on the ground, in some cases their background (e.g. lack of educational qualifications; insufficient language capacity) precluded them from joining DSS due to these stringent HR requirements. Some argued that for surge purposes it was not necessary that those employed need to fulfil the standard HR profile in terms of language and education. DSS agreed and pointed out that this was in fact already the case. Another suggestion was made to remove the requirement for prior UNSMS experience as this could serve to attract a wider pool of candidates who could then be recruited to work under experienced DSS officers.

28. One of the staff federations informed members that back in 2009 the IASMN had proposed conducting a skills inventory, noting that one had already been conducted in 1998. Without such an exercise it was asked how there could be certainty that persons with the requisite profile could be found. It was proposed therefore that there be a global skills inventory conducted and in this context the point was confirmed that there are plenty of persons willing to undertake surge activities but who are never contacted as the network of persons deployed is

confined to a small number. Another proposal made was that the skills database provided for in the UN secretariat's on line recruiting and performance management tool, Inspira which is presently focused only on secretariat staff, could nevertheless be helpful for those not in the secretariat who should be urged to register their profile skill set in Inspira and that this could possibly be linked with a security page.

29. Clarification was sought regarding what is meant by a surge, i.e. normally a surge is time-limited and after a certain period a distinction needed to be made between a surge and a situation that was initially considered as a surge but had in fact turned into a new reality expected to be sustained for a longer period. At the same time, it also needed to be recognized that situations improve as well as deteriorate. What was needed is a system that can respond rapidly, e.g. by new persons backfilling in more mature operations while qualified persons could move on to other operations. One of the problems with this however was that managers did not wish to release their Security Officers. It was asked whether DSS had experimented with using local security assistants (LSAs) outside their home country, especially in places where there is already a structure and support in place. It was also suggested that DSS tap from its own resources, e.g. using some desk officers from its Division of Regional Operations (DRO) and tapping into its Security and Safety Services (SSS) for surge capacity. DSS confirmed that all of these were already being done.

30. Another constraint identified was the inability to use different funding sources to support surge requirements, i.e. it was not possible to use anyone under the peacekeeping account for anything other than peacekeeping activities. The HR Network raised the need to be mindful of some mental health and PTSD related issues when surging personnel.

31. DSS reiterated that security advisors (due to the small numbers of DSS staff in each country) often did not have the time to devise budget proposals or to advocate for resources to be dedicated to resource mobilization, particularly during a crisis. While it was agreed that there was a need for everyone to work together, it was a good idea to also have a global skills inventory. On the issue of backfilling, it was pointed out that there would be problems with meeting the costs to surge two different persons. Given the present budgetary climate, this was not really a feasible option. While another option was using trainers for surge, it was noted that trainers are generally heavily committed to training programmes and therefore could not fulfil this role. Regarding restrictions imposed to limit officers from DPKO/DFS deploying, members were informed that efforts could be made to seek the lifting of those restrictions. The need for organizations to take PTSD seriously was also supported.

32. Turning to the issue of the actual JFA budget for 2014-2015, one member (FAO) informed the IASMN that it had reviewed the official documents for this meeting and had identified some issues from the past. FAO noted that the 2014-2015 budget had not yet been approved and that IASMN would have to consider the content-not merely the level-of the 2014-2015 budget in its role as recognized by the GA, the ACABQ, the HLCM and the TORs of the IASMN. Based on this, and in light of the upcoming consideration of the JFA budget, there were some recommendations to propose and the view was expressed that if the recommendations presented were not to be accepted as recommendations at this IASMN session then, at the very least, it was requested that the recommendations be reflected in the final report of this meeting.

Accordingly, the recommendations, which were presented by FAO with a view towards bringing additional clarity to budgets and especially facilitating the development of the next biennial JFA budget were as follows:

- In terms of cost clarification—important to avoid delays in the review process as the budget in various fora -- FAO proposed that the analysis requested by the IASMN [*Report of the IASMN Feb. 2012 para 74; IASMN Report of the IASMN June 2010 para 112*] with respect to the cost itemization between the JFA and LCS (locally cost shared budgets) be presented with the 2014-2015 budget proposal;
- Noting that close and early collaboration between UNSMS organizations and DSS in the preparation of the biennial budget could result in more comprehensive discussions and potentially avoid delays in the review process, FAO proposed that a small group (consisting of interested organizations) work towards identifying organizations' information requests and that these requests be presented at the next session of the Steering Group. As a starting point, the proposed working group could use the previously agreed-upon budget format [*CEB/2011/HLCM/FB/4*].
- FAO believes that an analysis of surge costs/needs in the past and current biennia as well as an estimate of in-kind contributions (AFPOs lending security staff in the field) could be useful to understanding the level of needs for the next JFA and requests that this information be made available.
- To present a clearer picture of deliverables provided to the AFPOs—especially in the context of the budget discussion—it is proposed that the agreed paper on this topic [*Report of the IASMN SG May 2012 para 119 iv*] be made available to the IASMN at its next session. Noting that budget cycles differ among partners in the UNSMS and to facilitate the AFPOs in planning for their respective budget cycles, FAO requested that the JFA budget presentation include a broad work plan that projects anticipated needs over several years as agreed by the IASMN. [*Report of the IASMN June 2010 para 112*].
- More generally, FAO also proposed that 1) IASMN documents be distributed at least a week before scheduled sessions to allow internal vetting within organizations, especially as FAO (and perhaps other organizations) cannot join any explicit or implicit agreements on issues with budgetary impact without such vetting; 2) Policy papers for decision by the IASMN include an estimate of increased workload and potential impact on required resources so that organizations may be made aware of possible increases for planning purposes; and 3) A security staffing overview and resource allocation by country(including OECD countries)be made available regularly to the IASMN [*A/61/223 para 14*].

33. DSS pointed out that the FBN and its Working Group was already examining many of the specific issues cited in the recommendations submitted by FAO and that this work should not be duplicated and was best left to the FBN WG to consider. It was added that the FBN Network would review the JFA Budget proposal for 2014-2015 at its VTC on 26 February 2013. While

supporting that the FBN WG meets before the next IASMN Steering Group or regular session, FAO insisted nevertheless that its views be included in the report of this session (as indicated above). FAO also noted that the mandate of the FBN WG on Safety and Security costs was solely to look at the apportionment of the JFA, i.e. on how to divide the \$200 million plus among all AFPOs. The WG did not have a mandate to examine surge or local cost sharing or many issues covered by the FAO recommendations. FAO further explained that there was in fact another FBN working group, chaired by UNFPA, which was currently examining governance issues, (i.e. issues such as invoicing of the budget and the high vacancy rates imposed by the General Assembly). That working group however will not deal with more fundamental issues like what goes into the JFA. This was really the purview of the IASMN and, it was added, the issues raised are basically the recommendations the IASMN had already approved and requested on different occasions. The reason clarity on those proposals was now being sought was to facilitate a smoother process for the JFA.

34. Several members asserted that the IASMN needed to examine the substantial portion of the JFA and that the report of this session needed to reflect the fact that IASMN members did not have the programme and budget submission for 2014-2015 before them and that this be provided as a matter of urgency¹. Noting that there is a dual responsibility, i.e. the substantial part of the programme to be examined by the IASMN, and then brought to the FBN to look at the levels of the budget, it was felt that the level of information was not sufficient. IASMN members were informed that DSS would ensure that they would receive this information. Further, members were reassured that there would be no additional resources in the 2014-2015 budget, as compared to the budget for the 2012-2013 biennium and that the general idea behind the 2014-2015 budget was not to submit anything different from the current biennium budget.

35. One member highlighted the fact that in the late 90s and early 2000, budget issues had always been a stumbling block for DSS and before that, for UNSECOORD. He expected that certain documents would have been provided regarding the JFA and encouraged DSS to share as much information as possible right now about the 2014-2015 budget to give AFPOs the opportunity to examine it. If this was not done, DSS could find itself facing complaints from the AFPOs. Now was the opportunity to discuss this. While he acknowledged that his organization was lucky in that there is funding for security, he recognized that many AFPOs were not as financially stable as his organization. He also recalled that the last time the budget had been discussed there was a demand for zero growth. Another member informed the meeting that his organization had budgeted on the assumption of zero growth. He wished to have an open discussion about the budget, noting that a precondition for the 2014-2015 budget was a strategic review.

¹ The detailed JFA budget proposal was distributed to IASMN members electronically on 12 February 2013. It was not possible to distribute this prior to the IASMN meeting as discussions with the UN Secretariat's Programme Planning and Budget Division (Controller) concerning the budget were ongoing until 11 February 2013. Also, it is important to note that to proceed with the requested strategic review of DSS operations, DSS needs to complete its homework internally, a process that has already been initiated. Following on from discussions at the IASMN's 18th session, the strategic review will take time to complete but the budget process timeline has meant that DSS has needed to submit a budget for 2014 – 2015 that closely mirrors that of the current biennium, 2012-2013 in terms of the staffing levels and associated non post requirements. It needs also to be noted that in reality DSS has already needed to come up with considerable efficiencies and cost savings, given the increased demand from places like Syria and the Sahel in order to maintain expenditure levels for 2012-2013 within the \$218.6 million ceiling that was approved by the AFPOs.

36. Generally, a more substantial discussion on the JFA budget for 2014-2015 was expected at this session. While welcoming the paper submitted by FAO, one member noted that some of the items included in the paper had been brought to the IASMN previously. He too supported a reference to this paper in the final report of this meeting and urged that the items be examined by DSS and not only be considered in the FBN meeting. Regarding the issue of locally cost shared budgets, he was really looking for something more in depth to be presented to the IASMN, i.e. something comprehensively specifying and itemizing the resources in the JFA.

37. Another member, who had also pointed out that the IASMN should be discussing substance as well as funding when it came to considering budgetary issues, while actual monetary figures would be addressed by the FBN, noted that his organization was facing huge problems funding the current JFA. Taking this into account and also the fact that the UN was facing austerity measures, there were some principles that needed to be considered while preparing the 2014-2015 budget, e.g. how to better optimize security resources for JFA activities and how to enable the UNSMS and DSS to deliver more with less. Recognizing that this is the current reality we face and that the situation is not improving, alternative solutions need to be found to optimize the work and make it more effective. Otherwise, the same situation will be faced resulting in a budget reflecting unaffordable needs. It was proposed therefore that while preparing the next budget what needed to be taken into account was not only the issue of transparency, but also the timely submission of documents.

38. The Chair reassured members that the figures for the 2014-2015 budget would be flat and that they would be provided with the requested documentation. It was noted that there was insufficient time to discuss the budget, leading to a perception of a lack of transparency, which needed to be addressed. Furthermore, there was recognition that DSS needed to share associated budget papers in advance.

39. The IASMN recommended that there be a more proactive approach to addressing surge capacity. *

**It is to be noted that some members of the IASMN requested that the recommendations proposed by FAO, as referenced in paragraph 32 of this report, be implemented. In the absence of the opportunity to properly review, discuss and arrive at firm recommendations by the IASMN, and in the interest of ensuring greater transparency and clarity between DSS and IASMN members on budgetary issues, DSS proposes to submit the FAO paper, together with a CRP addressing the recommendations contained therein, to the next session of the IASMN Steering Group for its consideration.*

B. Crisis Management (CRP 4)

40. In its Steering Group meeting held in New York in October 2012, the IASMN recognized that the United Nations system needs to improve its responsibilities and coordination in this regard and recommended that an overarching approach to crisis management be referred to the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) with a view to proposing the establishment of a working group to consider this issue.

41. DSS reminded members that at its 16th session in Bangkok in February 2012, there were discussions about crisis management (CM) and whether there was a need to establish a policy as part of the UNSMS Security Policy Manual. At its 17th session in June 2012, the IASMN expressed concern about the state of readiness within the system, given that so many disciplines were involved. The conclusion was reached that DSS should lead a group to set up a framework for emergency interventions. In October 2012, the Steering Group agreed that the issue of CM was bigger than their scope and that the responsibility lay with HLCM to incorporate other actors, in order to review how the UN system collectively responds to crises.

42. DSS reminded the IASMN that given the current review by HLCM of its working methods, this might not be the opportune time to escalate additional issues to HLCM so the issue now was how to agree on a way forward. It was noted that a presentation later in the meeting's programme from Mr. Ian Sinclair, Director of the UN crisis centre (UNOCC) may support discussions on this issue, but essentially the IASMN needs to determine how to bring together a number of threads relating to crisis management and organisational resilience.

43. One member believed that CM was captured by business continuity and that in security, what is being dealt with is critical incident management. He noted that mass casualties were caused by deliberate attack; or by vehicle accidents or by natural disasters; or large-scale evacuations on short notice or victim response and did not particularly wish to see the UNSMS drifting into business continuity where security had a coordinating and not a leading role. He noted that the UNOCC was looking at business continuity, whereas the response and overall coordination of security management of a critical incident is largely the responsibility of the AFPOs. Human resources was of course a key component and he asked the IASMN to consider the boundaries of the UNSMS and to define critical incident management and those incidents for which the UNSMS has a responsibility. Turning to the issue of security incident reporting, he noted that how incidents are reported and terminology that is used, as well as reporting lines and what is reported is important. There is both routine and flash reporting but guidelines are clearly missing. His organization was currently trying to look at gaps they have had in past experiences. He advocated for using appropriate terminology to clearly determine those incidents the UNSMS is responsible for managing and coordinating.

44. One member informed the meeting that it had recently reviewed 34 lessons learned since 2006 to see how security had been managed in a crisis, and identified 3 crisis scenarios --an Abuja type incident where UN personnel are affected by crisis, a second scenario where the population is affected by crisis and a third scenario where both UN personnel and the population are affected by crisis. For the first scenario, there is a need for little change in UNSMS requirements; the second scenario needs to consider levels of acceptable risk and the third scenario was the most difficult because this would see two operations going on concurrently. While there would be one operation to look after UN personnel, there would also be a surge operation to support the local population in crisis. The UNSMS received the most criticism when it came to the third scenario, which is difficult partly because it is so dependent on host country capacity, which in turn impacts on the ability of the UNSMS to deliver, often overstressing security mitigation and protection measures already in place.

45. So while there is a need to address the first scenario, there is also a need to expand the scope and look at the wider issue of security management within a crisis and how the UNSMS responds to enable the UN system to fulfil its mandates in a crisis. Whether in Haiti, the tsunami, Syria, Liberia or Lebanon in 2006, it is a terribly difficult thing to do and if not done right there is criticism.

46. The representative of the UNMDWG reminded the IASMN that at its 17th session, the UNMERT lead had spoken about mass casualty preparedness and response. From a medical perspective, while UNMERT had deployed successfully in Abuja, it still remains a struggle to address the lessons learned. The UNMDWG is very keen to be part of this discussion and part of the solution. It was noted that when there are a number of different entities responding to a crisis or critical incident, the question remains, who is in charge. Clear and trained leadership is needed; specifically DOs and SMTs need to be trained in crisis management and know what is expected of them. In his previous role with the US government, he had always seen field security officers as the lead in the response. Similarly, cautioning against underestimating the situation when an Abuja type incident occurs, he noted that the DO in such incidents looks to the CSA and SA to take the lead. As both security and medical are first responders, organizations will need to depend on both to define what is wanted out of crisis management as a policy.

47. One member noted that mass casualty plans are typically part of security plans. DSS noted the need for mandatory mass casualty contingency plans to be in place. So far, this was the case only in Kenya and Haiti. It was added that when HLCM had been presented with the UNMERT proposal in the past that it had taken 4-5 years to secure funding for the proposal.

48. The staff federations highlighted the fact that when staff are faced with a mass casualty scenario, often more difficulties and injuries were caused by staff eager to assist, but not really knowing how to react or what to do. The provision of mandatory first aid training for all UN staff globally was requested to avoid the issue of additional injuries. It was also pointed out that there is reluctance among organizations and senior management to conduct mass casualty exercises as this disturbs programmes. Nevertheless, these should be mandatory and conducted periodically. Only by doing so may gaps be discovered. DSS noted that in one location, although plans were in place, assumptions had been made about the capacity of the safe haven, which proved to be inadequate in the end.

49. Another member cautioned against trying to define crisis management and agreed with the UNMDWG by noting that a key element is determining who is in charge. It was noted that there would be incidents in which security would be in charge, such as in Abuja where the USG, DSS had taken charge. The same could be applied to the scenario where both UN personnel and the local population are impacted by a crisis. There also needed to be coordination of the humanitarian effort where security has a support role and is an enabling force, but is not a driver. The IASMN needed to be clear about where security fits into the scenario. Yet another member raised the issue of 'preparedness' and highlighted slow and rapid onset disasters, where sharing of information and analysis needs to be good and where there is merit for a coordinated approach to CM.

50. Another member noted the discussion at the 17th session of the IASMN wherein it was cited that the IASMN has a well organized and effective body led by DSS and should take the lead to address this issue. As evidenced in Abuja and during the Algerian hostage crisis, there is no universal crisis management response. There is a need therefore to move forward as fast as possible. He was surprised that members of the Steering Group had decided to send this issue to HLCM, as he believed the HLCM would revert to the IASMN on this issue. Instead, he proposed that the IASMN take the lead on this and report to the HLCM exactly what it intends to do. He was pleased to see a move from discussing policy to discussing a crisis management framework.

51. The Chair agreed that there are not only security crises, but also crises that are beyond that, which have a security component. Some crises are political in nature. Some are specific to the AFPOs. The fact that there are different types of crises makes this discussion confusing and mandates the need for simple recommendations. He observed how crisis managers in the UN work at the HQ level – crises are handled in their offices among a relatively small number of people. Informing IASMN members of the upcoming presentation by the Director of the UNOCC, he added that he hoped the UNOCC would take root in the UN system. He recalled that the DPKO Sitcen was established at the strong urging of member states, based on the UNICEF OPSCEN model, but this was not established on a system wide basis. UNOCC represents a new start, at least at the level of the UN secretariat where all departments are represented. After the UNOCC presentation, he urged IASMN members to consider how their organizations might fit into this structure in order to secure agreement from all parts of the UN system on how crisis management may be handled. Perhaps a lessons learned exercise needed to be conducted. For security crises, there was a need to ensure we have our act together and recommended DSS examine security crises, such as Abuja and what the procedures/checklist are for handling the response.

52. Recognizing that crisis management is wider than just security, IASMN members agreed that it first needed to fully understand its role in a wider crisis management framework before reverting to the HLCM on this issue. To do so, the IASMN agreed that DSS would take stock of what already exists in terms of crisis management policies and SOPs, including what crisis response procedures are in place and share this information with IASMN members with a view to progressing further on this issue.

Presentation on the United Nations Operations Crisis Centre (UNOCC) by Mr. Ian Sinclair, Director, UNOCC

53. Mr. Ian Sinclair, Director of the newly established UNOCC addressed the meeting via VTC. Mr. Sinclair noted that the proposal for the UNOCC had been around for many years but the catalyst for launching this came under the Capital Master Plan in March 2010. In October 2011, it was decided to establish and resource it. The objective was to establish a single centre under the Secretary-General's authority, to provide UN senior management with a common global UN picture – a single venue for management of crises in the field, with round the clock support.

54. Although the UNOCC was established on 7 December, it began operations on 28 January and was expected to be fully operational by mid-2013, allowing more time for the development of some of its procedures and products. There are 10 stakeholders in the UNOCC joined in a 24/7 watchroom, including the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), the UN Secretariat's Department of Management, as well as some key operational departments and offices, e.g. human rights, and peace and security. Not everyone in the UN system was yet on board. The UNOCC brought together DPKO's Sitcen and UNDSS' Comscen, joined in a single room with staff from other stakeholders, which has already proved to enhance the information flow. The UNOCC, located in the UN secretariat, is organizationally situated in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) and in addition, there is a USG level steering committee to oversee its work.

55. The centre essentially has three functions: situational awareness, crisis response and executive communications. For the first time UNOCC is unifying reporting from across the UN system to put out a product early every morning for UN senior management. At present, reports are confined to senior UN management and their special assistants until there is enough confidence in the product. Then, it will be distributed more widely. The centre will also provide alerts about significant events or incidents that are breaking, informed by the UN field presence. It also provides a summary report on specific crises such as Syria and Mali in the morning, in addition to the daily product.

56. The centre is equipped with three crisis rooms to simultaneously manage 3 crises, plus surge space. While the Secretary-General retains oversight of crisis management, depending on the nature of the crisis, the principle of the relevant department taking the lead is maintained, e.g. if it is a safety and security crisis, DSS will take the lead, using UNOCC facilities. The UNOCC would provide a specific summary report in the morning, in addition to the report cited above. The 24/7 duty room connects senior leaders around the world, particularly when they are travelling.

57. The centre is funded by stakeholder departments and offices contributing personnel and resources from their own budgets. It has no separate budget but is working with the Controller's office for a cost sharing arrangement for certain items that may not be covered. It has also obtained extra budgetary support from some member states.

58. Following the presentation, there were several questions from members on the functionality and implementation of the centre, including queries about the compatibility of the centre's modern equipment with the equipment in the field and what the relationship of the centre is with Resident Coordinators and key UN AFPOs. It was also asked how common analysis and planning would be implemented, whether the UNOCC would eventually replace the DPKO and DSS crisis centres and what the involvement of DSS desk officers would be regarding the daily product from the UNOCC.

59. It was clarified that if the centre receives word of a major problem through, for example, the peacekeeping net, (e.g. a major exchange of fire in DRC), they would generate an alert within the peacekeeping group, but also share this with the other stakeholders. Members were assured that the centre's modern state of the art equipment, including video wall technology and

videoconference equipment works with all peacekeeping equipment. The Centre is also authorized to engage directly with political missions. In addition, provisions have been made at an alternate location within New York as backup for the centre. Members were also informed that, at the outset, the centre's daily would continue to be distributed on a limited basis. This would not yet be distributed to security focal points until there was more time to develop confidence in the products produced. The Chair fully expected the sharing of information with security focal points in due course and intended for DSS to use this venue for DSS meetings and interactions with AFPOs.

60. The difference between the UNOCC and UNICEF's OPSCEN was noted. Though having the same three functions, the UNICEF OPSCEN also provided surge support on a 24/7 basis and was located inside UNICEF's Division of Emergency Operations. While welcoming the centre, UNICEF nevertheless confirmed that it would continue to maintain its own independent operations centre for the foreseeable future. The OPSCEN's backup operation is based in Geneva, which they handed over to during hurricane Sandy. In event of a crisis, UNICEF will send a liaison officer to UNOCC, transmit information from there, and participate in its meetings. UNICEF's view was that once its centre was developed the cost of running it would not be prohibitive. The benefits gained clearly justified the cost. In an effort to promote closer collaboration with the UNOCC, UNICEF suggested that it conduct some tabletop exercises together to test its processes.

61. Some concerns were expressed that the UNOCC was very much secretariat focused, which could result in some of the reporting being skewed to meet UN secretariat needs rather than those of the AFPOs. It was important to ensure therefore that the AFPOs and the UN secretariat have in place common reporting and analysis. There is also a need to ensure that humanitarian concerns are addressed and in this regard it was noted that there is an OCHA representative in the centre. From the perspective of the UNOCC, it was explained that the UNOCC clearly wished to become more inclusive and was not meant to replace existing functions, but to assist in ensuring more unified planning and analysis to produce a better result. The more it can give to the AFPOs, the better for the system. It was felt that as the centre develops, the benefits for the agencies should become clearer, without eliminating the ways in which agencies liaise with the field. DSS agreed to encourage the centre to share information as much as possible, and to avoid the temptation to sanitise reports for the sake of fulfilling multiple mandates and senior management requirements.

C. Report of BOI, Abuja (CRP 8)

62. The IASMN Steering Group, held in New York from 10 to 11 October 2012, discussed follow-up issues concerning the report of the "United Nations Board of Inquiry into the attack on the United Nations Common Premise in Abuja, Nigeria in 26 August 2011" that had been provided to security focal points from the United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes. Among the main issues discussed were the UNSMS policy on "Boards of Inquiry" and the physical security of United Nations facilities.

63. The Abuja report was shared with IASMN members, along with a matrix of actions drafted after consideration of the report. The IASMN Steering Group, at its last session in October 2012, requested that a working group be formed to draft guidelines against the UNSMS

Policy on the Security of UN Premises and that the WFP-led working group on blast be a sub-group of this working group.

64. It was noted that the UNSMS had learnt important lessons from incidents like Algeria and Abuja. Since the Algiers incident, there had been a culture change to ensure that understanding what had happened did not amount to scape-goating or blame.

65. One member noted the difference between ‘accepted’ and ‘acceptable’ risk and reminded members that as a system, we did not simply accept fatalities, but that it was necessary to articulate the level of risks we accept as organizations. The member also noted that the resignation of a USG as a result of a major security incident did not set the right tone to the system or to staff. It was important to promote the understanding that we accept risk and to articulate the difference between acceptable and unacceptable risk. It was also necessary to promote a culture of accountability.

66. DSS noted that a decision was made after Abuja not to have an independent panel enquiry. Previous enquiries did not amount to lessons learnt that could have as effectively been determined through a UNSMS board of enquiry.

67. One member asked whether the BOI report had been well-accepted by senior management and the staff federations. The member pointed out that one of the key recommendations was to have a working group to create premises guidelines for the implementation of the UNSMS Policy on the Security of UN Premises and that a timeframe was needed for establishment of this working group as this was a critical action. The Chair appreciated the need for a DSS implementation plan, particularly that attention needed to be paid to lessons learned and DSS agreed to convene a working group to develop premises guidelines within 6 weeks. Related to this, WFP confirmed that it would chair the blast working group. (and finalized the TORs for this WG for distribution at this meeting), but noted that the rightful chair should be DSS. It was also noted that the next meeting of the blast working group would take place in March 2013. Members agreed that it was urgent to activate the blast assessment working group led by WFP, especially as in the Sahel there were physical security challenges to face and a need to start providing guidance to those countries.

68. One of the staff federations noted that many national states provide a coroner’s report following an incident, but that the UN approach had usurped that and did not follow a formal process. Neither of the federations had received any information on the BOI report and in their view, better coordination was needed on how BOIs are dealt with, no less so because, while appreciating the need for confidentiality and sensitivity in these circumstances, it was the staff bodies who often acted as a necessary conduit of information when questions were asked by survivors and family members of those left behind. It was also noted that the staff federations were pursuing the ratification by more Member States of the Convention on the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel and the Optional Protocol to that Convention.

69. Another member reminded the IASMN that the BOI policy for the UNSMS had actually been approved by the IASMN and that there had been much forward movement into looking way

past who was responsible. He stressed that the point of an enquiry was to determine whether everything reasonable was done to manage the risk, and in that context, whether the risk was acceptable. It was stated that the UNSMS still has to hold itself accountable against these clear questions, but that it often failed in the implementation of risk management, and that staff are not always aware of the risks they are asked to take.

70. The representative from the UNMDWG wished to ensure that the working matrix considered all aspects of the incident in Abuja, including medical issues that needed to be taken into account. DSS indicated that it would update the action matrix and share this with IASMN members to reflect the current status of actions taken to date and what remains to be done.

71. The IASMN recommended that the first meeting of the premises guidelines working group be convened within 6 weeks and approved the TORs for the WFP led blast working group (Annex C).

D. Draft Policies for the United Nations Security Policy Manual

a. Saving Lives Together (CRP 9a)

72. The IASMN was presented with a paper on Saving Lives Together (SLT) and requested to approve the draft Policy to be included as Chapter II, Section G of the UNSMS Security Policy Manual. The IASMN was also asked to take note of the progress on the operational aspects of the SLT Framework.

73. One member summarized the multifaceted loss of confidence amongst INGOs/NGOs, (represented by the four INGO/NGO consortia), in relation to SLT, in particular, the lack of systematic attention being given to SLT, the lack of substantial progress made in implementation, and the concern about ‘projectisation,’ with money having been attributed to provide specific staff for this project in a very limited number of countries and to provide a full time liaison officer at DSS HQ. Those INGO/NGO concerns were reflected in previous IASMN discussions, recognizing the need to see SLT more as a core function for all security professionals to enable safe and secure delivery, rather than as an ‘add on’ responsibility. Accordingly, the policy was intended to embed the idea of collaboration with INGOs/NGOs as both fundamental and inherent to security management responsibilities.

74. In addition to considering the draft policy, members were updated on progress on the operational aspects of the SLT framework. While DSS had examined this and considered the operationalization of SLT, it was noted that this had been made in line with previous IASMN discussions that SLT would be mainstreamed, i.e. SLT would be made one of the core tasks of security advisors to ensure partners are well informed. DSS’ DRO now chaired the SLT oversight committee, with the day-to-day liaison for SLT delegated to OCHA that would field the multiple communications with the INGOs. Some products had been amended and changed slightly and together with that, best practices examined.

75. Against this background, the meeting was informed that the IASMN Steering group had proposed that there be a UNSMS policy to further embed SLT as one of the key functions of the

security advisor. The INGO consortia itself was not perfect (there was not yet a full list of INGO partners) and SLT implementation was not highly regarded by all who are part of the consortia. To genuinely prove to our INGO partners important to our delivery and to ensure that our security advisors understand this is a key task, it was strongly believed that there is a need for a policy to make this one of the core tasks of security advisors.

76. A number of members strongly supported the need for a policy, noting that while information sharing should be a natural process in the field and part of all ToRs for staff with security responsibilities, this is not always practiced. A policy would therefore hold these staff accountable for this fundamental task within their collective roles.

77. One member noted that paragraph 3 of the policy limited the scope of information sharing, namely to INGOs of the four consortia, excluding the likes of MSF and ICRC. The member suggested that the policy be broadened beyond the consortia. Another member agreed, suggesting that the policy also be made more flexible with the mention of “the spirit of the framework and UN core values,” to avoid specifying which parties should be included, i.e. it should be left to the discretion of the DO to decide on which organizations should be covered by the spirit of the policy.

78. The capacity and willingness of INGOs/NGOs to engage in the SLT framework was considered. One member cautioned that formalizing this philosophy might put too much pressure on staff, particularly given that the flow of information tended to be from UNSMS members to INGOs/NGOs. There were also concerns that INGOs/ NGOs would make unreasonable demands, particularly relating to resources. Though positive results in the two way flow of information as a result of the creation of formalized NGO groups such as ANSO had been demonstrated, sensitivities about programme delivery meant that the success of SLT hinged largely on interpersonal relationships and trust.

79. It was generally recognized that INGOs/NGOs have to take greater responsibility for SLT. It was also pointed out that INGO/NGOs wanted to use former SLT funding to establish similar organizations to ANSO and PAC, which would avoid the need for a separate forum (in addition to the SMT) and allow information sharing in a controlled and reasonable way.

80. One member cautioned against the IASMN expectations being put on security advisors if SLT implementation is formalized too much as this would be overwhelming. He supported that the success of SLT is inter personal and trust based and believed that the draft policy imposes an additional burden on SAs in the field. While noting that NGOs have to take greater responsibility, SLT was essentially a philosophical framework and should not be imposed. He cautioned that if SLT is made rigid, NGOs will end up cherry picking what they need and this could interfere with some UNSMS internal mechanisms.

81. Another member did not believe that there was a need for such a policy at this time and that if there was such a policy, its implementation should not be a core task or key function of security advisors. He highlighted that the UN should ensure that its limited resources are targeted to assist those covered under the UNSMS Applicability policy before a policy is created mandating that valuable time and resources are expended on personnel not covered under the

UNSMS. While the SLT framework was supported, it was believed that the problem with its implementation rested more with the interpretation of the framework and the level of involvement by the various local players, including the NGO community, from whom a greater commitment to SLT was required. It was suggested therefore, that for the foregoing reasons and with no additional resources, that DSS revise instructions and SOPs to its personnel regarding implementation of the SLT framework. The Chair indicated that DSS would re-examine its internal SOPs in this regard.

82. One member was concerned about how the SLT policy would affect costs in the JFA. It was highlighted that at times expectations are created at the field level without resources being put into this and though there was no explicit talk here about resources, this still needed to be factored in. Noting that the DO is responsible for implementing policy it was questioned whether it was also intended that the responsibility for mobilizing funds for implementing the policy would be left to the DO.

83. Another member supported and liked the policy but believed that the wording might be a bit strong because it places obligations. What is needed is a very clear affirmation that SLT is part of our working modalities. He suggested adjusting the policy to satisfy some of those needs – perhaps produce an operational document or guidelines for the SMOM, referring to best practices. It was added that it would be impossible to attend to all the NGO needs so instead a focus on good practices is needed. Further it was suggested that instead of having NGOs at SMTs they should be encouraged to create their own separate body, in which security personnel could participate.

84. One member suggested that SLT, particularly the elements of information sharing and making training available, could be implemented at no cost to the IASMN, with benefits to the UNSMS as a whole. DSS iterated its view that specific funding should no longer be set aside for SLT and that fundraising should be done jointly with INGOs/NGOs. The member also suggested that the creation of analyst positions could benefit INGOs/NGOs and enhance SLT.

85. One member, noting that SLT is embedded in the TORs of the FSCO, added that this policy is drawn out of frustration over what needed to be exercised as common sense. He proposed simplifying the policy with the main aim of getting persons out to talk to people. If the current SLT Framework was applied correctly it would be a good framework that actually works but if not applied correctly then there is a need to create a policy. However, there was concern that a policy would commit our security managers but not necessarily commit the other side. Instead, he proposed that the framework be improved.

86. The Chair agreed that given the supposedly inherent nature of information sharing, perhaps the policy was overwrought trying to clearly define responsibilities, and wondered whether it could be simplified and include national NGOs. It was suggested that the UN secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) may need to be involved to expand the list of members of the consortia who can be involved in SLT.

87. There was the general feeling that a commitment was also needed from INGOs/NGOs in relation to their SLT responsibilities, rather than just a commitment from the side of the IASMN.

88. DSS explained that the policy had been provided following the Steering Group's request, but that the wording of the policy could be reviewed with the INGOs/NGOs at the next SLT Oversight Committee meeting to be held on 26 February 2013.

89. The IASMN noted the progress made on the operational aspects of the SLT framework. It supported the idea of a policy to formalize the collaboration with INGOs/NGOs and hold accountable those responsible for this fundamental and inherent security management responsibility. However, the IASMN agreed that the policy, before being presented to the next session of the IASMN Steering Group required further consideration by the SLT Oversight Committee.

b. Staff Lists (CRP 9b)

90. The IASMN was requested to consider and approve the draft policy on "Lists of United Nations Personnel and Other Individuals" to be included as Chapter V, Section F of the UNSMS Security Policy Manual.

91. Members recognized the critical nature of having accurate personnel lists, the difficulty in accounting for personnel during and after incidents without it, and the dynamic nature of the information required. They also noted the inherent duplication of capturing data in multiple systems and the on-going effort required to maintain the data.

92. One member welcomed the policy as a way to emphasize to the field the need to update this information regularly. However, another member believed that this responsibility lay with HR departments. DSS clarified that the duties and responsibilities reflected in the draft policy were based on the Framework of Accountability for the UNSMS.

93. Yet another member commended the policy, which he believed was good and was a serious risk mitigation measure. It was critical to maintain regular lists yet difficult to encourage this and this policy created a greater foundation for this. Taking into consideration experiences in Haiti and Abuja, it was very important to have a policy in place to address the maintenance of lists, noting the difficulties that had been faced there, as well as in Egypt where events had occurred very suddenly. It had taken a lot of time to finalize those lists. He highlighted one very important paragraph in the draft policy, i.e. to maintain the responsibility of the DO and SA to maintain the lists and ensure they are maintained and available.

94. Some members proposed a number of changes in the wording of particular paragraphs in the policy, as well as in the annexed forms. Regarding the forms, the suggestion was made that security personnel in the field be consulted to determine what information is actually required.

95. Another member believed that the process of collecting data to comply with the policy should be more technologically friendly, to make use of existing platforms and avoid the duplication of information in multiple locations. His organization had introduced monthly excel sheets to update their lists which the Security Focal Point had access to. He offered to share the information collected from country offices once this exercise had been completed.

96. The view was expressed that it would be preferable to capture this information in one central database and the use of the UN secretariat's recruitment and performance management portal 'Inspira' was suggested. However, it was explained that this is limited to capturing information from the UN secretariat. It was noted that there was no interconnection between Inspira and TRIP, nor did these two systems work on the same parameters, which made consolidating information difficult. DSS took on board the need to develop forms that may be used online, though it was noted that one central database to house those forms was lacking. In this respect, the issue of data protection and privacy was raised in relation to the management and storage of data, i.e. who would have access to this and the ability to audit such a system. The same concerns were indicated in respect of TRIP.

97. One of the staff federations fully recognized the need for accurate lists and stressed that if staff understood why data was being collected and could be assured of its secure storage, there should be no need for concern. A good outreach to staff would be needed to support these efforts. DSS agreed to explore the issue of data security further.

98. Another member also supported and welcomed this policy and noted that it is necessary to emphasize the responsibility of colleagues in the field to update this information. His organization had recently sent a message requesting updated staff lists to all Resident Representatives in West Africa as part of their preparedness plans. None had immediately reverted with the requisite information. Hence, support to obtain this information was very much welcome as was automating the process.

99. The Chair, having recently been posted in Haiti, recognized the importance of this issue and at the same time noted that maintaining these lists involves a very substantial investment of time. A fully-fledged effort was needed therefore to maintain lists as best as possible. Further, the security of those lists needed to be addressed in the policy.

100. The IASMN agreed that several points in the policy needed further clarification and amendment, and that once complete, the revised policy would be circulated electronically to IASMN members. If possible, the policy will include a more up to date template for more effective electronic data capture.

E. Update on IASMN working groups

Security Incident Reporting System Working Group (SIRSWG) (CRP 10a)

101. The IASMN was presented with an update regarding the SIRSWG and requested to take note of the progress made by the Group to date and offer any additional guidance/advice as it deems necessary, including whether the Working Group should be expanded to include developing security incident management processes that can be universally applied by all members of the UNSMS.

102. Members of the IASMN commended DSS for the progress achieved by the WG, under the leadership of DSS. One member informed the meeting that the WG would soon hold a workshop to focus primarily on the taxonomy of incidents to ensure a common language across

the UNSMS. He was keen to stress that although the WG's focus was on reporting, the wider issue of crisis management cannot be entirely separated from reporting. The inclusion of UNOCC in the WG discussions was a move towards this. Acknowledging that AFPOs are normally the first responders to incidents, it was suggested that the categorization of incidents (critical, severe) would enable the UNSMS to develop effective response mechanisms, as well as ensure coherence in security reporting. Overall it was recognized that incident reporting was one part of a holistic incident management process and of security risk management more broadly. While outside the scope of the SIRSWG, it was noted that this would need to link in with further efforts on crisis management, including inter-agency responses to crisis and the roles of the USG, DSS and Executive Heads. Following the upcoming workshop, it was hoped that a report would be completed for presentation to the next IASMN Steering Group.

103. One member cautioned against underestimating the complexity of categorization and typology issues and noted that different agencies have needs for different types of information. His organization has recently established its own databases and now they have a fully fledged system in place. It does not have all the functionalities of the DSS system but meets their needs. He noted that any system really requires a critical pre condition of addressing typology issues and who has access also needs to be addressed. Another member, recognizing the current progress despite the complexity of the task, stated that it would continue to use its own technology platform until some of the issues surrounding data were fully resolved. A number of other members also stated that they maintained their own systems given that they were interested in different types of incidents, and not necessarily just those with a direct impact on their staff. One member, for example, needed to report on a number of occupational health and safety related incidents, a requirement not shared by other members. He believed a system should be capable of capturing all requirements, and that AFPO specific needs should not detract from the overall output, as long as system users clearly understood what had been entered, to determine how this would affect the overall output. It was noted that a minor incident for an individual can be quite traumatic and very stressful but that the focus of the reporting was actually about the impact on the organization.

104. One member cautioned that any system should not go beyond recording those safety incidents that fell within the remit of the UNSMS, namely aviation, road and fire safety as, if this were to be the case, this could put additional strain on security professionals. Another member pointed out that AFPOs should be free to decide whether to make use of the full safety functionality or not, and that just because the system would make a provision for this should not make its use mandatory. It was proposed that only those AFPOs that wished to track and analyse safety incident information need use it.

105. It was confirmed by a member of the WG that the primary driver for standardizing incident reporting was not the need to fulfil General Assembly reporting requirements and any new system may not necessarily fulfil the format requirements, (though the quality of the information reported would improve), but instead was driven by the need to enable security advisors in the field. Nevertheless, DSS emphasized the importance of needing to fulfil mandated General Assembly reporting requirements.

106. The IASMN noted the progress made by the SIRS working group. It acknowledged that the wider issue of crisis response cannot be entirely separated from reporting and that incident reporting is one part of a holistic incident management process, but does not propose expanding the remit of the working group to include this at this stage.

Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG) (CRP 10b)

107. DSS presented the need for a UNSMS policy on Critical Incident Stress, to ensure a unified response to critical incident stress management across organisations in the UNSMS. It was explained that the need for a comprehensive policy on stress management had been highlighted in early 2000, to ensure that there was a systematic provision of stress management across the UN system. Unfortunately, the revised Framework of Accountability no longer included training on stress management as a compulsory requirement. There was a need therefore for a policy to formalize the provision of stress management and provide for the creation of professional counsellor positions in all high-risk duty stations. DSS explained that in order to achieve this, funding would, in due course be required from AFPOs, but that until a policy was finalised, critical incident stress management could be implemented through the use of part time staff. DSS also proposed including the need for critical incident stress management in security plans and making this part of the mandatory training for CSAs/SAs.

108. There was some agreement for the systematic need for stress counsellors in response to the UN's duty of care. The representative of the UNMDWG noted the much improved coordination between the CISMU counsellors and the medical doctors. He liked the concept of having resources on the ground that are easily accessible and was very supportive of that initiative. He also noted that work needed to be done to develop SOPs for UNMERT and for all responders to critical incidents and saw this initiative by CISMU in the context of crisis management and one that is needed in every planned concept of crisis management

109. One member noted that despite creating some additional work, the presence of stress counsellors was a positive force for avoiding incidents in the first place, as well as providing benefits during and after an incident. However, the same member questioned where the gaps existed in the current structure and whether counsellors were only being proposed for high-risk locations.

110. Some members expressed concern about the integration of critical incident stress management into psychosocial and mass casualty plans and believed that introducing mandatory stress management training for CSAs/SAs was not feasible, arguing that this would only add another dimension to security training and responsibilities that should be viewed more as part of an HR, rather than a security remit. Another member queried the reporting lines for counsellors while another asked how top management may be sensitized to the need for stress management.

111. DSS noted that security staff did not have to become stress management experts per se but rather become sensitised about the basics, (as per the appropriate competency based learning levels), and that training in this regard could possibly be delivered online. It was also noted that there was already a requirement for mass casualty plans within UN security plans but members needed to devote resources to improving them.

112. There were mixed views about the use of commercially operated psychosocial services, with one member seeing value in the fact that they were not linked to the work environment, and another believing that they would not have a sufficient understanding of the circumstances in which the UN worked.

113. On the matter of peer helpers, while one member saw the benefit of peer helpers, DSS warned that their effectiveness was also dependent on professional guidance from a national professional counsellor.

114. The IASMN supported the formulation of a critical incident stress management policy but also requested an inventory on existing stress counsellors, including information on how they are funded, how posts are established and where else additional counsellors would be required based on the risks.

115. While the IASMN was receptive to DSS developing online stress management training for its review, it was also noted that this should be for personal stress management purposes only and not intended as a training module to enable CSAs/SAs to administer stress management.

Security Training Working Group (STWG) (CRP 10c)

116. DSS provided a summary of the recommendations presented by the Security Training Working Group, based on their discussions during a recent meeting in New York. The WG was asked by the IASMN to look at the competency based learning methodology and recommended that the IASMN validate that TDS move forward in establishing the use of Blooms taxonomy. The WG had identified 497 individual competencies for actors within the UNSMS, including a number of soft skills. It was noted that security advisors take on increased responsibilities in country teams and core values, e.g. ethics, integrity, also needed to be addressed.

117. While the progress made in addressing CBL was acknowledged, it was also noted that although all of the identified competencies were relevant, some were more relevant than others, and that their relative level of importance be reflected in the overall training package. It was stressed that learning should be “just in time”, rather than “just in case”. DSS explained the five levels of competency, effectively ensuring the relevance of some competencies over others. One member however highlighted the already identified lack of interpersonal skills for some security staff, and saw this as an opportunity to review the balance between technical and interpersonal skills listed in the competency table.

118. In addition, it was reported that the STWG had discussed franchising. Due to TDS resource constraints, it was suggested that TDS start franchising its training programmes, which would involve training trainers from the AFPOs to go out and deliver courses now delivered by TDS. While franchising had some inherent challenges, (e.g. maintaining consistent standards), one concept to be considered was joint venturing. This would still mean that one would need to go through the methodology of training trainers but there would be one person from TDS and one or two trainers provided from the AFPOs to present courses jointly. The STWG believed that this was a better methodology than purely franchising and asked that the IASMN consider this

option, which was currently being piloted by TDS and WFP for LSA training in Amman. Joint venturing was also recognised as successful when it came to Hostage Incident Management (HIM) training. To support this concept, WFP informed the meeting that it was putting in a training team in Nairobi to link with DSS trainers. He believed that if competencies were properly identified and trainers trained effectively, issues of quality control could be managed to expand the UNSMS training capability. Another member stressed the importance of ownership, (with a course developer maintaining ownership, whether delivered as a joint venture or franchise).

119. One member questioned whether, given the success of the Nairobi training team, any analysis had been done on the benefits of such a set-up and if this was going to be replicated. Another member welcomed the progress towards the professionalization of security professionals but did not believe there was merit in centralizing all aspects of training and that, where possible, staff should be empowered to deliver training. However, emphasis was needed to ensure that SMT training was consistently delivered so that staff responsible for security could be legitimately held accountable. DSS confirmed that it was in the process of finalising basic online SMT training, which members looked forward to, and at the same time commended the efforts of the ASG, DSS in ensuring TDS involvement in Resident Coordinator (RC) training which was a key leadership initiative to ensure that security is recognised and taken seriously at the senior level. New RCs are brought to New York for a week and during that time TDS organizes a full day's training on their DO responsibilities. An additional half day is spent at DSS HQ for specific country briefings.

120. Regarding medical training, the STWG discussed whether this should be considered a standard skill or a specialist skill, much like HIM training. DSS summarised the STWG's recognition of the perception in the field that all security staff already have basic first aid skills, noted the advantages and disadvantages of providing medical/first aid as both a core skill and a specialist one, appreciated the cost of recertification, and accordingly, asked the IASMN to quantify what level of first aid training was needed for different staff/locations.

121. One member was concerned that one third of an SCP course was dedicated to medical training and did not feel that this was representative of the work of a security officer, particularly when, in the majority of cases, it was likely that a security professional would not give first aid support if there was a larger incident to advise on and manage. That said, some members noted that there were locations where standalone security professionals without available medical intervention required these skills as first-responders, but that this was dependent on the location and the risk. It was advised that whilst medical may want to provide guidance on the medical training required, this need had to be balanced against practicalities, (e.g. access conditions).

122. Another member highlighted that first aid training was something that had been repeatedly requested and he supported the need for a high level of medical training for security officers, but also proposed basic first aid training for all staff. DSS noted that this could be arranged at the local level through service providers. Yet another member also believed that the responsibility for medical skills did not rest solely with security staff and that it should be reflected in MOSS requirements, based on a security risk assessment (SRA). There were concerns about the number and cost of trauma bags, a cost that needed to be rationalised through

a more rigorous application of the SRA as well as through financial controls. DSS confirmed it would consult with UNMERT on the issue of trauma bags.

123. The representative of the UNMDWG requested time to raise this with the UN Medical Directors Group, in the hope that they could collectively identify some common requirements and skills in relation to medical training for security staff, with a view to adopting a solution that benefitted both the security and medical services. He asked what the basic skills are that security officers should have across organizations and proposed that different skills be assigned to those security officers in the deep field and that perhaps there be modified training for those requiring just basic skills. Before any final decision is made, he would like to bring this back to UNMERT to see if a solution can be found that could apply across the board. The UNMDWG wished to see the medical component of MOSS addressed and reviewed for compliance on a regular basis. He supported that trauma bag training needed to be reviewed, including a look at why there were so many trauma bags at certain locations.

124. Regarding learning management systems, it was recognised that most AFPOs have their own systems which, though not compatible with each other, could serve to devote resources to the STWG when it came to software applications. Of course, it was recognized that there was a need to look in depth at these systems to see whether one management system should be created or whether interoperability between several management systems should be created.

125. DSS was concerned that there was insufficient HIM expertise, particularly given the departure of the head of TDS and his imminent retirement. The STWG also noted that as hostage incidents became increasingly protracted, AFPOs typically revert to DSS to provide expertise in this area, which results in a loss of capacity in TDS to meet other scheduled training and development deliverables. The question of whether to outsource this expertise outside TDS was raised.

126. One member noted that HIM is a UNSMS responsibility, not a DSS responsibility, though DSS should take the lead on this. There was disagreement among members over whether there were sufficient numbers of people who were HIM trained or whether it had merely been a case of AFPOs not being asked to provide/contribute resources. Some members recognised that sometimes trained staff for HIM duties were not routinely released, but DSS maintained that there is a need to ensure that the right persons (with availability and experience) were always available so that, collectively, this expertise was at hand. Despite a suggestion to outsource HIM through certain well experienced governments or law enforcement agencies, it was noted that this had already been explored and was not feasible. Another suggestion that was supported was to have a roster of retired professional negotiators on standby, using “While Actually Employed” contracts. DSS stated that this system was already in place, with resources having already been most recently identified for the Sahel.

127. Regarding mandatory on line security training, the STWG identified that given that the content of the new version of BSITF (BSITF II) significantly overlapped with the content of ASITF, perhaps there was not a need for two separate training modules. The IASMN was therefore asked to consider the need for both. DSS also updated members on the fact that BSITF II is currently being translated into 5 official languages but that further work was required to

improve the quality of those translations. It was hoped this process would be finalised in the next few months.

128. Whilst the need for mandatory training was recognised by members, there was value in avoiding duplication, but first what was needed was a better understanding of where the two online courses overlapped. One member noted the need for local area specific training given how generic the BSITF II is, but it was felt that this could be addressed through country briefings and where, appropriate, SSAFE training.

129. Regarding SSAFE training, the concern was raised that this training was still not standardised, with one location in particular (Iraq) not recognising attendance on other SSAFE courses as being sufficient for entry into that country and requiring persons to also go through SAIT training. The IASMN collectively agreed that all SSAFE training should be considered equal, with a current SSAFE qualification able to be carried over to all countries that required SSAFE training (notwithstanding the country specific briefing). TDS agreed to send a memorandum to the country identified reiterating this point. Another member stressed the need for DSS to maintain some oversight of SSAFE in the event of franchising, to ensure consistency between packages. Some members noted the similarities between SSAFE and SAIT and questioned the need for both, particularly when SAIT was costing much more, given the involvement of a private company. Furthermore, it was noted that the cost of SSAFE training had increased from 1,000 to \$4,000 for one week, which was making it difficult for some organizations to afford.

130. DSS noted there was a lot of commonality between SAIT and SSAFE training and informed members that as of two weeks ago, 25% of SSAFE trainers DSS had trained but had not yet implemented SSAFE training in their countries. The vision for SSAFE was to have a good basic online programme and then have SSAFE training provided in specific areas.

131. The staff federations advocated that training staff on basic elements would save lives. It was believed that no UN staff should be a bystander, but should be able to assist in emergencies. As proven in the Algiers BOI, staff will try and help. They supported the idea of training partnerships, the standardization of those partnerships and train the trainer programmes.

132. DPKO/DFS indicated their willingness to participate in the STWG in future. At the same time a specific request was made for more time to clear the recommendations made by DSS with its own internal management. In noting that DSS might consider withdrawing FSCOs from missions and instead putting in mission personnel to fulfil security functions, the point was made that thought needed to be given to providing training for those mission personnel. On the issue of trauma bag training, he believed that this should be provided across the board, rather than only to security officers. Lastly, it was asked how the imminent launch of UMOJA (a platform to combine HR and logistics), would reconcile with the inventory platform DSS is designing and building.

133. DSS suggested that the idea of using a different set of testers and trainers for courses such as the SCP could prevent possible biases and enable a means of recertification. This was practiced with the HIM, with people who had been trained returning to role play for new

participants. DSS also asked the IASMN to consider the inclusion of the UN system staff college in the STWG.

134. The IASMN agreed to endorse the Competency Based Learning (CBL) Business Matrix, appreciating that it is a living document and likely to evolve. The IASMN did not sufficiently discuss whether TDS should develop a CBL programme for Security Focal Points (SFPs), or approve the idea.

135. The IASMN approved the concept of joint venture training but notes that course developers maintain ownership responsibility for the course.

136. The IASMN endorsed the concept of train the trainer and trainer certification.

137. The IASMN requested that the UN Medical Directors Working Group discuss the issue of trauma bag training with UNMERT and DSS in order to establish some common requirements for training. Members noted that requirements will be driven by need as well as practicalities, whilst acknowledging their mandate for safety and security.

138. The IASMN agreed to the coordination role of the STWG in security related training and learning programmes, but notes that certain specific DPKO/DFS training falls outside their remit.

139. The IASMN also supported the participation of the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC) in the STWG.

140. The IASMN agreed to a broad review of Learning Management Systems (LMS) inventories with a view to determining how and whether future products could be shared across LMS platforms.

141. The IASMN agreed to the review of HIM training by the STWG following the development of a concept paper on how best to do that.

142. The IASMN agreed in general that there is duplication in the BSITF II and ASITF and accordingly approved a comparative review of their content.

F. SAT Tracking System/MOU on shared use of vehicles (CRP 6)

143. The IASMN Steering Group met last October 2012 in New York and based on a CRP prepared by FAO, discussed the issue of SAT/GPS vehicle tracking and that of an MOU for the inter-agency sharing of UN vehicles.

144. WFP reminded IASMN members of its global vehicle tracking system and updated members on the current tender for a new vendor (to be compatible with existing technology being employed). WFP informed members that its software would be compatible to provide a computer-based tool to accommodate parameters. He considered that their tracking system provided only minimal security mitigation in that the only benefit from the security perspective

is when a vehicle is carjacked. While WFP has global coverage, this could be monitored from its Headquarters in Rome. Each country office can download the terminal and manage the country fleet locally.

145. DPKO/DFS, which does not have a tracking system in place per se, but rather a logistics system and a vehicle task team on vehicle tracking, indicated that it would be willing to share this information with other members. It was also indicated that if new efforts yielded cost effective solutions, then they would also be interested in this. Regarding the suggestion that there be a Letter of Agreement (LOA) in place for the sharing of vehicles, DPKO/DFS informed the meeting that it already had a LOU in place that may be used as a model and offered to share this with IASMN members (attached as Annex D).

146. A number of other AFPOs presented information and case studies about their own systems but most agreed that the primary benefits of SAT tracking lay in fleet management, rather than security. In fact, one member stated that vehicle tracking was not a security mitigation measure, although this was refuted by another member on the basis that road safety was part of the UNSMS mandate. DSS pointed out that ‘selling’ fleet management to countries that typically resisted this type of technology was less controversial than the idea of a tracking tool, therefore making implementation easier.

147. However, others noted that whilst such a system had some benefits, response processes were a critical part of the success and effectiveness of such a system. In addition, members were keen to ensure that this measure not be applied as standard in all locations, or included in MOSS, and that a risk-based approach should always be adopted to ensure that any measure is commensurate to the risks in situ.

148. Notwithstanding the points already made, it was recognized that there are potential economies of scale to be gained from using one vendor and accordingly, WFP offered its LTA to other AFPOs to save on additional administrative efforts. However, WFP did not see the need to adopt an integrated approach whereby all AFPOs used the same system.

149. There was no strong preference for the need for an MOU/LOU, with some members lending armored vehicles to other IASMN members without such a document. In any case, the DPKO/DFS LOU would be made available for those who wished to adapt it accordingly and use it.

150. The IASMN believes that the advantages for security of a vehicle tracking system are overstated in many cases, depending on the risks inherent in a particular situation. It therefore rejects the need for a policy that on the use of SAT tracking, but accepts that AFPOs will lend support and advice to each other in relation to such a system, giving guidance where requested.

151. Regarding the sharing of vehicles, the IASMN agreed that both the sample LOU attached to CRP 6, as well as DPKO/DFS’ LOU could be considered for use by IASMN members on an individual basis in the event that it is required.

G. Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) (CRP 2)

152. At its last session in New York in October 2012, the IASMN Steering Group considered the information contained in CRP 2 and its related annexes (Annexes 1 to 11). This was in response to increasing concerns that had been expressed at previous Steering Group and regular sessions of the IASMN regarding the spiralling cost of MORSS throughout the UN system. Recognizing that the implementation of MORSS over the years had resulted in the addition of items not originally foreseen which in turn resulted in increasingly spiralling costs, the IASMN Steering Group, acknowledging the need for swift action and further consultation with the HR Network on this issue, agreed to present to the 18th session of the IASMN a revised CRP to include the following caveats for approval:

a) The UN system has a responsibility for providing minimum levels of security for the residences of international staff where warranted, with the aim of protecting life and not property.

b) MORSS coverage should be limited to the three items included in the scheme in effect as of 2002, namely bars, alarms and guards, with 100% reimbursement up to a cap. Furthermore, the Steering Group recommended that MORSS not be used to pay for generators, fuel or anything else that otherwise falls under Business Continuity

c) In addition, inclusion of a provision for a safe room (including grills and a locked door) may be applicable, if justified by an SRA to the standard established in that country.

d) Furthermore, the IASMN Steering Group recognized that, while not always feasible, housing pools nevertheless may lead to significant cost savings. In this regard, the Steering Group encourages AFPOs to make use of housing pools wherever and whenever possible.

153. In the absence of representation for this segment of the meeting from UNISERV, the attention of IASMN members was brought to a statement submitted by the staff federation indicating their concerns about eliminating generators and fuel from MORSS as it was believed these were items constituting essential business continuity requirements for personnel. One member agreed that these items were predominantly for business continuity - and on that basis, not security requirements to be met by MORSS.

154. Although initially there was support from members for the Steering Group's proposals, further discussion identified a number of issues with the proposed changes. One member highlighted that the selection of the three measures essentially delinked MORSS from the SRA, a move which could affect UNSMS credibility. There was support therefore with linking the SRA with the determination of MORSS coverage. Another member noted that the SMT should make a proposal based on a proper SRA, which could in turn be approved by DSS after consultation with the SFPs of the AFPOs who have a presence in the country. Another did not believe the SRA was enough and still another view expressed was that there could be different levels of items to approve, with perhaps certain levels approved by the DO.

155. Others believed that limiting measures for MORSS into three categories was too categorical, and that measures should be applied on a case-by-case basis, based on the risks

present. It was noted that AFPOs already have the ability to comment on country MORSS before they are approved, although one member suggested that the SMT should not approve MORSS as this was essentially a conflict of interest. Another member cautioned that a change to MORSS could be overly complicated and would require guidance on how to implement and review the process. The relevance of each measure as a risk mitigation measure, and the approval, payment and/or reimbursement process all had to be captured and be clearly auditable as part of the review of MORSS.

156. On the matter of specific measures, one proposal was for MORSS to cover two categories, namely bars and guards, with lighting, generators and blast resistant film being determined by the SMT after a detailed inspection. Another suggestion was that guards must be chosen from private security companies that have been vetted by DSS. One member recognized that there could be any number of items included under MORSS but noted that the Steering Group had not approved the inclusion of shatter resistant film.

157. Regarding the payment of MORSS, one member felt that compensation was too high and not commensurate with the actual costs involved in securing premises, particularly given that personnel often occupy residences where MORSS is already met. Furthermore, one member proposed that there were rarely processes to ensure that money was properly spent or that measures were properly evaluated. A number of AFPOs went on to explain their own processes and advocated for additional processes that reduce abuse/misuse of the system, including practices such as undertaking an assessment of the premises prior to a lease being signed, to identify necessary security mitigation; inspections of premises post-implementation; direct payment of security services without giving lump sums to staff and ensuring costs were incurred directly by the staff member and only reimbursed on proof of receipt. Strict compliance with the rules was advocated by some to help reduce abuse of the system.

158. Members acknowledged that there was a tendency for staff not to take responsibility for their own security and that there was a need to reduce the expectations of staff regarding MORSS by emphasizing the fact that these are *minimum* standards, and that staff are compensated for items such as generators, etc. through the assignment grant. This attitude amounted to, at a minimum, a misuse of funds, and, at a maximum, fraud. It was noted that the distinction between what is paid by the AFPOs and what is paid by the staff member had never been made and that this required attention. Some believed that MORSS removes the responsibility from staff members and that staff should not be pampered at the expense of taking their own responsibility.

159. One member called for yet a more detailed review of the cost of MORSS, suggesting that only 5-15% of the maximum amount was actually paid in the case of his organization.

160. It was noted that the issue of MORSS coverage for national staff remained unresolved which only highlighted the differential treatment between national and international staff. However, one member pointed out that international staff were employed where skills did not already exist in-country, resulting in the need to offer requisite incentives and compensation, whilst national staff should not be subject to MORSS unless specifically at risk as a result of their employment with their organization. It was also pointed out that a distinction needed to be made between measures that are required as a result of relocating and those that are essentially of a universal nature no matter where one lives. (e.g. fire extinguishers, smoke alarms, first aid

kits.), with anything else dependent on a local determination based on the risks in that duty station determined by a local SRA discussed by the SMT. He believed persons had to be held accountable for the functioning of the system and any abuses, even if this meant holding them accountable and imposing disciplinary measures.

161. It was suggested that a formal process be adopted to identify and list residences that had already been subject to MORSS improvements, but at the same time, it was recognized that this might unnaturally inflate rental costs. On the issue of housing pools, it was noted that surely the organizations would have some form of right, especially in the deep field, to say where someone can live or not. One view was that in some locations, the use of UN provided housing should be made mandatory. It was also believed that the provision of a safe room would not be needed in every location.

162. Regarding local staff, he noted that this cannot be looked at in terms of MORSS only. It was asked whether local staff would even agree to, like some international staff are obliged to, live in a security perimeter. Specifically when one considers the areas and standards of housing of international staff against local staff, there are great differences sometimes. Therefore it was not doable to apply the same standard for both.

163. The staff federations present for this discussion noted that they had shown consistent support for the security services provided through the IASMN but were concerned that changes in the coverage of MORSS were now being driven by purely cost concerns, rather than on risk and that if this was going to be the case, then there needed to be accountability. While there was agreement that action needed to be taken against those found to be abusing the system, it was proposed that one way of saving money without compromising staff security would be to procure en masse those items needed on a global scale, such as first aid kits and fire extinguishers.

164. In response to the staff federations, it was pointed out that it was not the case that the IASMN was examining MORSS at the expense of safety and security, but rather acting appropriately in reviewing the coverage of MORSS, particularly as there were staff entitlements, such as the assignment grant for example, that were designed to cover items such as generators, etc. Furthermore, it was noted that the UNSMS Framework of Accountability had also noted the individual responsibility of staff members for their own safety and security. It was asked how MORSS could be provided therefore and at the same time hold staff members accountable.

165. While the merits of reforming MORSS coverage were debated, one member highlighted the fact that it was only because of specific MORSS measures in his duty station that there had been a marked decrease in house invasions.

166. The Human Resources Network was grateful for the discussions but needed more time to review the proposal made by the Steering Group. It was suggested that HLCM may need to be contacted if significant changes are proposed. Several AFPOs also requested additional time to consult with their HR divisions, but agreed that given HR Network representation at the meeting, this would be satisfactory. The representative from the HR Network confirmed that she would report this discussion and bring the IASMN CRPs on this issue back to the HR Network as a whole, as it presently did not have a mandate from the HRN to endorse any recommendations made here.

167. Some members called for a wider look at this issue including a statement of the principles supporting the rationale behind MORSS and suggested it be left up to the SMTs to make justified recommendations.

168. The Chair noted that the Steering Group, at its last meeting, had thought that this proposal would resolve the issue and suggested that in the absence of consensus, the IASMN revert to the idea of a small working group to examine this issue further.

169. The IASMN agreed to set up a small informal working group (comprising ITU, ADB, CCISUA, DSS, UNFPA and UNON) to examine more closely the issues raised at this meeting with a view to formulating a proposal for a way forward to address the spiraling cost of MORSS and the implementation of the system.

170. In so doing, any examination of MORSS would rest on the principle that the UN system has a responsibility for providing minimum levels of security for the residences of international staff where warranted, with the aim of protecting life and not property. Furthermore, while not falling strictly under MORSS, it was also recognized that the UN system also has an obligation to exercise duty of care and consider measures that could be taken to better ensure the safety and security of its local staff.

H. Programme Criticality (verbal update)

171. DSS verbally briefed the members of the IASMN regarding recent developments with regards to Programme Criticality. In this regard, the ASG, DSS reminded IASMN members of last year's discussions about the linkage between programme and security and emphasized that "how to stay and deliver" is a core element driving the program criticality (PC) process, with the aim of determining acceptable risk, rather than avoiding risk altogether.

172. IASMN members were reminded that PC is not undertaken by the security team and that programme personnel are responsible for determining what is critical, but there remains an important link with security, with the security risk assessment being a critical aid to the final outcome of the process.

173. The ASG, DSS noted that leadership was a key component in the success of the PC process, and that by raising awareness at a senior level, more support could be obtained for the concept. She also noted that the quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR) introduced into the UN 4 years ago, and now supported by a recent General Assembly resolution was an effective way to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and impact of UN operational activities and determine how the UN can work as one, lending support to the PC process.

174. DSS explained that HLCM had established a PCWG, whose sub group, now the PC coordination team (chaired by UNICEF) had produced a revised PC framework. The first framework was initially approved and intended to be rolled out in 12 countries. Due to difficulties raising funds the roll out in all 12 countries was not completed. The process so far had received mixed feedback. One of the criticisms was that no report detailing lessons learnt was produced and that there remained confusion over ownership of the process. The framework has since been revised, and more recently a letter was distributed to all Resident Coordinators, and copied to Designated Officials, signed by 6 Under-Secretaries-Generals clarifying that

responsibility for conducting PC rests with the country team at the country level. The revised PC framework, which was distributed to IASMN members for information, will be considered by the HLCM at its next session in March 2013.

175. One member noted that programme criticality is one of the core concepts to allow acceptably secure programme delivery. The philosophy behind it was to balance the importance of a programme against the residual risk in a given location. On this point, the member reminded the IASMN that programme importance was important in that context and that programmes must be judged against the strategic results in the country. It was very important to look at the outputs of programmes rather than the activities of programmes. He noted that it is a relatively simple idea, but nevertheless requires strong leadership, particularly of the RC and HC, as well as realism from heads of offices in the UN country team. He informed the IASMN that there was concern with the actual PC framework and tool and cautioned that care must be taken to maintain PC as a concept. The tool exists to assist programme criticality. He continued that PC is a balance to determining acceptable risk and informed the IASMN that what is needed is a statement of residual risk. The PC process is not relevant in all countries and that where residual risk had been reduced to medium or low, a PC assessment was not necessary. He added that in almost all countries where PC is applied, the security side has provided an understandable concept of residual risk but this has not always happened. There is still confusion among SAs in the field regarding what information they need to produce. He confirmed that PC is absolutely not a security process but it is nevertheless in the interest of security professionals that PC is conducted in a manner that produces legitimate justifiable results that shows due diligence has been undertaken. As security advisors, it is important to understand the process – to ensure that programmes are delivered in the right way at the right time. Additionally, it was noted that while the process was a relatively simple idea, it required strong leadership of the RC/HC and a degree of realism at the country level.

176. Whilst it was acknowledged that PC is not a security exercise in and of itself and that security teams should not conduct the PC process, it was agreed that it is clearly in the interests of security that the PC assessment takes place and that it produces legitimate, justifiable results that show due diligence when determining and accepting risks. It was noted that paragraphs 6 to 9 of the revised framework, detailing the responsibilities of the RC, as well as those of the DO, effectively highlighted their parallel responsibilities, and ensued that the SRA and PC assessment come together to determine who can be where and when. However another member wished to see a clearer statement about the role of the CSA/SA in the country management team and PC assessment, noting that without this, accountability for PC assessment could still be perceived to rest with those running programmes. Overall it was agreed that the premise for all security risk management was a mutual understanding of the work between programme managers and security.

177. Another member, strongly supporting what was said at the outset, requested members to remember that PC is fundamentally a concept and not to let the tool kill the concept. He noted that the tool did not quite fit and that the more specificity that was added to the tool, the more there were situations that did not quite fit what those tools were describing. He cited the example of Syria, where a strict application of the tool may not take into account the specific details of the situation on the ground, i.e. persons were trying to fit his organization's activities in Syria into the PC framework by justifying those activities as life saving when in reality it was

difficult to say this was the primary reason for what his organization was trying to do in Syria, which was actually more strategic, i.e. demonstrating UN neutrality. But the latter of course may not result in the determination as a PC1 activity according to the tool. He also cited situations that had arisen in Libya that also did not fit neatly into the PC framework and as such noted there is a grey area in-between. While he supported that the fundamental concept of programme criticality is unarguable and needs to be mainstreamed, he cautioned against being too prescriptive in its application and urged that judgment be exercised when applying the tool.

178. Another member noted that each agency wishes to survive on its own and that there are issues of donors trying to retain funds for certain programmes and the agencies not wishing to lose that funding. It was noted that though there is a tendency to say that security advisors should be brought in, she had not seen many security advisors sitting on country teams and believed that there is a need to involve security aspects in deciding what is critical at the agency level. She believed it was the job of security to tell the AFPOs what is needed so resources may be put in place. Another member pointed to the need to clarify who the programme should be critical for – the organization or the population, believing this was a decision to be taken at the Executive level and not at the regional or country level. Another member noticed that there had been an improvement in the knowledge of DSS SAs and CSAs about programmes and also noted that sometimes security professionals are invited to CT meetings, while other times they are not and something needed to be done to address this.

179. Yet another member expressed concern about paragraph 27 (last bullet point) of the framework, noting that the statement about the fact that the framework does not affect UN activities delivered by third parties should be stated more clearly at the beginning of the document. The question of how the potential conflict of interest was addressed when the RC and DO roles are fulfilled by the same person was also raised. He further questioned whether activities should be grouped in clusters. IASMN members were reminded however that only humanitarians worked in clusters, and that PC was intended to cover all UN activities.

180. It was pointed out by another member that despite delivering as one and UNDAFS, persons are working on different programmes in different locations and where security is crucial for the implementation of programmes, security is sometimes not part of this process. He stressed the often-cited mantras – no programme without security, no security without resources, and advocated that security should become an integrated part of all activities at the country level. It was not only for SMT representatives or SAs represented at the country level at the country level, but a means needed to be found to ensure a top down approach to integrate security into programme activities. He suggested that both HLCP and UNDG needed to be involved and while he was pleased to see the recent letter that had been signed off by six USGs to ensure a common understanding and approach on PC, at the same time he believed that if a PC concept was not synchronized and universally understood by the whole system this will detract from its value. This was a broader issue that extended beyond just the SMT and the country teams.

181. Some other members felt that the framework was too restrictive when it came to certain aspects of the UN's work. While it fit into development and humanitarian aspects of the UN system's work, it did not necessarily fit for other aspects such as rapid response and special missions, peace and security and human rights (e.g. Brahimi mission in Syria). It was questioned whether these types of missions needed PC approval. Although it was explained that a caveat already existed for these missions (under PC1), another member suggested that it would be

helpful to educate DOs and the HLCCM about these criticalities, so that country teams do not consider these activities an unnecessary burden. Further, one member, citing mandated Security Council and special surgical missions, raised concerns about paragraph 34 of the framework, noting that PC may not work in such cases. He recommended that for every law there is an exception and suggested that the DO and USG, DSS might have the authority to clear such missions. At the same time, he recognized that not all country teams and DOs necessarily know about all the activities of all organizations, including his and that it was necessary to bring DOs and RCs to a certain level of awareness of those activities. While noting the comments about the need to mainstream security into programmes, he believed that security managers should have the chair in country teams and while this was happening in some cases, there was still a long way to go. Overall, members believed more needed to be done to address the role of the CSA in the country team and in the PC assessment. Concern was expressed that the accountability for conducting a PC assessment must rest with those enacting the programmes. However, the CSA/SA must be responsible for providing advice while at the same time, something must be done to ensure accountability for security in the process.

182. Another member clarified that security managers must be required to understand programmes and programme managers must understand security. On contextualizing delivery and what makes something important, he cited the difficulties with some Member States over this issue, noting that PC assessment is not a planning process but rather an assessment of the planning of the process against existing plans such as the CAP and UNDAF and reaffirmed that it intended to judge the UN's programmes (activities) against what the UN already said it is supposed to be doing. For special missions, he advocated that there must be flexibility and not just an obsession with the tool, confirming that PC1 is not assessed by the tool. It is asked if it is immediately life saving at scale or whether a mandate has specifically been given by the SG. And once more he emphasized the relevance of PC to high risk locations.

183. One member cautioned against using the PC process as a way to simply accept that staff may lose their lives delivering UN programmes, although another member was quick to point out that the PC framework does not give this license, but rather supports the decisions made in doing so. He urged that the document be kept in perspective. The UN's duty of care to staff and the legal implications of exposing staff unduly to the potential of being harmed were stressed, with a reminder that the PC framework had been developed on the basis of the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk, which determines and identifies the appropriate levels for decision-making levels for PC and security regarding the acceptance of high, medium or low risk. He pointed out that the person who agrees this is the head of agency in country, together with HQ, with final sign off by the DO (up to situations deemed high risk). Only for PC1 activities is the Executive Head of an organization asked to sign off, though the final say rests with the USG, DSS. Another member explained that it in terms of accountability and responsibility, his organization had gone beyond the security policy to ensure that staff understood the risks to which they were exposed, by developing a formal statement of acceptable risk and a risk escalation policy, both approved by its respective legal department and endorsed by its senior management. This ensured that the onus and oversight for security risks lay with senior management, but that staff were also aware that when they go into areas of high risk and very high risk, they are made aware of significant risks to life.

184. Members debated whether there was a UN-wide option for staff members to voluntarily withdraw from accepting certain risks, and the ramifications of doing so were discussed, with a number of case studies supporting both positive and negative repercussions in the event of non-acceptance.

185. One of the staff federations suggested that there is a need for a signed document to show that staff are fully aware of the risks they could step into and asked for clarification on how this could apply to local/national staff. Furthermore, it was asked whether staff would have the option to refuse to undertake certain missions if they deemed the risk was too high and if they would be disciplined if they refused to operate in such circumstances. There was general support that staff must be fully briefed and trained to deliver and recognition that if they refuse to undertake certain missions there should be no consequences.

186. One member believed that while all risks to staff cannot be reduced that staff need to understand and accept the risk. He noted that we had come a long way from the days when management stated it was not prepared to accept any risk and the framework for accountability recognizes we cannot control the world we live in to state that we can eliminate risk. As an adjunct to this discussion, it was generally agreed that survivor and family support, including compensatory mechanisms (particularly in the aftermath of specific targeted attacks on the UN) needed strengthening.

187. The Chair summed up the key issues from the discussion, including the need to highlight the responsibilities of the HC, DO and security officers. He noted this is a tool and aids some organizations, as well as a thought process and helps guide RCs and DOs. But at the end of the day, it is just a tool. This discussion of course highlights the really important responsibilities that all security personnel have on life and death matters, which only reinforces the notion that having good, solid professional and intelligent security officers is critical to our success.

188. The IASMN took note of the revised Programme Criticality Framework to be submitted to HLCM at its next March 2013 session and requested that HLCM be made aware of the IASMN discussions on this issue at this present session.

J. Update on 24th session HLCM and CEB/HLCM Retreat (CRP 7)

189. The CEB Secretariat was represented at this meeting by the Secretary of HLCM, Mr. Remo Lalli, who gave a short briefing to IASMN members highlighting the main points from HLCM's recent retreat as it relates to HLCM's relationship with its respective Networks. He highlighted the main point that the work of IASMN is brought to the work of HLCM as safety and security is an HLCM standing item, which is always presented by the USG DSS, depending on availability. What will change in future is the process rather than the substance, i.e. the process regarding the reporting of the Networks to HLCM. The other Networks reporting to HLCM include the ICT, Procurement, HR and Finance and Budget Networks.

190. He continued that after a while, HLCM had deemed that reports at their sessions by each Network were not considered the best use of time since the majority of reports were endorsed because discussion had already taken place where the respective professionals are, i.e. in each individual Network. So instead of a verbal presentation of reports by the Networks, specific issues will be considered by HLCM via virtual means. The Networks would be expected to

participate as before on substantive items at a particular session, but having the option of considering some issues virtually will result in freeing up time and hence be a more efficient way of managing the limited time of the HLCM. He cited the last HLCM session during which there had been a substantive discussion on the Secretary-General's Policy Committee's decision to strengthen survivor and family support, a subject for which the IASMN had something important to contribute and where the representatives from DSS conveyed those views. There are also areas of HR for which IASMN views will need to be sought. HLCM considered the existing reporting lines satisfactory. It was recognized that security professionals report to their respective heads of administration who meet at HLCM and then through HLCM, items are reported to the CEB, and thus to the executive heads. He also informed the meeting that HLCM would be finalizing new working arrangements at its upcoming session in Rome in March 2013 and will formalize and communicate the new working arrangements to the IASMN. He told members not to expect new changes. What will change will be the way the representatives in HLCM interact in the committee.

191. One member, noted that while it was mentioned that security is an item on HLCM's agenda, it was not mentioned that security is on CEB's agenda. He also pointed out that in the current governance mechanism for the IASMN, what is discussed at HLCM is then submitted to the CEB, but what was not clear is what items are submitted to the CEB by HLCM. He therefore requested a clear definition of what needs to be submitted to the CEB, noting that right now that decision is left to HLCM. He proposed that perhaps when the IASMN considers an issue it also needs to specify that when it is submitted to HLCM it has to also be endorsed by the CEB.

192. The Secretary of HLCM confirmed that, with safety and security as a standing item of HLCM, the full HLCM report, including references to any policies adopted by the IASMN and the briefing usually conducted by the USG, DSS is submitted to the CEB by the Chair of HLCM. In other words, the entire conclusions go to the CEB. He informed members that the CEB formal session lasts for three hours, which includes three reports from HLCM, UNDG and HLCM. In the afternoon, there is a closed session, including a political briefing by the Secretary-General, followed by private meetings. In presenting the HLCM report in its entirety, the Chair of HLCM gives a brief presentation. There is not really a sub-selection of items that go and do not go to the CEB. The CEB approves in its entirety the CEB report. What has happened in the past three years is that the huge work done by the UNSMS in redesigning the security management system (including the introduction of the SLS, revising the accountability framework and establishing the Executive Group on Security), – all this has gone to the CEB. Because of the priority accorded to this work and the prominence of this work, the USG, DSS reported regularly to the HLCM. Hence, there is really no prioritization of IASMN items for the CEB; everything that emanates from the IASMN goes to the CEB as well.

193. One member raised the issue of the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QPCR 2012) and noted that it covers many things. Delivering as One. is going beyond just development and there is a strong focus on avoiding duplication and parallel systems. He believed this points directly to the discussions held in the IASMN on the first day of this session when there was talk of reviewing the security system. As such, he reiterated that the strategic review, requested from DSS, which needed to be undertaken urgently, not just be a DSS review, but a review of the whole security management system.

194. Another member addressed the practicality of the changes and asked whether any changes in HLCM's working methods would have an impact or allow for more flexibility of the IASMN's meeting schedule which at present is planned in accordance with HLCM's meeting schedule, especially as some policies might not now be submitted to the full HLCM but would be considered virtually. At present, the IASMN meets before the HLCM sessions.

195. The Secretary of HLCM replied that there has not yet been any change agreed. This will all be considered at the HLCM's upcoming session in March 2013. However, he did not think that any changes agreed at the next HLCM session would result in altering the IASMN's meeting schedule and that perhaps it would be good to maintain the present schedule as there is value in continuing to have fresh input from the Networks into HLCM sessions – whether virtual or physical. He recognized that this of course creates a kind of a peak of meetings just one month before the HLCM, which is particularly difficult in the fall session. While there are pros and cons to shifting the IASMN's meeting schedule, he saw more benefit in retaining the status quo.

196. He further informed IASMN members that the CEB has three main pillars (HLCM, HLCP and UNDG) and that over the years, there has been an increasingly developed connection with UNDG and between the Headquarters and the field, particularly when it came to QCPR. This push is now even stronger and in considering business effectiveness, this is more attentive to the field. Regarding programme coordination, there are a number of ad hoc situations, which require strong attention. Programme criticality is a typical one. The ASG, DSS added that the implementation of QCPR should also be submitted for consideration of HLCP and not just the HLCM, which is key to its facilitation.

197. One member noted that HLCM's proposed new approach could result in a benefit in that the IASMN could invest its time in issues that really warrant discussion. He noted that between now and June, the proposed date for the next planned regular session of the IASMN, there is not a lot of time to devote to substantial issues.

198. Another member expressed the view that it was a very good idea to invite a representative of the CEB secretariat to this IASMN meeting. He noted that the future success of our operations on the ground would very much depend on how we manage to incorporate security into our programmes. He was encouraged to hear HLCP and UNDG would be involved and glad to hear that it is the intention of the CEB secretariat to draw attention to that. He added that if we wish to make our programmes sustainable at the country level, there is a need to look at security, not only from the management point of view, but also from the programme point of view.

199. The IASMN thanked the Secretary of HLCM for taking the time to address the IASMN, took note of the HLCM developments and looks forward to what the HLCM decides in March 2013. The IASMN suggested that it may wish to look into a more flexible manner of addressing certain issues, including the scheduling of its meetings.

200. The IASMN took note of the proposed changes to the format of the HLCM, which may bring more flexible working arrangements and looks forward to receiving further information following the HLCM's next regular session in March 2013.

K. Aviation Risk Management (CRP 5)

201. The IASMN was presented with a CRP following previous discussions held both during the 17th session of the IASMN in Geneva in June 2012, as well as subsequent discussions during the last IASMN Steering Group meeting in New York in October 2012. The CRP addressed the following areas:

- Update and discussion on the methodology for the FlightSafe replacement, currently named United Nations Scheduled Air Operators Suitability System (UN SASS)
- Discussion on the Need for Data Collection to support the methodology and further development for the FlightSafe replacement (UN SASS) and the ARMO
- Update on the Co-operative Agreement with the ARMO Analytical Unit (AU) at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
- Discussion of the “Aviation Safety Policy” (formerly referred to as the Aviation Risk Management Policy), which includes the Terms of Reference (TORs) for Air Travel Focal Points (ATFPs).

202. At the outset, Mr. Mitch Fox of ICAO joined the meeting by teleconference when DSS was explaining that ARMO, DSS’ Aviation Risk Management Office, has been working, with ICAO, to develop a replacement to FlightSafe, the commercial database used by the UN to classify the safety of aircraft, following the identification of some limitations in its methodology. A replacement methodology was devised by ARMO and ICAO and its algorithm, which considers a number of new factors, (including the ability of country to oversee the airlines, airline audits by ICAO and IATA, the aircraft mix and age), is currently being tested. The new methodology also has three, rather than four aircraft classifications and takes into account data collected from various sources, including TRIP.

203. ARMO has also devised an aviation safety policy, which proposes a methodology for special risk assessments for any special charter and not commercial flights, (including gift flights), with the DO maintaining responsibility for approval of these trips. The draft policy also details responsibilities for Air Travel Focal Points (ATFPs), namely to apply the policy and be a point of contact regarding questions about specific airlines/issues.

204. DPKO/DFS and WFP, noting that they already have established aviation safety policies in place insisted that the name of the draft policy be changed to: “Donated and commercial flight clearance policy” or “scheduled air carrier suitability policy” or something to that effect.

205. It was suggested that, before any policy is approved. the four entities within the IASMN who have a deep seated role in aviation matters, namely (ICAO, WFP, DPKO/DFS, and DSS) should agree on their differences with a unified approach, work on the draft policy further and then submit this to the Steering Group for consideration. The IASMN was reluctant to approve a policy that had not yet been approved by the body of aircraft safety experts. The representative from ATAG informed members that ATAG was due to meet within the next two months and supported having representatives from WFP, DPKO/DFS and DSS at their meeting, with ICAO acting in an advisory capacity.

206. There were concerns about the reduction from four to three aircraft classifications, raising doubt about the ability to effectively manage aircraft safety risk. Some members believed that where there was limited information about an aircraft, the advice of “no adverse information” should be given, rather than assuming that no information meant no guarantee of safety. AFPOs should then be allowed to make decisions based on the limited information and accept that risk if necessary.

207. On the management of risk, IASMN members were reminded to maintain a holistic approach and keep the tool in context; that just because a set of flights in one country is less than ideal, the fact that this may still be a safer route than road travel should not be overlooked. Another member had concerns with the use of donated aircraft, with the exception of military aircraft. Another cautioned that care needs to be exercised in the use of whatever will be developed, as it will be one more tool to help genuinely manage risk.

208. Another member while commending the work done to date to produce the first version of this policy also pointed out that initially the policy was intended to cover only commercial flights, but now a wider range of options had been included. He noted the need to distinguish between the regular use of donated flights, as opposed to one time or limited use flights.

209. Some members considered the three days’ timeframe for special assessments too long, but DSS noted that there could be provision for exceptions. The inclusion of SOS and emergency flights was also raised, but DSS felt that this required very specialist knowledge, which was beyond the current capabilities of the ARMO staff. It was noted that policy did not address aviation security, (baggage handling, perimeter security, fuel sampling etc.), which were all items beyond the scope of DSS. These were nevertheless points that should be reviewed when resources are available.

210. Some members felt that it was overly cumbersome and a blur to internal accountability to have a number of offices managing approval processes, preferring this to be centralized through ARMO. While the proposal was based on a country team requirement for flight approval, one member noted that this needed to be examined from the perspective of being managed from headquarters. He did not believe this was about the DO requesting authorization but rather a question of process, i.e. having a direct link with ARMO, with a copy to DSS’ regional desks. Furthermore, the issue of a timeframe for dealing with requests needed to be addressed.

211. It was also deemed impractical if there was one trip (with different flights) that needed to be split into multiple requests. There was also a call for clarity regarding the title of air travel focal points, noting that in one organization, there already existed air travel managers. There were also conflicting requests to either retain the idea of having three air travel focal points or reducing it to one. Furthermore, clarification was sought on what defined a line manager for the purpose of signature authority (paragraph 3 of the draft policy).

212. Several members requested the opportunity to provide comments on the policy in writing and felt that all members should be given the chance to contribute. One member emphasized the general principle that safety comes before cost. Further, it was noted that there was no reference to the accountability framework in the policy and as such the issue of accountability is not well set up in the policy. It was also noted that while it was clear that this policy, once adopted would replace the IASMN Guidelines on the use of Commercial Aircraft, what was not clear was the

status of a document DSS had circulated some time ago on the use of military aircraft and whether this was still relevant and would remain so.

213. Some members had concerns about the request for AFPOs to draft and maintain their own guidelines particularly as it was understood that there should be common policies under which all UNSMS organizations should operate. It was important to be consistent across the AFPOs and not create any confusion in the field, especially for the DO and particularly when it came to the use of donated flights, which is usually the case in joint missions. DSS suggested however that by AFPOs drafting and maintaining their own guidelines, this would allow greater flexibility in implementing the policy based on an AFPO's own internal structure.

214. While one member believed that the maximum number of UN passengers per flight was something that needed to be addressed, it was pointed out that so far the IASMN had not been able to reach agreement on this issue. It was also believed by some that this was essentially a business continuity issue and a matter that could not ever be reasonably calculated, as the technology to track this information was not available. It was also asked whether the policy should take into account restrictions on air travel in accordance with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions if possible, for example, in cases where sanctions were imposed. One member suggested that the determination of the number of staff on flights be left to each AFPO to decide and to work it out with their respective insurers.

215. DSS concluded by stating that only having security air safety professionals making this policy will not satisfy requirements and would wish to see other members of the IASMN on this working group. While air safety professionals may offer advice about particular aircraft, they do not have the necessary competencies or perspective to determine whether, for example, in some situations air travel may be safer than road travel. Addressing concerns about a needed definition for a line manager, DSS believed that one advantage in AFPOs developing their own guidelines was precisely that they could develop their own definitions of what a line manager is, noting that in some cases this would be someone in their regional bureau, while in other cases this may be a direct supervisor. A one-size fits all approach to this issue may not be feasible. He noted that while common policies are in place, AFPOs are responsible for implementing these within their own organizations. Furthermore, there may be a need for country specific guidelines. He confirmed that in considering any policy, safety was the overriding factor and not cost. Regarding the maximum number of UN passengers per flight, this was indeed a business continuity issue, although it was difficult to ascertain with any certainty the total number of UN personnel on any given flight. He believed that issues relating to GA restrictions on airlines in certain countries was something that could be addressed in an organization's guidelines.

216. The IASMN agreed to the creation of a standing working group composed of ICAO, WFP, DPKO/DFS and DSS, but to be expanded further to ensure that the requisite field concerns and operational requirements are considered together with air safety concerns.

217. The IASMN, while noting that a replacement to Flightsafe needed to be established, did not approve the draft policy as presented and suggested that comments be submitted electronically for consideration by the working group at their first meeting to expedite the necessary amendments to the policy.

L. Any other business

MOSS compliance missions

218. UNFPA praised the time and cost effectiveness of the online MOSS compliance self-assessment tool, following a recent global self-assessment of MOSS compliance for all its offices. It advocated for wider use of the tool to better identify gaps in MOSS compliance and more effectively allocate funding for MOSS. Due to resource constraints, DSS could not complete global MOSS compliance; for example, only 12 MOSS compliance visits had been conducted last year and it was noted that DSS did not have the capacity to complete all pending duty stations in one year. The inconsistency in coverage of these missions was also noted and it was questioned whether these missions to all countries are actually warranted, for instance, some countries had been visited twice in a span of three years, while others, although deemed to be higher risk, had not been visited at all. It was suggested that if the compliance visits were to continue, the criteria for prioritizing countries needed to be reviewed. Finally, it was noted that since the online MOSS compliance was introduced, that compliance visits could instead be even more focused for added value.

219. One member believed that compliance missions were perhaps more necessary now than ever for security management, given that there is a more comprehensive set of security policies than previously, and thus there is a need to ensure their implementation. He noted that there is a constant struggle to deal with decisions and actions taken outside of the current policies and that persons often struggle with ad hoc decisions that make things very difficult. At the same time, it was acknowledged that compliance missions as they stand currently may not be the best use of resources and that there might be a wider and slightly adjusted role for compliance.

220. Another member also supported the views that while the value of compliance missions cannot be dismissed, the cost efficiency of such missions needed to be examined against their added value. He believed that there was a need for DRO's regional desks to conduct better checks to determine whether MOSS and related measures are well supported by an SRA and if there are potential less costly actions that could be taken. In this regard, DSS noted DRO's West Africa desk was currently reviewing all SRAs, MOSS and MORSS to identify such gaps.

221. For another member, compliance missions had resulted in a higher percentage of his organization's offices being MOSS compliant. Thus, he viewed the missions as a very good security mitigation tool and supported these as independent evaluations of how we work.

222. One other member also noted that an IASMN decision had been made to make MOSS self-assessments mandatory, but that this was not enforced, making it difficult to inform senior management of compliance on the basis of the parameters set by DSS. The member requested a more rigorous application of the decision.

223. DSS reminded members that compliance is not a JFA funded activity, but rather funded by the organization's regular budget and that it had originally been established as a result of the Ahtissari report. While there was certainly room for improvement, measures were already being taken to improve the composition of compliance teams. There was also a need to garner the views of CSAs and others from the ground on the value of compliance visits. DSS added that there was real value in comparing compliance visits against the self-assessments, and supported both practices simultaneously.

224. The representative from the UNMDWG reiterated an earlier comment that MOSS include a medical component, which should be separated from other components of MOSS.

TRU products

225. OHCHR raised the issue that IASMN members had received a limited number of products from DSS' TRU last year and hoped to receive more in the future, noting that many of the products produced by the SIOCs are much in demand. He would like to receive common analyses on major security incidents and their impact on the UN system, as well as periodical products. (e.g. a certain number per month). Greater transparency in dissemination of the products was also requested.

226. The Chair strongly agreed and noted that he had already highlighted the need for greater information sharing of these products by TRU.

Syria situation

227. There was an extensive discussion on the current situation in Syria. IASMN members clearly recognised the dangers and difficulties in dealing with a chemical threat and the general approach to initially identifying and procuring certain preventative measures was thought to be a prudent one. Members recognised the right of each member to determine the best way forward based on their risk appetite and notwithstanding a UN system-wide decision on the matter, acknowledged the value in keeping each other informed of decisions and plans, to facilitate a common effort where possible. The question was raised again about the need for a policy on operating in chemical, biological and nuclear environments. The Chair recommended that DSS' Threat and Risk Unit (TRU) produce an updated analysis on this matter to better inform decision-making. In addition, WFP offered to share its comprehensive SRA with IASMN members.

UNON briefing Kenya

228. UNON provided a brief overview of the security situation in Kenya in anticipation of the elections, as a topic affecting nearly all IASMN members. The member expressed optimism given the on-going efforts by the UN country team and local governments, by civil society and other organizations, who are all working towards a peaceful election. In this regard, business continuity is being considered and cooperation within the security cell is being enhanced, but members were asked to take into account the dual reporting lines that would exist temporarily to support a unified security structure during this period. UNON also noted that there are two major conferences planned during the period, which would need some consideration, unless UNEP and Habitat decided to cancel, relocate or postpone. The member thanked OCHA for providing the funding for 3 additional surge officers, enabling a presence in all 8 humanitarian hubs.

M. Other Matters

a) IASMN Regular and Steering Group sessions:

- i. Spring session, IASMN Steering Group, (14 to 16 May 2013, New York – exact venue tbc)

- ii. 19th session IASMN (10 to 13 September 2013, ICAO HQ, Montreal)

b) HLCM and CEB meeting schedule

- i. HLCM 25th session, (7 to 8 March 2013, IFAD HQ, Rome)
- ii. CEB Spring Session (5 to 6 April 2013)