

**Report of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network  
16<sup>th</sup> session, UNESCAP, Bangkok, Thailand  
6 to 9 February 2012**

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the Headquarters of UNESCAP in Bangkok from 6 to 9 February 2012. A list of participants is attached at Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members is attached at Annex B. This was the 16th session of the IASMN since its first meeting in Vienna in 2000.

2. The IASMN members wish to express their gratitude to UNESCAP for hosting the meeting.

3. Dr. Noeleen Heyzer, Executive Secretary, UNESCAP addressed IASMN participants, highlighting the critical and challenging role the UNSMS plays in the UN system and expressing the deepest respect and appreciation for all the work done on an inter-agency level. She noted that every duty station presented its own unique challenges and thanked everyone for all their very hard work. Acknowledging that the UNSMS continues to enable implementation of work programmes by helping to ensure the safety and security of UN staff and dependents, she found the IASMN's programme of work well balanced between issues of policy resourcing and practical security.

## **II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING**

### **A. Security Policy and Guideline Issues (CRP 13)**

4. At its 15<sup>th</sup> Session in June 2011, the IASMN discussed the balance between general policies and guidelines and agreed that it was first necessary to complete the *Security Policy Manual* to have a strong policy framework in place before work should begin on revising the UNSMS guidance manual, i.e. the *Security Operations Manual*. Since the 15<sup>th</sup> session however, it was evident that proper security management required both policies and guidelines to be in effect. In addition, DSS recognized that there was a need to consolidate security management-related communiqués and memoranda issued since 2005 that contained operational guidelines for a variety of security issues and post them on UNSMIN. Therefore at this session, the IASMN was requested to consider that the new *Security Policy Manual* be developed concurrently with the revision of the *Security Operations Manual*, to be renamed the *United Nations Security Management Operations Manual* (SMOM), to distinguish it from the version issued in 1995. The IASMN was also informed that until such time as the SMOM table of contents was agreed upon and finalized, it is the intention to "populate" the SMOM on UNSMIN as guidelines are agreed upon and endorsed by the IASMN. Members were asked to generously volunteer to lead in the development of some key guidelines in coordination with DSS to increase the quality of the SMOM and accelerate the process for its completion.

5. While satisfaction was expressed with the approach outlined by DSS in building security management policy, guidelines and technical standards concurrently on a conceptual framework

of security risk management, and with the progress made so far, the point was also made that due to the ongoing engagement of DSS' Division of Regional Operations (DRO) with the field, the need for input by DRO's Desk Chiefs in the development of physical security guidelines was needed.

**6. The IASMN approved the development of the *Security Management Operations Manual* in tandem with the development of the *Security Policy Manual* and agreed to contribute to the development of some key guidelines in coordination with DSS.**

## **B. Armed Private Security Companies (CRP 9)**

7. At its 15<sup>th</sup> session in June 2011, the IASMN took note of the decision of the Secretary-General following the meeting of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee in May 2011 on the use of armed private security companies (PSCs) and agreed to form a working group to progress the decisions made by the Policy Committee. The Working Group, comprising representatives from OHCHR, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, DPKO/DFS, DPA, FICSA, CCISUA and DSS, as well as representatives from the UN Secretariat's Procurement Division and Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), was established on 18 August 2011.

8. At the last session of the IASMN Steering Group in November/December 2011, three draft documents were presented for consideration covering three components: where the use of PSCs may be an option, the services that may be contracted from PSCs, and a Statement of Works for use by the UN's Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) in developing a model contract for how to engage the selected armed PSC. The Steering Group was informed that the Working Group would continue to refine these components and develop the specific criteria by which a provider may be selected after the use of an armed PSC has been approved, including the screening of the PSC and of PSC personnel.

9. For the current session of the IASMN, the Working Group had consolidated the three draft documents and produced a draft policy and draft set of guidelines (requiring further revision) on the Use of Armed PSCs which members were asked to consider, with a view to approving these within the next two months in order that these may be submitted to the UN Secretary-General for information, before continuing the process through the IASMN, HLCM and CEB.

10. The Chair acknowledged that the use of armed PSCs is a controversial issue and that others had registered objections to their use. However, in view of the fact that the UN system was already using such companies, and the use of PSCs was only to be considered if other options, such as UN, host country or Member State support were not feasible, he emphasized the importance of having a policy in place to regulate their use that would represent the gold standard that can stand up to scrutiny, as is the case for the UNSMS' Use of Force policy. In fact, it was intended to annex both the Use of Force Policy and the Weapons Manual to the policy on the Use of Armed PSCs. It was further explained that there are already many external groups, (e.g. the Montreux Group, NGOs and industry professionals) waiting to see what the UN is going to produce on this issue and that this issue would also need to be socialized with both Member States and staff-at-large.

11. Two members, while continuing to voice their overall objection to the use of armed PSCs, did nevertheless recognize the need to comment on the draft policy. A number of specific concerns were raised and clarification sought on aspects of the draft policy and guidelines, including on those portions that were UN secretariat specific. For example, regarding procurement, references were made to the UN's financial rules and regulations whereas it was noted that several AFPOs had their own financial rules and regulations. It was hoped the policy could be more generic in recognizing that. There were concerns about how PSCs would be managed and the capacity of organizations to do so in a meaningful way. The level of responsibility and accountability of the CSAs/SAs in the process, and the level of those advising either the DO or CSA/SA on such issues was also a concern, e.g. it was strongly believed that advice on the use of armed PSCs should not be left to local security assistants to provide. Clarification was also sought on the use of non-state actors in lieu of the use of armed PSCs. There were also concerns about situations where a PSC operating in one country may operate differently in another, which could have an adverse impact on the image and reputation of the UN. Further, recognizing that the USG may consult as needed with the Executive Group on Security (EGS) as well as individually with Executive Heads of the relevant UN entity on the use of armed PSCs, it was suggested that this be made a requirement to ensure there is systematic consultation, as a decision by one AFPO to contract armed PSCs would clearly have an impact on other AFPOs. Clarification was also sought with respect to the decision making process, particularly the role played locally by UNSMS organizations and the SMT. It was asked how any disagreements and/or the global implications of using PSCs in particular regions would be handled.

12. Another member believed that the guidelines should cite the need for SMT members to be properly trained in handling the contracting of armed PSCs and that benchmarks be provided for the DO and SMT to guide when the use of armed PSCs should be considered, and when their use should end. Other members, also noting that the UN was already using PSCs, urged their continued use if the UN wished to operate in some high threat environments. Noting that the EGS already exists as a mechanism by which to consider critical decisions, it was suggested that similarly the use of armed PSCs should be seen merely as another tool among the risk mitigation tools available. Concerns about self-regulating and self-screening of armed PSCs and the UN's capacity to perform those tasks were also raised, and it was questioned whether it would be necessary to have an independent third party to conduct those tasks. Additional comments were made on specific items in the policy that needed further clarification, e.g. while the policy distinguished between static and mobile security, and for the most part focused on static security, further discussion was needed on the latter, e.g. would close protection and air and sea movements be considered under mobile security. There were also concerns raised about potential conflict of interest issues, i.e. how would one ensure that those involved in the contracting of armed PSCs did not end up working for those same companies one or two years later. The access of contracted PSCs to UN communications facilities, e.g. radio rooms, was brought up as an issue requiring clarification, as this could have potential consequences. Generally, more clarity in the language used in the policy was needed, e.g. in defining such terms as "adequate", "armed", 'non-compliance' and 'necessary level of skill'. There was a need to ensure that the way in which concerns about host country support was conveyed in the policy did not have the unintended effect of coming across as if there was no confidence in host country authorities. Questions were also posed as to whether PSC personnel would need to certify in BSITF and ASITF and whether there would be a common database to share the factual

information to be provided, as referenced in the guidelines, and who would follow up on any remedial actions required.

13. It was recognized nevertheless that despite best efforts to regulate armed PSCs, things could still go wrong. The representative from the UN's Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), after making the point that the contract modalities for the use of armed PSCs was largely driven by procurement, informed participants that there would be some provision built in to the contracts that allowed for the termination of contracts if services are not provided to the correct standards and levels. He recalled that previous meetings of the IASMN had addressed the vetting of security staff and had agreed that it should not only be security staff singled out for vetting, but that this needed to be applied to others such as, for example, those performing accounting functions. He made the point that armed PSCs should be viewed in the same way as any service provider. One member however begged to differ as he saw a big difference between those entrusted with lethal force as opposed to those entrusted with, e.g. accounting functions. In view of the huge impact on the UN the use of armed PSCs would have, another member advocated for having in place the best due diligence process possible, to include the best possible vetting system, even if not perfect.

14. Some members, while supporting the use of armed PSCs, especially in the most high-threat areas, and in some cases, also recognizing that host country support may not be the best or a suitable option, also supported that in lieu of contracting armed PSCs, the expansion of DSS' SSS services be looked at in order to strengthen existing guard forces, noting that this was an issue that had been raised following the Abuja attack.

15. The Chair reassured the IASMN that the process of deciding on and hiring armed PSCs would in fact be a risk-managed operation. While it would be impossible to remove all risk when and if armed PSCs are contracted for security it is currently the case that not all risk is eliminated when there is a reliance on host country or even Member State support. Issues of capability, as well as issues of impunity and immunity would arise in all cases, also including with respect to the use of DSS' SSS officers. Essentially there is a need to take reasonable amounts of risks to do the best job possible and even with procedures in place, the vetting process would never be complete, i.e. international companies using the best vetting standards could be faced with a situation where their employees end up with unintended consequences in situations they could not control. The IASMN was further informed that the Montreux forum had decided that a third party needed to vet PSCs; however this would have the effect of relieving the relevant company of all responsibility for the vetting of its personnel. The point was made that even with the best vetting mechanisms in place, things can still go wrong. Training and oversight is needed, as well as a realistic understanding of what a PSC can and cannot do. He agreed that it is critical for the policy to include references to the SMT, the USG, DSS and the EGS because what one organization does presents risks for the entire UN system. There is a need therefore to put in place a structure where organizational risk to the larger UN is minimized.

16. While the policy needed to be improved in terms of addressing overall management responsibilities, the Chair noted that CSAs/SAs are already overworked. As such, it would be impossible and he could not accept to load the management and oversight of PSCs onto existing

personnel. He suggested that a high quality direct hire management team, with personnel who have contract training, is needed to oversee the management of a PSC contract on a daily basis. Noting the variances in host country support and the capacity to provide such support, the Chair agreed that the policy remain vague in addressing host country issues. Regarding the use of SSS officers to guard more facilities worldwide and the further suggestion that existing SSS officers could be deployed to areas where they could be more useful, he reminded members of the vast number of facilities globally for which the UNSMS was responsible, i.e. over approx. 5,600 facilities, without counting UNRWA facilities and those provided by host governments. Noting that there is neither the mandate nor the funding available to provide and train SSS officers for all those facilities, and noting that funding for SSS officers is provided through the UN's regular budget which is overseen by the UN's General Assembly, it was clear there are limitations on what may actually be done in this regard.

17. One of the staff federations noted that the proposal to deploy existing SSS officers to high risk locations, which was raised at the 15<sup>th</sup> session of the IASMN, had been a popular proposal and members were reminded that, at that time, it was suggested that a cost analysis be conducted to explore this possibility. It was now likely that staff would ask why this had not been done. DSS, while supporting that there could be an examination of where SSS staff may be used and that this might be a solution for certain locations, also noted that there are many areas where the capability of SSS is limited compared to the capability of a PSC and that the investment in bringing SSS staff to that level would be too high as compared to the cost of using PSCs. While precise cost comparisons, which would present a clearer view, had not been carried out, it was noted that the average cost of assigning an international staff member somewhere is approximately \$250,000 per year and even greater in high threat locations. As such, the Chair believed that it is false to think that this could be done more cheaply by the UN, also taking into account the additional training that would be required. Further, current recruitment timelines within the UN made this untenable, especially for situations that deteriorate so quickly and call for a rapid response. One member, who supported this view, noted that his organization had conducted a cost analysis exercise to consider protection for one of its facilities and that the exercise concluded that PSCs might be the only option. It was however mentioned by some members that mostly local personnel would be recruited, which could greatly reduce the cost of UN armed guards, i.e. the cost of blue uniformed security personnel was based on local salary scales which were not comparable to the cost of internationally recruited security officers (i.e. \$250,000). Therefore, it was felt that this option needed to be fully explored, as had also been requested by the staff federations on a number of occasions.

18. Noting that the discussions at this session were focused on both the theoretical and practical aspects of using armed PSCs, the Chair urged members to focus on providing specific comments on the documents provided, stressing that the intent at this stage was not to seek IASMN endorsement of the documents, but rather to agree on the way forward, which would begin with presenting those documents to the UN Secretary-General to solicit comments about the significant progress achieved so far and whether this is headed in the right direction. Taking this into account, and stressing once again that armed PSCs are already being used within the UN system with no regulatory framework in place, it was necessary to impose a more stringent deadline for submission of further comments by IASMN members. Noting that any policy on the use of armed PSCs would need to go to the HLCM and the CEB at their respective fall

sessions and that there would be a need to sensitize this issue with Member States, he urged IASMN members to act as ambassadors on this issue within their respective organizations. Although he recognized there was still disagreement among some organizations over the use of armed PSCs, the fact remained that the decision to use armed PSCs had already been made and what remains to be finalized is exactly how. While it would be impossible to address every single issue in the policy, once this process is completed, it would also be possible to produce an FAQ to address some outstanding issues.

19. One member, noting that the adoption of this policy may require an increase in Member State provided military and police forces, a task that was particularly difficult in many high-risk environments, proposed that the USGs for DPKO/DFS also examine this draft. As it was likely that any decision to use armed PSCs would rise to the level of Executive Heads, it was not necessary for the IASMN at this session to agree on their use at this meeting because the option would still exist for an organization to opt for not using them. What was needed now was merely an agreement on setting a realistic timeframe for further IASMN input in order to complete a package for presentation to the UN Secretary-General. The representative from OLA clarified that the policy is meant to provide a common theme that unifies all members of the IASMN. OLA was in the process of developing a model contract to reflect key elements of the policy. It was noted that the model contract, though based on UN secretariat procurement processes and requirements, is intended to help provide a sense of how the UN secretariat contracts with PSCs and although there are UNSMS entities with different procurement requirements, the model contract would nevertheless serve as a guide for those entities. It was also recognized that organizations would have to modify their contracts accordingly and this needed to be clear in the policy.

**20. Following a rigorous discussion, the IASMN noted the significant progress made by the IASMN Working Group on Armed Private Security Companies since its 15<sup>th</sup> session and agreed to submit further comments on the draft policy on Armed Private Security Companies no later than 15 March 2012 with a view to approving this policy shortly thereafter. Upon approval, the IASMN further agreed that DSS would submit this policy and the draft guidelines to the UN Secretary-General as an update of the work achieved so far in response to the Secretary-General's decisions emanating from the Policy Committee Meeting on Private Security Companies, held in May 2011. It is intended that this product will then be presented to the HLCM's 24<sup>th</sup> session in the fall 2012.**

### **C. Update on the Security Risk Management (SRM) Improvement Working Group (CRP 16) and Review of Scope and Coverage of Security Risk Assessments (CRP 3)**

21. At its 15th session, the IASMN was informed of new procedures and tools being developed by the Security Risk Management (SRM) Improvement Working Group for improving likelihood assessments within the existing Security Risk Assessment process. At this session, while the IASMN was informed that the field testing of the likelihood procedures and tools, involving 93 UN security professionals, was completed in mid-September 2011 and that the overall feedback was very positive, the Working Group was reluctant to introduce likelihood processes and tools in isolation of other future SRM improvements to avoid confusion and uncertainty, which would be counterproductive. In this respect, the Working Group highlighted

the fact that the introduction of the SLS, though a very positive contribution and major improvement to the SRM process had caused confusion because it was not properly placed into the context of the wider SRM framework. Therefore, in order for a more holistic product to be presented to users and recognizing that developing improvements to the entire SRM framework would take time, the Working Group decided that the implementation of the likelihood tools should be delayed until further work is completed on other aspects of security risk assessment, including impact assessment, program assessment and security risk management measures. The IASMN was also informed that the Working Group had also redrafted its Terms of Reference and included a work plan to finalize the SRM improvement process, both of which had been endorsed by the IASMN Steering Group at its last meeting.

22. With respect to impact assessment, the IASMN was informed that the Working Group, capitalizing on the foundations set by the likelihood process and tools, had developed a similar approach to impact assessment, completing both parts (likelihood and impact) of a computer-based risk analysis tool. It is the intention that this risk analysis tool, which was presented to IASMN members, would contribute towards more accurate and timely SRAs, specific to one geographical location. A user guide would also be developed and the requisite training provided once the full SRA process was tackled, thus providing security officers in the field with a tool with which to make better, smarter decisions and informed recommendations.

23. Following the presentation, there were several questions about how impact was rated and would be taken into account. Abuja, for example, was a case where there were many deaths and it had a huge impact on the morale of staff, but little impact on operations. On the other hand, there could be a situation where the kidnapping of one staff member could have a huge impact on the morale of staff and a bigger impact on operations than if many staff had been killed. It was recognized that in some cases decisions about how to manage security risks were problematic, especially when an event is deemed as high impact but low likelihood and decisions are taken on how to manage the risk based only on impact. It was questioned therefore whether taking measures to lower risk is cost-effective when the likelihood is negligible. The Chair of the Working Group clarified that following additional work linking security risk management decisions logically to the risks they are meant to lower, the problem of unjustified recommendations should be eliminated.

24. Though significant progress had been made in assessing risk and there was agreement that the likelihood tool should be disseminated to security officers, it was suggested that more time was needed to develop the full model. Concern was expressed that a totally computerized system could mean less of a reliance on human judgment and situational knowledge, both of which should not be removed from the process. One of the staff federations stressed that when the tool is rolled out, not only was it important that this is communicated properly, but care needed to be exercised to ensure that the impression is not given that this computer generated system would not replace human judgment and decision-making in the SRM process. The relationship between the number of injuries that could occur and impact assessment was also cited, i.e. in a situation where few staff are killed, but many injured, this was something that needed to be factored into figuring out when to remove persons from certain areas. It was also questioned how the methodology would help or hinder member state influence, as it was recalled



that under the former security phase system, certain member states had been reluctant to have phases raised or lowered.

25. The Chair confirmed that tools such as this do not relieve senior managers from dealing with hard questions and taking management decisions. Further, he did not see member state influence as an issue as this tool is meant to be shared with host governments in the same way the SLS was. Another member believed that as long as there is a logical system in place for security risk management, that includes the SRA process and subsequent decisions about how to bring risks to acceptable levels, then there would not be problems with member states. However, should there be a move away from this logic, then there could be a problem. In this respect, he cited the example of a small conference that had been scheduled for a location designated as at Security Level 4. Although, the Security Level reflected only the threat, the conference was nevertheless moved to another country. This was a clear example of a decision made without any discussion of risk, which had the result of causing an unpleasant interface with the original host country authorities.

26. An argument was also made by another member for using the language of probability in assessing risk as this was a scientifically used and understood language. Though some training would be required, quantification was still considered to be the gold standard. The Chair of the Working Group emphasized that risk assessment based on probability/quantified risk assessment were not appropriate for on-the-ground security assessments for human-caused violence. It was also asked whether there would be guidance provided to rate the quality of risk management measures as not all measures would be equally good and some caution was also expressed about completely eliminating voluminous SRAs as such documents were important in providing a starting point to provide knowledge of the environment and conditions on the ground and should not require frequent amendment.

27. While it was recognized that there were still issues to examine regarding impact assessment, support was expressed for moving forward with the likelihood product and for testing the impact assessment and for building in quality control into the system to ensure that the results are not manipulated. Though some confusion remained about different aspects of the tool, there was a need to combine impact and likelihood to produce a simple risk analysis tool for improving SRAs.

**28. The IASMN approved the revised TORs of the Security Risk Management (SRM) Improvement Working Group and took note of the computer-based risk analysis tool.**

#### **D. Review of the Scope and Coverage of Security Risk Assessments (CRP 3)**

29. Pending further work of the Security Risk Management Improvement Working Group and the development of guidelines for *Security Risk Management (SRM)* for the new *Security Management Operations Manual (SMOM)*, some provisions of the present policy on Security Risk Management required immediate clarification, in particular for provisions such as those that require SRAs to be developed “*for all locations in the country where personnel of the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependents are present*”. In addition, many Designated Officials, Security Management Teams and security professionals had raised questions regarding



the scope and coverage of SRAs and sought clarification as to whether SRAs should be mandatory for all provinces, security coverage areas, duty stations, or for all individual UN facilities and residencies in the country or mission area. As such, the IASMN was asked to consider a number of recommendations, intended for immediate implementation, to help determine the requisite scope and coverage of SRAs.

30. Overall, the recommendations were found to be very useful, particularly for those countries where it would be impossible to develop fully blown SRAs. It was noted that there seemed to be a move towards having an SRA for each SLS area, as opposed to having an SRA for the whole country, though it was recognized that in some cases it would be impossible to have just one SRA for the country. In the context of close protection, it was also noted that the issue of SRAs for individuals was not included in the recommendations. The wish to see physical assessment surveys covered in the recommendations and the importance of operationalizing the SRA process, i.e. having SRAs cover not only locations but also operations, was highlighted. It was also asked why the preparation of an SRA was prepared only by DSS security officers and not by those from the AFPOs. The latter would be particularly important if an SRA is to cover operations. On a related note, a request was made for information about SLS levels by duty station.

31. DSS made the point that it was not necessary for every SRA to be approved at HQ and in an effort to reduce the number of voluminous SRA documents, one idea to consider would be to have an overall country SRA with information on other locations within the country annexed to it. A reality check from the ground would be needed to see if this was feasible.

**32. The IASMN agreed that:**

- a) Security Risk Assessments should be mandatory for each country or mission, as well as for each designated Security Level Area.**
- b) Country and/or area-specific SRAs can be developed separately or as a single document reflecting, where appropriate and practical, individual Security Level Areas in the SRA.**
- c) DOs, in consultation with SMTs, should determine the need to highlight in country and/or area-specific SRAs, specific duty stations (geographic locations) and/or programmes where the security risks and recommended security risk management measures differ significantly from those pertaining to the rest of the country or area.**
- d) All country/area-specific SRAs, after approval by DOs, must be submitted to DSS' DRO Regional Desks for review and endorsement.**
- e) Supplementary comprehensive "physical security assessments/surveys", but not SRAs, should be developed for individual UN facilities, including, but not limited to UN offices, logistics bases, terminals and guest houses according to the format developed by DSS and promulgated in DSS' DRO Memorandum of 12 December 2011.**

**f) As “physical security assessments/surveys” are subsidiary technical assessments that must be in line with country/area-specific SRAs, their formal review and endorsement by DSS’ DRO Regional Desks are not required. However, the Desks must be copied in order to exercise the requisite oversight.**

**g) All country/area-specific SRAs should be developed and/or reviewed annually or updated immediately following significant changes in the security operating environment or following major security incidents.**

#### **E. Proposed Policies for the UNSMS Security Policy Manual - Fire Safety (CRP 2 (g))**

33. In May 2006, the IASMN endorsed the development of Fire Safety Guidelines for the UNSMS based on a recommendation made to the IASMN in July 2005. In 2006, DSS convened a Fire Safety Working Group to develop those guidelines, which were presented to the IASMN in March 2007. The IASMN did not endorse the guidelines at that time but recommended their continued development. As part of the ongoing work to complete the *Security Policy Manual* (SPM), DSS drafted a policy on Fire Safety that benefited from feedback from IASMN Steering Group members following the Steering Group meeting in November/December 2011. The policy was developed at the same time as the new “United Nations Fire Safety Guidelines” developed by DHSSS, which were currently being thoroughly edited. The fire safety policy is intended to be implemented in conjunction with the Guidelines. The IASMN was requested to review the draft policy with a view to approving its inclusion in the *Security Policy Manual*.

34. One staff federation, noting the reference in the policy to establishing a fire safety focal point, sought clarification on the requisite grade level of the focal point. DSS clarified that this would be up to each AFPO to decide. One member noted that, in practical terms, professional security officers, though not necessarily possessing specific fire safety expertise, would be more suitable for this role than those who held no safety and security responsibilities. Some concern was also expressed about the vagueness in the policy about the skill set required for the fire safety focal point. Responding to the suggestion that security officers assume this role, one member cautioned that not all security officers are experts on fire safety. At the same time, he recognized that if security officers could not act as fire safety focal points how could it be expected that other staff, regardless of level, could act in this regard. DPKO/DFS pointed out that the fire safety focal point in some of its locations is a local staff or field service level staff member, ranging from the FS5 to the FS7 level and that those persons are fairly well trained in fire safety issues. Another member pointed out that in his organization, there is an incident response team that falls under a contractor with fire fighting expertise.

35. Some members stressed the need for the policy to put a stronger emphasis on saving lives over saving property and that the policy needed to be clearer on basic safety fundamentals, such as detection systems, alarms, alternative means of escape, etc. Another suggestion made was to include in the policy a reference to offices situated in government buildings, as is the case with MOSS.

36. The Chair, reiterating the evolution of this policy, noted that the original fire safety guidelines developed by DSS SSS were designed for the UN secretariat. These had to be

expanded to cover a wider variety of locations. While the policy was intended to be more general, the fire safety guidelines were intended to be more specific. Furthermore, the point was made that security professionals are not posted at every one of the 2,000 plus duty stations in the UN system, but perhaps at only about 200 of those duty stations. In addition, just as fire safety in schools is entrusted to teachers or someone else who has fire safety training, it would be expected that fire safety focal points in the UN could be any number of possible staff members, with a varied knowledge of fire safety issues. This would vary from organization to organization.

37. One of the Staff federations, disheartened to hear many comments that had been raised five years ago, stressed the importance of finalizing the policy. It was recognized that it would not be possible to appoint fire safety focal points with all the duties and responsibilities detailed in the draft policy and that this would need to be adjusted. Another concern for the federation was the tendency for senior officials delegated with fire safety responsibilities to delegate these to more junior staff, though one participant clarified that only tasks, but not responsibilities can be delegated.

38. Further discussions during the course of the meeting produced additional amendments that were made to the draft policy and presented to the IASMN once again for consideration.

**39. The IASMN approved the policy on Fire Safety for inclusion in the *Security Policy Manual* and reaffirmed that the policy is intended to be implemented in conjunction with the “United Nations Fire Safety Guidelines” developed by DHSSS.**

#### **F. Update on Saving Lives Together (CRP 10)**

40. On 6 and 7 October 2011, UNDSS hosted the 2nd SLT Conference in Geneva with some 50 participants representing a broad spectrum of humanitarian and security experts, including the USG, DSS, representatives from UN agencies, personnel from HQ and the field, and representatives of NGOs, donors and academia. The 2011 Conference charted the progress made in terms of piloting SLT in Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Eastern Ethiopia, Somalia), as well as the Darfurs, Sudan. It was agreed at the 2009 SLT conference that as the mainstreaming of SLT through training and animation had not had the desired impact, all stakeholders would undertake every effort to “pilot” SLT at a number of agreed upon high risk duty stations. To this end, it was determined by consensus that the model for the DSS Senior Officer dedicated to NGO security requirements, which the IASMN had endorsed for the Darfurs in 2007, would serve as the catalyst for such piloting initiatives, pending availability of extra budgetary funds. As funding was not available in 2007, the precise duration and extent of the piloting could not be determined in advance but it was deemed that a period of four to five years would be needed to draw conclusions on the efficacy of the SLT programme. At its 2011 conference, the stakeholders agreed that the piloting of SLT had demonstrated significant success and renewed their commitment to continuing to reinforce efforts in critical humanitarian operations, alongside the mainstreaming of SLT.

41. The IASMN was further informed that one of the main conclusions arising from the conference was that in situations of extreme risk, the piloting of SLT proved to be most effective

where there is a dedicated UN SLT NGO Liaison Officer and some formal mechanism of INGO collaboration. Such mechanisms include the INGO ‘Safety Platforms’ such as, ANSO (Afghanistan), GANSO (Gaza) and NSP (Somalia), whereby teams of INGO security officers serve their community, while working closely with UNDSS. Although there was room for improvement in terms of information sharing, maintaining trust and promoting greater awareness about SLT among both UN and INGO staff globally, the participants from both the UN and NGOs expressed a very high degree of satisfaction with the piloting of SLT. The new SLT framework, which was revised by an SLT Taskforce chaired by DSS and comprised equal numbers of UN representatives, (including IASMN, OCHA, UNICEF and WFP) and NGO representatives (including the IASC NGO consortia), was introduced during the conference. Participants were informed that the IASC had endorsed the revised SLT framework in September 2011 and formally requested DSS to take over its operational management in October 2011. During the conference, representatives from both the UN and NGOs showed enthusiasm and commitment to continue the work of the SLT taskforce, with participants agreeing to reconvene the Taskforce in the immediate future to review and reinforce the governance of SLT, taking into account the new role of DSS as the lead for the development and overall implementation of SLT. They agreed, as equal partners, to reinforce efforts both at HQ and in the field, for the consensus based management of Saving Lives Together.

42. IASMN members were also informed that while the piloting of SLT demonstrated that in some extreme situations dedicated resources are essential to effective SLT implementation, this should not substitute for ongoing efforts to “embed” SLT functions on a global basis. DSS’ NGO Liaison Unit was working closely with DSS’ Training and Development Section (TDS) to ensure the provisions of appropriate and up-to date training material on SLT for all levels. It was noted that there are costs involved regardless of whether SLT is embedded in existing DSS functions or supported through extra budgetary means. With its strong emphasis on resource sharing, handled through fundraising efforts in the Consolidated Appeals, SLT is able to bring significant resources to the UNSMS. Close monitoring and evaluation of the piloting phase of SLT would allow the IASMN to assess the most effective and cost efficient means of maintaining and institutionalizing the SLT platform. Thus, the IASMN was requested to note this update and, as always, invited to support this initiative and contribute to the activities in support of the Outcomes from the Second International Conference on Saving Lives Together.

43. The Chair noted that just under three years ago, SLT was moribund and that much has been achieved since then. There is a dependence on NGOs to implement UN mandates and with this comes a responsibility to a larger community of individuals.

44. One member proposed that the SLT framework be linked to the IASC transformative agenda, while another expressed the view that the initiatives taken at DSS HQ should not be a substitute for embedding SLT functions on a global basis with security officers, both for AFPOs and the NGO community. That member’s organization had pushed for more training to assist its security officers in developing a culture of SLT, rather than push for funding more officers to implement SLT. He did not believe that this key message from the SLT Conference was reflected in the report from the meeting. Another member proposed that there be a strategic rethinking of the SLT approach, i.e. instead of managing NGO liaison officers, there is a need to examine more broadly what is being done to mainstream the SLT spirit and operationalize this initiative.

Regarding NGO liaison officers, the tendency was to deploy such officers in high risk areas, whereas it might be the case that in those areas, the need is already met. Therefore, it was proposed that it might be optimal to find a balance between covering high-risk areas and those areas where the need is not covered. There was general agreement that the programme could be optimized further by mainstreaming and operationalizing SLT on a far broader basis than the NGO liaison programme.

**45. The IASMN noted the update on Saving Lives Together and the outcomes from the Second International Conference on Saving Lives Together.**

**G. Programme Criticality (VTC) (CRP 11)**

46. At previous Steering Group and regular sessions, the IASMN was briefed on the progress of the HLCM Programme Criticality Working Group (PCWG), and its programme criticality sub-technical working group (PCSTWG), on the development of the Programme Criticality framework that was requested by the HLCM (April 2009) to complement the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk (Acceptable Risk Model). The IASMN was informed that since the last report to the IASMN at its 15<sup>th</sup> Session, the PCWG had finalized the development of the Programme Criticality Framework (methodology and tool), which was developed through extensive consultation at headquarters and field levels, including field-testing in Somalia, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The PC Framework is designed to inform decision making when determining the criticality level for specific activities within a given geographic location and timeframe. The PC Level determination is then fed into the Acceptable Risk Model to ensure that United Nations personnel do not take unnecessary risks and that those who remain in-country work on the highest priority activities in accordance with United Nations strategic results.

47. The IASMN was further informed that a report was submitted by the PCWG to the 22<sup>nd</sup> session of the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) in September 2011 and that, at its 22<sup>nd</sup> session, the HLCM:

- A. Approved the Programme Criticality Framework (methodology and tool) for decision making within the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk which was subsequently submitted to and endorsed by CEB at its Fall session on 28 October 2011 and
- B. Recommended that the Programme Criticality Framework be rolled out in at least 12 high priority countries (between January 2012 and April 2013) and that a consolidated progress report (with lessons learned and recommended adjustments) be made to HLCM at its 2013 spring session, following a preliminary update at its fall 2012 session. The list of 12 countries could be adjusted if so required by changing security conditions.

48. At this session, IASMN members were also informed that a report on the High Level PCWG was to be presented to the 66<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly at its first resumed session in March 2012, in response to the General Assembly Resolution mandating that the Secretary-General report on the work of this group.

49. Concern was expressed about how the roll out of the PC framework would be funded and about who would take ownership of the future implementation of this and who would take decisions on programme criticality. The Chair clarified that the initial funding proposal was for \$1.2 million to roll out the framework in 12 priority countries (with another two having been recently added - Niger and Mali). He reminded participants that when the SLS had been rolled out it was necessary to send out training teams in support and that DSS managed to do so within existing resources by reprioritizing its training activities. To roll out the PC framework, funding and training are required. However, DSS was not responsible for either nor was any single agency in a position to provide this. Therefore, funding needed to be found and it would be up to the UNICEF led working group to determine how to secure funding for the roll out. He expressed the hope that the AFPOs could support funding for this. The Chair also expressed his concern that although the notion was understood that when persons are put in high threat locations they should be doing the most important work in those locations, in practice, this was not being applied. One member questioned whether the PC framework contradicted the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk in that the Guidelines state it is up to each Executive Head of agency to decide on which programmes are extreme, whereas the PC framework states that this would be a collective decision. DSS clarified that program criticality does not contradict the Guidelines For Acceptable Risk and that it would only be in cases where the residual risk is very high, after PC level 1 is determined, that the Executive Head is expected to weigh in after the use of the PC framework in-country.

50. Some members advocated for the opportunity to further implement the PC framework as it provided a more substantial tool for decision making, both with respect to continuous activities and stand-alone operations, noting the progress that had been made in Afghanistan when it was first introduced. As such, it was important to get PC mainstreamed as a programming, more than a security tool.

51. UNICEF sought IASMN support for moving forward with the roll out. One member noted that the budget for the first roll out had in fact been reduced to \$695,000. DSS and four other AFPOs had donated funds and the total amount needed would be covered if a few other AFPOs spread out the costs between them. In addition, UNICEF had pledged to offer 50% of the time of one professional staff member, though it nevertheless expressed the desire that this be reimbursed.

52. The Chair acknowledged that there had been some mistakes in the past, i.e. the need for some Executive Heads to sign off on activities when the residual risk was not very high. He added that anytime there is a situation when there is a need to measure the difference between high and very high residual risk, it was not bad for Executive Heads to understand what personnel are doing in the field. It was all too easy in the past for seniors to state that they did not have anything to do with security and it was certainly not a bad thing to have them understand what they are doing in places around the world. Today, both Executive Heads, as well as the Secretary-General, are much more aware of the security risks UN personnel face.

53. DSS pointed out that when the field-testing had been conducted, there was a broad discussion that the level of unacceptable risk in the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk may be too high and that

this may be adjustable in the future, especially considering the changes to the impact scale recommended by the SRM Improvement Working Group.

54. One member indicated that he had looked at the number of malicious deaths in his organization over the last 21 years and that this figure, though varied from year to year, was remarkably constant over a 10 year period, which indicated that there is a consistent appetite for risk within his organization. When the number of personnel was factored in, there was a consistent benchmark figure of 1 in 2000 persons per year, or about 50 per 100,000, killed by malicious acts in high threat duty stations. Although he could not say what defined acceptable risk, he could say that in the past twenty years, one half of one tenth of persons had a chance of dying. Another participant noted that more persons die from medical disease than from trauma, with most dying from cardio vascular disease and it was clear that the statistics referenced did not take account of this. In this respect, he drew the attention of the IASMN to the need to consider the timing of medevacs, as the chance of persons surviving severe medical problems, even for two days before they could be medically evacuated is zero. Another member noted that of 35 deaths that had been examined, two had died of wounds en route during their medevac. DSS noted that while the issue of the medical threat is important, there is currently no organization enterprise risk framework in place to address this.

55. The Chair noted that in the Secretary-General's Annual Report on the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel, statistics on deaths are provided that show casualties per 100,000 UN personnel. The figures are not staggering and it could be said that against those figures quite a bit of money is nevertheless being spent on security. The statistics could also be used to argue whether DSS and the IASMN are really needed. However, the money spent on security is primarily due to the high visibility of terrorist attacks against the UN and the need to exercise due diligence more than ever, especially in high threat duty stations. DSS and the IASMN are in fact needed more than ever. One member noted that with all the investments in security over the years, the number of deaths has remained relatively constant. A preliminary assumption could be that increased investment in security was ineffectual, but a close examination could reveal that increased investments in security requires threat actors to increase their efforts and capability when confronting harder targets. It is the case that over the years, the cause of deaths has changed. In the 1990s for UNHCR, for example, staff deaths were conflict related and mostly resulted from those being caught in the cross fire. While conflict-related deaths have decreased, deaths from targeted terrorism have increased, especially since 2001. One member believed that security and the number of deaths would remain constant in high threat locations. While better security risk management measures and procedures may be put in place, at the same time, UN personnel would increase their work tempo, including access and exposure to high threat situations.

56. Another member noted that of all those covered by the UNSMS, 1% were involved in security incidents. Overall statistics can be misleading until you see that criminal activity tends to be singular in nature whereas terrorism accounts for a small number of incidents but with a large number of casualties per incident. He believed that in future we would likely see changes in tactics to try to affect the UN's risk tolerance and that it was important to make people realize that the UN's risk tolerance will not be broken.



**57. The IASMN took note and fully supported the developments on Programme Criticality, including the Framework for Program Criticality, as part of the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk, that was endorsed by the CEB in 2011, and urges IASMN members to assist in raising awareness of the need to meet the funding requirements for the roll out of the Programme Criticality Framework, beginning with the first set of 14 identified priority countries.**

## **H. Budgetary Issues (VTC)**

### **(a) JFA Budget Performance Report for 2010-2011 and Programme Budget for 2012-2013 (CRP 14 (a))**

58. At its meeting in Amman Jordan from 30 November to 2 December 2011, the IASMN Steering Group was presented with a CRP providing provisional figures on the JFA Budget Performance Report for 2010-2011, as well as the proposed programme budget for the 2012-2013 biennium. The CRP presented to this session of the IASMN provided the final appropriation for the jointly financed activities (JFA) for the 2010-2011 biennium and the approved initial appropriation for the 2012-2013 biennium.

59. While there was a spirited discussion on this issue, triggered principally by concerns that the 14% budgeted vacancy rate in the field estimates, imposed by the General Assembly, masks the real staffing costs in the field and results in higher than anticipated costs to IASMN members, it was recognized that this issue required further discussion in HLCM. IASMN members were reminded that they had been informed about the issue with the General Assembly mandated vacancy rate from the time of the IASMN Steering Group meeting in Panama. However, while DSS was thanked for providing transparency on this issue, one member noted that the budget for 2012-2013 did not equate to zero growth and several members were clearly dissatisfied with what they saw as increased costs and what could likely be more increased costs in the future. Furthermore, this was exacerbated by the sentiments of a few members who perceived a decrease in the quality of service provided by UNDSS. Specifically, one member acknowledged the inevitability of an increased budget, but advocated for a Service Level Agreement between UNDSS and UNSMS members, which would more accurately spell out the services expected from UNDSS.

60. A discussion ensued regarding the possible need to look at making further cuts and instituting some contingency planning in anticipation of possible mandated cuts across the board, either from the General Assembly or HLCM. A few members proposed that there might be a need to examine cutting the jointly financed budget. One member called for an examination of services provided in the field. DSS pointed out that cutting the budget by just \$12 to \$15 million would easily translate into cutting 30 posts and that it would be meaningless to look for cuts in operating costs from which perhaps only about \$10 million could be cut. DPKO/DFS offered to examine where DSS security advisors were not needed in its missions, with a view to their possible redeployment to country teams with high priority.

61. The Chair informed IASMN members that he had already approached the UN controller on the issue of the artificial vacancy rate, an issue which he reminded the IASMN, was not up to the

UN secretariat to pronounce upon, but rather the General Assembly. In any case, it would be up to HLCM to comment on this.

**62. The IASMN noted the report on the JFA budget performance for 2010-2011 and the programme budget for 2012-2013. In doing so, the IASMN expressed continuing concern regarding the final billing costs to IASMN members for 2010-2011 that exceeded the original budgeted figures. The discrepancies resulted from a General Assembly mandated budgeted vacancy rate that was substantially higher than the actual vacancy rate. While IASMN members thanked DSS for providing regular expenditure updates throughout the biennium, they also raised concern about increased costs and sought assurances that the UN Controller would be approached to determine if this process could be refined for 2012-2013 to avoid such over expenditure.**

**(b) HLCM FBN Working Group on Safety and Security Costs (CRP 14 (b))**

63. The IASMN was presented with the third draft discussion paper that summarized the work to date of the Working Group on DSS Safety and Security Costs and its achievements. There are three key tasks outstanding: to consider options for cost-sharing the Jointly Financed Activities (JFA) of the UN Security Management System; to identify means by which security costs could be attributed to programmes; and to review Local Cost-Sharing. The paper concentrated primarily on cost-sharing the JFA and included background information relating to the UNSMS and its funding; the outline structure and funding of UNDSS; and the timetable for the UN budget process. Several options for cost-sharing were introduced in the paper, as well as proposed criteria for evaluating these options.

64. The IASMN was informed that the paper, which was intended to provide a comprehensive analysis, reflected an update on the pros and cons of various options following discussions within the Working Group and that if any alternative cost sharing arrangements were decided upon, these should apply with effect from 2014-2015. It was hoped that comments incorporated at the conclusion of this IASMN session would help to finalize this discussion paper and that efforts would then begin on drafting Discussion Paper 4. Participants were informed that one of the specific questions that had been put forward to the Working Group was whether any alternative options were missed. Option one remained using the regular budget to pay for the JFA. Noting that at present, apportionment for the JFA account remains headcount based, the representative of the FBN asked the IASMN to consider whether extracting specific data from TRIP would be a reasonable approach to apportioning costs. He believed that the use of TRIP data would be a valid way of validating costs, but this data needed to be reliable and accurate.

65. Several members had a great deal of doubts about the TRIP concept and one member commented on an alternative option, i.e. determining per capita by SLS level as it is known how many staff are at locations for which SLS levels are determined. He proposed that as there is a presumption that security services are used more as SLS levels go up, one could weight more for staff at security levels 3, 4 and 5. Another member believed there needed to be some baseline costs established. Using TRIP would be counterproductive, burdensome, difficult to manage and could not ensure predictability. There was general consensus not to use TRIP data for costing and to remain with the status quo.

66. The representative of the FBN explained that at the beginning of the process, there was a feeling that there were considerable difficulties with the current cost sharing mechanism. Hence, the need arose to flesh out alternative proposals and it was the intention of the Working Group to flesh out the pros and cons of using the SLS level in the current discussion paper. IASMN members however cautioned about linking the SLS to any financial system as it was important to maintain the integrity of the SLS and not link factors to it that are not threat based.

67. The Chair was also very suspicious of incorporating TRIP data and opposed using a system that is made for something specific for something else. He noted that the current headcount method does not count UN personnel in OECD countries and that, increasingly, there are requests from Designated Officials in OECD countries for full-time security personnel. Outside of Headquarters and Offices away from Headquarters, where security is paid for through the UN's regular budget, there were no financial resources with which to provide additional security in OECD countries. He recognized, however, that somewhere along the line this would need to be addressed. The representative from the FBN, while promising to look into this issue further, pointed out that, in 2001, it had been decided that as most of the staff who were field based would require security services the most, staff from OECD countries would not be included in the headcount for apportioning JFA costs.

68. One member pointed out that DSS' mandate was to protect staff where the government is unable. Another member cited one of the Brahimi recommendations, i.e. to revisit paying for the UNSMS through the UN's regular budget. At the same time he understood that there was no possibility to transfer JFA costs to the regular budget and that the only viable option is maintaining the status quo. The representative from the FBN confirmed that in the current financial environment, looking for more funding from the regular budget would not fly.

69. To summarize, the representative from the FBN informed the meeting that he would take the feedback from the IASMN back to the Working Group, i.e. the conclusion that the TRIP data would not be used, and that the Working Group would, as mentioned above, would flesh out the pros and cons of using SLS levels. Regarding the latter point however, the IASMN was firm in its conviction that using the SLS levels would politicize the security level system for which hard work had gone into ensuring its depolitization. The IASMN therefore stood by using the headcount, i.e. maintaining the status quo, as the most viable way to proceed in terms of apportioning the Jointly Financed Account. DSS stressed in this regard that it was important to take this message back to the FBN.

**70. The IASMN noted Discussion Paper 3 from HLCM's Finance and Budget Network Working Group on DSS Safety and Security Costs that was presented by the Finance and Budget Network representative. The IASMN agreed that the Working Group should be informed that the current methodology be reaffirmed as the best mechanism for apportioning of the jointly financed account. In this respect, the IASMN strongly recommends that the TRIP system not be used to provide information to determine apportionment of costs and that a focus on the CEB headcount in non-OECD countries should continue as the most viable mechanism.**

### **(c) Update on functioning of new modalities for locally cost shared budget**

71. DSS informed IASMN members that the new tool on the UNSMIN website that is intended to keep track of locally cost shared budgets seemed to be working well. It still required follow up with security advisors in the field to ensure that information is input correctly and in a timely manner. It was noted that as security advisors get used to the tool and its benefits that this aspect was bound to improve. DSS further informed the IASMN that the 2012 data was only being entered now. There are eight categories approved by the IASMN that seem to be standing the test of time as, invariably, expenditures fall within those categories. The tool is thus enabling the application of a good comprehensive approach without too many items put into the miscellaneous category.

72. Members reiterated the time frame for submission of locally cost shared budgets, as agreed by the IASMN at its 15<sup>th</sup> session in Rome, i.e. that the country cost-shared budget be circulated in country by 1 October, with billing issued on 15 November and payments to UNDP received no later than 1 March. Another member, while acknowledging the great progress that had been made in making this more systematic, pointed out that one area was still missing, i.e. attention to the fact that when local security costs are discussed in the SMT they are still not being discussed in an objective manner, e.g. one recommendation made by a Security Adviser to the SMT was for a dedicated driver for the Deputy Security Advisor. In order to facilitate an informed discussion on local security costs and ensure that these costs are not already funded through the JFA, it was requested that information on DSS HQ jointly-financed personnel and activities be made available to the SMT, prior to approving local security costs. In this regard, another member added that it would be good to clearly know the budgets that are allocated to security and deputy security advisors.

73. The Chair noted that a great deal of improvements had been made from DSS' side with respect to monitoring locally cost shared budgets, but that there has not yet been quite the same level of reciprocity from the AFPOs.

**74. The IASMN welcomed the progress made by DSS in ensuring transparency and oversight of locally cost shared budgets, requests that improvements continue in the mechanisms for overseeing locally cost shared budgets and looks forward to receiving at its next regular session a comprehensive paper on related issues to include, to the extent possible, an itemization of services to be funded through locally cost-shared budgets, as clearly differentiated from those provided as a result of JFA funding contributions.**

### **I. Update on the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Working Group (CRP 8)**

75. At its 14th session in January 2011, the IASMN was informed that the United Nations secretariat's Policy Committee at its 13 July 2010 meeting decided that "DSS will, in consultation with DPKO, DPA and all other relevant UN agencies, coordinate and facilitate the development of a comprehensive policy on the UN's approach to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that are part of active hostilities and target UN personnel and facilities. The policy will be in line with humanitarian principles and take into account the experiences of IACG-MA [Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action] members." The IASMN agreed that the

development of an IED policy should be examined at the security inter-agency level through an IASMN working group as a matter of priority. Accordingly, a draft policy developed by this inter-agency Working Group comprising security professionals and mine action advisors from key UN entities was presented to IASMN members. The policy was the result of eight months of development, including field consultation, which comprised an anonymous on-line questionnaire to 87 United Nations personnel in 7 countries. The draft policy reflected changes suggested by feedback from the field.

76. It was further explained to IASMN members that although the TORs of the Working Group had only covered the development of the policy, the Working Group believed that the policy needed to be supported by comprehensive guidance on the details of managing security risks from IEDs. UNMAS had agreed to coordinate with DSS and other interested UNSMS organizations on the first stages of the development of this technical guidance, and DSS would coordinate the finalization of the guidance so that it can be included in the *Security Management Operations Manual*.

77. The IASMN was requested to consider the draft policy with a view to endorsing this, in tandem with the projected endorsement by the IACG-MA, which was expected by the end of February 2012. It was the intention to then submit the endorsed draft to the Policy Committee, which would decide on the next steps. Included in the Policy Committee submission would be a reference to submitting the policy to the HLCM/CEB for formal endorsement as a UNSMS policy.

78. The Chair of the IED Working group clarified that the main intent of the policy was that no United Nations personnel would be involved in any actions meant to render an operational IED into a remnant IED. The Chair added that the rationale behind the UN not dealing with operational IEDs is that if the UN was seen to be affecting the active weapons systems of parties to the conflict, the UN would lose any claims of neutrality. He added that it was UNMAS' job to deal with explosives that are not operational and explained that in the past there was a lack of clarity on dealing with operational IEDs. The draft policy therefore is about not putting everyone at risk and allowing relevant parties like, for example, the AU, to take care of active IEDs.

79. One member questioned the role of the Policy Committee with respect to this issue, noting that the Policy Committee fell out of the normal governance mechanism for the IASMN (i.e. IASMN- HLCM- CEB) and that the Policy Committee was not included at all in the UNSMS Framework of Accountability. Therefore, he sought reassurance that submissions to the Policy Committee would be on behalf of DSS and not the IASMN. The Chair confirmed that the document would be submitted by DSS, but at the same time the Policy Committee would be informed that the views reflected therein were endorsed by the IASMN. In this regard, another member made the point that if the Policy Committee wish to make major changes to the present draft of the policy, these changes would need to come back to the IASMN for consideration.

**80. The IASMN endorsed the policy on the UN's approach to Improvised Explosive Devices and its submission by DSS to the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee, with a view to its subsequent submission to the HLCM/CEB for formal endorsement as a UNSMS policy.**

## **J. Proposed Policies for the UNSMS Security Policy Manual - Relations with the Host Country on Security (CRP 2 (e))**

81. The IASMN agreed at its 14th session in January 2011 to end the pilot on Model Host Country Security Agreements because this effort did not receive enough support from either Designated Officials or Member States and it was recognized that further efforts to advance this concept would not be well received. Noting that two previous related initiatives that had been launched (i.e. creating host country liaison committees and host country supplemental agreements) received a similar lack of support, the IASMN agreed to explore a more holistic approach to strengthening host country relations, including a number of enhancements to training, compliance with security policies and procedures, and enhanced communications with Member States. At its last regular session in June 2011, the IASMN recognized that, to strengthen support from host countries for the safety and security of staff and premises, it was necessary to first identify if relations with host country authorities are adequate or need to be improved. The IASMN agreed that DSS should develop a survey to assess host country relations. To obtain input from a broad range of clientele and ensure that the most current information is captured, it was further decided that such a survey would be provided to the SMT, DO, CSAs, and SAs on an annual basis. It was also agreed that DSS would develop the survey questions, and the range of possible responses, with input from IASMN members and to pilot test the survey in the field.

82. To ensure that a survey on host country issues is properly designed and grounded in policy, DSS drafted a policy on Host Country Issues to be incorporated in the *Security Policy Manual* (SPM) and presented this policy to the IASMN at this session. The draft policy highlights the need for the Designated Official, the Security Management Team and Security Advisers to carry out a regular assessment and review of host Government collaboration on issues related to the security of the United Nations. A preliminary draft Host Country Survey was also presented to the IASMN and it was explained that this was developed to serve as the tool for this regular assessment and review of host Government collaboration. DSS pointed out that after the attacks in Baghdad and Algiers, attempts were made to identify best practices to improve relations with host countries and that these had been communicated within the UNSMS by issuing various memoranda. It was confirmed that all of the best practices found in those previous memoranda had been incorporated in the draft policy. The Chair indicated that he would really like to see this policy approved because it was an important document to discuss with Member States and should become part of the regular business of SMTs.

83. Overall, the policy received widespread support within the IASMN, although some points were raised to improve it. One member welcomed this policy as a useful aid especially as his organization was currently reviewing host country collaboration (with the police) in a particular location. In fact, his organization was looking at establishing a diplomatic police unit such as that which existed in Nairobi for which a great deal of training would be required. Another member was especially pleased with the timing of this policy as his organization was currently negotiating a supplementary agreement with the Host Government.

84. One member, while supporting endorsement of the policy, sought clarification as to whether the policy was intended to broaden the duties of the Designated Official vis a vis host country



authorities. Another member pointed to certain definitions in the policy that did not properly cover some situations, such as when the “host” authority is responsible for an area not officially a country, for occupied territories or for situations when the host country is a party to a conflict. Addressing the point about dealing with parties in conflict, DSS noted that while this is something normally enshrined in law, a qualifier could be added to indicate that nothing in the policy is intended to contradict what is enshrined in humanitarian/international law. DPKO/DFS pointed out that the majority of DPKO/DFS persons in the field are not in the UNSMS and the section on applicability needed to be reworded to clarify that the policy only applies to persons that fall under the UNSMS and not to members of formed police or military units.

85. The Chair, cognizant that the UN is composed of 193 Member states, stressed that there is a need to emphasize the intention of the UNSMS to cooperate with Member States on security issues, and, in this regard, one had to be careful to maintain good relations with the host country to operate effectively in the country. He added that the survey would be further developed and would also likely vary over time. DSS added that the survey would also be tested to ensure the best modality to capture the information required.

86. Following these discussions, further amendments were made to the policy during the course of the meeting and presented to the IASMN for consideration.

**87. The IASMN approved the policy on Relations with the Host Country on Security for inclusion in the UN Security Policy Manual and further agreed that DSS continue to develop a Host country Survey to serve as the tool for a regular assessment and review of host Government collaboration.**

#### **K. Proposed Policies for the UNSMS Security Policy Manual - Board of Inquiry (Policy and Procedures) (CRP 2 (d))**

88. Following the heinous attack on the United Nations common premises in Abuja, Nigeria on 26 August 2011, it was decided that the United Nations needed to conduct a fact-finding assessment similar to the Boards of Inquiry (BOI) conducted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support in similar situations (for example, the attack on the UNAMA compound in Mazar-i-Sharif). However, there is no policy foundation for such an inter-agency inquiry. DPKO/DFS is the only member of the UNSMS that has a policy on BOIs. Most organizations comprising the UNSMS have some form of audit investigations but there is no UNSMS-level policy or process for conducting such an inquiry.

89. Following inter-agency consultations regarding convening a BOI for Abuja, DSS drafted a policy for a UNSMS BOI, based on the best practices of DPKO/DFS BOIs. The policy is meant to provide the framework needed for the UNSMS to conduct an independent BOI to establish the facts of a serious security incident and identify lessons learned. It was explained to the IASMN that having a UNSMS-agreed policy and procedure for BOIs may lessen the need for future “independent panels” following serious security incidents. It was also pointed out that the BOI for Abuja is using the draft policy to guide its work and the experience using the document will inform the final draft, which has already benefited from feedback from the UN secretariat’s



Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), as well as from Steering Group members following its last meeting in November/December 2011.

90. The Chair explained that in the aftermath of Mazar, the Bakhtar Guesthouse attack and several incidents that had looked at DPKO facilities, a discussion had been initiated about what should happen when something occurs that affects the wider membership of the UNSMS. When WFP was attacked, it was decided that WFP and DSS would do a fact finding to ascertain what had happened. However, it was apparent that there was no systematic way of dealing with major security incidents and no agreed-upon policy and procedures in place. As such, another “independent panel” (e.g. Brahimi, Walzer) might be convened in the event of another attack, which would involve high-level persons that might not be the best persons to deal with such enquiries. When Abuja happened, there was a need to send out a team to investigate, and the USG DSS spoke with the Secretary-General to propose that a BOI be constituted following the investigation. Subsequently, a BOI was convened and is currently working using the draft policy. At the same time, the issue of BOIs was picked up by the Secretary-General’s change management committee.

91. It was emphasized that this would not be a DSS/BOI but a UNSMS BOI, with the draft policy granting the USG, DSS the ability to convene this in his capacity as head of the UNSMS. One of the issues which was still not clear in the policy was what type of event calls for a BOI to be set up, e.g. major loss of life, major property damage, mass casualties, or an event impacting only one or two persons. One member believed that the policy did not need to specify when a BOI should be convened, that this was something the Executive Head of an organization could discuss with the USG DSS on a case-by-case basis. One of the staff federations indicated that this was a massive issue, particularly when staff have lost their lives and the families wish to know what happened. It was noted that even with military personnel killed in service there are coroner’s reports and enquiries. There must be a degree of transparency in the process. It was important that if mistakes were made, they should not be repeated and that persons should be held to account if there was negligence involved. It was also emphasized that any lack of information could easily be perceived as a cover up. The IASMN was further informed that for the Abuja BOI, there were some staff who wished to give evidence but did not know the process to do so. While the Federation supported instituting procedures for a BOI, it supported that the results should also be circulated and made an open document.

92. Another member did not believe that the resulting BOI report should be made available in full, but rather only the recommendations and what follow up would be necessary to prevent future attacks. Another member was concerned about maintaining confidential information about any victims identified in BOI reports. He believed that such information should not be released unless there was specific authorization to do so. DPKO/DFS informed the IASMN that it had in place a functioning BOI process and that their policy and guideline documents were used to draft the UNSMS BOI policy. DPKO/DFS also noted that the policy granted authority to the USG DSS to act as the convening officer for the BOI while another provision in the policy limited this to certain types of incidents. In this regard, he noted that many incidents that occur are also political in nature and that it is very difficult to create a perfect trigger to launch a BOI. Therefore, there is a need for a consultative process with Executive Heads of organizations

affected before the USG DSS convenes a BOI. Roles and responsibilities need to be very clearly set out, including how the USG DSS is conferred with this authority to convene a BOI.

93. Further questions were raised regarding the appropriate number of persons on a BOI and the need to include provisions making it mandatory for staff members of UNSMS organizations to deliver statements to the BOI when needed, so that the policy is binding on everyone. How this would impact other organizations not in the UNSMS was unclear. There was a call for a two-step process, a first step to determine the need to convene a BOI and a second step to decide on its composition and TORs. Another suggestion was that there should be a panel deciding whether a BOI should be convened to make this a more transparent decision. Questions were also raised regarding the composition and qualifications of persons who would sit on a BOI. One member saw this as a specialist type of board.

94. Recognizing that there was general consensus that a policy on BOIs for the UNSMS was needed, the Chair emphasized that a BOI must not be seen as a process of DSS investigating itself or one UNSMS organization investigating itself. Further, he did not consider that a BOI report should be a confidential document by default, because that creates the impression that there was something to hide. He believed that internal UN documents could also be shared with families at the discretion of the UN and that we should strive to make the process as open and as helpful as possible. Having considered the concerns expressed, it was clear that the policy was not quite ready to be finalized, but it was hoped it could be in time for the HLCM's Fall 2012 session.

95. The representative from OLA informed the IASMN that the UN secretariat had developed BOI procedures for DPKO/DFS and recognized that if there was now to be a policy to apply to the UNSMS that this would need to be adapted accordingly to the purposes and requirements of the IASMN and its diverse membership. Given the nature of the policy that was being established, and in particular the legal, administrative and other implications it may have for members of the IASMN, he urged members of the IASMN to refer the matter to their legal offices for their review. If needed, he was prepared to discuss this further with AFPO legal advisers. One issue that will have to be closely examined is how confidentiality will be addressed. In general, BOI Reports are confidential in nature as they may include security sensitive and confidential information on personnel. The BOI is primarily intended to serve as a tool for management. In accordance with practice with respect to DPKO/DFS Peacekeeping BOIs, only portions of the report are extracted and made public. For example, the statement of facts is provided to affected family members. Caution was expressed against the report itself being largely declassified or not classified. Some leeway needed to be built in so perhaps it could be left to the BOI to make certain recommendations about that.

96. Another member believed that the concept of having a BOI for the UNSMS was a good one and provides credibility, and while supporting the concept of confidentiality, noted that there was a duty to advise colleagues about the details of the incident. Furthermore, BOI recommendations should also help prevent similar attacks in the future. DPKO/DFS clarified that its BOI documents were considered as internal documents of the UN and were not generally released to outsiders. When there is a BOI, Member States are frequently interested in knowing what happened. Member States, particularly for troop contributing countries, have obligations of their

own. In those cases, a BOI report may be shortened or specific parts of the report provided as decided by the USGs of DPKO and DFS, with the caveat that the document is not for further dissemination. Recognizing that a BOI report can contain important information for victim's families or legal representatives, a summary (i.e. factual account not containing extraneous details and allegations) has been approved by the USGs upon request. It may well be the case in some instances that a full report can be shared. In any case, OLA's advice should be sought before releasing any BOI report. Another participant, while supportive in principle to providing families of victims with information, also made the point that in some cases it would not serve their interest. Citing Haiti as an example, some staff members died days after having been trapped under rubble and providing details on the suffering of such staff may not serve the best interests of the family.

97. The Staff federations supported that staff and their families should see the results of a BOI. The Chair supported having a transparent process to engender confidence in staff. It was important to begin from the premise that the report will be unclassified (but for internal UN use), but that certain aspects may need to be confidential. One member suggested that it might be a good idea to have a legal advisor on the team. Another took the view that once this policy is adopted, a BOI should not be forced on an organization but organizations affected should be part of the decision to convene a BOI. At that time, each UNSMS organization affected must abide by the policy.

**98. The IASMN agreed to provide to DSS further input into an updated draft policy on establishing UNSMS Boards of Enquiry no later than 31 March 2012, with a view to circulating a new policy to IASMN members for approval that would also take account of the lessons learned from the Abuja Board of Inquiry.**

#### **L. Proposed Policies for the UNSMS Security Policy Manual - Close Protection (CRP 2 (b))**

99. The IASMN approved the "United Nations Policy on Close Protection Operations" at its regular session in Lyon 28-30 July 2008. On 8 October 2008, the USG DSS issued a memorandum disseminating the "United Nations Policy on Close Protection Operations" throughout the United Nations Security Management System. After the promulgation of the policy, an issue arose with regard to the access of armed United Nations close protection officers to humanitarian agency premises and vehicles. The discussion at the time centred on the fact that humanitarian agencies generally prohibit the carriage of firearms into their premises and vehicles, but the successful delivery of United Nations close protection requires such access when the Senior UN Official is either from a humanitarian agency or is visiting the premises of such an agency. In this regard, in January 2009, the regular session of the IASMN considered and approved an amendment to the 2008 Close Protection policy that granted armed UN Close Protection officers permission to access all United Nations premises and vehicles, when required, pursuant to their duties.

100. The IASMN was informed that the approved "United Nations Policy on Close Protection Operations", including the approved amendment from the IASMN in 2009, needed to be included in the *Security Policy Manual*. Therefore, this Policy, together with the approved amendment from the IASMN in 2009, was drafted for insertion into a formal section of the SPM

and the only change to the approved 2009 version was to update the language and format in accordance with SPM standards, including proper references to SPM Chapter III.

101. DPKO/DFS proposed several amendments to the draft policy (which were included during the course of the meeting) to reflect the fact that DPKO/DFS have, as a long-term practice, a number of military teams to provide close protection. It was explained that UN police provide close protection to government officials and others when required and Member States provide close protection teams who are not employed under UN contracts. Additional language was proposed to provide for exceptions for senior UN officials from the provision that close protection officers are only deployed for official business. Because DPKO/DFS has about 300 CP officers, a further suggestion was made to include a footnote requiring all CP officers to attend CP officer training and refresher courses by 1 January 2015, in accordance with the HLCM endorsement of the IASMN recommendation in this regard. This footnote would provide the necessary leverage to help secure funding to fulfill this requirement.

**102. The IASMN approved the policy on “Close Protection Operations” for inclusion in the *Security Policy Manual (SPM)*, reflecting the update and amendment of the previously approved “United Nations Policy on Close Protection Operations”.**

#### **M. Proposed Policies for the UNSMS Security Policy Manual - Arrest and Detention (CRP 2 (a))**

103. DSS informed the IASMN at its 15<sup>th</sup> regular session in June 2011 about the progress of the transition from the *Field Security Handbook* to the *Security Policy Manual* and that one area of policy requiring transition, development and redrafting was that of Arrest and Detention. A draft text for the *Security Policy Manual* on “Arrest and Detention”, developed by DSS in consultation with the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), and amended by the IASMN Steering Group following its meeting in November/December 2011, was presented to the IASMN at this session. The draft contained much of the language from the relevant text of the *Field Security Handbook (FSH)*, with additional language included to clarify the role of the UNSMS in cases of arrest or detention. In the past, officials of the UNSMS (including Security Advisors) have gone beyond their remit in providing opinions and advice on the legal status of arrested individuals. In some cases the opinions and advice was incorrect. It was explained, therefore, that the policy attempts to clarify the limited role of an official of the UNSMS during incidents of arrest or detention.

104. The IASMN was also notified that the language in the *Field Security Handbook (FSH)* paragraphs 6.18-6.26 and Annex N) that was transposed and updated for the SPM had originally been based on UN Secretariat document ST/AI/299 (including its Annex I) dated 10 December 1982 and that it was expected that OLA and the Office of Human Resources Management would review this ST/AI, but that nevertheless, the principles contained therein, reflected in the FSH, and now the attached SPM section, should not change significantly. It was also explained that as one of the main objectives of the revised policy is to emphasize that legal determinations regarding the status of the person(s) detained or arrested should not be taken by security officials, it was not recommended that the contents of FSH Annex N be transferred to the SPM. It was also pointed out that Annex A of the draft policy (“United Nations Procedural Preferences for Reporting Cases of Arrest and Detention”) replicated the same language as Annex M of the FSH.

105. The representative of OLA confirmed at the outset that ST/AI/299 continues to remain in force and that work would be undertaken with DSS and OHRM to revise this. A number of suggestions and proposals were made during the ensuing discussions to amend the policy where it was believed this was needed. One member suggested that the issue of informing family members of the staff member arrested or detained should be addressed in the policy, although it was pointed out that it was actually the right of the staff member to decide whether or not to inform his or her family members. Another suggestion made was that the safety and rights of staff arrested and detained should be addressed and that the policy should include references to the UNSMS organization security focal point where applicable. In this regard, one member informed the IASMN that it was always his organization's local chief security officer who acted as the first responder in situations where incidents arose as he had his own connections with local police authorities. It was also asked how long persons on the ground should be given before an arrest or detention is reported and whether there would be accompanying SOPs or Guidelines developed for this policy.

106. Further discussions followed during the course of the meeting and additional amendments were made to the policy.

**107. The IASMN approved the policy on Arrest and Detention for inclusion in the *Security Policy Manual (SPM)*.**

#### **N. Proposed Policies for the UNSMS Security Policy Manual – Hostages Incident Management (CRP 2 (c))**

108. On 25 May 2006, the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security issued a memorandum disseminating the United Nations “Hostage Incident Management Guidelines” throughout the United Nations Security Management System. Although this document had been referred to as “guidelines”, it contained an updated policy on Hostage Incident Management, which superseded the policy contained in the *Field Security Handbook*, Chapter IV, Section H, paragraphs 6.29-6.47 issued in January 2006. The IASMN was informed that the intention was to include the “policy” component of the previously approved “Hostage Incident Management Guidelines” as part of the *Security Policy Manual (SPM)*. The only change was to update the language and format in accordance with SPM standards, including proper references to SPM Chapter III (Applicability), and the addition of two amendments following the recommendations of the IASMN Steering Group meeting in Amman. The IASMN was also informed that it is intended that the “guideline” component will be included in the new UNSMS *Security Management Operations Manual*.

109. Participants noted that the IASMN Steering Group at its last meeting in Amman had provisionally approved the policy and further accepted the suggestion made by DPKO at this session for inclusion of a reference to “in extremis support”, in recognition of the fact that DSS had provided great support in hostage incident management to persons who are not in the UNSMS, specifically military personnel who had been taken hostage.

**110. The IASMN approved for inclusion in the *Security Policy Manual (SPM)*, the policy on**

**“Hostage Incident Management” which subsumes the “policy” component of the previously approved “Hostage Management Incident Guidelines” and endorsed the inclusion in the *Security Management Operations Manual* of the “Guidelines on Hostage Incident Management”.**

#### **O. Handbook for Designated Officials (CRP 15)**

111. Designated Officials (DOs) for safety and security play a vital role within the United Nations Security Management System. Accountable to the Secretary General, through the USG, DSS, DOs are responsible for the safety and security of all UN personnel, eligible family members, and assets throughout their country/area of responsibility. While DOs must ensure that UNSMS goals are met in their country/area of responsibility, their DO position is always combined with other senior management posts, namely, Resident Coordinator (RC), Resident Representatives (RR), Humanitarian Coordinators (HC), or Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Recognizing that senior UN officials serving as DOs are charged with an array of other UN system managerial responsibilities, the IASMN was informed that DSS is developing a DO Handbook that will provide targeted and practical information on the UNSMS for all senior UN officials serving as DOs. The outline of the Handbook was provided to IASMN members and it was explained that this product would describe the key actions DOs should take to prepare for and respond to safety and security matters in their country/area of responsibility. Given that the responsibilities of Area Security Coordinators (ASCs) mirror those of a DO, participants were informed that this product would also be of value to all ASCs serving throughout the UN system.

112. DSS confirmed that the Handbook would not be restricted to DOs but would be equally applicable to SMT members, including DOs a.i. and Area Security Coordinators (ASC). IASMN members welcomed this initiative and recognized that the handbook was instrumental not only for DOs but for those with security responsibilities in helping to set the expectations about what is required for safety and security.

**113. The IASMN took note of the efforts by DSS to date to develop a Handbook for Designated Officials to be provided with the mandatory training for Designated Officials.**

#### **P. Proposed Policies for the UNSMS Security Policy Manual – Security Training and Certification (CRP 2 (f)) and Training Issues (CRP 12)**

114. The IASMN was informed that as part of the ongoing work to complete the *Security Policy Manual* (SPM), DSS had drafted a policy on Security Training and Certification that reiterates all training responsibilities in the Framework of Accountability. The draft policy, presented to the IASMN, supersedes all training-related references in the *Field Security Handbook* and benefited from feedback from IASMN Steering Group member organizations following the Steering Group meeting in November/December 2011.

115. At the same time as the draft policy was presented, the IASMN was also informed of the evolution in the training and development of security professionals in the UN Security Management System, with the major change being a shift in paradigm from training to

knowledge transfer. In doing so, the Training and Development Section (TDS) of DSS had evaluated each competency required of actors in the UNSMS and tailored knowledge, attitude and skills transfer to those competencies. A separate paper, setting out the Competency Based Learning (CBL) concept was also provided to participants.

116. IASMN members were also updated on the IASMN Security Training Working Group which had met several times in the past few months to draft TORs as well as a workplan for consideration at this meeting. Participants were also asked to consider several issues raised by IASMN members including AFPO Security Awareness Programmes, SMT Training, and SSAFE Training.

117. TDS informed the meeting that its new training concept, which is part of its long-term vision until at least 2015, was well known and it was now a matter of formalizing the new competency based learning. CBL, which had also been presented to the IASMN security training working group (STWG), is based on sound academic learning theory and provides a solid foundation upon which to base learning, tuned to job specifications and functions in the UNSMS. Support was requested from the IASMN for this concept and this methodology as the way forward for future training and learning. It was intended to compile an online catalogue of all courses conducted for the UNSMS with aims, objectives, learning profiles, topics to be achieved, learning points and detailed lesson plans. Once this had been completed, UNSMS learning and training materials could be franchised across the UN system. Concurrent with this, issues of certification and validation also needed to be addressed and in this regard, participants were informed that TDS would be a part of the certification process that evaluates and certifies learning managers and trainers, not only for DSS but also for AFPOs. At the same time, TDS would demonstrate how to deliver and conduct DSS learning programs. Through this approach, the outreach of TDS learning programmes across the UNSMS would be extended and would require only the application of a validation mechanism to build in checks and balances. Once training managers are certified, they would only need to re-certify every 3 to 5 years. It was hoped there would be a consolidation of the new learning process based on CBL where analysis is applied to every course conducted and that baseline courses are established to move forward with certification and validation.

118. One member acknowledged the excellent cooperation between DSS and his organization on training issues. While also acknowledging the TDS initiatives as a positive step forward, another member was concerned about the franchising aspect, in particular certifying persons to be trainers in his organization which already had trainers on board. He stressed the need to agree on the content and methodology for the 'training of trainers (ToT)'.

119. DPKO/DFS was not prepared to approve the security training and certification policy as presented as certain issues still remained to be addressed including the provision that required DSS to collect training data. This requirement would require DPKO/DFS to keep this data and considering that there are about 30,000 staff (military and police personnel) receiving various types of security training at multiple locations at various times in their career, it was indicated that this would be an impossible task the one security focal point for DPKO/DFS. It was also not clear specifically which data was needed and it was also unclear what the intent was in making



this data available to department heads, in this case, the USGs of DPKO and DFS. It was suggested therefore that the newly revitalized STWG more closely examine this issue.

120. Regarding modalities for delivery of training courses, TDS confirmed that it was not going to develop online web based systems at the expense of everything else and that CBL would allow for a closer look at how best the training is delivered. Where possible of course, remote means of training would be used, including Webinars (such as Webex) and distance learning. However, TDS emphasized that it would maintain its capability to deliver traditional face-to-face training from trainers or learning managers, in parallel with the development of this new system. One member suggested that perhaps a trainer from one of the AFPOs could join the TDS team to train with them and in the process, acquire certification. Another member believed that the draft policy needed to include a reference to the STWG establishing training content as appropriate for security training officers before this is franchised.

121. The suggestion was made that IASMN members be given the opportunity to review this policy once more at its next Steering Group session, taking into account the points made by IASMN members at this session. The Chair however, while recognizing that this policy required further work and did not wish to include as policy anything that could not be implemented, did not believe that the policy needed to go back through the IASMN Steering Group and subsequently the next regular session of the IASMN but that a shorter deadline needed to be established to provide to IASMN members the opportunity to provide further input to TDS electronically, as there was a need for a clear policy to be posted on UNSMIN that set out what is mandatory and what is needed. He indicated that at some point a larger discussion needed to take place on how much training of individuals is conducted by AFPOs and how much by TDS, adding that if every AFPO created its own training programs, then something would be lost in terms of leverage. Though the policy on security training and certification would not be finalized at this session, the Chair was nevertheless pleased that for the first time substantial discussions were taking place on this issue.

122. One member believed that if a security officer was not trained to a standard expected by TDS then they would need to be further trained; however, it was necessary to decentralize this training. Another member informed the meeting that it was developing its own online training course modeled on BSITF that would be an acceptable alternative to BSITF. This of course would not be successful unless the online training course being developed was acceptable to DSS. He confirmed that his organization would be pleased to develop this closely with DSS and that it would be important for the security training and certification policy to reflect this by including the provision that all personnel are to complete BSITF or ‘an acceptable substitute’.

123. TDS noted that it had already been established that BSITF is mandatory, as is ASITF for those who work or travel in locations outside headquarters. He informed the IASMN that he had received several inquiries asking whether other organizations could develop their own agency-specific Security Awareness (SA) programmes. While TDS had no objection to any organization designing its own agency-specific package, it should not be forgotten that it is mandatory for all UN personnel to complete BSITF. This requirement provided a generic package for all. TDS offered to provide any or all BSITF modules in order that organizations may supplement the development of their own SA programmes. Or, alternatively, those who need to do so may add a

module to BSITF to address agency-specific issues. The latter alternative however would make the training module quite long. TDS cautioned that if AFPOs are allowed to develop their own agency specific programmes in lieu of BSITF II then it would undermine the whole program. He recommended therefore that BSITF II be maintained as the standard of security awareness training for the UNSMS and if AFPOs wish to do something agency specific, they should develop it in conjunction with TDS. Regarding the translation of BSITF II into the official UN languages, TDS added that PAHO had agreed to translate into Spanish. French translation would be effected by the UN secretariat and the translation into other languages would be completed by October 2012. BSITF II was online for those who wish to download it.

124. The Chair did not believe that many AFPOs would go to the level and expense of redoing BSITF II or ASITF and that most would use the existing packages. On the other hand, he recognized that the IASMN is rather diverse, and while encouraging the use of BSITF II and ASITF, he could accept that if an AFPO needed to go its own way, then there should be the requirement that the material contained in BSITF II or ASITF must be to the satisfaction of the STWG. One member proposed that there be a constant review of BSITF and ASITF to ensure their relevance and questioned whether those on very short-term missions would still need to complete this training. Another member also questioned this, noting that there are those who travel on mission to Headquarters locations for short periods and as such, are challenging this requirement.

125. Another member welcomed the suggestion that organizations could use their own in-house courses and added that it would be an onerous task for TDS to vet or approve their course. His organization had a specific risk profile and accordingly focuses its courses on those risks. While welcoming TDS' offer to provide the training modules, he believed that organizations needed to be allowed to design and weight issues in their programmes based on their particular risks. His organization had been running its course for over 12 years and required the flexibility to change it if needed. As it is, the course is reviewed every year and he did not believe that TDS approval was required for any changes. Another member organization had also developed its own training course and while it was grateful for TDS' advice to include certain aspects in its course, he believed it was up to staff in his own organization, and not TDS to design the training.

126. The Chair reminded members that there had been agreement on BSITF by the vast majority of organizations and that this is used as the minimum training standard. He was cautious about losing this basic understanding that we are one security system and would certainly not like to lose that concept in franchising. At the same time, he could accept that there are differences within the UNSMS and that equivalent and yet agency specific courses could be developed, and there can be some flexibility in the system as long as the basic learning objectives are maintained. He therefore asked that there be a balance applied without losing the core concept. The general consensus regarding equivalent BSITF and ASITF courses was that it would be acceptable to have equivalent courses as long as the TDS learning standards and objectives for BSITF II are maintained.

127. On the issue of SMT training for which TDS had recently designed a web-based programme, the IASMN was informed that the programme, expected to be launched online by the end of April 2012, addressed the key issues of concern for SMTs, and was designed in a

similar format as BSITF II. It is intended to roll this out globally to every member of every SMT. The IASMN was requested to support this initiative and to reaffirm that SMT training is a mandatory requirement for all SMT members. While promoting the online SMT training, TDS also noted that web-based platforms could not address issues such as skills, attitudes, team building and crisis management and there would still be a need to conduct this type of traditional face-to-face training, particularly for those SMTs in high-risk locations. Two members were not convinced that security professionals, i.e. CSAs, should be allowed to deliver SMT training and indicated that they could not wait for DRO to further identify countries where such training was needed. Another member informed the meeting of consistent problems with SMT attendance. He pointed out that his Assistant High Commissioner had recently sent a strong message to SMT members that she expects people to attend the meetings. It was stressed that SMT training is of high quality and in this regard it would help to ensure that the training is more engaging. Another member believed that if those providing SMT training come from outside TDS, that they nevertheless be vetted by TDS beforehand. Regarding SMT training, the Chair wished to postpone further discussions on this, including any affirmation that SMT training is mandatory until the online SMT training is at least rolled out to see how it will be accepted.

**128. The IASMN agreed to request its Security Training Working Group to carefully examine the draft policy on Security Training and Certification with a view to providing an amended draft of the policy to DSS no later than 31 March 2012 in order that it may be disseminated to IASMN members for approval at the next regular session of the IASMN. The IASMN noted the change in the TDS training strategy to Competency Based Learning and Franchising.**

**The IASMN approved the TORs and Workplan of the IASMN Security Training Working Group.**

**The IASMN, recognizing that the diversity of UNSMS membership might necessitate individual organizations developing their own training modules agreed that those organizations needing to do so may develop their own training modules equivalent to BSITF II and ASITF providing that the material contained therein adheres to the minimum standards of BSITF II and ASITF, in coordination with the IASMN Security Training Working Group and DSS' Training and Development Section.**

**The IASMN agreed to review the mandatory requirement for SMT training after further work is conducted on the online SMT training tool developed by DSS.**

#### **Q. Demonstration on Geographic Information Systems (VTC)**

129. DSS' Information Management Unit gave a presentation on how GIS is used in the UN Security Management System. The Chair informed the meeting that until now, there had never been a common platform for much of this information. In terms of the use of GIS, most AFPOs are ahead in many ways. DSS was still not there in terms of how to present the data and how fast this may be done and there is still some convincing to do to obtain all the data needed.

130. It was explained that when online on UNSMIN, there is a general snapshot provided of where UN personnel are, but also in relation to other events going on in the same place. For example, in Yemen, when discussions were taking place about relocating staff, the SIOC there had sent in a coded map of downtown Yemen which clearly showed where every local and international staff member lived, and in a matter of seconds it was decided to relocate locals from that area.

131. Instead of the discussion focusing on GIS, it turned to the functioning of the UNSMIN website. In this regard, one organization noted that it still had access problems with the UNSMIN website. Another asked and had it confirmed that he could search for all travel by his organization's staff members through the UNSMIN website. DSS clarified that to address problems with accessing UNSMIN or with downloading information from the site, one had to first register his/her details with DSS and second, where possible, provide a screenshot of any problem to DSS' Chief, Information Management, TDS. It was confirmed that UNSMIN is only accessible to security professionals or those with security responsibilities. However, if there are particular issues then members were asked to direct these to DSS' Field Support Services. Another member asked if we should not be granting access to UNSMIN to a wider pool of persons who are not necessarily security professionals, while another suggested UNSMIN access remain as is, but that open source information be shared more widely.

132. The Chair noted that UNSMIN had been designed to be open and used by colleagues in the AFPOs and that TRIP may be interfaced with the AFPO's ERP systems. All systems were designed to exchange information so it would just be a matter of contacting DSS to obtain the data to use. UNSMIN was one way, but not the only way to obtain data. One member acknowledged the tremendous support he was receiving from FSS and expressed the hope that MOSS self-evaluation could be concluded by June. So far, 75% of the evaluation had been completed.

**133. The IASMN took note of the presentation by DSS of its work on Geographic Information Systems and its use in the UNSMS, and congratulated the Department for its efforts in this regard.**

## **R. Review of the Security Level System (SLS) (CRP 5)**

134. The departure from the old Security Phase system and introduction of the Security Level System (SLS) based on the Structured Threat Assessment (STA) provided the United Nations Security Management System with a more accurate and efficient tool to evaluate and assess the threat environment. Since the launch of the SLS in January 2011, substantial experience with its implementation, as well as feedback from duty stations and actors in the UNSMS was considered by DSS. This experience and feedback comprised valuable lessons to be used to further improve and strengthen the implementation of the SLS.

135. At its last session in Amman, the IASMN Steering Group was asked to consider the first preliminary review of the SLS and approve the recommendation that the following technical modification be made to the implementation of the SLS:

- (i) Abolish a single SLS designation and designate the specific levels of individual threats and hazards by applying the existing descriptors for each level, ranging from “negligible” to “extreme” for armed conflict, terrorism, crime, civil unrest and hazard.

136. The Chair reminded the IASMN that the UNSMS had done exactly as recommended in the Brahimi report, i.e. abolish the security phase system and its direct connection to entitlements and establish a straightforward way of examining threats. He emphasized that having a general understanding of the threats is one part of the SRM process, followed by consideration of mitigation and residual risk. He noted that in a short period of time, a huge amount of people in the UN system were educated about the SLS, in some cases at the expense of not receiving other training, and that security officers had been tasked to produce security levels. He could not fathom before the SLS how to evaluate threats to be able to make better and smarter decisions and while there were still implementation issues to contend with, as well as the fact that some still do not understand the system, the SLS represented a major milestone in modern security management for the UN. He reminded the IASMN nevertheless that it was always the intention to review the SLS at the end of one year. While there was no study commissioned to carry out a full review, he informed the meeting that by the middle of last year, doubts started to arise regarding the use of the single aggregate weighted SLS number. Those doubts had been validated through internal discussions within DSS. As such, he supported abolishing the single aggregate weighted number and using instead, the numbers for the five different threat levels, with attention paid to the highest one or two levels. He believed that the single weighted score actually held the UNSMS back in separating itself from the old security phase system. As an example, he cited actions during the crisis in Egypt at the beginning of 2011, wherein the SMT had tried to manipulate the SLS number to achieve an overall weighted score over 3 to justify evacuation. He added that, in the case of Egypt, if the individual level for civil instability was off the charts, then that alone should have served as justification to take necessary actions. This was the clearest example offered to show that confusion existed about the single aggregate weighted score.

137. One member believed that the aggregate score still has value for a comparison across the globe; however if there was a consensus to abolish it, he would go along with that. Another member believed that the aggregate score was not all bad and recognized that it was used for a number of different purposes. As such, he was reluctant to part with it. On the other hand, if the consensus was to disaggregate it, that would also be fine. The main concern was that different threat categories affected the UN system differently. It was noted in this regard that if a credible agent targets the UN with the capability to really inflict harm, then this presented a greater threat than operating in a conflict area. His preference would be to completely disaggregate hazards, recognizing these are different and instead focus the SLS on human malicious acts. He suggested that a weighting system be built and that incidents’ data, particularly those incidents that are crucial (i.e. cause injury or death) be looked at. He noted that there was a very high percentage of incidents that hit his organization that were either deadly or nearly deadly. Only last year, 50 civil unrest incidents were reported. He proposed that DSS obtain more accurate statistics because it has a larger sample to work from and that attempts should be made to try and reconfigure the weighting system to see what the results are, with all the data at hand. He further proposed running regression analysis on this and then comparing this data against the incidents that are actually hurting or killing people. While he understood that there might be a conceptual

reluctance to this approach (as it did not represent a pure assessment of the threats as it ties in with mitigating measures), he also noted that one problem was trying for a pure assessment of threats. For the UN system, which differs from the local population, he suggested that perhaps the focus should be on only defining the threats for the UN community.

138. Another member suggested that the aggregate score be built with two factors – one for the security categories and the other for the threat from hazard. He believed that the problem with the SLS lay more in its implementation than in the design of the system itself. He added that some persons do not differentiate between threat and risk and take into account mitigating measures. The other problem is more acute, in that despite the fact that the SLS is not a predictive tool, some people had a tendency to use it to make predictions. Instead of having a snapshot in a given area they tended to project what might happen. He suggested that the Security Training Working Group might discuss how to improve or refine SLS training to ensure that the SLS is implemented properly.

139. One member was not sure whether the SLS score was needed to obtain a security clearance or a security notification. Numbers did not mean very much at the end of the day. The current situation in Greece was a case in point where the SLS score is low but the risk to the staff of his organization is high. Another member believed that the reason for having a single aggregate score was for the purposes of programme criticality, while another supported keeping the aggregate number as it was useful for inputting into decisions rather than for driving key decisions.

140. The Chair informed members that in DSS' experience, the weighted score is the single number seen by most persons. However, there is a difference between professionals using the weighted score and the impression given to the larger body of UN staff by this score. He noted that armed conflict and terrorism make the dangers to UN personnel extremely high.

141. One member reiterated that the weighted score not be changed. Noting that the system had been in place for only one year, he offered that whether the aggregate score was the right or wrong way to go, it needed to be questioned whether any change could be justified. In this case, he did not believe that the justification to abolish the weighted score stood up to scrutiny and that there is value in the aggregate score for security professionals who understand there is a threat score. At the same time, he did recognize that staff wish to know what the risk is.

142. DSS informed the meeting that the weights were designed using a technique called sensitivity analysis that is based on linking one part of the model to another. He confirmed that programme criticality is based on risk and that providing a snapshot of the risk faced is more difficult. He also added that there is no perfect way to fix the weights.

143. It was asked by another member whether it would be possible to still maintain an aggregate score and also have individual scores. Another member recognized that hundreds of staff are travelling daily and only see one number. He supported the Chair's contention that the IASMN had a duty to make changes based on lessons learned and that following one year of SLS implementation, there is a need to send the right signal to staff about challenging situations.

144. Another member noted that as a staff member when he looks at the threat levels and asks the obvious questions, the threat level does not indicate what the risk is. He would not be interested in the threat level as a staff member and believed that most staff will look at the threat and not ask second questions. For security professionals, he believed that there is a need to provide further information. However, for the staff member, there is a need to provide the true picture and this is not contained in the aggregate number but in the components of the aggregate number. In fact, the aggregate number could impede the staff member's understanding of what the real threats are because they are masked.

145. Another member noted that it was a question of communicating the news to staff and proposed that perhaps we could go further and provide more information. The suggestion was subsequently made that it would provide a clearer picture to staff if the one aggregate score was to be broken down in the travel advisory, showing the five components. The Chair added that once it is known there are threats, information might be relayed as to whether the risk is mitigated to high, low, etc. However, he noted that risk mitigation measures do not always work. He strongly believed there is a need to be honest with staff and provide them with information they can use and what staff really wished to know was whether the threat for terrorism is very high. He stressed that we have a duty of care to our employees to provide them with information in direct, clear and unambiguous language. Throughout the world, conditions change and there are some technical reasons to allocate resources. He informed IASMN members that he is really concerned that the aggregate number lowers the threat level from the highest it is.

146. One member noted that moving from the security phase to the SLS was a great improvement. Moving away from numericals and having more text or more text and qualifiers would be equally good. He believed that a number only provides a snapshot and someone who is a security professional will read the number differently from the way in which someone in HR or a staff member reads the number. As far as noting this in travel advisories, he reminded the meeting that the text in travel advisories sometimes does not change for months at a time and requires regular updating so one needed to be careful on this score.

147. Another member noted that the aggregate number may have begun as a useful first approximation, but it could also be hindering some from going past that first approximation and thinking through the unintended consequences. He noted that different categories come out differently and wondered if a different score would be meaningful for people. Another member argued that the focus should not be on improving the tool but ensuring that the tool is used correctly and that when there are discrepancies, it is sometimes because threats are based on assumptions and not on actual facts. Guidelines had been issued for the SLS but information provided to staff on how to interpret the security level had been overlooked. Another member suggested that this needed to be looked at in terms of simplifying the process. If the threat, risk and mitigation are overanalyzed then one does not end up with the desired outcome.

148. Following the foregoing debate, the Chair asked the IASMN to decide on whether to de-emphasize or abolish the aggregate number, stressing that it was important to keep this simple because 145,000 staff members needed to understand this. He stressed that security is not the business of staff at large and when staff view travel advisories, they need to make decisions



about where to go and they need to know what is out there. One member responded that the numbers were not intended to be a discreet categorization of a particular location but rather a general chapeaux that categorizes groups of locations under a similar threat. It's only when one drills down that additional analysis can be done. His organization tried to avoid going to numbers to ensure that economists and others who are not security professionals can really understand what is really going on in their particular location. Another member supported the notion that security professionals look at the figures and that simplifying this by listing the security level for each category would help staff. Having said this however, he was not sure how a place like Nairobi would fare if different figures were indicated. Showing individual levels for each category could end up making this more complicated.

149. The Chair concluded that in the absence of a consensus, changing elements of the SLS system might not be the best thing to do at present. However, he suggested that at least the aggregate number be deemphasized in the travel advisory and that the numbers of each of the individual categories of threat and hazard be indicated, with the highest ones placed prominently for emphasis.

**150. While the IASMN did not agree to changes in the Security Level System at this time, in order to provide better clarification to staff at large of existing security threats, it was decided to deemphasize the aggregate SLS number in the Travel Advisory by listing the security levels for all five categories of threats and hazards, with attention drawn to the highest security level in an individual category.**

#### **S. Presentation on Mass Casualty Incident Preparedness and UNMERT Support to the UNSMS**

151. A UN Secretariat Medical Services Division representative from the Emergency Preparedness and Support Team/UN Medical Emergency Response Team (EPST/UNMERT), was invited to give a presentation to IASMN members on Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) preparedness and the United Nations Medical Emergency Response Team (UNMERT) support to the UNSMS. It had been quite some time since these issues were discussed within the IASMN and, following the Abuja attack, a number of issues had come to light requiring further follow-up. The Chair, at the outset of the discussions noted that the response from UNMERT following the Abuja bombing had so far been the best response provided after any UN emergency.

152. During the presentation, questions such as the need to mobilize resources and reduce disability were highlighted. It was pointed out that when managing a critical incident with casualties, the objective is saving lives and reducing long term health impact. It was necessary to have a crisis response mechanism established for three different functions - operational, managerial and political, and at all different levels and it was vital for crisis management teams to obtain as much support as possible from the host country, the DO and HQ, as well as from the Humanitarian Coordinator, if needed. As such, the point was made that a mass casualty incident policy document was needed to address guidelines, compliance mechanisms, training, testing, resources and fundraising. Furthermore, a policy document and guidelines on the roles and responsibilities of the Security Management Team was also needed to clarify whether the Crisis

Management Team (CMT) in country would be a role for the SMT or pre-identified members of the Country Team to assume. In this regard, the Chair informed the IASMN that immediately following the Abuja attack, it was necessary for the SMT to first work through its own trauma before it could even truly function as a team.

153. Additional questions were raised including whether there is a policy document that governs whether lists of victims may be disseminated. Clarity was also sought about the role of UNMERT medical doctors and how, in the context of treating victims post crisis, their access to medical facilities in country is handled. It was explained that access of an UNMERT medical doctor to treat patients, for example, in a local hospital following an emergency would be wholly dependent on the local doctor who is part of the host country crisis management team.

154. It was noted that it was also important to look at what is working well and what requires improvement. Often there were problems providing support to non-UN personnel, particularly where any sort of payment was involved. In such cases, letters from Executive Heads were often needed to effect any action. Furthermore, it was also pointed out that dependant on need and where the incident occurred, while host country would normally provide support for incident control, the host country would never be staffed to the requisite level to provide incident support. As such, guidelines to improve on this would also be needed.

155. One member indicated that his organization had conducted a lot of mass casualty reviews over the last six months. The last review had involved the police, the fire brigade, and hospitals in order to prepare a mass casualty plan, helping to ensure access to hospitals when needed. Picking up on the earlier point about the effect of trauma on SMTs, it was asked what would happen when SMT members themselves are the victims and there is no longer an SMT. One suggestion was that in such cases, an area SMT might step in to assist. It was also asked if it was reasonable to expect that all staff members be trained in handling mass casualty events. The representative from EPST cautioned that in situations where everyone wishes to help this in itself could pose problems. He cited an example where sometimes lives may be lost because a victim may not be moved properly.

156. A representative of one of the staff federations recounted how he had the unfortunate experience of dealing with a bombing when he was a firefighter and how there would have been far more injuries had persons not been trained. He was not talking of training persons to a paramedic level but at least training in the basics because it can save lives. He pointed out that under health and safety legislation in the EU, there is 1 trained medic per 40 in a safe environment so he saw no reason why the same policy could not be put in place, at the very least, for even higher risk areas than the EU. When there is a bomb or blast injury or a collapse, he believed that this type of training can save lives or make recovery quicker and proposed that a skills inventory be conducted to allow the UN to call upon skills when needed. He noted that during the Haiti crisis, many who had surged in to provide support did not have the requisite skills.

157. One member proposed that the IASMN come up with a policy recommendation to establish what is being done in a crisis and who is responsible for this. He recognized the need in today's world that pursuing a single emergency plan is not good enough, but rather there is a need to

pursue a family of emergency plans that need to be harmonized. Saving lives is a priority, but there are also other considerations. He suggested therefore that the IASMN note the briefing, welcome the development of a policy on the subject to be presented at the next Steering Group meeting and welcome the development of guidelines to provide more detailed guidance to the field. This could then be taken to the next regular session of the IASMN and would at least provide the UN system with an approach. Another member supported this and added that despite the fact that so many security professionals had been trained in ensuring that mass casualty evacuation plans are part of security plans, there was a need to ensure quality control of security plans, as well as of a practical crisis coordination centre. Another member pointed to the need to address the inadequate or the lack of medical facilities in certain locations, making the point that in two locations faced with an equal level of security risk, a staff member was likely to face a higher risk of losing his/her life in the place with poorer or no medical facilities.

158. The Chair noted that the response in Abuja had a lot to do with luck. Persons had connections with people and access to things. Some were unlucky because the crisis centre, which was housed in the Abuja HQ building had perished. The entire response had been within a small circle of actors in the UNSMS. Regrettably, he did not believe that the UNSMS has a better level of understanding of what to do in those circumstances and that the medical network needs to create a jointly funded program to address these issues on a cost shared basis. So far, this has been a one-man show. It would be a long stretch to say the UN system is prepared. He clarified that the purpose of the presentation at this session was to raise the awareness of the IASMN regarding these issues and provide some information. This is a much larger issue that goes beyond just training. There is clearly a need to work on progressing this issue and help is needed on all fronts, from the IASMN, the HR Network and the Medical Directors Working Group. He cautioned that should there be a mass casualty incident in the near future, the response would be primarily based on individual responses that can be pulled together. There is a need therefore to work on the next steps and in this regard, he suggested the establishment of a small working group to progress these issues.

159. One member added that this issue deserved to be discussed at HLCM. Once more, it was reiterated that what is needed is a policy document and a review of the mass casualty situations framework. DPKO/DFS informed the IASMN that it had already completed a report on Organizational Resiliency Management Systems, which details the overall approach to crisis management within the UN. He explained that this issue is just in the beginning stages and only a first step. This would be the perfect time to engage on this issue but first, what needs to be done must be clearly defined. Another member expressed the view that care had to be taken in setting up a specific security crisis policy because there should be a general security crisis policy for the UN system. He stressed that mass casualty involves the whole UN and not just security.

160. The Chair asked that any organizations having emergency manuals kindly provide these. While two members noted that emergency plans needed to be detailed in country security plans, one organization informed the IASMN that it had a separate document outlining its emergency action plan that is provided to all its country offices. Although it is the responsibility of the head of office in country to put together an emergency action plan, the document provided by his HQ provides them with a framework to assist them in doing that.

**161. While acknowledging the progress made by the United Nations' Medical Emergency Response Team (UNMERT), the IASMN remains very concerned about the overall state of readiness of the UN system to respond to mass casualty events. As such, the IASMN agreed that DSS would develop a security crisis management policy to be part of a larger and cross-disciplinary crisis management structure in the UN system. In addition to developing a security crisis management policy, the IASMN further decided that mass casualty policy and guidelines would be developed for inclusion in the Security Policy Manual and Security Management Operations Manual.**

#### **T. Aviation Risk Management (CRP 7)**

162. The IASMN was provided with an update on the work of the Aviation Risk Management Office (ARMO) within DSS. Since its formation in May 2011, ARMO reviewed the IASMN endorsed Commercial Passenger Air Travel Guidelines and matched the intent of the guidelines with actionable activities. The ARMO met with the aviation expertise found within the UN system (including ICAO, DFS/DPKO and WFP/UNHAS) to identify the various resources, in terms of air travel. To better define the scope of services, understand and project the needs of UN staff, the ARMO has worked to develop cooperative relationships with UNSMS members from AFPOs, in the field and elsewhere.

163. The IASMN was also informed that many requests and questions fell outside the role initially envisioned for the ARMO. Examples include questions regarding the review and evaluation of select airports and key aviation security areas, such as passenger and baggage screening, the review/ evaluation of gratis flights offered by governments and other entities, and the review/ evaluation of helicopter operations. It was intended for DSS to consider this and determine which areas may be addressed within existing resources. Areas deemed necessary, that fell outside of the envisioned scope, may be addressed within existing resources; however, some areas may be subject to additional funding for which provisions would need to be considered in the 2014/2015 Jointly Financed Account. At this time, it was emphasized that this was only being presented to the IASMN for information.

164. In addition, participants were informed that Terms of Reference for Air Travel Focal Points (ATFPs) were being developed and is intended to provide at the next IASMN regular session.

165. The Chair reminded the meeting that the UNSMS had three safety remits, for fire, road and aviation safety. Prior to the formation of ARMO, there had not been any way of addressing aviation safety in an organized fashion. Now, much work had been done in a short period of time. He stressed that the details provided on ARMO's activities at this session were for information, in order to glean feedback from IASMN members about the general direction of the office. One member, in this regard, stressed the need to ensure a duty of care to personnel in a timely manner on aviation safety issues.

166. The Chair also informed the IASMN that he questioned the value of having to approve travel on host country and military aircraft. There were instances where UN personnel were flying on host country and military aircraft over active conflict areas and in such cases, decisions about whether they should fly or not become security risk management decisions rather than

decisions focused on whether the actual aircraft was suitable or not. It was noted that in FlightSafe, there is not the capability to look at military aircraft. DSS confirmed that FlightSafe was still being used, but information is now bolstered with data from ICAO and other reliable sources. ARMO is working on devising its own process, similar to that used by FlightSafe, but to deliver 'real time' risk assessments and it was intended that this could be completed in the very near term. It was also intended that there would be a policy on aviation for the SPM, also to be completed in the near term.

**167. The IASMN took note of the update on the work of DSS' Aviation Risk Management Office and congratulated the Office for its efforts to date.**

#### **U. Significant Security Incident Reporting System (SSIRS) (CRP 4) (VTC)**

168. The IASMN was provided with an update on the new Safety and Security Incident Reporting System (SSIRS), which is being developed, by the Department of Safety and Security.

169. It was recalled that the Security Incident Reporting System (SIRS) was launched in 2006 and it became clear with the change in the strategic focus that it did not meet the needs of the UNSMS, both from a technical and substantive standpoint. The problems identified included the fact that an unknown number of security incidents reported by respective duty stations had not been registered in the system, country office reporting had been incomplete and there was difficulty in generating incident statistics.

170. IASMN members were informed that among the advantages of the new SSIRS was the fact that it provided for a standardized form to record security events separate from the recording of the impact of the event, allowing for an overall view on UN personnel, premises, property and programmes, is designed to be integrated with Geographic Information Systems to capture data and visually display incident locations directly from the data entry form, and generates reports to enable the monitoring of the rate and type of security incident and to provide security statistics.

171. There were a number of questions and concerns regarding the new system. e.g. how complex incidents would be recorded; whether the data on incidents would indicate whether the staff member was on or off duty, noting that in some specific circumstances it would be important to see if this was linked to the staff member being directly targeted or not; and whether it would be left to CSAs or SAs to decide upon who can enter data into TRIP. This last issue in fact spurred further discussion. One member believed that the AFPOs should decide on who would enter this data, stressing the need for the data, in addition to being reported to the DO and UNDSS in country, to be made available to line managers who have a responsibility to report events to their own chain of command. At the very least, there needed to be automatic inclusion of the security team on the system. Essentially this should be a UNSMS SSIRS system, and not result only in generating information for the use of DSS. Unfortunately, the system as currently presented was limited in its ability to support this and needed to have a stand-alone capacity for sending information to multiple addresses if AFPOs are to adapt this to their needs. While the product was commended and it was recognized that there is a desire for using a common system, this issue needed to be resolved, i.e. further work was needed to ensure it could be made

available to staff of the AFPOs and not left to the CSAs and SAs to determine who has access, which would only complicate things.

172. DSS informed the IASMN that it hoped to go live with SIRSS on 1 March. In the meantime, participants were encouraged to provide further comments to DSS' Information Management Unit.

**173. The IASMN took note of the progress made with respect to the development of a new safety and security incident reporting system (SSIRS) and encourages DSS to continue moving forward with its development, adjusting it as needed, taking into account lessons learned and further input from IASMN members.**

## **V. Any other Business**

**The Chair briefed the IASMN on the current situation in both Syria and Afghanistan as well as on the current developments in the Maldives.**

### **MOSS/MORSS and Common Security Costs**

174. One member raised the issue of MOSS and MORSS and common security costs, noting that in some instances the submissions sent to DSS were not being scrutinized properly by DRO's regional desks. An ideal situation would be for AFPOs to receive the submissions from their representatives in the field, incorporate their respective HQ views, with the intention of finalizing the documents at the SMT. It was pointed out that too often DSS' regional desks forward specific AFPO comments to the Country Team verbatim which ran counter to a previously agreed principle that the regional desks should not name or share explicit AFPO concerns. Unfortunately, there had been instances where, as a result of such practices, a DO had contacted an AFPO directly asking that it reconsider its position. Such a situation could be avoided when the regional desks ensure that concerns are communicated generically, without specifically naming the agency or SFP who had raised the concern. A mechanism was therefore called for which would provide for the submissions, before receiving final SMT approval, to be sent to HQ security focal points to ensure that they and their representative on the SMT are on the same page.

175. The Chair noted that DRO desk officers are not budget officers. He also noted that currently an SMT approves its own security plan and recognized that there is a need to control the situation where the country teams and the SMT formulate their own SRA and decide on what level or resources are needed, especially when large increases are indicated. He supported that the submission needs to be questioned and scrutinized and that transparency is the only way to control this.

176. Another member noted that the issues of MOSS and MORSS are continuously raised at IASMN meetings. There is concern that in many instances, the cover of security is being used to cover what should be administrative costs. Accordingly, there is a need to establish a baseline and alert DRO's regional desks to the need to revert to the SMT when glaring increases are spotted, e.g. such as a request for 10 generators in a duty station with a small presence. Another

suggestion made was that submissions could be put on UNSMIN, as living documents, to allow persons to review these for a few weeks before they are finalized.

177. It was confirmed by one member that sometimes personal considerations drive the submission. He supported the need to review the baseline for MOSS. It was also confirmed that the SRM working group would also do so after it completed its other tasks. Further, there would be a need to put together a separate MORSS working group in the next few months. However, where MORSS was concerned, it was acknowledged that this needed to go through the HR Network. The Chair asked that any additional suggestions for improving the existing system be directed to DSS' DRO. It was recognized where MORSS was concerned however that this also needed to go through the HR Network. The Chair also added that any additional suggestions for improving the existing system be directed to DSS' DRO.

## **W. Other Matters**

### **178. a) IASMN and Steering Group meeting schedule**

- i. Spring session, IASMN Steering Group, 2 to 4 May 2012, Cyprus
- ii. 17<sup>th</sup> Session IASMN, UNAIDS, Geneva, 25 to 28 June 2012
- iii. Fall session, IASMN Steering Group, October 2012  
(Arusha or Kigali, ICTYR) (TBD)

### **b) HLCCM and CEB meeting schedule**

- i. HLCCM 23<sup>nd</sup> session, 15 to 16 March 2012, UNWTO, Madrid
- ii. CEB Spring Session, 13 to 14 April 2012