

**Report of the  
Inter-Agency Security Management Network  
15<sup>th</sup> Session, IFAD Headquarters, Rome  
27 to 30 June 2011**

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Headquarters in Rome from 26 to 30 June 2011. A list of participants is attached at Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members is attached at Annex B. This was the 15th session of the IASMN since its first meeting in Vienna in 2000.
2. The IASMN members wish to express their gratitude to IFAD for hosting the meeting.
3. The Chair welcomed Mr. Michael Goon, Assistant President, Corporate Services Department, IFAD who gave a short presentation that highlighted the increasing challenges in protecting staff and commended the UNSMS for responding to the mounting level of insecurity by improving its processes to respond to new threats.
4. During the course of this session, the Chair introduced to IASMN members via VTC, DSS' new Assistant-Secretary-General, Ms. Mbaranga Gasarabwe. In addition, Ms. Lisa Spencer, DSS' new Aviation Safety Officer was able to participate in the 15<sup>th</sup> session and meet with members of the Network.
5. Also during the course of this session, the IASMN participated in a VTC with the Global Conference of UNDP Resident Representatives that was held in Tarrytown, New York. The USG, DSS addressed the conference on security issues, followed by a question and answer session. During the Q and A's, a number of issues were addressed, including the relation of the crime rate on the hardship classification of a duty station, how social unrest factored into the security risk assessment, steps taken to improve security measures for local staff, and the need to improve and categorize communications to the field.

## **II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING**

### **A. Report of the IASMN Steering Group**

6. The Report of the IASMN Steering Group Meeting that was held in Paris in May 2011 was provided to the members of the IASMN for their information.

### **B. Draft Policy for the UNSMS Security Policy Manual – Road Safety**

7. The IASMN, at its 14<sup>th</sup> session in January 2011, was informed that General Assembly Resolution 65/132 on the “Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel” requested the Secretary-General and the UN system to continue to enhance road safety through improved initiatives to promote road safety and to report to the GA

at its next (66th) session on road safety initiatives. IASMN members agreed to reaffirm their respective organizations' road safety campaigns. At the same time, DSS agreed to reinforce its road safety campaign and provide the next IASMN Steering Group with a draft policy on Road Safety to be included in the *Security Policy Manual* that would encompass the UN Secretariat's administrative instruction on road safety, as well as other road safety policy initiatives from IASMN members.

8. The draft policy on Road Safety was presented to the IASMN Steering Group at its last session in May 2011 in Paris and was further revised following additional input by Steering Group members after that meeting. The input received indicated that the following four areas warranted further discussion by the full IASMN:

- a) Seatbelt use in all situations;
- b) The inclusion of rented vehicles;
- c) Requirements and timelines for medical assistance/response; and
- d) Vehicle safety items that should be mandatory vs. only recommended.

9. There was an extensive discussion at the outset about how a balance between general policy and specific guidelines should be struck in the road safety policy as members noted that the draft policy contained too much detailed language regarding certain issues and questioned whether more should be elaborated in SOPs, rather than be included in a policy document.

10. One member noted that too much detail was provided for some vehicle safety features listed, such as head restraints and suggested that such safety features were the responsibility of fleet managers and not the UNSMS. Regarding medical emergencies, concern was expressed over the "golden hour" response time as this would be particularly difficult to achieve in some deep field areas. The representative of the UN Medical Directors' Working Group (UNMDWG) supported that the language used in the document referring to the "golden hour" was non restrictive and was there mostly for information. He emphasized that it was more important to have a plan in place that works and to have staff adequately trained to respond in a specified period of time, especially in deep field locations.

11. Another member pointed to the need to be aware of how any reporting requirements in this policy fit into other reporting systems. The present incident reporting system (SIRS) was not capturing all incidents and the data was not being entered in a standardized way. One member recommended that it would be best to refer to reporting in general terms because if SIRS changed there would be a need to amend the policy. The Chair acknowledged that SIRS needed a major overhaul which DSS had started to address. It may not yet be prepared to deal with the reporting provisions of the policy as drafted. Another member noted that there would be difficulty providing local UN statistics and that national statistics on road accidents would be more difficult to obtain and in many cases would be unreliable. Further clarification was sought as to when a road incident would be serious enough to warrant completion of an incident report. The Chair supported the idea that reports on road traffic accidents should be made locally and that such reports should only be made when there is personal injury resulting from the accident.

12. Another participant recognized that there were difficult enforcement and image issues when it came to UN personnel driving under the influence. The Chair agreed that the document needed to be stronger and indicate "zero tolerance" for driving under the influence of alcohol.

Another participant suggested that the document reference the need for MOSS to include provisions for road safety and that road safety issues also be addressed in the country security plan.

13. When it came to seat belt use, one member warned against vesting a driver with the authority not to move the vehicle unless all seatbelts were correctly fastened (i.e. UN drivers should not have the same authority as an airline pilot). The driver's authority should not go further than for reporting seatbelt violations. There was some discussion about the circumstances when passengers in UN vehicles would not have to wear seat belts, but it was generally believed that the policy should require all passengers to wear seatbelts at all times when driving in a UN vehicle and that it was the passenger's personal responsibility to comply with this provision. The Chair agreed that it was important that the concept of personal responsibility in safety and security programs should not be lost here, and that it was the passenger's responsibility to wear a seat belt and not the driver's responsibility to enforce seatbelt use. There was also a need to note the role that passengers needed to play in ensuring road safety and that road safety awareness campaigns should also extend to cover personal vehicles and the safety of UN personnel as pedestrians. DSS noted that the UNSMS could not dictate how UN personnel drove their personal vehicles, but that the policy would nonetheless provide examples that could be applied to personal driving.

14. Another member cautioned about the provision requiring the UN to adhere to local driving laws because in some countries there were laws that prohibited women from driving that were contrary to the principles of the UN when it came to gender. DSS clarified that references to local laws in the policy were only meant to apply to the need for UN drivers who were operating UN vehicles to do so with care and to adhere to local laws that supported safe driving. There was nothing in the policy requiring that the UN adhere to all local laws related to vehicle and road use, including those that may be gender biased.

15. It was also questioned whether it was the DOs responsibility to put in place many of the provisions of this policy (for example, training) because DOs did not normally have a budget in this regard. It was clarified that the DO had the responsibility to implement plans and preparations for these measures but that it would be each organization's responsibility to implement the actual measures.

16. The Staff Federations welcomed the document and suggested that a mechanism be established to ascertain how the policy was being adhered to and how to enforce non compliance. It was highlighted that the image of the UN vis a vis the local population was impacted negatively because of bad UN drivers and the reference to this issue at the beginning of the policy was welcomed. Further clarity was sought as to whether the policy would apply to UN personnel using UN vehicles for private use. DSS clarified that the policy in referring to "UN drivers" is applicable to any UN personnel who drive a UN vehicle and not just those hired as drivers.

17. There was support from another member that having a policy in place for road safety was a very important step forward and that it was the responsibility of all to comply with all security and safety procedures, regardless of their level. It was important to promote this policy on the ground and to monitor how it is implemented at HQ and in the field. While one member agreed with the need to have policies and guidelines on road safety in place, the important goal was

actually to minimize the number of accidents and deaths of UN personnel and civilians. He noted that accidents mainly occurred when a UN car was not driven by professional drivers and believed that the document omitted a strong recommendation that UN cars should be driven only by UN drivers and not by private individuals. The Chair pointed out that DSS did not have the actual data to support that observation. Further, he cautioned on the unintended consequences of inhibiting the UN on how it can operate.

18. The Chair emphasized that the need for this document was in line with the safety mandate of the UNSMS, serving to illustrate what the UNSMS should be doing for road safety. He informed the IASMN that the General Assembly, concerned at the high number of accidents and resulting casualties among UN and associated personnel, and conscious of the importance of road safety in preventing casualties among civilians and United Nations and associated personnel, had mandated DSS not only to continue taking necessary measures to enhance road safety so as to reduce incidents caused by road hazards, but also to report on the steps taken to strengthen data collection on and the analysis of road incidents, including civilian casualties resulting from road accidents.<sup>1</sup>

19. The Chair also stressed the need to have one common UN policy in place that could be presented to HLCM. UNSMS members had different policies and different road-safety requirements in different locations and this document was intended to strike a balance between the various requirements. DSS had been running road safety campaigns but without the use of common materials and a common basis. He believed that this policy reflected the basis for a common road safety program across the UN system and provided a minimum common baseline for addressing this issue. At the same time, the policy should not prevent any AFPO from going beyond this common baseline.

20. In view of the extensive discussions reflected above, DSS revised the policy during the course of this session to take account of the issues raised and circulated the revised policy to IASMN members for final approval. In so doing, DSS confirmed that the policy required a certain level of detail to make it clearly understandable and workable in the field.

### **Recommendation**

21. The IASMN approved and adopted the policy on Road Safety that will be included in the *Security Policy Manual*, subject to approval by the HLCM at its next session.

### **C. Update on the transition from the *Field Security Handbook* to the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual***

22. The IASMN agreed to replace the *Field Security Handbook* (FSH, 2006) with the United Nations Security Management System Policy Manual (*Security Policy Manual* or SPM) and at its 13<sup>th</sup> session in June 2010, also agreed that the transition from the FSH to the SPM should occur on a step-by-step basis because of the requirement to revise existing policies and develop new ones. DSS has been coordinating the development of sections of the SPM and presenting them to the Steering Group and the full IASMN at each session.

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<sup>1</sup> This was mandated by General Assembly Resolution 65/132.

23. At this session, the IASMN was informed of the progress made so far in the transition from the FSH to the SPM, as well as the policy areas that required IASMN attention for the transition to be complete. DSS provided a “map” of the transition, showing those FSH sections that had been superseded by approved sections of the SPM, and those FSH sections that remain in effect and required IASMN attention. The IASMN was requested to provide guidance for addressing areas in the FSH that required IASMN involvement before they could be transferred to the SPM, namely MORSS, SIRs, Arrest and Detention and the Security Plan, taking into account that working groups to cover some of the items were also being considered. The IASMN was also informed that the following sections of the SPM would require IASMN involvement before they could be drafted:

- a) Host Country Matters;
- b) Premises Policy;
- c) Private Security Companies;
- d) Telecommunications Policy;
- e) Information Security;
- f) Blast Mitigation;
- g) Crisis Management;
- h) Medical Plans;
- i) Continuity of Operations;
- j) Fire Safety Issues; and
- k) Procurement of Security Equipment.

24. DSS clarified that the IASMN Steering Group had recommended that MOSS revision would be addressed by the SRM Improvement WG in due course, after the WG finished its work on likelihood, impact and SRA improvement. Considering that MOSS is effectively a security risk management measure, it made sense to consider MOSS revision as part of the SRM improvement process.

25. DPKO/DFS pointed out that further work to develop policies on telecommunications, information security, continuity of operations and crisis management should not be conducted in isolation as there were other efforts currently underway within the UN system to address the emergency preparedness aspects of these areas. Hence, policies on those areas should not be developed independently and needed to take into account the ongoing work on organizational resilience management, which was moving ahead quickly in DPKO due to the imperative to support field missions. It was vital that discussions take place to identify the linkages between those various efforts. DPKO/DFS proposed to provide information to the next IASMN Steering Group meeting on organizational resilience to inform the future development of related policies for the UNSMS.

26. The discussion turned to the availability of the SPM and FSH for UN personnel at large. It was confirmed that the only official versions of the SPM and FSH were currently available on UNSMIN, but that access to UNSMIN was still limited to actors in the UNSMS. Therefore, UNSMS policies were not available for all UN personnel. It was pointed out once more that there were portions of the FSH that contained sensitive material vis-à-vis Member States. The Chair however emphasized that because the FSH was already freely available on the internet, (as a quick Google search confirmed), keeping it from UN personnel at large made no sense. He

further emphasized that the SPM was trying to move towards establishing overarching policies so much of what was in the FSH would not necessarily appear in the SPM.

27. The representative from the HR Network sought a guarantee that wide access would be granted to the FSH and the SPM, especially as the FSH had been widely used by HR professionals. The Chair confirmed that just as the Security Level System, for example, was designed to be shared on a wider basis, so too was security policy intended for all personnel, so it would be absurd to keep it secret. He recognized that while certain instructions and guidelines should not be open to everyone, the larger policy had to be made as widely available as possible.

28. One participant pointed out that the SPM had not yet been completed and reminded the IASMN that its revision was called for by one of the Brahimi recommendations. He also asked when the Security Operations Manual (SOM) was expected to be completed. DSS emphasized that it first wished to see a strong policy framework in place before a revised SOM was produced and that perhaps an inter-agency group could be established to produce this at a later date. The same member however took the view that most of the content of a manual could be updated by the Regional Desks in DSS' Division of Regional Operations. In addition, UNICEF offered to share its own SOM that was expected to be available by early November 2011. WFP also expressed a willingness to share more tactical guidelines but agreed that there was a need to have a very firm policy framework in place first.

### **Recommendation**

29. The IASMN noted the update on the transition from the *Field Security Handbook* to the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual* and agreed with the proposed mapping of the policy areas earmarked for further review. It was agreed that DPKO/DFS will provide a CRP for the next IASMN Steering Group on emergency preparedness and organizational resilience to ensure that efforts already underway in the UN system to develop policies on these issues are taken into account in the future development of related policies for the UNSMS.

30. The IASMN also agreed that it is necessary to have a strong policy framework in place before work may begin on a new Security Operations Manual.

31. The IASMN endorsed the concept that the policy manual will be made available to the widest possible audience as an internal UN document.

### **D. Update on the Work of the IED Working Group**

32. At its 14th session in January 2011, the IASMN was informed that the United Nations Secretariat's Policy Committee at its 13 July 2010 meeting, decided that "DSS will, in consultation with DPKO, DPA and all other relevant UN agencies, coordinate and facilitate the development of a comprehensive policy on the UN's approach to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that are part of active hostilities and target UN personnel and facilities. The policy will be in line with humanitarian principles and take into account the experiences of IACG-MA [Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action] members." The IASMN subsequently agreed that the development of an IED policy should be examined at the security inter-agency level through an IASMN working group which, due to the upcoming Policy Committee meeting on this subject, needed to be continued as a matter of priority.

33. DSS briefed the meeting that the IED Working Group had been reconvened and expanded to include IASMN representation. The TORs of the WG were provided. Participants were informed that the IED WG was in full agreement on all the main issues, including that UN personnel covered under the “Applicability” policy of the UNSMS cannot directly engage in, support or fund activities primarily meant to disarm, remove or destroy IEDs still “in play”. The Chair added that if an IED is “in play”, then it was something for the national authorities to address and not UN Mine Action or any other civilian personnel in the UN. UN civilians should not get into the business of trying to remove “in play” IEDs.

34. It was asked why the WG was only considering IEDs and not other weapons, and DSS clarified that this was because the Policy Committee had specifically requested a policy on IEDs. DSS clarified that although addressing this issue was taking time, it was nevertheless moving forward. The WG would provide a copy of the policy for endorsement to both the IASMN Steering Group at its next session at the end of November 2011, and to the Mine Action equivalent (the Inter-Agency Standing Group – Mine Action, or IASG-MA), before submission to a Policy Committee meeting (date still to be determined).

35. DPKO/DFS pointed out that in South Lebanon the capacity existed for UN Peacekeepers to remove live IEDs and that the military components would do so because those IEDs were targeting the UN. He confirmed that the WG was considering carefully the issue of dealing with live IEDs with respect to self protection, while ensuring that there are no unintended consequences for others. He also noted that the proposed policy did not cover UN military or police that are part of formed units in DPKO missions. Another participant asked whether we would not have a vested interest in directly dealing with IEDs that specifically targeted the UN. The Chair responded that we would but that UN agencies should not be the ones to do so. Instead, we should turn to the Host Government, peacekeeping forces or other international forces. Essentially, what we did not want was UN civilian personnel engaged in taking IEDs out of play. Another member added that going beyond what are considered remnants of war impacts on the UN’s neutrality, also impacting the neutrality of UN Mine Action. DSS noted that the WG was recommending the establishment of a process to determine if an IED is a remnant (and therefore removable by UN personnel). Such a process would not fall under the remit of the UNSMS but that of the Resident Coordinators and appropriate advisors.

36. The Chair reiterated the importance for the IASMN to have a clear understanding of the issues being considered here as when policy decisions are made this will have an impact on the AFPOs.

### **Recommendation**

37. The IASMN noted the progress made in the IED Working Group to develop a comprehensive policy on the UN’s approach to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

38. The IASMN requested that the draft policy be provided to IASMN members as well as to the Inter-Agency Contact Group – Mine Action (IACG-MA) before it is presented at the Policy Committee’s meeting on IEDs (date TBD).

### **E. Membership of the UNSMS/Membership Moratorium**

39. The IASMN Steering Group discussed the issue of membership in the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for non-UN entities as far back as 2006. In 2007, the IASMN agreed to the Steering Group recommendations that “no new participation from outside the UN System can be accepted until the new cost-sharing formula has been reviewed and a review of capacity has been undertaken”. This “moratorium” on membership in the UNSMS was reinforced by the IASMN Steering Group meeting in Florence in January 2008 when it "agreed unanimously that no more MOUs should be signed with organizations seeking to join the UNSMS, considering the current capacity of DSS." The IASMN Steering Group in Lyon in December 2009 further discussed the moratorium on new membership and concluded, based on various factors that the moratorium will remain in effect for both local and global MOUs for the next 12 months.

40. Subsequent to this, four Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) that already had MOUs with the UNSMS, namely the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), requested revisions to their MOUs because of changes in the UNSMS over the years. The 14<sup>th</sup> Session of the IASMN in January 2011 approved a revised MOU template for this purpose and agreed to replace the sample MOU in Addendum I of Annex P of the *Field Security Handbook*. At the same time, the IASMN confirmed that the moratorium on entering into additional MOUs was still in force and that it would be important to establish proper mechanisms and procedures for membership, to specify what services were going to be provided and to clearly elucidate lines of responsibility should it be decided that the moratorium would be lifted in future.

41. At this session, the IASMN was informed of the Steering Group’s recommendation from its meeting in May 2011 to end the moratorium by agreeing that membership in the UNSMS should be limited to those entities that are part of the UN system in some way. The IASMN was also briefed on the Steering Group’s recommendation that Annex P of the *Field Security Handbook* (FSH), which outlined the procedures for establishing an MOU with the UNSMS, be abolished and that there was no need for a similar policy in the *Security Policy Manual* because there would no more MOUs in future.

42. It was restated by some members that non-UN entities should not be part of the UNSMS until such time as the system was more solid in its work and that the moratorium had been put into place because the capacity did not exist to deal with a larger membership. One participant stated that it would have been useful to include an organization like the African Development Bank in the UNSMS and that his organization was considering some sort of bilateral agreement with the Bank. The Chair, in citing the Steering Group’s recommendation to end the moratorium but limit the membership to UN entities, pointed out that the only UN entity identified at present was UN Women. He recommended that the IASMN support the Steering Group’s recommendation, noting that the UNSMS was already struggling to provide services for UN entities. While the UNSMS could still provide advice or guidance to other IGOs, it would be with the understanding that they were under no obligation to act on the advice. Further, different contractual mechanisms in place for non-UN entities, as well as the expected difficulty in holding other non-UN entities accountable, would further complicate matters. One Staff Federation sought clarity about what it meant to be a “UN entity” and asked whether there would be a definition provided. The Chair confirmed that rather than pin down one definition where there is doubt about the



status of an organization, guidance would be sought from OLA. The important consideration was ensuring that the UNSMS was kept manageable and equitable.

43. Another member pointed out that there existed both global agreements and agreements at the country level. DSS pointed out that the original Annex P of the Field Security Handbook had contained four MOU templates – one local and one global for both NGOs and IGOs. The new template before the IASMN only considered global arrangements for IGOs. As MOUs with NGOs (local and global), as well as local MOUs with IGOs would no longer be possible, no templates were prepared. The Chair indicated that smaller MOUs on the ground were a source of problems, e.g. in Sudan and the Congo where individual agencies had signed agreements that included evacuation arrangements for others. This served to provide a false sense of security and was irresponsible in cases where evacuation was difficult for those covered under the UNSMS. Another participant confirmed that some agreements that were made in the field countered what the DO had agreed in terms of evacuation and relocation, i.e. there were corporate agreements in place that did not fall in line with what the DO had agreed. DPKO/DFS informed the meeting that an MOU, signed prior to 2006, between MONUC and an NGO supporting MONUC radio stations, pre-dated the moratorium, and the arrangements within the MOU needed to be continued due to the high value of the programme.

44. Another member pointed out that more needed to be done to implement the Framework of Accountability for the UNSMS, e.g. TORs for all personnel and programs and projects should include the responsibility for security - performance appraisals for individuals should include a section on security responsibilities and evaluation milestones for programs should also include a security component. Another member questioned whether the real concern about including other IGOs was based on perceived difficulties with implementing the framework of accountability or on whether the nature of IGOs would change the nature of the IASMN as well.

45. The Chair reminded members that every AFPO was supposed to be drafting its own internal accountability framework. At the same time, he recognized that no time limit had been put on that exercise. A quick survey of those present indicated that 11 members had already approved their own internal frameworks and promised to provide this to DSS for circulation to IASMN members. The Chair offered to send a note to Executive Heads of the AFPOs urging those who had not yet done so to approve internal frameworks of accountability, to be provided by the end of 2011. However, one member, noting that this was a sensitive topic, requested instead that it be noted in this report that all members of the IASMN were encouraged to complete their own internal frameworks of accountability by the end of the year. Another member asked if DSS had produced its own internal framework of accountability as well.

46. It was confirmed that limiting membership of the UNSMS to only UN entities would of course not apply to any IGO that is already a part of the UNSMS.

## **Recommendations**

47. The IASMN decided that membership of the UNSMS should be limited only to UN entities and current members of the IASMN. At the same time, the IASMN agreed to end the moratorium on membership in the UNSMS.

48. The IASMN further agreed to abolish Annex P of the *Field Security Handbook* and noted the revised version of the waiver that is attached to the new MOU agreed to at its 14<sup>th</sup> session.

## **F. Budgetary Issues**

- i. Update on expenditure for current biennium (2010/2011)**
- ii. Update on next biennium budget (2012/2013)**

49. DSS provided via VTC an update on expenditure for the current biennium 2010-2011, as well as an update on the next biennium budget for 2012-2013. The IASMN was informed that DSS' midyear budget performance report would be generated once final figures were available from UNDP. Although the report was due at the end of June 2011, there was approximately a one month delay in obtaining the necessary information. With respect to field activity in the budget, the IASMN was informed that DSS was at the 52% expenditure level in the total year for the 2010/2011 budget, which was right on target. Some additional funding was expended for surge capacity because of the situation in the MENA region. Almost \$300,000 was spent just on surge alone - something that could be absorbed primarily by rationalizing missions and security assessment visits and shifting them to provide surge capacity. There was no contingency funding specific for surge requirements and any funding provided for this needed to be absorbed from whatever resources were available.

50. The IASMN was also informed that once the June figures were in, a report would be provided to members that would provide a snapshot of 18 months' worth of budget execution. From an HR perspective, DSS was heavily engaged in a recruitment exercise for the field to accommodate all the posts granted at the beginning of the 2010-2011 biennium. Presently, according to the latest vacancy statistics, there were only 5 vacant positions that remained to be filled in the field at the inter-agency level and 35 at the local level, i.e. less than 10% of local security assistant posts (LSAs). By the end of 2011, it is intended that all international posts will be completely filled and there will be 100% incumbency and maybe only a 4% vacancy rate for local security assistant posts. This will affect the end of year final tally which will be the basis of the billing to AFPOs. Members were informed that as mentioned during preparations for the 2012-2013 biennium budget, the Controller's office factored in the appropriation a 14% vacancy rate for 2010/2011.

51. Given that DSS had gone beyond that and was approaching 100% incumbency, members were further informed that the appropriation provided will fall short, which will affect the billing that in turn will affect the final settlement. This will also affect the 2012-2013 budget which is also being calculated against a 14% vacancy rate. As had previously been explained, for reasons beyond the control of DSS, the Department will continue to carry this artificial vacancy rate which results in a distorted level of expenditure that is then corrected at the time of billing.

52. DSS further informed IASMN members that the 2012-2013 budget would soon go through the Controller's office and be presented to ACABQ shortly thereafter. It was confirmed that the resulting budget was virtually the same as the one presented to the IASMN at its 14<sup>th</sup> session in January 2011, and subsequently to the FBN and HLCM, so there will be no surprises. Whatever feedback is received from ACABQ will be transmitted to IASMN members before the budget is presented to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly in the fall of 2011.

53. One member asked whether the 14% vacancy rate was miscalculated because it was quite significant when in reality there is less than a 1% vacancy rate. DSS not only confirmed that this was not miscalculated, but reiterated that this information was contained in the 2012-2013 budget proposals that were cleared by the IASMN Steering Group in Panama 2010, the full IASMN in New York in January 2011, and further endorsed by the Finance and Budget Network in early 2011. DSS further clarified that the 14% rate was applied across the whole biennium and that it was doing all it could to limit the damage. It was further explained that when DSS received the appropriation on 1 January 2010, the Department was close to the 14/15% vacancy rate. As posts continued to be filled, the vacancy rate decreased. This issue had in fact been raised with the Controller's office at the time of the 2010 revised appropriation, when the Controller was preparing the 2010/2011 appropriation. At that time, DSS informed the Controller's office that the vacancy rate was no longer sustainable and that this would create a problem at the end of the biennium. Despite this, the Controller maintained a vacancy rate of 14% for 2011.

54. One member expressed frustration at the apparent lack of two way communication regarding funding issues. He pointed out that OIOS had raised this issue and suggested that perhaps there needed to be an audit of DSS. DSS responded that it would welcome such an audit if needed and that OIOS was presently examining the Department's crisis operations. It was further stated that to fund a surge, other areas of DSS services needed to go unfunded and that it was very difficult to devise a budget 38 months out with any certainty, e.g. no one could have foreseen the events in the Middle East and North Africa region that ended up demanding significant additional resources.

55. The Chair confirmed that the UN contributes 25% to the entire JFA. One consolation at least was that DSS was not asking for additional funding and then not filling its positions. He further informed members that the Department was conducting an internal exercise to ensure that its posts were distributed appropriately at headquarters. It is intended to conduct the same exercise for DSS' field posts as two years down the line DSS is in a different position. He added that it will be necessary to work together with the AFPOs to identify where all security officers are posted throughout the world. DSS will try to implement this rebalancing exercise in 2011/12. DPKO/DFS requested that its assets also be taken into consideration as part of the rebalancing exercise, particularly as it sometimes has an excess of staff in some locations and also has certain unique capacities, e.g. close protection officers. Furthermore, conducting the rebalancing exercise with the inclusion of DPKO/DFS would help to assess the security occupational group holistically, as well as contribute to cooperation on the ground.

56. One member pointed out that AFPOs sometimes ended up putting in additional security resources and were having difficulties explaining why they needed to do this when they are funding DSS for providing this service. He had no objection to including everyone in the security occupational group. The Chair acknowledged this concern and at the same time explained that hopefully the rebalancing exercise would address this. It was not the intention for the exercise to conclude that DSS wishes to have AFPO officers to carry out DSS' work, but rather that AFPO officers are sometimes needed where there is a huge mission and there are not enough resources available through the JFA to meet the demand. It would be the decision of the AFPOs to put more people on the ground or not and much of this work can be temporary in nature, e.g. either a surge capacity or a capacity lasting two to three years. A fair argument could also be made where AFPOs have people on the ground and where the program demands are such

that there may not be a need for additional DSS personnel. The Chair concluded by pointing out that the budget process in the UN was very complex and confirmed that DSS would provide a budget update at every IASMN meeting.

### **Recommendations**

57. The IASMN noted the verbal updates provided by DSS on expenditure for the current biennium (2010/2011) and on the next biennium budget (2012/2013).

58. The IASMN expressed concern about the high vacancy rate that the UN's Controller continues to assume in the budgetary process for both the Jointly Financed Account and the Regular budget of the UN.

59. Furthermore, the IASMN welcomed DSS' efforts to undertake a rebalancing exercise in 2012 intended to identify the number of DSS security officers in each location, with a view to assessing whether the existing distribution needs to be maintained, according to needs. It is intended that this exercise is conducted in conjunction with the UN secretariat departments and the Agencies, Funds and Programmes.

60. The IASMN further noted that the Finance and Budget Network of HLCM had not yet provided further information on the work of the HLCM working group on Safety and Security costs and pointed out in this regard that it had been agreed at the 14<sup>th</sup> session that the IASMN would be provided with the draft report from the WG before it was submitted to HLCM.

61. The IASMN noted that no conference room paper was put forward for this agenda item and specifically requested that a conference room paper be provided for all future budgetary agenda items.

### **iii. Update on Locally Cost Shared Budget**

62. At its 14<sup>th</sup> session in January 2011, as part of the review of the DSS proposed programme budget for 2012-13, the IASMN was presented with a report that included, inter alia, the initial steps towards a systematic collection of data on country cost-shared budgets. To that extent, the report included a breakdown along eight activity lines of locally cost-shared budgets approved at the country level for the year 2010. Building on the experience gained from that exercise, DSS was engaged in continuing the exercise through the introduction of 2011 data. While the presentation for 2010 was recognized by the IASMN as a step in the right direction, the Network indicated that a mechanism to provide for oversight and comparison of local costs between duty stations be established. In view of the recommendation, DSS undertook to review alternative data views that would assist the IASMN in general and the agencies, funds and programmes in particular to better budget their global resources for safety and security, including studying how to provide additional reporting on expenditure ratios, and resources in relation to the number of staff by country.

63. DSS provided a verbal update at this session on the steps taken to clarify the level and reporting of cost shared data, with a view to strengthening inter-agency cooperation in the exchange of financial and human resources data within the UNSMS. It was explained that to date, DSS had received input from some 81 countries and it was not yet certain whether more data was forthcoming as not all countries have a locally Cost Shared Budget or include these

costs under common services. From the data received from 81 countries, the cost indicated was approximately \$26 million dollars. DSS found that the cost of items under similar headings varied widely from country to country and that the quality of data needed to be improved.

64. The IASMN was also informed that DSS had considered hiring a consultant to examine in-depth the country cost shared budgets and what was being covered in order to identify what the problems and the duplications are. However, clearer direction from the IASMN was first needed as to exactly what the IASMN was trying to achieve through the examination of the country cost shared budget and exactly what it was DSS needed to be looking at. One member offered that the IASMN expected the full implementation of the operational guidelines that had been developed in full consultation with DSS, which he observed had not yet been implemented. He pointed to, on one hand, the Headquarter contribution and then on the other hand, the country cost-shared budget which was supposed to be formulated in October, reviewed in November and sent to HQ in December. One latest example of where the country security budget raised questions was in Nigeria just two weeks ago which showed a budget increase of 66% while the security situation had improved significantly in country. This request seemed to correlate with a budget proposal based on an SRA that had been conducted in 2009. He requested more robust control on the part of DSS security officers and questioned how 8 radio operators in Abuja and another 8 in Lagos could possibly be justified and how the cost shared budget for Sri Lanka could support a fully funded P3 security officer to implement Saving Lives Together (SLT). He noted that there were specific countries that were problematic and despite repeated messages to desk officers within DSS, there was no oversight over the country cost shared budgets. While he welcomed the offer from the USG, DSS to intervene in the Nigeria case, he suggested that DSS' regional desks be requested to provide updated information to the USG on other cases and suggested that perhaps there needed to be mandatory training on handling such budgets. He added that a WFP consultant had done extensive work on this subject which had not been supported and therefore questioned the usefulness of employing a consultant. DSS noted that if WFP were to share with DSS the information/data collected by its consultant that a further consultancy would not be needed.

65. Another member clarified that the work undertaken by WFP was done on behalf of the FBN. DSS added that it was constantly monitoring the Atlas system to try and identify issues to be corrected. However, to increase transparency even further, what was in Atlas needed to be translated and sufficient data put on the UNSMIN website. The Chair disagreed and believed that there was already oversight on that system and what was lacking was oversight from a programmatic standpoint on what was being put into country cost shared budgets.

66. Another member pointed to the lack of any clear definition on what can and cannot be charged under a country cost shared budget while another member, referring to the earlier agreed timeframe for submission of country cost-shared budgets, noted that there was still confusion over what was covered and what was not and he was not sure a consultant would fix this.

67. One participant pointed out that this issue had been discussed at length at the 14<sup>th</sup> session of the IASMN when some emphasized the difficulty with planning for additional resources as the security situation changes so rapidly. There was general agreement that there was a need to make the locally cost-shared budget more transparent to better prepare for unforeseen situations. It was not a matter of requesting special information but rather having a clear breakdown of costs with good justification why these costs were needed. It was also stressed that now was the time

to work as a team in a very coordinated way to address concerns and that the days are long gone when DSS prepared something and did not share this with other UNSMS members. Although any increase in field costs was a great challenge, there was still a need to maintain the sustainability of operations in the field.

68. DSS pointed out that much information was available on UNSMIN and that there were broad categories that existed to define whether a cost was DSS-related or covered a locally shared area. It needed to be made clearer under each particular heading what can be charged and what cannot be charged. DSS promised to convey this message to DRO and the Desk Chiefs, particularly the concerns that were raised when the size of the country cost shared budget did not match the security situation on the ground.

69. In closing, one member made the point that in today's age of oversight and accountability it would be easier to obtain funds and make contributions to DSS if there was a strengthened and solid reporting mechanism in place that inspires confidence. If it is known that more resources are needed, communication of budget issues at the country level needs to be substantiated by reports and communications to help the AFPOs convince their senior managers of the need to fulfil those costs.

## **Recommendations**

70. The IASMN requested that DSS provide written guidance to the field setting out the agreement reached at the IASMN's 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> sessions, specifically that the country cost-shared budget be circulated in country by 1 October, with billing issued on 15 November and payments to UNDP received no later than 1 March. The guidance is also to include a reminder outlining the eight major categories of locally cost-shared expenditure and a request that those countries that had not yet updated their information do so without delay.

71. The IASMN also emphasized that any increases in locally cost shared budgets would be difficult to support without sufficient justification. Where the security situation is improving or deteriorating, the DO, SMT, SO and DSS' Regional Desks/POSS should ensure that the country cost shared budget is reflective of the security environment.

## **G. Mechanisms for Emergency Response – Modalities and Funding**

72. At its 14<sup>th</sup> session in January 2011, the IASMN was presented with a paper on Emergency Funding Mechanisms that outlined both the current obstacles faced by DSS in providing a "surge capacity" of security professionals in a stand-by mode to be made available for deployment at short notice, as well as the difficulties inherent in securing funding for emergency needs. The IASMN decided that these issues required further examination and that DSS provide further proposals and analysis in this regard. At the same time, the IASMN considered forming a working group to examine these issues more closely but this was decided against, primarily due to the fact that financial expertise was best sought in another forum.

73. At its last meeting in May 2011, the IASMN Steering Group confirmed the IASMN's earlier conclusion that the IASMN did not have the expertise to develop funding modalities for emergency situations. Recognizing that this was a long term project, the Steering Group recommended that HLCM be formally requested to instruct its Finance and Budget Network

(FBN) to examine the issue of how best to provide for funding to respond to unanticipated emergencies in general. The Steering Group also agreed that the USG, DSS task its Division of Regional Operations (DRO) with drawing up a set of proposals in the interim to address the obstacles in providing a “surge capacity” of security professionals, including means by which inter-agency cooperation could be strengthened in this regard.

74. At this session, the IASMN considered a paper that referenced the various funding mechanisms that had already been examined and two proposals to address surge capacity in emergency situations, with a view to deciding whether these should be acted upon, require further development or whether additional proposals needed to be explored. In this regard, the Chair informed IASMN members of a recent proposal that had been made to secure funds to strengthen security capacity in Libya. Unfortunately, appeals for security funding tended to yield a low response rate. Previous attempts had been made to secure funds in emergency situations through CERF appeals, but CERF functioned more like a loan mechanism. The Chair recognized that even though some extra-budgetary funding from certain sources had been received, and was grateful for the support WFP and UNHCR had rendered in providing personnel on the ground, solutions needed to be found for more satisfactory means of ensuring funds could be available for emergency situations. He recognized that DSS was competing with the AFPOs for funds for the same purpose. Although it was not expected that answers could be found soon, there was nevertheless a need to request HLCM to examine whether there are other alternatives.

75. The ensuing discussion focused on the availability of surge personnel. One member pointed out that when emergencies arose, those available are not always the ideal people for the job – sometimes the person who is the next most qualified is available (often FSCOs). In some cases, an AFPO officer may be the best choice to provide support, but at the same time the agency may also need that manpower. The suggestion was made that in such cases, the AFPO security officer, for example, could be deployed for the emergency and arrangements could then be made for someone less experienced to backfill the SO. It was further suggested that perhaps DSS officers should spend some time with AFPO’s to see how they operate. This would also provide for good career development. Another participant noted that times of crisis were not the best times to send in a new security officer. In fact, sending in the wrong person could make things worse. It was suggested that DSS look into providing a framework to utilize those who have previous experience in the system as and when needed.

76. The IASMN was reminded that there were two distinct issues here - the funding and the pool of personnel available for surge support. IASMN support was needed to put the issue of emergency funding forward to HLCM with the view that perhaps the FBN Working Group on Safety and Security Costs be requested to discuss emergency modalities. Regarding the personnel concerns, it was recognized that each emergency was different and needed to be looked at closely as each emergency demanded different personnel, e.g. following the earthquake in Pakistan different persons were needed to those needed for Benghazi and Tobruk. Much advance work would be needed to ensure slots were filled in a timely manner. What was perhaps most important was the coordination mechanism.

77. UNICEF offered to share with DSS its new framework that classified levels of emergencies. Another participant suggested that the new ASG of DSS who has extensive experience in raising funds might also have ideas on the creation of a sub-fund for security, as well as a corresponding

UN mechanism. As for providing more security officers during a crisis, the point was made that during the crisis in Pakistan there was no shortage of security officer's deployed, but rather a lack of leadership that resulted in problems. Another participant cited the Libya proposal as a good example of evaluating what was needed, what needed to be facilitated and what benefits could be sought from having a security setup. In short, it was about defining results and having a proper evaluation framework in place. Another member pointed out that in his organization, operations, programming and security persons were brought together for training and then evaluated to see if they could be deployed in a crisis.

78. The Chair informed the meeting that hard lessons had been learned in the past year about what is possible to obtain and what is not. He noted that officers on the ground needed to be trained faster and better and be provided with templates on what is needed to submit a proposal in the appeal. It was suggested that DSS' Division of Regional Operations and Executive Office convene a small group with some security focal points to further examine personnel issues during crises.

## **Recommendations**

79. The IASMN agreed to formally request HLCM at its next session that its Finance and Budget Network (FBN) examine a variety of funding sources for emergency needs.

80. In addition, the IASMN considered preliminary proposals to strengthen surge capacity and requested that additional proposals be developed and explored by DSS in order that draft proposals may be presented to the IASMN Steering Group at its next session (Nov/Dec 2011). It is to be noted that the IASMN did not support the idea that DSS hires a consultant for this purpose.

## **H. Update on Saving Lives Together**

81. As was the case during the IASMN's 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> sessions, (June 2010 and January 2011, respectively), as well as during the IASMN Steering Group meeting in May 2011, DSS provided an update to the IASMN at this session on the "Saving Lives Together" initiative. In so doing, it was recalled that SLT was revised with the aim of streamlining the recommendations and providing clear guidance on roles and responsibilities. It was also recalled that the issue of reliable funding remained at the forefront in light of the ever growing demand for security collaboration between the UN and NGOs.

82. The significant achievements that had been made since the revision of SLT were highlighted at the meeting, including the successful deployment to the field of 8 "FSCO-Liaison" officers (who are specially selected DSS Officers working under the SLT framework to provide security support to the UN's INGO partners operating in the humanitarian cluster system) and the development by DSS of a four point strategy to complement and enable the revised SLT by:

- enhancing the UN Security Management System's engagement on the SLT Framework
- enhancing the security and safety of SLT partners through the provision of advice and services, which include coordination on security arrangements, planning and implementation of SLT initiatives, sharing of information and analysis at both field and headquarters levels



- responding to security requirements for humanitarian operations including SLT partners, in a timely manner (coordination, surge missions, mutual security requirements in the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)) and
- achieving the highest level of professionalism among DSS FSCO Liaison Officers and INGO security Officers.

83. The IASMN was also informed of the upcoming three day conference (SLT Conference II) that would be held in the Fall of 2011 that would bring together all SLT stakeholders to review the progress made since 2009. It was hoped that the IASMN humanitarian agencies' security professionals would participate and support this initiative as they had in the past.

84. The Chair cited the fact that the level of security programming and security awareness among NGOs ranged from excellent to poor and that it was certainly not possible to have a "one size fits all" approach. He reminded members that the rationale behind developing SLT was not to field a specific office but rather to set up a framework to ensure an NGO liaison capacity and provide security officers with the capacity for providing advice. One participant wished to see a better description of what the SLT framework is and sought further information on the NGOs seeking cooperation with DSS.

85. UNICEF informed the meeting that the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) would be presented with a final paper in July 2011 confirming that the work of the Steering Group on Security had been completed. The paper would also request DSS to report back on funds that had been received and to examine the development of a mechanism to be shared between DSS and NGOs. In closing, he added that the Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO) was functioning well and, as such, there may not be a need for additional capacity.

## **Recommendation**

86. The IASMN noted the progress achieved since the revision of "Saving Lives Together" and expressed continuing support for the program. The IASMN further supported that staffing for SLT duties in the field should be funded using extra-budgetary resources.

## **I. Armed Private Security Companies**

87. At its 14<sup>th</sup> session in January 2011, the IASMN considered a paper produced by the IASMN Working Group on the Use of Private Security Companies (PSCs). The Working Group had been established to support DSS in taking the lead on providing input into the UN secretariat's Policy Committee meeting on the UN's use of PSCs that was scheduled to be held in March 2011. After an extensive discussion during that session, the majority of IASMN members acknowledged that the use of armed private security companies was a security risk management measure that may be needed to be employed by the UN and that the IASMN participating in the formulation of a policy for the use of armed PSCs should not be seen as supporting an ongoing/open policy and a blanket endorsement of armed PSCs. The IASMN subsequently recommended that the IASMN WG on PSCs continue to work with the UN's Policy Committee Secretariat to prepare a proposal for submission to the Policy Committee meeting.

88. The IASMN Steering Group was informed at its session in early May 2011 that the Policy Committee meeting had been deferred to 17 May. The Steering Group agreed that the 15th

session of the IASMN should be provided with the decisions emanating from the 17 May Policy Committee meeting in order to consider how best to progress those decisions that fell within its remit.

89. At this session, and following consultation with the Policy Committee Secretariat, the IASMN was provided, on an exceptional basis,<sup>2</sup> with the decisions of the Policy Committee meeting that was held on 17 May, as well as with the Policy Committee paper that had been produced for that meeting, which was a result of collaborative efforts involving DSS, IASMN members, other members of the Secretariat, as well as representatives from the agencies, funds and programmes. The IASMN was informed that during the course of the Policy Committee meeting, the USG, DSS had ensured that the objections voiced by WHO, UNRWA and CCISUA during the 14<sup>th</sup> session of IASMN regarding the use of armed PSCs were communicated to the Policy Committee. At the same time, it was made clear that the use of armed PSCs was subject to certain caveats that were also set out in the Policy Committee paper, including the fact that armed PSCs were to be used only in exceptional circumstances and never as a first choice.

90. The conclusions reached during the Policy Committee meeting recognized that there were risks inherent in using armed PSCs, but that there were greater risks in using armed PSCs without first assessing those risks properly and without clear policies, safeguards, operating procedures and mechanisms for robust oversight in place. The use of armed PSCs required a different kind of decision making, as well as consideration of how Member States would be engaged in this issue.

91. As a result of the Policy Committee meeting on 17 May, DSS had been tasked, in consultation with the IASMN, with developing a regulatory framework, including a contract model by the end of 2011. Additional guidance needed to be developed as part of a regulatory framework to provide clarity on UN decision-making procedures for the use of armed PSCs with respect to screening procedures, standard operating procedures regulating their operations and mechanisms for oversight and accountability.

92. UNRWA was satisfied that its comments had been incorporated in the policy paper that was submitted on 17 May and was pleased that the political umbrella was now provided under which to proceed with developing and implementing the decisions made. Noting that the IASMN WG that had been formed to provide input into the Policy Committee paper had now been disbanded, some members supported that work to progress the relevant Policy Committee decisions be considered in a new IASMN working group as this issue would impact the whole UNSMS. Another member supported the establishment of a multi-disciplinary working group to include others beyond only IASMN members. It was also debated whether there should be made available a full time professional from within DSS to support these efforts or whether it would be best to hire a consultant for this purpose. One member believed that a great deal of the work on this issue needed to first be worked out in-house by consultants and then examined on a broader basis to address the greater questions.

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<sup>2</sup> It is to be noted that normally Policy Committee papers and decisions arising from Policy Committee meetings have a very restricted circulation. However, as the decisions arising out of the Policy Committee meeting held on 17 May 2011 called for further action by DSS, in consultation with the IASMN, DSS sought and received permission for Security Focal Points concerned with this issue to be provided with a copy of both the Policy Committee decisions and the Policy Committee paper submitted to the 17 May meeting.

93. Another member proposed that a temporary solution be put in place to beat the timeline imposed by the Policy Committee, i.e. the end of 2011. He suggested that a working group come up with an initial policy. The Chair however did not support this proposal as he believed that temporary policies would not meet the necessary requirements. He pointed out that until such time as a policy was completed, the Executive Group on Security (EGS) would be used as the forum within which to decide on the use of armed PSCs and added that there were already a great deal of model documents available to consult, including documentation that the Montreux group had developed. The Chair did agree however that DSS needed to provide dedicated resources to fulfill the task entrusted to it by the Policy Committee. Noting that diligent efforts had already managed to produce a policy for the use of deadly force and standard training for close protection, he believed that this task was certainly achievable and that it would be better to relegate this to someone from within the Department rather than to an external consultant to ensure that the UN's interest in this is protected.

94. WHO stressed that it was not in favour of using armed PSCs for mobile escorts and expressed its fears that, if agreed, the use of armed PSCs could become a MOSS requirement in several countries. Moreover, WHO expressed concerns over the fact that the decision to use armed PSCs was taken outside the governance mechanism of the UNSMS i.e. IASMN, HLCM and CEB as clearly described in the Framework of Accountability that had been endorsed by the UN General Assembly, i.e. the decisions of the Secretary-General were not taken in his capacity as Chair of the CEB. WHO noted that the decisions discussed at this session resulted from a meeting of the UN Policy Committee which comprised only a few members of the UNSMS and therefore those decisions were not binding for all the participants of the UNSMS who do not report to the Secretary-General or to the UN Policy Committee. WHO urged that the proper established governance mechanism be strictly followed for such important decisions. He was concerned about the caveat that PSCs should be used only when an SRA had indicated that protection by the host country or Member States was insufficient because this could apply to many countries. He added that when we discuss the necessity to "stay and deliver", it is important that we impart a neutral and impartial image and resorting to PSCs goes against that.

95. The Chair disagreed that these decisions were taken outside the governance mechanism of the UNSMS and confirmed that the IASMN had been fully engaged in this issue from the outset. The Policy Committee decisions called for further action to be taken and it was the intention to take the conclusions of a new IASMN PSC working group to HLCM and CEB when the work was complete. The Chair added that, before this could be done, it was important to seek guidance from among senior leaders in the organization on this issue.

96. Another member, who also supported the establishment of an IASMN WG on this issue, viewed this as a great opportunity for the IASMN to take the initiative to regulate the use of PSCs in a more positive way and believed that it was important to agree on a timeline. One member was concerned that the mandated timeline might not allow for the completion of the work required. The Chair was not willing to agree on a timeline until it was clear what this work involved. He reiterated the need to address governance issues by ensuring proposals were put to the IASMN, HLCM and CEB and pointed out that the Policy Committee would not be surprised to hear that this process would take longer than originally envisaged.

97. OLA recognized that there would be difficulties with working out political and legal liabilities in connection with the use of armed PSCs. He pointed out that one of the deficiencies of the original Policy Committee paper was that it did not mention political liability. He also expressed concern over meeting the timelines and did not believe that this should be left only to an IASMN working group or a consultant, but that in view of the complexity of the issue, more of a dedicated effort was needed to ensure intense attention to it.

98. Another member added that there was also a need to consider internal communication with staff on this issue because there will be many questions. In fact, there were several aspects to this work that needed to be considered carefully in addition to communications, including operational, political, legal and humanitarian aspects. He noted that the EGS might form its own working group if needed and favoured leaving procurement issues to the experts. Yet another member noted that it could take years to deal with all the issues involved. OLA added that it would take considerable effort and a push to review the procurement process which is inextricably related to the development of model contracts. Whatever model is developed, it would need to be developed together with the AFPOs.

99. The meeting was reminded by the Chair that time was of the essence and that AFPOs needed to start thinking about this. Every security situation was different and we did not have the luxury of saying we should not be operating somewhere as long as there were political and humanitarian mandates to fill. He pointed out that staff in some of the most dangerous duty stations would not wish to continue working there without security contractors because they did not have faith in the national forces. He reminded the IASMN that the mandate of the UNSMS was to enable programs and the tools must be in place to do so. All available options needed to be looked at. In any case, PSCs were already being used in many locations and it was now clear that a decision had been made to progress this issue. What was needed was a plan for doing so.

100. CCISUA informed the IASMN that after the tragic incident in Mazar Al-Sharif, the issue of having PSCs at that location had been raised by both UN and non UN persons and that staff are vehemently opposed to the use of armed security officers from private contracting companies and this is making them very nervous. This is not a popular option and risks putting the UN system in even more difficulty in the event of the death of a staff member. With all the additional changes currently underway in the UN system, i.e. post cuts and changes to staff entitlements, he confirmed that this issue was contributing to the general anxiety felt by UN staff.

101. FICSA recalled its objection to the use of armed PSCs that was expressed during the 14<sup>th</sup> session of IASMN but recognized that now that decisions had been taken it was important to see how the decisions were going to be monitored. He acknowledged that this would be an ongoing learning process. FICSA pointed out that staff normally have serious reservations about the outsourcing of functions and activities, a practice that has increased over the last few years. Although PSCs were intended to be used only as a last resort, FICSA was concerned that PSCs could be used beyond exceptional circumstances, particularly if it was found to be a cheaper alternative to in-house security. In its view, safety and security issues could not be treated as other administrative activities that were outsourced, as we are dealing with the life of staff and their families. Furthermore, FICSA wished to know where the budget for private contractors would come from. Both FICSA and CCISUA requested to be part of an IASMN working group on PSCs – a request that was supported by the IASMN and by DSS.

102. In response to the concerns expressed by the Staff Federations, one member pointed out that PSCs were already being used as an absolute last resort. However, this was not the case system-wide. The IASMN needed to take this further and respond to the decisions made. The Chair acknowledged that some IASMN members continued to express the view that decisions to use armed security contractors could have serious repercussions for the UN in terms of reputation, legal liability, and image. The question was how to socialize those decisions with employees in the UN system. He confirmed that DSS would devote additional resources to completing this task, that best practices would be looked at and at the same time, it would be borne in mind that the UN is a unique institution that needs to develop policies and procedures that recognize and acknowledge this. While all efforts would be made to work diligently to finalize the work mandated by the Policy Committee, DSS would inform the Committee that, at the very least there would be significant progress reported on this issue before the end of 2011.

### **Recommendation**

103. The IASMN took note of the decision of the Secretary-General following the meeting of the UN Secretariat's Policy Committee on the use of armed private security companies and agreed to form a working group to include OHCHR WFP UNDP UNICEF UNHCR OCHA DPKO/DFS FAO, DPA, FICSA, CCISUA and DSS to progress the decisions made by the UN secretariat's Policy Committee on the use of armed private security companies. It was agreed that DSS would devote additional resources to assisting the working group before it is convened in order that the first draft of proposals by the Working Group may be presented to the IASMN Steering Group at its next meeting (Nov/Dec 2011). In this regard, the IASMN supported that DSS inform the Policy Committee Secretariat of this timetable.

### **J. Security Arrangements at External Events, Conferences, Special Conferences of the Secretariat and meetings, sponsored or organized by United Nations System Organizations**

104. The IASMN was informed that DSS had issued guidelines on conferences and external events sponsored or organized by UN system organizations in April 2009, given that the Department supported a large number of external events and conferences each year. The broad variations in size, scale and security requirements for these specific programmed activities necessitated the revision of this guidance. Subsequently, revised guidelines were produced that clearly delineated the DSS security management processes in order to improve the efficiency with which DSS can support the security requirements and successful delivery of external events. The revised guidelines also provided an overview of how the preparation and organization of external conferences should be conducted.

105. Although it had been pointed out to the IASMN Steering Group in May 2011 that the guidelines and supporting documentation are not applicable to the Agencies, Funds and Programmes, in recognition of the fact that the revised guidelines could nevertheless have an impact on the Agencies, Funds and Programmes particularly with respect to attendance at or sponsoring of major conferences, DSS believed that the revised guidelines should be provided to the full membership of the IASMN for information before they were promulgated.

106. Accordingly, at this session, the guidelines and supporting documentation were provided to IASMN members who were asked to provide their comments. It was noted that the guidelines did not apply to regular meetings coordinated by the United Nations Country Team nor did they apply to the regular schedule of meetings for United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes

at duty stations in the countries where they are present. One member indicated that he did not have any problem with the guidelines as long as they remained as guidelines and not policy, emphasizing that they are not applicable to the AFPOs. It was confirmed in this regard that the guidelines would not be included in the *Security Policy Manual*. It was also noted that the guidelines referenced additional tasks that had been relegated to the AFPOs that had not appeared in the previous guidelines and that it seemed that there were items included in the guidelines which could add to the workload of the CSA. One member observed that the request in the guidelines to provide for at least 6 months' notification of conferences was not realistic as often the sponsoring organization was not in control of the organization hosting the conference and added that this was something to be taken into account in any new guidelines.

107. OLA clarified that the General Assembly required that appropriate legal agreements are in place with countries for the hosting of conferences away from headquarters and that generally, if the conference was at the invitation of a Member State that the host country was responsible for the costs. For large conferences, pre planning costs were also absorbed by the host country. He added that host countries have conference agreements in place to deal with questions of privileges and immunities to ensure that delegations are treated properly and to ensure there is the legal framework in place to deal with third party liability. For larger conferences, DSS would conclude a separate MOU with the host country security authorities to ensure coordination and cooperation. Further, it was to be noted that during the period of the conference DSS would be in control of the territory temporarily defined as UN territory for the purposes of the conference and that the provisions would differ depending on whether the conference was meant to host 20 or 2000 persons.

### **Recommendation**

108. The IASMN took note of the revised Guidelines that had been devised by DSS' Security and Safety Services. Members of the IASMN were invited to submit further comments on the guidelines directly to DSS.

### **K. Host Country Relations**

109. The IASMN agreed at its 14<sup>th</sup> session in January 2011 to end the pilot on Model Host Country Security Agreements because this effort did not receive enough support from either Designated Officials or Member States and it was recognized that any further efforts to advance this concept would not be well received. In noting that two previous related initiatives that had been launched (i.e. creating host country liaison committees and host country supplemental agreements) received a similar lack of support, the IASMN further agreed to explore a more holistic approach to strengthening host country relations, including through a number of enhancements to training, compliance with security policies and procedures, and enhanced communications with Member States.

110. It is to be recalled that the impetus behind the measures cited above and the continuing need to strengthen host country relations arose not only by the fact that improved host country relations served to improve the security environment for UN personnel, but that there were specific recommendations in the *Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of*

*United Nations Staff and Premises* (a.k.a. “the Brahimi Report”), that called for efforts to be taken in this regard.<sup>3</sup>

111. In light of the more holistic approach to strengthening host country relations decided by the IASMN at its 14<sup>th</sup> session, the IASMN Steering Group at its last session in May 2011, considered ways in which to move forward on the various enhancements proposed. At the Steering Group’s meeting and to stimulate discussion on this issue, DSS provided two compliance survey samples that focused on coordination and liaison with host country authorities, diplomatic missions and other international organizations, as well as an updated matrix of the status of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report that highlighted the recommendations specifically relating to host country issues. The Steering Group noted that the crux of the issue was how to identify if relations with host country authorities were adequate or needed to be improved, and recognizing that DSS compliance missions alone would not provide a global picture of host country relations and areas of priority action, the Steering Group agreed, as a first step, that a proper tool needed to be established to assess and subsequently monitor host country relations. In this regard, it was agreed that DSS develop a draft survey on Host Country issues that could serve as a self-evaluation tool for DOs, SMT members, Security Advisors and Area Security Coordinators to be able to obtain a fairly credible picture of where relations with the host country stood which in turn would allow for focused remedial action to be taken where improvements were needed.

112. At this session, the IASMN was informed that the idea of a survey to assess host country relations was not a new one, as from December 2006 to July 2007, DSS had conducted a survey of Designated Officials (DO)’s views on security collaboration with the host countries in which the United Nations operates. The IASMN was also informed that the recent recommendation from its Steering Group to devise another survey differed from past efforts. For one, it was proposed that there be an annual survey to ensure the most current information was captured. Second, it was proposed to seek input from a broader clientele, i.e. not only DOs, but also SMT members, Security Advisors and Area Security Coordinators. Sample survey questions were provided to IASMN members.

113. The IASMN supported the idea of a survey along the lines proposed, although some reservations were expressed about the capacity in some cases to truly assess the attitude of the host government toward the UN in country. There was general support for extending the survey to a broader client base as in many countries it was the SA or CSA that had a direct relationship with host country authorities on security matters.

114. Regarding the capacity to assess the attitude of the host country towards the UN, the Chair pointed out that if the situation so warranted, it would be enough in some cases for replies to the survey to merely indicate that host country relations were not what they should be without needing to go into great detail, as such a statement in itself would provide a general indication of where relations stood. It was hoped that the survey could also reveal whether in cases where problems were raised with the host country authorities, these were addressed accordingly. Certain information could only be gleaned from the duty stations directly and there was a need to

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<sup>3</sup> The specific recommendation that drove efforts to consider host country supplemental agreements, host country liaison committees and model host country security agreements read: “...that a working group of senior UN officials led by the USG/DSS and Member States should urgently propose practical guidance for a best practice mechanism to help ensure “buy in” by all Member States into the requirements of protecting UN staff and premises worldwide.”

check this at least once a year. The Chair believed that there is a perception that we cannot be honest but at the same time, there is a need to tell host country authorities that they are not fulfilling the UN's needs when this is the case. Knowing the attitudes of the host country and others was crucial to realistically understanding the critical threat environments we are facing. The Chair hoped something like this survey could serve to change attitudes and he would like the security officers, SMT and DO to complete a survey like this once a year.

115. Several members viewed this survey as critical and agreed that it should be completed on a regular basis as this would contribute to keeping the SRA as credible as possible. It was also suggested that further consultation on the survey be undertaken with DOCO. Another member noted that DOs may not be wholly honest in completing the survey and proposed that there be some type of indicators established, perhaps by the SMT, to assist in the survey process.

116. Further questions were proposed by IASMN members for possible use in the survey that addressed such issues as the control of movements by HC authorities, the time span for the release of security equipment (customs or licenses), the reaction time on requests, whether host countries charged for services rendered and whether there were any accreditation issues. It was noted that the issue of accreditation was tricky in that a CSO or CSA was not formally accredited to the government. One member raised the problem that some AFPOs had, i.e. that their security focal points were excluded from meeting with host government officials who would insist only on meeting with the DSS security officers whom they viewed as the main focal point on security issues.

117. Another member saw the survey as a means by which to promote the relationship between the DO, SMT and the host country. Relations with the host country were key for security. It was hoped that the survey and any initiatives arising from it would encourage the host country to be more cooperative with DOs and SMTs. He added that it would definitely help to coordinate the activities of SMT members. Another member also supported that trying to get proper support and assistance from the host country should be a collective effort and not be left only to the DO. The results of the survey could lead to actions that would support better coordination among organizations on the ground and it was hoped that the survey could be conducted at least once a year or more often if possible. One staff federation noted that an improvement with host country relations could also go a long way in improving the situation of local staff. Some members offered to provide indicators to DSS, as well as additional questions addressing Status of Forces (SOFA) agreements. It was cautioned by one member that overstating good relations with the host country was dangerous.

118. In the context of the discussions, it was asked whether the UN Secretary-General consulted with DSS on host country issues. The Chair confirmed that when the Secretary-General was either visiting somewhere or meeting with Member States and security issues were addressed, DSS was always consulted to provide input and talking points. However, DSS could be doing more when it came to raising issues to be discussed, particularly its regional desks had an important role to play in identifying and keeping abreast of issues. Noting that many in the UNSMS had expressed dissatisfaction with what the regional desks were doing and expected more, he added that it would help remake the primary role of the regional desks if they were asked to concentrate more on issue-based concerns rather than fulfilling information based rote requirements. Issue based information could then be raised with the DO, the Secretary-General



and others. In closing, he requested that IASMN members submit to DSS the information they wish to be captured in this survey.

## **Recommendation**

119. Recognizing that in order to strengthen support from host countries for the safety and security of staff and premises it is necessary to first identify if relations with host country authorities are adequate or need to be improved, the IASMN agreed that DSS develop a survey to assess host country relations. To obtain input from a broad range of clientele and ensure that the most current information is captured, it was further decided that such a survey would be provided to the SMT, DO, CSAs, and SAs on an annual basis. It was also agreed that DSS would develop the survey questions, with input from IASMN members.

## **L. Information Management**

120. The IASMN was presented with a paper outlining the progress in information management that was made in 2011 with respect to the implementation of the new security clearance system, (TRIP) which currently sees the processing of approximately 5,000 security clearances per day. In addition, the meeting was briefed on the implementation of the new security level system, specifically the mapping of new security level areas (809 SLAs ) that were created to reflect the distribution of a threat within a country.

121. The status of three issues that required further attention by DSS was also brought to the attention of IASMN members at this session, namely a) arrangements for ensuring that all users can access the UNDSS web based resources using a single user ID and password; b) wider circulation of the *Security Policy Manual* as an internal UN document and c) the posting of the Women's Security Awareness Training (WSAT) module on the UNSMIN website to provide materials to trainers and facilitators.

122. The Chair stressed that the main purpose of information management was to be able to provide information that should be used to make better decisions. To be of greater value, information should serve a dual purpose – feed into decision- making during crises and be suitable for daily use.

123. WFP appreciated that WSAT was now posted on the UNSMIN website and would be made available to trainers and facilitators. However, it was still awaiting feedback on SIRS from DSS. Another member, while commending the DSS travel advisory which contained extremely useful information, noted that it still remained technical in that it indicated the security level and security area, while staff wished to see more practical information included, e.g. information on appropriate accommodation and commuting details. Another member pointed out that, while the travel advisory was a comprehensive document, it was not easy to update on a weekly basis and that it would be difficult to include all necessary information. He noted that those receiving security clearances were able to obtain general information for the country so that one option to be considered would be to create links with the security advisory to TRIP, rather than include information separately in a weekly travel advisory. Another noted that it was more important that staff actually used the information in travel advisories and that DSS may wish to check how many staff had their profiles established.

124. Another member, while commending the work done on UNSMIN also noted that links to MOSS, MORSS and SRAs were lacking and requested that these be uploaded/linked to the UNSMIN country profile listings. Some members believed that certain sub-data or pages of UNSMIN could be offered to other users, i.e. non security professionals and those with specific needs for certain information. DSS clarified that the Security Focal Point may request access to UNSMIN from DSS on behalf of those who may require access for specific information.

## **Recommendations**

125. The IASMN greatly appreciated the progress achieved by DSS in 2011 in improving information management capacity in the UN security management system, while noting that further improvements in information management capacity were needed.

126. Regarding the Women's Security Awareness Training (WSAT) developed by a WFP led working group, the IASMN reiterated the importance of presenting WSAT training in its entirety and on a face to face basis.

## **M. OCHA To Stay and Deliver**

127. OCHA introduced a study that it had conducted entitled "To Stay and Deliver" that addressed the issue of operating in complex high risk environments, which was led by Mr. Jan Egeland, the former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief. It was pointed out to IASMN members that over the last two years, most AFPOs had been confronted with security incidents that impacted delivery and assistance to the local population.

128. The study covered 6 complex emergency environments and more than 230 people from the level of USG to program officers participated in it. In addition, a questionnaire had been distributed to more than 1000 national staff.

129. OCHA explained that one of the objectives of the study was to share a number of best practices on how the UN and the AFPOs operated in areas where there was not direct access to the population in need of assistance. One observation that arose from the study was that while the number of conflicts had decreased in 2010, the number of casualties had significantly increased. In some years, up to 100 people were killed, severely injured or kidnapped in the operating environment. While these numbers increased it had to be noted that this occurred in a few operating environments like Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan, as well as more recently in southern Sudan and Libya. The problem was that the more dangerous the environment, the higher the humanitarian needs. The dilemma was to operate and deliver where the UN would not normally go.

130. The point was made that in the humanitarian context, avoiding all risk was not possible, as delivering in high risk environments entailed some risk. Zero risk does not exist. This was something that was well accepted in the humanitarian community. Attempts are made therefore to try to optimize all the mitigating factors and look at program criticality and the importance of delivery assistance and measure the risk. Once all this information is available, it is hoped an informed decision is taken.

131. OCHA further pointed out that when the USG, DSS had attended the Humanitarian Coordinator's conference in Montreux, he explained the shift in the UNSMS from risk aversion to risk management. A shift from "when to leave" to "how to stay" which was not just about staying for the sake of staying but staying to deliver and ensure effective access to the population in need. The USG, DSS at that time also spoke of the need to ensure that this mindset permeated the SMT and DOs who needed to take informed decisions. OCHA did not believe this mindset had yet taken hold in the field where too often the DO and SMT were relying solely on instructions relayed by the CSA. He believed that risk aversion still exists within SMTs and more work needs to be done to change this mindset.

132. OCHA also pointed to a recent meeting of humanitarian principals that had been held in May 2011 where all recognized that there was still a long way to go between what we claim we want to do and what the reality on the ground is. In this regard, he emphasized that when this report was published, the UN was evacuating critical staff from Tripoli and Abidjan just at the time when we were talking of how to stay and deliver. It would be important to have security officers who had a better understanding of what humanitarian programmes mean and why there should be higher acceptance when a programme is assessed as being critical. This can only be done if interaction was enhanced between the CSO, CSA and members of the country team. There needed to be a better understanding of the context of where we are operating and what the needs of the AFPOs are. OCHA further explained that acceptance did not mean acceptance of traditional interlocutors, but in complex environments, this meant acceptance by the local population and local communities. There was a need for dialogue with the population to show that a difference could be made in alleviating suffering of the people. He cited examples in Afghanistan and Somalia where humanitarian access could have been extended through interaction with community leaders.

133. OCHA also explained that when we talk about "to stay and deliver" there is a cost and the issue of covering this cost had not yet been addressed. More fundraising was needed to support operating in high risk environments. While he recognized that acceptance was key, he also recognized that, even though there were situations where there was no other choice but to accept armed escorts, better protection and better bunkers, resorting to bunkerization, excessive hardware and armed protection unfortunately conveyed the impression that the humanitarian organizations had an agenda that was not compatible with providing impartial assistance to the population. Further, in too many countries, the UN was seen as being too westernized and this show of protection did not help improve the acceptance.

134. OCHA emphasized that humanitarian principles still mattered. He was not interested by organizations stating that they are not delivering and noted a dangerous trend during the last few years where AFPOs pretending to be impartial and neutral were acting in a different way on the ground. In Afghanistan, for example, for many years, the humanitarian agenda was off the table because the agenda was political. Another example was Gaza where some donors had a 'no contact' policy. Translated into a program, this meant that INGOs could agree to operate programs in Gaza only in those zones not under the control of Hamas. He believed this undermined the legitimacy of the humanitarian organizations operating there.

135. Turning to the issue of national staff, he believed that it was not just about the question of evacuating local staff but the need to be more empathetic overall about local staff. He concluded by pointing out that the study contained quite a number of ideas on how to operate in high risk

environments which can only be accessed if the humanitarian organizations can show on the ground that they are honest brokers and providers of assistance. He stressed that the results of this study did not represent guidelines or policy and invited IASMN members to distribute the study quite broadly to promote best practices and provide food for thought for colleagues operating in high risk environments.

136. The Chair pointed out that when the authors of this study had approached DSS in 2005/2006, DSS did not cooperate with them. This was no longer the case and although he did not agree with everything in this report, the study did serve nevertheless to highlight that there are really problems out there and those real issues were captured in this report. He encouraged IASMN members to read the report and informed the meeting that it had already been distributed to every security officer in the field. Cooperation between OCHA and DSS was a win-win situation and he heralded a close relationship between OCHA, DSS and the IASMN.

137. One member was not pleased with the report which seemed to go overboard in criticising the way in which humanitarian operations were presently conducted. He added that no one in any humanitarian agency viewed bunkering as an option and that the issue of 'good donorship' was not emphasized in the report and that this was an issue to be considered in light of the fact that some donors would not sponsor efforts in particular countries. Another member welcomed the report, noting that much of what was reflected mirrored his organization's own operating modality. He believed that the report should be part of the toolkit of a security officer in the field. He also asked how the elements in the report could be operationalized and how persons could be positioned as problem solvers to ensure safe delivery of programs while keeping personnel safe. Only focusing on staying safe reinforced the traditional paradigm over and over and he believed that while a security officer has the right and the obligation to say no in certain circumstances, before doing so, that thinking must be challenged. In this regard, he looked forward to working with DSS to find ways to move forward.

138. Another member noted that the report encouraged dialogue with non-state actors in a number of practical areas. He advocated for the need to train humanitarian colleagues in risk management. Another member cautioned about stating that local staff were more at risk than international staff and added that acceptance meant that UN agencies operating in areas needed to ensure that their activities were clearly understood and accepted by the stakeholders. It was not only about bunkerization but ensuring that persons fully understood what the humanitarian organizations were doing.

139. DSS informed the meeting that it was involved in the OCHA led working group on humanitarian space and that it was important to step away from dogma and bunkerization and examine in what context acceptance works. Not all aid was humanitarian aid and some parts of the UN were not involved in humanitarian programs. Therefore there was a need for clarity in framing this issue conceptually and it was hoped that the study would launch a clear fact based discussion on how to move forward.

140. The Chair stressed that acceptance was not a substitute for security policies in any shape or form and believed that the UN still had a great deal of work to do on this issue. He was greatly concerned with training security officers and the type of training they received. In this regard, he informed IASMN members that DSS was currently reviewing all its training programs.

141. OCHA responded that perhaps we needed to admit that acceptance and the UN is an oxymoron, but in so doing we might have to admit that the UN cannot deliver and then maybe ask the NGOs to do the job and coordinate their work. He emphasized that the report was only an inventory of practices in the field and that it highlighted that more needed to be done with respect to the interaction between security officers, political persons and program officers. While he agreed that it was true that local staff may not in reality be more at risk than international staff, he nevertheless believed that after interviewing more than 1000 local staff for the study, it was clear that the perception that the UN was not doing enough for its local staff needed to be addressed. Local staff needed to be listened to and shown more empathy. He also believed dogma does not lead anymore and was not quite sure what comes next. In any case, certain discussions need to take place.

## **Recommendation**

142. The IASMN took note of the OCHA study “To Stay and Deliver - Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments”. While not all IASMN members agreed on all points in the study, and acknowledged that not all points could be applied in all circumstances, the IASMN recognized the study as a useful inventory of practices that can be used to maintain an operational presence in difficult environments, and a constructive addition to the discussion on safety and security in humanitarian operations.

## **N. Critical Incident Stress Management**

143. At this session, the IASMN was presented with a report on the activities undertaken by the Critical Incident Stress management Unit (CISMU) from January to December 2010 and early 2011 that outlined the achievements of the Unit on coordination issues, strengthening the UN response preparedness on critical incident stress prevention and management (CISPM), and on improving access of UN staff to quality psychosocial services. In order to enhance UN Crisis Response Preparedness and Critical Incident Stress Management within UN organizations, CISMU sought to build the capacities of UN counselors and improve coordination, both within the UN secretariat as well as within the UN common system and worked closely with their partners within the UN Secretariat’s Staff Counseling Office (SCO), the OHRM Emergency Preparedness and Support Team (EPST), and the Medical Services Division (MSD), as well as with the agency, funds and programmes, also counselling staff throughout the year.

144. In its report, CISMU requested the IASMN to consider that:

- the human factors related to security risks, (e.g. resilience building, stress management training, critical incident stress management interventions) be assessed with a view to integrating these factors further into the security management system.
- the IASMN recommend to CSAs/SAs, SMT members and DOs that they facilitate the implementation of Critical Incidents Stress Intervention Cells as an integral part of their emergency preparedness plans and that
- the IASMN considers including Stress Counseling in the MOSS for medium to high risk duty stations.

145. In addition to its annual report, IASMN members were also presented with a paper intended solely to provide information to IASMN members on the rationale behind the placement of CISMU in DSS. The reason for providing this paper was predicated on the fact that at its 13<sup>th</sup> session in Vienna in June 2010, the IASMN when considering CISMU's annual report had debated whether the unit should continue to belong in the security environment or come under the umbrella of another department in the UN secretariat. At that time, the IASMN did not make any formal recommendation on this issue but the Chair noted that if the IASMN strongly believed that CISMU belonged in the medical community, then that judgment would be left to the IASMN. At the same time, he also reminded the IASMN that as USG, DSS, he reserved the right to make that decision as CISMU is currently part of DSS.

146. Although there was no formal request to include the issue of the placement of CISMU on the agenda of the 15<sup>th</sup> session of the IASMN, nor was any action being requested at this time, it was recognized that this issue was likely to be raised once more during the consideration of CISMU's annual report and, as such, it would be prudent that any discussions on this were based on sound information. The paper therefore set out the history behind the evolution of the Unit in DSS, presented arguments for the added value of maintaining CISMU in DSS and noted the differences in functions performed by the "Staff Counselors" Office within the Medical Services Division.

147. The discussions at this session, while acknowledging the achievements of the unit over the past year, focused primarily on the placement of CISMU. The Chair stated from the outset that if CISMU could operate as well or better somewhere else then he would be willing to consider the unit being placed elsewhere and then address the budgeting issues accordingly. However, he had not yet heard from IASMN members that they were dissatisfied with the unit.

148. One member noted that the work of CISMU was critical and raised questions about where the unit was best placed – whether in DSS, in the UN or decentralized. He was concerned with what was being done (or not) to de-stress the stress counsellors, recognizing that critical incident stress counselling was an invaluable service. He was uncertain as to whether there was an obligation for the organizations to see counselling through for a staff member and if so if there was a methodology in place in the UN to monitor and ensure the follow up of cases. He acknowledged that this might be particularly difficult in areas where stress counselling was not readily available.

149. DPKO/DFS added that no one had yet been convinced that critical incident stress counsellors operated more effectively outside of DSS, rather than inside. He pointed out that CISMU was only one part of the counselling network. DPKO/DFS provided a considerable number of counsellors. Regarding the recommendation that the IASMN consider including stress counseling in the MOSS for medium to high risk duty stations, he asked how this would be funded if this was going to be the case. He also expressed concern that as DPKO missions get smaller, the pool of counsellors will diminish. If, in high risk duty stations one could not rely on a pool of counsellors to be available, then an alternative plan would be needed for providing the same service.

150. CCISUA reminded the IASMN of the animosity that had existed in 2005 between the stress counsellors and other counsellors in the UN system and that it was important to consider

counselling for those returning from the field as well as the difficulty inherent in following up on cases when there was the need for confidentiality between patient and client.

151. The representative of the UN Medical Directors' Working Group (UNMDWG) cited the positive interactions that had taken place with CISMU and noted that when the stress counsellors were deployed in emergency settings they do good work. He also acknowledged the animosity in the past that existed between different groups of counsellors and recognized that there still existed issues with lack of communication and lack of collaboration. The UNMDWG would welcome more and regular communication with CISMU. He added that the UNMDWG strongly objected to the last two paragraphs of CISMU's report and clarified that all counsellors were performing similar functions to those performed by CISMU and that the Medical Services Division in New York, while only limited to NY, did nevertheless communicate with the field on a regular basis.

152. Another member was concerned that CISMU's present capacity to deploy quickly might disappear if the unit was assigned to another department. He also opposed including stress counselling as part of MOSS, as did another member whose organization's stress counselling function rested with its human resources department.

153. FICSA welcomed the discussion and expressed concern regarding the recent recommendation by the General Assembly to reduce the rest and recuperation (R and R) package which he believed would increase stress on staff even more, especially those serving in the most difficult duty stations. It was important that the UNMDWG, HR Network and DSS have a coordinated approach in order that staff do not suffer from any gray areas that fall in between.

154. The representative from the HR Network pointed out that the HR Network staff counsellors do report regularly to the HR Network and the impression from the HR Network side was that there was improved coordination. She added that with respect to R and R, it was the intention that the DSA portion of R and R would be discontinued as of 1 July 2011 and one unintended consequence of that would be that staff would use R and R to a lesser extent.

155. The Chair noted the concerns of the UNMDWG and ensured the IASMN that it would try to ensure closer collaboration between CISMU and the UNMDWG as well as with other staff counsellors. He noted that the stress counsellors in DSS served two primary functions – one in a post incident setting and the other in triage. He also noted the concerns about the need for the counsellors themselves to de-stress. It was further noted that CISMU fell under the JFA and the support account. He summarized that there was general approval that CISMU was seen as worthwhile and continuing.

156. One member saw stress counselling going beyond what was considered to be necessary and believed that for long term care, persons could use their own health insurance. There were concerns expressed about the way in which stress counselling services were being provided. Another informed the IASMN that even though his organization had in place a well developed program of staff counsellors, it still benefited from the DSS stress counselling services and the feedback has been very good.

157. At the conclusion of the discussions, the representative of the UNMDWG brought to the attention of IASMN members a recent report of the Joint Inspection Unit that focused on the

need to develop an occupational health and safety policy for the UN system (Review of the Medical Service in the United Nations System, JIU/REP/2011/1). The JIU, in its report, recommended that each organization should have an occupational health and safety policy and that a network should be created to include all different identities with respect to staff health, including CISMU. IASMN members were provided with a full copy of the JIU report.

## **Recommendations**

158. In recognition of the shift from risk aversion to security risk management, the IASMN supported that the human factors related to security risks, (e.g. resilience building, stress management training, critical incident stress management interventions) should be assessed with a view to integrating these factors further into the security management system.

159. While the IASMN generally supported the idea of establishing Critical Incident Stress Intervention Cells as an integral part of emergency preparedness plans, it did not necessarily believe that this action needs to be taken across the board and as such warrants further examination.

160. The IASMN did not approve the recommendation that stress counselling should be included in the MOSS for medium to high risk duty stations.

161. The IASMN requested that DSS makes every effort to ensure that there is closer collaboration between its Critical Incident Stress Counselors, the Medical Services and other staff counselors within the UN system.

## **O. Update on the Work of the SRM Improvement Working Group**

162. At its 21 July 2010 teleconference, the IASMN Steering Group requested that DSS lead a Working Group (WG) composed of interested AFPOs of the IASMN to examine ways to improve Likelihood Assessments in Security Risk Assessments (SRAs). At its 14th session, the IASMN was informed that a working group on Likelihood was established which is chaired by DSS and includes UNICEF, WFP, DPKO, UNHCR, UNDP, UNFPA, WHO and DSS (including one CSA in the field) and would report back on its work to the next IASMN Steering Group meeting. The IASMN also agreed to expand the mandate of the Likelihood WG to address other SRM issues, so it was renamed the “SRM Improvement Working Group.”

163. The Chair of the WG gave a presentation to the IASMN Steering Group at its May 2011 session on the procedures and tools developed by the WG for improving likelihood assessments in the SRA and the tools were well received. It was highlighted to the Steering Group that the likelihood of natural disasters cannot be assessed through the SRA process so natural disasters should be excluded from this process. Furthermore, the Steering Group agreed that the WG should move forward with pilot testing the likelihood concepts and tools in the field and recommended that the issue of how the UN should manage the risk from natural disasters be referred to the next session of the IASMN for subsequent referral to HLCM.



164. The IASMN was thus similarly briefed on the Working Group's work that included a proposed definition of "likelihood" within the SRA process<sup>4</sup>, the revised procedures for how to go from general threats to specific event descriptions and the development of three tools for assessing likelihood (one for deliberate events and two for non-deliberate events – one for road traffic accidents and one for accidental fire). The Chair of the WG emphasized that a clear definition of likelihood was required because there was often confusion between the likelihood of an event occurring in general and the likelihood of the event occurring and affecting the UN. The new definition made it clear that the likelihood to be assessed is of the event affecting the UN.

165. The Chair confirmed that the SRA is the primary tool of the UNSMS and that the current SRA process was laborious, cumbersome and not effective enough in serving as the right tool to assess what is happening in order to facilitate decision-making. Presently, any conclusion could be justified using the current SRA process. This is why a review was needed. The SRA was in much need of supporting tools that in turn would support how we could do business better. The Chair also confirmed, in response to a query by one of the Staff Federations that there would be a greater focus on risk assessment and that this may also be used to assess movement operations.

166. One of the main points made during the presentation was that the SRA process was not about predicting the future, which was impossible, but about organizing our thoughts about it in order to prioritize risk interventions. It was pointed out that the UNSMS had made a strategic decision not to use Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) because QRA was highly scientific and mathematical, requiring unique expertise beyond the scope of the UNSMS. It was also very time consuming, which would not afford the UN the quick flexibility it needed in the field. Instead, the UNSMS used a structured subjective model in assessing risk. The tools on likelihood were designed to assist this model. Another key aspect of the tools developed was the link between vulnerability, i.e. the lack of preventive risk management measures and the increased likelihood of an event affecting the UN.

167. One member asked why "probability" was not being used when talking of likelihood. Drawing the analogy with Russian roulette, he pointed out that occurrences that are not likely in everyday definitions may be exceptionally high risk when lethal weapons are involved and pointed out that once the probability is determined then it needs to be assessed whether the risk may be accepted. He further asked how we can speak of risk until it is put in some concrete terms, by using a more specific language of probability. He believed that more could be done with past data and if the use of past data was ignored, one could end up with likelihood results that need a reality check. Past data, which on the whole was pretty constant, should be used as a baseline to see if things radically changed from year to year. It would not be wise to be bitten because one did not see the change. He offered that information such as how many UN staff died from civil unrest or from being in the wrong place at the wrong time or from direct targeting could indicate where one should be weighting the data. He added that there was a need to really define what the term "acceptable risk" means.

168. The IASMN was informed that the WG had decided that probability would confuse everyone and be difficult to use in the field. The Chair of the WG added that there were many important reasons for not using probability, including the fact that the UNSMS was not using

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<sup>4</sup> "Likelihood is a rating (1-5) of the assessed potential of an undesirable event affecting the UN"

mathematical approaches to risk, as noted above. In addition, probability, as a mathematical concept of likelihood, in many cases required large data sets which did not exist for the many rare events that we needed to assess. Further, the human element of deliberate events (e.g. intelligent threat actors plotting and adjusting) rendered probability analysis almost impossible and statistical analysis inappropriate. The Chair explained that within the UNSMS people did not know the difference between vulnerability, threat and risk and focus only on the threat against the UN. One member noted that the concept of vulnerability needed to capture elements such as organizational perception, image and the issue of acceptance. He added that internal profiling analysis can interact with the threats to determine vulnerability. He cited two examples to support this, e.g. where an organization with a lot of equipment may be an attractive target for criminality and where the success of a scuba diving mission may be dependent not only on equipment but on whether the diver is a good swimmer.

169. The Chair of the WG agreed that the definition of vulnerability needed to be examined, noting that a wider definition was needed to include the elements of organizational perception, image and the issue of acceptance. He also anticipated that the future review of MOSS would be linked to the concept of vulnerability, since the lack of MOSS in itself represented vulnerability. The Chair of the WG further explained that the improvement of the SRM process will likely take a long time to complete and that the work now being done provided a starting point. The next steps will be to tackle impact assessment and then making the full SRA process computer based. One member noted that a classic mistake that is made is when something that is super high impact occurs, persons believe there is a need to do something about it. He noted that “interplay” vs. “likelihood” is fundamentally mathematical and added that something that is really high impact and high likelihood becomes a danger.

170. The discussion turned to the issue of natural disasters and how these could be accounted for and how the risks they create should be managed in the UN. At the outset, it was asked how natural disasters are defined. One member took the view that the UNSMS could not afford not including natural disasters in the SRA when our UN environment includes references to natural disasters. The Chair responded that with earthquakes for example, no one can provide the factors to allow for intelligent decisions to be made in a timely manner. No one can say whether another earthquake was likely in the next 10, 100 or 5000 years, so how can informed decisions on risk management investments be made. The UNSMS did not have the tools to predict earthquakes; at best it may have information on locations or areas more prone to earthquakes, for example along fault lines, but to do an accurate likelihood assessment in the SRA was beyond the scope of knowledge and ability available within the UNSMS.

171. While some believed this was a safety issue not within the remit of the UNSMS, some took the view that the UNSMS could not categorically state it has nothing to do with natural hazards such as earthquakes. Another member suggested that facilities management needed to be brought into this and that a recommendation was needed to define where the management of the risks from natural hazards should have ownership. Another member advocated for training, awareness and personal preparedness as the approach to adopt with respect to natural disasters, rather than the predictive approach (as recommended by the WG). The Chair of the WG informed the IASMN that the WG had made a clear recommendation that, because the UNSMS could not do proper likelihood assessments on natural disasters, they should be removed from the SRA. The WG further recommended that the UN needed to create a dedicated decision-making process for managing natural disaster risk that should involve external specialized assessment for threat and

vulnerability and emphasized that the UNSMS should only deal with mitigating the risk from natural disasters (i.e., lowering the impact after they occur) through its responsibility for building evacuation, mass casualty support and other crisis management issues.

172. The Chair confirmed that the likelihood model is primarily a security model and as such, the SRA should not apply to natural disaster risk management. He wished the IASMN to understand that the SRA methodology and improving it addresses security issues directly and not natural disasters. He supported referring this issue to HLCM. At the same time, where there could be issues as a result of natural disasters, there needed to be a push from the UNSMS to have communications, first aid, triage and emergency action plans in place.

173. The Chair of the WG confirmed that the next steps for the WG would be to continue with pilot testing the processes and tools in the field, develop a user guide, report and documentation, seek IASMN approval and subsequently train persons on the likelihood model. One member requested that DRO play its role to improve the SRA in the interim.

## **Recommendations**

174. The IASMN was highly appreciative of the work being conducted by the DSS-led SRM Improvement Working Group and approved the work that has been conducted to date on likelihood assessment and tools.

175. Due to the characteristics of natural disasters and the fact that this is an area requiring expertise outside of the scope of the UNSMS, the IASMN agreed that the likelihood of natural disasters could not be properly assessed in the SRA. The IASMN recognizes that the UNSMS must nevertheless manage the security management aspects of the effects of and response to natural disasters for UN personnel and premises.

176. The IASMN agreed that the issue of how the UN should manage the risk from natural disasters should be referred to HLCM.

## **P. Geographic Information Systems**

177. The IASMN was provided with a brief progress report on the use of Geographic Information Systems within the context of the UNSMS, as well as an overview of the possible uses of GIS. IASMN members were informed that within the UN system there was currently no centralized repository of spatial data available and that a steering group of the UN Geographic Information Working Group had been established to oversee the implementation of a UN Spatial Data Infrastructure that would provide the UN system with a central repository for all UN spatial data. In addition, a special interest inter-agency group on “Staff Security and Spatial Data” was created in order to foster an informal exchange of ideas and innovative solutions.

178. The IASMN was further informed that DSS had been granted additional resources for Information Management under the UN’s regular budget which were used to recruit a GIS Officer who, in addition to supporting the Department with respect to GIS, will also be responsible for the coordination of GIS efforts at the inter-agency level.

179. The Chair informed participants that DSS had now started beta testing of presenting data in GIS formats. He added that the UN's use of GIS was greatly misunderstood in that it seemed to focus more on maps. As confirmed by DSS' brief report on the subject, the UN had not really moved forward on this issue. Each AFPO was using its own systems in its own way and we were still far from creating a common platform for the use of GIS information.

180. WFP strongly believed that DSS should engage with it on this issue and that the system it has available could also be made available to all those who are interested.

181. The representative from the UNMDWG informed the IASMN that from a medical perspective, the UNMDWG was trying to identify their worldwide resources through the use of GIS. He believed that both security, medical and medical resource data could be wedded and linked in with each other. One member asked how tools may be provided for the field that could first teach them the basics, e.g. Google earth, as such tools could prove invaluable. UNICEF informed the IASMN that it was in discussions with WFP about adopting a user friendly approach to include mapping and was looking at systems that could aid everyone in reaching a common approach across the UNSMS.

182. The Chair reminded members that there were bigger issues that needed to be dealt with, such as deciding on the entire platform and architecture that the UN would use, including how information on latitudes and longitudes was collected. He suspected that it will be similar to that which was being used by WFP and other humanitarian organizations, but recognized that DPKO/DFS would have a big say in this.

183. DPKO/DFS informed IASMN members that the transition to more modern systems was hindered by their capacity and that they were looking to the IASMN to address concerns about the various efforts going on in this area and the present lack of cohesion.

184. WFP pointed out that some organizations including its own had a history of doing cartography and mapping for a very long time. He did not believe that HLCM should be encouraged to find one global system. This was supported by another member who believed that this issue was not likely to progress through that route.

## **Recommendation**

185. The IASMN took note of the overview of the possible uses of Geographical Information Systems within the context of the UN Security Management System. However, it was noted that the overview was not fully comprehensive or inclusive. The IASMN requested that it be kept informed of further efforts in this regard.

## **Q. Vehicle Tracking**

186. At its 14<sup>th</sup> session in New York in January 2011, the IASMN noted that "WFP offered to submit a CRP on this issue for the next session of the IASMN and, together with UNICEF offered to lead this working group with the participation of DPKO's transport section. WFP was requested to revert at the next Steering Group meeting with ideas on what it wished the IASMN to support with respect to fleet management. At its Steering Group meeting in Paris in May 2011, WFP reported that since 2006, it had operated and developed a global vehicle tracking and

fleet management system based on technology from EMS/SATAMATICS. The system so far has proved to be highly reliable and very resistant even under extreme environmental conditions. The management of the system is purely web-based and can be either centralized or decentralized depending on the wish of the organization. The cost of the system is approximately \$1500 per vehicle which covered the training of operators, technicians and the tracking device itself. The running (and re-occurring) cost is approximately \$462.00 per vehicle per annum.

187. The Steering Group, at its session in May 2011, recommended that vehicle tracking be looked at further in a working group that would identify one or more compatible and suitable solutions for a UN-system wide implementation of electronic vehicle, asset and personnel tracking, fleet management and administration. It was intended that the working group would produce a conference room paper containing a draft proposal on technology and procedures to be applied for tracking for possible endorsement by the IASMN.

188. At this session, it was proposed that all aspects of tracking in general be examined by a working group. It was stressed that what had been developed so far was not just a security system, but a fleet management tool that allowed for the fleet manager to better control the utilization of vehicles. In 2008/2009, for WFP, the cost savings from fuel alone in Sudan was \$27,000. There had also been half a million dollar in savings for spare parts due to less wear and tear on vehicles. WFP believed that it was to everyone's benefit not to introduce multiple systems and platforms when this system had already been tried and tested.

189. The Chair asked whether it made sense to produce a policy on this and how best this could be addressed. Having the IASMN endorse a vehicle tracking system for fleet management and making this mandatory at medium to high threat duty stations would only bring us partly there. He would rather not have two or three different tracking systems and radio rooms so there was a need to harmonize efforts. He viewed this as a modern information management tool and did not wish to necessarily include in a policy any reference to a particular system. He suggested that this was something the working group needed to work on.

190. WFP was unclear as to what was wanted but agreed that a policy could not specify that only one product could be used. DPKO/DFS welcomed the WFP report and wished to make sure that its vehicle transport people have it. It was noted that already in South Sudan more than one system was being used. He supported having a working group looking into this as well as the larger issues. UNHCR informed the meeting that it was going forward with the same system WFP was using and viewed this as a fleet management tool first and foremost, but one with significant overlaps with security. One big question was what functionalities were intended to be rolled out and used, as these could not be rolled out all at once. Another question centred on the unintended consequences for security. Another member informed the meeting that it was currently working with fleet forum to look at an implementation project with fleet safety. His organization did not yet have a fleet management system in place because the infrastructure was very expensive. However, he recognized that if the systems were standardized, then many might benefit from lower costs.

191. Another member cautioned about the use of the term vehicle tracking because if this term was used it might prevent some governments from authorizing this. There was a need therefore to come up with alternate wording, e.g. calling it a fleet management tool.

## **Recommendations**

192. The IASMN noted the report from WFP and recognized the intrinsic value to the UNSMS of fleet management, both in terms of potential cost savings and in terms of the security benefits.

193. The IASMN supported the formation of a working group to examine whether there is a need to formulate a policy on fleet management and how best common fleet management tools may be developed for use throughout the UN system.

194. The IASMN requested that the working group, to be chaired by WFP and to include representatives from UNDP, UNHCR, DPKO/DFS, UNICEF, UNV and DSS, provide a report to the next session of the IASMN Steering Group.

## **R. Training**

195. The IASMN was provided with an annual report on the work of the Training and Development Section of DSS (TDS) and requested to consider the future tasking of the IASMN Security Training Working Group with a view to reconvening this group in the latter half of 2011.

196. The Chair informed the meeting that although some progress had been made in the past year with respect to DSS training activities, much more needed to be done. As such, the Department was closely examining its training activities and it was already evident that the training that had been created for security officers was not specialized enough nor was it of a high enough standard. There was not enough prioritization about what really needed to be done. It was pointed out that, although not a great amount overall, the amount allocated for security training activities was nevertheless the single largest pot of money anyone had for training within the UN system.

197. The report from TDS that was presented at this session also included preliminary results of the training survey that had been sent to security focal points requesting an indication of their specific training needs. This required further input and review. Not only with respect to this survey, but regarding the training strategy for the UNSMS in general, the Chair believed that the IASMN training group could have a lot to contribute in defining the way forward and that this should not only be left to DSS to decide.

198. Regarding SSAFE training, the Chair believed that it was absurd, for example, to have one SSAFE course for Iraq and a separate course for Somalia and that there was a need to identify commonalities in order to avoid persons sometimes having to repeat the course depending on the country of assignment or mission.

199. WFP appreciated the fact that DSS was re-examining its training activities with a view to re-doing these as it had experienced significant bottlenecks in the past. One member believed that the equivalent training that is provided for the SMTs and DOs would be useful for SFPs. Regarding the larger issue of training and development, there was support for expanding the input into training activities beyond only TDS which did not have the capacity to train everyone. Another member very much appreciated that SSAFE training was being re-examined and was encouraged by references to the use of new technologies, such as online modular training courses as this would save costs, particularly for those organizations with smaller training budgets.

200. Another member supported that external expertise be brought in to examine the training offered, particularly as the training remained very conservative. In this respect, he proposed that institutions such as the Wharton School be considered to provide advice on training for CSAs and SFPs.

201. WHO offered to draft TORs for the IASMN Working Group on Training which needed to be re-established as a matter of priority.

202. The Chair reiterated that further work needed to be done on SSAFE. Regarding close protection training, he pointed out that a lot of close protection officers hailed from DPKO/DFS, some from DSS and some from the AFPOs. He reminded the IASMN that the HLCM had endorsed the recommendation that all CP officers needed to complete the minimum CP training within four years. Currently it cost about \$15,000 per person to provide CP training (travel and training costs). Some had complained that this was expensive and he asked that members start thinking about funding CP training to meet this requirement.

203. DPFO/DFS reminded the IASMN that it would soon be completing its budget proposals and could not include a comprehensive provision for CP training in its budget until 2013.

204. Another member asked when the new Basic Security in the Field (BSITF) CD ROM would be available. The Chair informed the IASMN that the prototypes had gone out and that the comments received mandated changes. As such, the English version of BSITF was now due to be out later in the summer of 2011.

## **Recommendations**

205. The IASMN noted the direction of the current focus of the training issues presented by DSS and acknowledged the intention of DSS to improve its training strategy and the implementation of security training. In this regard, the IASMN supported that the IASMN Security Training Working Group be reconvened in the latter half of 2011 and that clear TORS be produced before the Working Group is convened. In this regard, the IASMN agreed that WHO would provide a first draft of TORS for the working group to consider.

206. Regarding SSAFE training, the IASMN agreed that this required further review in order to identify commonalities among the current country-specific SSAFE courses with a view to streamlining the process for SSAFE certification.

207. The IASMN further agreed to collaborate with DSS to seek means by which close protection training may be funded in view of the requirement, endorsed by HLCM, to have all close protection officers in the UN system trained to a minimum standard within four years.

## **S. Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring**

208. DSS provided by VTC a presentation on the work of the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Section (CEMS) that explained to IASMN members the types of compliance missions conducted, how the missions are manned, what the missions intended to achieve, and issues of follow up.

209. The Chair pointed out that it was not possible to run a large security program in 140 duty stations around the world without someone monitoring compliance and that CEMS had not had enough visibility with the IASMN. Addressing the problem of resources for the unit, the Chair pointed out that CEMS had only enough staff to visit approximately 15 countries a year so care needed to be taken in assessing where and how many missions could be conducted. It was possible to prioritize these types of missions and it was not necessarily that a huge expansion in the number of missions was required, but rather better tools with which to conduct the missions. He added that there will never be a perfect system in place, but that it was nevertheless necessary to take steps to ensure compliance for the sake of the validity of the system. The meeting was also informed that ACABQ last year had raised concerns about how compliance with security policies and procedures could be assured in the context of discussing the revised Framework of Accountability. The Chair in this regard pointed to the need to ensure follow up on issues and the need to raise awareness with ACABQ of the value of self-assessments.

210. One member, noting concerns raised by the Executive Board of his organization, asked how DSS could mandate what should be complied with when it did not have sufficient capacity to evaluate. He further noted that some personnel were having difficulties carrying out their warden functions in addition to their regular duties. Another member expressed the view that many of the shortcomings cited in CEMS reports could have been easily identified and addressed by DSS desk officers and in this regard asked DSS about the kind of interaction it had with its desk officers on these issues.

211. DSS pointed out that its Division of Regional Operations was responsible for determining which compliance missions to conduct and in doing so focused on countries, rather than taking a thematic approach. While there were a great deal of issues desk officers could have identified, it was pointed out that this was not possible as many desk officers are graded at P3, which is entry level into DSS, and as such had minimal field experience.

212. Addressing follow up to compliance missions, DSS also pointed out that all the resulting recommendations from a compliance mission are addressed internally at DSS HQ. If a recommendation is made to a DO, then that recommendation would also be addressed to DSS' regional desks for follow up. Recommendations had not been addressed specifically to the AFPOs or to IASMN. DSS would be drafting a section on compliance for the Security Policy Manual to be brought to the next Steering Group meeting in November/December 2011. It was intended that this section would also include the duties and responsibilities of IASMN members in this regard. Another consideration to be taken into account in considering compliance issues was the role compliance plays in security risk management.

### **Recommendation**

213. The IASMN took note of the presentation by DSS on the activities of its Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Section and continued to support that compliance evaluation missions are conducted in tandem with self assessments.

### **T. Update on Working Group on Program Criticality**



214. The IASMN was provided with a verbal update on the HLCM Programme Criticality Working Group (PCWG) from both DSS, as well as from UNICEF. Participants were informed of the progress on Programme Criticality (PC) since the last briefing that was provided to the IASMN at its 14<sup>th</sup> session in January 2011. Since then, the sub-technical working group of the PCWG had refined the PC framework and tools and started to pilot test the PC tool in the field. Pilot tests had been planned for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia, but due to many factors, the tests in Pakistan and Afghanistan had to be cancelled and the Somalia test delayed, causing serious delays in the testing schedule. Nevertheless, the group was back on schedule, with successful tests having been conducted with the Somalia UN Country Team (UNCT), and tests planned for DRC and Kenya UNCTs. Pilot tests involved the participation of DOs, Representatives of AFPs, senior program officers and a few Security Advisors. The two day pilot test session covered the concept of acceptable risk and an introduction to program criticality, followed by the chance for the country team to conduct an exercise for two areas in their country. The end of the final day was reserved for feedback, including through an anonymous written questionnaire. So far the testing team has received quite good feedback, indicating that the model is workable. Once the pilot testing was finished, the team will consolidate results and present their recommendations to the PCWG, with the view of presenting this to HLCM for approval.

215. Essentially a structured model was being proposed and definitions were established for Programme Criticality Level activities, i.e. Program Criticality Level 1 (PC1) activities are considered to be life-saving at scale or those mandated/endorsed by the Secretary General. PC2-PC4 activities are evaluated on their contribution to 6 UN strategic objectives established by the country team. Each activity is also evaluated in its likelihood to succeed. The tool included a simple formula to combine these assessments and establish the PC level, thus prioritizing activities. The methodology and tool are in line with the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk.

216. UNICEF pointed out that one of the biggest issues from the beginning was that the sub-technical working group was “security-led” so there was a need to reengage the program side. UNICEF encouraged IASMN members therefore to press within their organizations for the engagement of program staff on this issue, especially for the pilot tests in the field. The model ensured that the strategic objectives developed by the country team derived from existing planning documents, such as UNDAFs (United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks) and ISFs (Integrated Strategic Frameworks).

217. The Chair added that the IASMN would need to engage their senior management on program criticality. The UNSMS is about finding ways to stay in higher threat situations around the world. In really high threat locations where UN personnel may be put at very high risk, assessing program criticality was vital. If the UNSMS is going to find ways to stay, ensure that Security Council resolutions may be implemented and fulfil the highest humanitarian goals in some of the toughest places around the world, then due diligence needed to be exercised to make sure that those personnel staying in high risk environments are doing so because they are doing the most critical work of the UN and they are actually accomplishing something. The UN has a responsibility to provide and protect, but when operating in high threat locations where there is a high risk, there is even more of an onus to exercise due diligence and program criticality is about exercising that due diligence. It is a way of prioritizing what the UN is doing in the most dangerous places in the world.

218. One member noted that the vast majority of personnel in Afghanistan seemed to be engaged in lower priority activities rather than activities that would be prioritized using the program criticality model. Another member pointed to the situation in Libya where it was difficult to prove a humanitarian crisis as there were few activities and personnel on the ground monitoring the situation. (It was noted in this regard that NGOs like the ICRC were operating in Libya and as such fuelling the perception of donors that they deserved funding for those activities rather than the UN and the AFPOs.) The Chair added that too many of the decisions about whether to continue to operate in situations such as the current one in Libya were coming down to his judgement in his role as USG, DSS. As such, decisions were susceptible to the risk tolerance of the person making such decisions, rather than being based on a methodology. Without a clear programme criticality methodology, a risk adverse USG, DSS would make very different decisions. There was a need for a methodology that supported the notion of shared accountability.

219. DSS pointed out that the success of programme criticality lies in its balance with residual security risk in the Acceptable Risk model. Therefore, it was important for SRAs to be realistic and accurate. If security officers were inflating the risks, this makes programme criticality results unworkable. Another important point was that the PC methodology and tool are based on the premise that the UN works as one country team rather than AFPOs competing with each other for funds.

220. One member pointed to the relationship between program criticality and the mainstreaming of security in program conception and planning. Work should be done towards ensuring this is well grounded whether or not it is a crisis situation. There must be tools to ensure security is taken into account, not at the stage of implementation but at the time the program is conceived. There should be SOPs that make security responsibilities mandatory in the planning of all activities. At the country level, it was pointed out that there are security advisors who are seen only in the context of the SMT and not as being part of the UNCT. Essentially, it was critical to address security issues when programs are being designed.

221. Another member sought assurances that the PC methodology would be the same for those carrying out emergency operations as for those carrying out technical operations. Another expressed the view that program criticality was a tool, just like the SLS was a tool, that PR and marketing needed to be taken out of the equation and that the tool will be a reality check when it is time to send personnel to work on the ground. One member commended the Yemen SMT for managing the new processes very well, while another pointed to the difficulties in reaching a collective decision when only one or two agencies were operating in a certain environment. DSS clarified that program criticality was meant to have a clearly defined geographical scope, which would normally not be an entire country.

222. It was confirmed once more that there was an onus on the PCWG to report back to HLCM on this issue. At the same time, the IASMN was also informed that DSS had a responsibility to report back to the General Assembly on the conclusions of the PCWG as mandated by a resolution from its 65<sup>th</sup> session. The reporting requirement arose from the report DSS provided to ACABQ last year on the revised Framework of Accountability for the UNSMS and the implementation of the SLS.

223. In closing, the USG, DSS was commended for the briefings given to HLCM which were very well received and it was asked that this continue. It was important that one area of concern that had been identified by the CEB, i.e. the mainstreaming of security in programs and in all our processes needed to be dealt with at the principal level.

### **Recommendation**

224. The IASMN noted the verbal update provided by both DSS and UNICEF on the work undertaken so far by the HLCM Working Group on Program Criticality and looks forward to a further update when the report of the Working Group is completed.

### **U. Strategic Direction of the UNSMS – Prioritization and Formation of IASMN Working Groups**

225. At its 14<sup>th</sup> session in January 2011, the IASMN identified a number of issues for which further work was required on a security inter-agency basis and for which IASMN working groups either needed to be established or for which already established IASMN working groups could examine some of the issues requiring further development. The IASMN also agreed that DSS would further review the list of issues discussed, prioritize these accordingly and revert with a detailed schedule for both existing and new IASMN working groups.

226. The Steering Group, at its session in May 2011 reviewed the issues requiring further development through existing or new working groups and cognizant of the security staffing shortfall in some AFPOs which would not make it feasible to convene a great number of working groups, assigned priority to the various issues and to the formation of working groups and also identified alternate means of addressing some issues. The CRP (CRP7) that was provided at this session detailed the issues to be considered and the means of dealing with each.

227. At the outset of the discussions, one member supported the imminent need for updating blast assessment guidelines. Regarding participation in the working groups, he suggested that the designated representatives did not necessarily need to be those attending the IASMN, but rather functional specialists. Another member asked that the working groups be distinguished by those which are intended to be time-limited and those which are more of a standing nature. He also asked whether there were alternatives to the working groups. Another member suggested that the work of some groups could be compressed into one week to deal with issues quickly.

228. One member supported the prioritization of working groups and recognized that MOSS might not necessarily need a working group but rather a strategy geared towards sending one message out about minimum standards.

229. The representative from the HR network expressed interest in the IASMN WG on HR issues which would not be convened until 2012. She added that if it was the intent to establish a plan in 2012, then it might be prudent to examine the scope of the working group beforehand to assess timelines as well as the resources that would need to be committed to accomplish the requisite tasks.

230. Another member, interested in the notion of permanent working groups understood that this issue would be examined at a later date. It was pointed out by another member that in the past the IASMN had engaged in a number of working groups, with some successful while others were not. What was important was that the IASMN had put its credibility on the line because of the results. He cautioned about taking subjects away from the IASMN and giving them to a sub-group of HLCM, as had been the case with the operational working group of HLCM and believed that there is a need to specify which working groups would be sub-groups of the IASMN. Further, there is also a need to assign deliverables for those groups and ensure that they are properly chaired.

231. The Chair summarized that the priorities described in the conference room paper were generally supported and that in light of the proliferation of working groups, tight TORs, realistic schedules and sound management were needed to deliver results.

### **Recommendation**

232. The IASMN generally supported the prioritization of the working groups as set out in CRP7. In this regard, the IASMN asked to be provided with timelines for the formation of new working groups and the reconvening of existing working groups, as well as the expected timelines for working group deliverables.<sup>5</sup>

### **V. Other Matters**

233. a) HLCM 22nd session, 26-27 September 2011, Washington, DC

b) CEB, 28-29 October 2011

c) Steering Group and IASMN meeting schedule

i. Winter Session IASMN Steering Group, 30 November- 2 December 2011, Amman, Jordan

ii. 16<sup>th</sup> Session IASMN, date (tbd), Bangkok, Thailand

d) HLCM 23rd session, TBD

e) CEB Spring Session, TBD

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<sup>5</sup> IASMN members will be provided with an updated document setting out the information requested in this recommendation.