FINAL REPORT

Executive Summary

The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) held its 21st session at the Asian Development Bank Headquarters in Manila, Philippines from 3 to 5 February 2015. Twenty-eight United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) members participated in the session, along with two observers. Mr. Peter Drennan, Under Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG, UNDSS), chaired the session, with Mr. Drew Donovan, Head of the International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) Protocol and Security Division, serving as Co-Chair. Ms. Florence Poussin, Acting Chief of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security's Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit (UNDSS/PPCU), served as Secretary.

The IASMN discussed the global security environment and agreed on the need to develop a common messaging on the global security environment's impact on UN programmes and mandates. The IASMN stressed the need for the UNSMS to remain forward-focused, with the ability to anticipate future challenges through increased threat and risk analysis, develop and implement proactive security risk mitigation measures and promote a global security culture.

The IASMN expressed support for UNDSS' Strategic Review and endorsed its recommendations, including its outcomes and its immediate priorities. The IASMN took note of the progress of the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) Working Group on Duty of Care while recognizing that the scope of its work is limited to key duty of care issues in high-risk environments. The IASMN emphasized that the duty of care entails not only safety and security considerations, but also administrative, human resources and legal considerations, among others. The IASMN also took note of the efforts to end impunity for those who commit serious crimes and acts of violence against UN personnel as well as an update on the Joint Inspection Unit's (JIU) review of safety and security across the UN system.

With regard to existing UNSMS policies, the IASMN approved the amended Terms of Reference (TORs) and projected work plan presented by the Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group (SRMIWG). The IASMN also agreed to provide inputs on the latest draft of the SRM Policy, SRM Manual and training approach. With regard to the Safety and Security Incident Recording System (SSIRS), the IASMN endorsed the SSIRS Policy and User Manual. The IASMN requested that SSIRS be launched by April 2015, upon which a three-month trial and evaluation period will begin. If the launch is successful, UNDSS will become responsible for housing and implementing SSIRS, beginning in July 2015.

The IASMN also endorsed the Air Travel Policy, with the understanding that the Risk Management Tool (RMT) and Air Travel Operational Guidelines will address specific concerns raised by IASMN members, the policy will be subject to revision if it interrupts the day-to-day operations of UNSMS organizations, and any revision of the policy shall only be undertaken in consultation with all relevant stakeholders. With regard to the Residential Security Measures (RSM) Policy, the IASMN identified the need to submit the RSM policy to HLCM for approval as a priority and, in this regard, called on the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) Technical Working Group (TWG) to address the recent input provided by individual organizations through the Human Resources Network (HRN). Separately, the IASMN called for the establishment of a new working group to identify residential security risks in the context of locally-recruited personnel. Finally, the IASMN took note of the latest draft of the Management of Stress and Critical Incident Stress (MSCIS) Policy while calling on the Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG) to finalize the policy prior to the next Steering Group session in May 2015.

The IASMN supported the development of a UNSMS policy on the arming of security professionals, in recognition of the fact that there is a need to develop a formal approval process to arm security professionals whenever appropriate.

The IASMN agreed to limit the size of its Steering Group to its current membership and two additional members to be selected on a two-year rotating basis. With regard to the IASMN VTC, the IASMN reaffirmed that the VTC should continue to focus on operational matters and be conducted in an informal setting, thus requiring no TORs at this time. With regard to UNSMS policy development, the IASMN called for establishing a "college" of experienced security professionals in the field with a strong interest in policy development. Members would be expected to participate in relevant working groups and provide their input on draft policies.

The IASMN took note of the progress made by the recently established Gender Considerations in Security Management Working Group, including the development of draft TORs and the identification of gaps within existing UNSMS policies with respect to gender.

With regard to training, the IASMN emphasized the need to prioritize the outstanding requests for training deliverables. In order to do so, the IASMN called on the Security Training Working Group (STWG) to undertake a stock-taking exercise with respect to the status of training deliverables and the resources required for their completion, in addition to a timeline for their completion. The IASMN also identified the need to develop a training course for mid-level security as well as incorporating "soft-skills" for all security professionals in training programs.

Recognizing the importance of further clarifying the UN's position regarding the use of unarmed private security companies, the IASMN endorsed the establishment of a working group on unarmed private security companies. Under Any Other Business, the IASMN supported UNDSS' budget proposal with respect to Jointly Funded Activities (JFA) for the biennium 2016-2017 as well as the development and distribution of a list of blast engineers employed or contracted by UNSMS organizations. The IASMN also took note of a presentation

on ways to merge and consolidate physical and information security across the UN system. Finally, the IASMN agreed to limit IASMN Steering Group sessions to two days and IASMN sessions to three days in length. With regard to venue and dates, the IASMN approved its calendar of meetings through February 2016.

The IASMN is grateful for the remarkable support provided by ADB, in its capacity as host, during and in preparation for the 21st session. Such support ensured the effective participation of all IASMN members. The IASMN is also grateful for the support provided by UNDSS' country office in the Philippines.

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A. Introduction

1. The 21st session of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) was held at the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Headquarters in Manila, Philippines from 3 to 5 February 2015. Twenty-eight (28) United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) members participated in the session, with two (2) others participating as observers (see Annex B to this report for a detailed list of participants). Mr. Peter Drennan, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG, UNDSS), chaired the session while Mr. Drew Donovan, Head of the International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) Protocol and Security Division, served as Co-Chair. Ms. Florence Poussin, Acting Chief of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security's (UNDSS) Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit (PPCU), served as Secretary.

2. Mr. Bruce Davis, ADB's Vice President, and Mr. Andrew Clinton, ADB's Security Focal Point, welcomed the IASMN to Manila. Subsequently, UNDSS' Field Office in the country, led by UNDSS' Security Adviser, Mr. Ken Harrington, delivered a brief presentation on the local security environment in the Philippines. Security representatives from ADB Headquarters, including ADB's Senior Security and Emergency Services Officer, Mr. Rommel Enrique Del Mundo, provided a similar overview.

3. Subsequently, USG, UNDSS delivered his opening remarks, whereby he called on all IASMN members to remain committed to the "four Es"— effectiveness, efficiency, excellence and ethics. He emphasized the need to continue meeting the demands of stakeholders, including through the development of sound policies. Such policies should provide a framework within which decisions can be made after taking into account the local context. He also called for the development of a "security culture," in collaboration with Designated Officials (DOs)/Security Management Teams (SMTs) on the ground. Moreover, he called for a greater focus on professionalism and boosting communication with stakeholders. Finally, he cited various challenges facing the United Nations (UN) in the near future, including implications of the "stay and deliver" approach to operating in high-risk environments, strengthening its commitment to programme criticality, and addressing sexual exploitation and abuse.

B. Global Security Environment (USG, UNDSS)

4. USG, UNDSS presented an overview of the global security environment, which he described as complex, dynamic and challenging. He added that there is no indication that the environment is likely to improve over the coming decade. To the contrary, the environment is expected to only increase in complexity, which will, in turn, increase the demand for security personnel and flexibility to deploy and re-deploy rapidly.

5. USG, UNDSS highlighted the rise in violent extremism and terrorism as a particular concern, along with the rise in abductions of UNSMS personnel. The latest statistics found in the annual *Secretary-General's Report on the Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel* provide a sobering overview of risks faced by

UNSMS personnel and the real impact such risks have had on their safety, security and well-being, even in cases where the UN was not the primary or even secondary target.

6. USG, UNDSS continued on to state that the UN should consider the implications of its "stay and deliver" approach to operating in high-risk environments, whereby any decision to stay in a duty station or country should depend on whether the UN can deliver its programmes and mandates. In this regard, he added that there is little benefit to staying in a location if one cannot deliver.

7. USG, UNDSS concluded by noting that the Secretary-General was keen on incorporating the security perspective into the UN's strategic decision-making process, in addition to other key perspectives (e.g., political, humanitarian, developmental).

8. Following the conclusion of USG, UNDSS' remarks, one member noted the need to send a common message to the Executive Heads of UNSMS organizations with respect to the global security environment. IASMN members subsequently discussed and reached agreement on the content of this message (see para. 14 below).

9. Another member highlighted the fact that approximately half of all safety or security-related incidents occurred in armed conflict environments. In this regard, the member urged the IASMN to remain focused on traditional threats and risks to personnel operating in armed conflict environments while addressing direct threats to the Organization. The member continued on to identify two specific concerns in armed conflict environments: (1) being caught in cross-fire (i.e., "in the wrong place at the wrong time") and; (2) being targeted on the basis of identity (e.g., ethnic, gender, religious, racial identity), particularly in the context of locally-recruited personnel. Finally, the member stressed the importance of distinguishing among violent extremist movements around the world, taking into account differences in their methods of operation as well as evolution, while recognizing that such movements do not represent the vast majority of the respective local populations within which they operate.

10. Another member noted that the growing complexity in the global security environment over the past few years is due to an increase in the frequency of safety and security-related incidents in areas where the UN has traditionally operated as well as an extension of UN programmes and mandates into new geographic areas. With regard to peacekeeping operations in particular, the member noted a seventeen-percent increase in safety and security-related incidents impacting UNSMS personnel between 2011 and 2014 in areas where peacekeepers were deployed, with such personnel including personnel involved in rule of law and human rights programmes and mandates.

11. Another member argued that, despite changes in the global security environment (i.e., with regard to the nature and types of threats and risks), the number of critical or major safety or security-related incidents has remained relatively stable over the past few years. In this regard, the focus should be on training security managers in the field to adapt and address

these changes in the environment, based on acceptable risk. Multiple members expressed support for such training, with one member emphasizing the importance of developing a long-term security strategy and coordinating its implementation among all relevant stakeholders. Another member added that such training should address how best to situations where the Host Government is responsible for safety or security-related incidents impacting UNSMS personnel.

12. Finally, another member called for increased threat and risk analysis, which would enable security managers to be proactive in their approach (e.g., proactively addressing imminent safety and security concerns resulting from a rapid transition of power within a given country). This would, in turn, allow for more informed decision-making.

RECOMMENDATION:

13. **Taking into consideration the dynamic and challenging global security environment, the IASMN supported:**
    a. **The development of a UNSMS common messaging on the global security environment's impact on UN programmes and mandates;**
    b. **The need for the UNSMS to remain forward-focused, with the ability to anticipate future challenges through increased threat and risk analysis;**
    c. **The need for proactive security risk mitigation measures; and**
    d. **The promotion of a global security culture.**

14. **The UNSMS common messaging on the global security environment, including the five points below, should be communicated to the Executive Heads of UNSMS organizations:**
    a. **The current global security environment in which the United Nations delivers its programmes and mandates is complex, dynamic and challenging. There is no indication that such an environment is likely to improve over the coming decade.**
    b. **In order to address this complexity, the UNSMS must be able to effectively and efficiently identify and manage risk. The UNSMS must also be creative, flexible, agile and proactive when responding to changes within the environment.**
    c. **In order to facilitate these goals, the IASMN reminds all managers in the United Nations Missions, Agencies, Funds and Programmes to incorporate and budget for safety and security within their respective programme planning at the earliest stage possible.**
    d. **Furthermore, the IASMN calls on all managers to ensure that their acceptance of risk is commensurate with the criticality of their programme activity and calls on all UNSMS organizations to ensure that their respective managers have been trained and equipped to make such a decision.**
    e. **Finally, the IASMN calls on all relevant stakeholders to ensure that all UNSMS personnel and eligible family members, impacted by the acceptance of risk, are provided with adequate care and support by their respective organization.**

   C. **HLCM Working Group on Duty of Care (CRP 5)**

15. Following UNDSS/PPCU's update on the progress of the HLCM Working Group on Duty of Care ("HLCM Working Group"), the IASMN held a discussion on the duty of care. One member stressed that the duty of care should primarily be analyzed from a human resources (i.e., administrative) perspective, with security professionals providing support. In this regard, the member expressed concern over the fact that some IASMN members have taken the lead on this issue. The member added that the duty of care, as a principle, extends beyond the realm of safety and security and the mandate of the UNSMS. However, another member argued that the fact that some IASMN members have taken the lead on this issue reflects well on the IASMN and highlights the inter-agency body's enabling role.

16. Another member stated the importance of clarifying the scope of the duty of care and whether it applies to all UNSMS personnel, including contractors. Even if it is determined that the duty of care applies to all UNSMS personnel, parameters would still need to be set (e.g., extent to which personnel would continue to receive counselling following their exposure to a critical incident). Another member supported the setting of parameters, urging the Organization to define a reasonably achievable target with respect to the duty of care.

17. Another member noted that the sub-working group on Syria developed a questionnaire for personnel, whereby the duty of care towards locally-recruited personnel was identified as a priority. The questionnaire is currently being followed up with in-country focus groups. The member concluded by offering to exchange information on this topic with the HLCM Working Group.

18. Overall, multiple members expressed support for the HLCM Working Group, including its decision to limit the scope of its work to high-risk environments, while urging the HLCM Working Group to be as inclusive as possible in its analysis (i.e., identifying duty of care concerns impacting all personnel employed by the Organization, regardless of contractual status, while also addressing diversity concerns among personnel). Multiple members also expressed support for developing guidelines for managers, which would assist them in identifying and addressing duty of care concerns in the field. At the same time, however, it was understood that the HCLM Working Group's output would not be a panacea for the wide range of duty of care concerns.

19. Separate from the work of the HLCM Working Group, multiple members and one observer called on the IASMN to address duty of care concerns with respect to locally-recruited personnel, stressing that this issue has been pushed to the periphery for many years. One observer noted that the perception among many locally-recruited personnel that safety and security measures are primarily intended to protect internationally-recruited personnel. One member highlighted the fact that the recently endorsed Residential Security Measures (RSM) Policy does not apply to the majority of locally-recruited personnel (i.e., locally-recruited personnel that are not internationally-deployed). In this regard, the member noted the phenomenon of "nationally but not locally-recruited personnel," whereby

personnel may be recruited within one part of their country, but deployed to another part of their country that is entirely unfamiliar to them. The member also highlighted the fact that locally-recruited personnel are excluded from the UNSMS' evacuation policy, except under the direst of circumstances. Another member counter-argued, noting that the UNSMS' relocation policy applies to both internationally-recruited and locally-recruited personnel, while adding that ad-hoc measures have and should continue to be successfully implemented in unique or complex situations with respect to locally-recruited personnel (e.g., Central African Republic, Syria). Another member noted that his organization has struggled with this issue for years and have only recently addressed duty of care concerns with respect to locally-recruited personnel, whereby it was agreed among human resources, legal and security professionals that measures will differ based on whether the organization is directly responsible for placing an individual in a dangerous environment or whether the individual was already in that environment prior to his or her recruitment.

20. In this regard, USG, UNDSS stated that the duty of care concerns with respect to locally-recruited personnel are best addressed by the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) as any formal decision on this topic would have a significant impact on the Organization, adding that concerns with respect to locally-recruited personnel are broad and extensive. In order to draw the CEB's attention to this matter, it was agreed that UNHCR, UNICEF and UNRWA would draft a white paper on this topic, with a view to presenting the paper to the CEB.

RECOMMENDATION:

21. **The IASMN took note of the progress of the HLCM Working Group on Duty of Care while recognizing that the scope of its work is limited to key duty of care issues in high-risk environments. In this regard, the IASMN stated that it looked forward to the Working Group's expected output, including the identification of key duty of care issues in five high-risk environments (Afghanistan, Ebola-impacted countries, Haiti, Mali/Somalia and Syria) and the development of guidance notes for managers in the field.**

22. **Separately, the IASMN emphasized that the duty of care entails not only safety and security considerations, but also administrative, human resources and legal considerations, among others. Therefore, the duty of care, as a whole, is best addressed by the Executive Heads of UNSMS organizations (i.e., CEB level).**

23. **Recognizing the need to address duty of care issues with respect to locally-recruited personnel in particular, the IASMN agreed that interested organizations should produce a white paper on outstanding duty of care issues with respect to locally-recruited personnel, as necessary, with a view toward submission to HLCM.**

D. UNDSS Strategic Review (CRP 12)

24. USG, UNDSS presented the key findings of UNDSS' Strategic Review, with IASMN members expressing support for the much-anticipated outcomes. Multiple members noted that the Strategic Review clarified UNDSS' role in the field and articulated the Department's immediate priorities and long-term objectives. One member expressed appreciation for UNDSS' engagement with its clients over the course of the review, thereby ensuring a consultative process. Another member stated that the review addressed the vast majority of issues requested by the IASMN, including the need to promote knowledge management and establish a best practices and lessons learned unit. In this regard, another member noted that his organization has a single division devoted to policy evaluation and training, whereby best practices and lessons learned are able to be quickly incorporated into existing policies and trainings in a streamlined manner. The member noted that UNDSS may benefit from a similar organizational structure.

25. One member called for linking the Strategic Review with a functional review, whereby the role of the Desk Officers and Close Protection Officers in particular may be reviewed. More broadly, the member called for ensuring greater flexibility within the Security Risk Management (SRM) process, in recognition of the fact that it fits in a larger Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) process. USG, UNDSS responded by stating that no functional review would be undertaken in the near future, but that UNDSS needs to ensure the alignment of resources, with a particular focus on strengthening training and policy development. Moreover, there is a need to ensure that proper judgment is exercised at all times, with the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) carried out in accordance with the reality on the ground.

26. Multiple members noted the need to articulate career paths for those in the field. However, one member cautioned against trying to fit a "square peg in a round hole" and that the focus should be on ensuring mobility between UNDSS and other UNSMS organizations. Separately, one member called for ensuring that the United Nations Security Managers Information Network (UNSMIN) is regularly populated and updated. Finally, one member called for transitioning from a "stay and deliver" approach to a "how to deliver" approach. USG, UNDSS agreed with these points while noting that such points can be addressed outside the scope of Strategic Review. In this regard, USG, UNDSS clarified that the Strategic Review has been finalized, although its vision, mission and strategic objectives are always subject to internal review.

27. USG, UNDSS then stated that the Department will undertake a stakeholder (i.e., UNSMS) review in the coming months. The stakeholder review will seek input as to what UNDSS needs to improve and how UNDSS can work together with other UNSMS organizations in the most efficient and effective way. USG, UNDSS stated that a consolidation of resources would most likely create efficiencies. One member noted that his organization is conducting its own client survey and expressed support for UNDSS' stakeholder review and efforts to clarify the Department's future structure. However, another member expressed concern over any effort to consolidate resources, referencing an agreement on harmonization that allows UNSMS organizations to maintain their own capacities in advisory roles. In this regard, the member cited the *Framework of Accountability for the United Nations Security*

Management System (UNSMS) in support of continued de-centralization while expressing concern that any effort to consolidate resources would negatively impact responsiveness and efficiency.

RECOMMENDATION:

28. **The IASMN expressed support for UNDSS' Strategic Review and endorsed its recommendations, including its outcomes and its identification of immediate priorities. The IASMN also expressed support for a global review of the UNSMS and whether it is the most efficient and effective way to deliver safety and security services in the current environment.**

E. Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) (DPKO-DFS)

29. DPKO-DFS provided on update on the Joint Inspection Unit's (JIU) audit of safety and security across all UN Secretariat departments and offices as well as Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFPs). DPKO-DFS stressed that the JIU is an independent body that does not report to the Secretary-General, but rather the General Assembly. However, DPKO-DFS, upon the request of senior UN officials, is partly funding the study.

30. DPKO-DFS noted that the JIU fully realizes that Member States are first and foremost responsible for the safety and security of UN personnel. However, the JIU is of the opinion that there has been little to no follow up since the 2008 Brahimi report was released. The JIU views the Brahimi report as valid and their inspections are based on the recommendations made within the report. As of today, the JIU has completed its field visits, which included trips to various duty stations in Africa and the Middle East as well Geneva, New York and Rome, among other duty stations.

31. The JIU's aims to ensure that programmes are being delivered in a safe and secure manner. At the same time, the JIU recognizes that complete safety and security can never be ensured. Failures caused by poor communication, limited capacity and resources, human error and other causes will occur. The scope of the inspection is broad and aims to cover issues confronting not only the UNSMS, but also the CEB, HLCM and IASMN, with such issues ranging from accountability to security system instruments. The JIU is also interested in whether best practices and lessons learned have been developed and implemented.

32. DPKO-DFS noted that JIU's preparatory phase was completed in the middle of 2014, with their audit beginning shortly thereafter. In their initial findings, a sizeable majority of UN organizations and Member States surveyed identified the need to clarify roles and responsibilities, particularly with regard to coordination among various UNSMS organizations, as well as cost-sharing arrangements as the most pressing concerns with regard to safety and security. DPKO-DFS concluded by stating that the JIU is under no obligation to circulate a draft of its final report to the IASMN, but it may do so as the

relationship has been cordial thus far. Alternatively, IASMN members may simply have to wait for the final report to be released in September 2015.

RECOMMENDATION:

33. **The IASMN took note of the update on the Joint Inspection Unit's (JIU) review of safety and security across the UN system and looks forward to the final report, scheduled to be released in September 2015.**

F. Ending Impunity for those who commit Serious Crimes and Acts of Violence against UN Personnel (CRP 11)

34. UNDSS/PPCU's provided an update on the progress made by the working group established to end impunity for those who commit serious crimes and acts of violence against UN personnel.[1] Upon concluding the update, one working group member expressed confidence in the working group's ability to establish a database of UN personnel who were victims of serious crimes and acts of violence. The member added that the database would be particularly helpful in following up on single deaths and injuries, which often to do not lead to the establishment of formal inquiries.

35. Another member noted that the issue ties into the duty of care, particularly toward the next of kin. In this regard, a focal point would likely be required, along with relevant guidance. A second member urged the working group to expand its focus to include incidents involving non-state and state entities. In some cases, even a debriefing is not provided. At the same time, there is a need to ensure that any list remains confidential and does not jeopardize operations on the ground. A third member cautioned that a lack of investigation or collection of evidence may lead to potential litigation and accusations of negligence.

36. USG, UNDSS clarified that the purpose of a database is to ensure that serious crimes and acts of violence against UN personnel have been recorded and that a process is in place to bring the perpetrator(s) to justice. The database would be actively maintained and would serve as the basis for following up on specific incidents or matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

37. **The IASMN took note of the update on efforts to end impunity for those who commit serious crimes and acts of violence against UN personnel, including the development of a database to follow-up on such incidents. The IASMN looks forward to receiving an update on the working group's status at the 22nd session of the IASMN.**

G. Residential Security Measures (RSM) (CRP 8)

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[1] Previously referred to as the Justice Registry Working Group (JRWG); however, one member of the working group expressed reservations on this name that may imply certain responsibilities and/or actions not necessarily intended.

38. UNDSS/PPCU provided on update on the status of the Residential Security Measures (RSM) Policy, which was endorsed by the 20th session of the IASMN in June 2014. UNDSS/PPCU noted that the policy was subsequently circulated to the Human Resources Network (HRN), upon the request of the IASMN, due to the considerable financial and human resource implications embedded within the policy. Unfortunately, UNDSS/PPCU notified the IASMN that feedback from individual UNSMS organizations, through the HRN, was not received until January 2015. Thus, the Technical Working Group (TWG) has only recently begun addressing the input, with a view to incorporating or otherwise addressing all input received in the coming months. The TWG will simultaneously develop draft guidelines for implementing the RSM Policy, with a view to submitting a finalized draft of such guidelines to the IASMN Steering Group in May 2015.

39. Upon the conclusion of the update, multiple members expressed frustration with the fact that input was not provided by individual UNSMS organizations, through the HRN, until January 2015 and identified the need to submit the RSM Policy to HLCM for approval as a priority. These members also expressed their continued dissatisfaction with MORSS, whereby MORSS measures have come to be viewed as entitlements (i.e., procurement exercise), regardless of the prevailing security environment, with little effective oversight or compliance at headquarter or field levels.

40. Two members noted the need to address the need for residential security measures for all locally-recruited personnel, albeit with the understanding that this issue remains de-linked from the RSM Policy, which applies only to internationally-recruited or internationally-deployed individuals. A third member noted that residential security measures should not only be viewed in the context of cost-based elements (i.e., procurement), but also in the context of residential security training, which can be delivered in an online format, addressing residential security awareness and providing residential security advice (e.g., advice on selecting a residence), similar to Basic Security in the Field (BSITF) and Advanced Security in the Field (ASITF) courses. In response, USG, UNDSS called for the establishment of a new working group to consider residential security measures for locally-recruited personnel. As a first step, the new working group should draft Terms of Reference (TORs) and conduct a scoping exercise to identify residential security risks to locally-recruited personnel, including risks resulting from their contractual status with a UNSMS organization. The new working group – as well as the MORSS TWG – should also develop an awareness tool for personnel (i.e., online training course or video or other media) specifically with respect to residential security.

RECOMMENDATION:

41. **The IASMN identified the need to submit the Residential Security Measures (RSM) Policy to HLCM for approval as a priority and, in this regard, called on the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) Technical Working Group (TWG) to address the recent input provided by individual UNSMS organizations, through the Human Resources**

Network (HRN). The IASMN also called on the MORSS TWG to draft operational guidelines for implementing the RSM Policy, with a view to submitting a finalized draft to the IASMN Steering Group in May 2015 for review. The working group should also develop an awareness tool for personnel (i.e., online training course, video or other social media) specifically with respect to residential security.

42. **Separately, the IASMN called for the establishment of a new working group to identify residential security risks in the context of locally-recruited personnel, in recognition of the fact that the RSM Policy applies only to internationally-recruited or internationally-deployed personnel and their eligible family members, as noted under its Applicability section. The new working group will be chaired by UNICEF, with IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, UN Women and WFP serving as members. CCIUSA will participate as an observer. As a first step, the working group should draft TORs and conduct a scoping exercise to identify residential security risks to locally-recruited personnel, including risks resulting from their contractual status with a UNSMS organization.**

H. Security Risk Management (SRM) (CRP 4)

43. The Chair of the Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group (SRMIWG) provided an update on the progress made by working group since the last IASMN Steering Group session, held in Dakar in November 2014. In this regard, the Chair of the SRMIWG confirmed that the new SRM methodology has been confirmed, tested, and adopted. Moreover, the SRM Policy, which incorporates the Security Level System (SLS) Policy and elements from other relevant policies, lays down principles while providing sufficient flexibility for implementing the methodology in accordance with the local context. Furthermore, the SRM Manual is now testable. The SRM e-tool is partially complete while training modules linked to the e-tool also still under construction, with a five-country testing phase planned upon completion of the e-tool. Training will first be provided to support teams (e.g., UNDSS-HQ, Security Focal Points-HQ, and regional security advisers), then to users (e.g., UNDSS-Field, DPKO-DFS, DPA, AFPs) and, finally, key security decision-makers. It is important to note that the e-tool will function on low bandwidth and mobile devices and aims to be user-friendly. Both Desk Officers and security professionals in the field will take part in the testing. A final roll-out date has been set for November 2015, whereby everyone is expected to be trained in the SRM process over the course of the following year. At that time, the transition from the SRA to SRM will have been completed.

44. The Chief of the SRMIWG also noted that, with regard to compliance, measures are now recorded whenever implemented. If measures have not been implemented for whatever reason by the agreed time, the CSA/SA and relevant Desk Officer will be notified. Moreover, with regard to recording lessons learned and developing best practices, all security managers will be able to record all implemented measures around the world, thus allowing colleagues the opportunity to review other practices from other countries, including in relation to cost and effectiveness.

45. Upon the conclusion of the presentation, one member asked how Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) for different areas within a given country be affected by the new SRM process, particularly given the understanding that each organization can conduct its own assessment. In this regard, USG, UNDSS and multiple members stressed the need to ensure flexibility within the new SRM process, whereby individual areas can be assessed within a given country and whereby MOSS, even when tailored to a specific area, should be viewed as *minimum* standards, which individual AFPs may wish to strengthen in accordance with their own assessment. At the same time, there needs to be continuous engagements with AFPOs to ensure that the new SRM process remains demand-driven, rather than supply-driven.

RECOMMENDATION:

46. **The IASMN approved the amended Terms of Reference (TORs) and projected work plan presented by the Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group (SRMIWG).**

47. **The IASMN approved the latest draft of the SRM Policy, SRM Manual as ready for field testing and agreed to provide any further input to the Chair of the SRMIWG by the end of February 2015.**

48. **Finally, the IASMN expressed deep appreciation for the work of the SRMIWG thus far and recognized the fundamental importance of SRM process to the work of UNSMS security professionals.**

I.   **Air Travel (CRP 7)**

49. UNDSS' Field Support Section (UNDSS/FSS) presented the Air Travel Policy and accompanying Air Operational Guidelines. These drafts incorporated all changes requested by the IASMN Steering Group, IASMN and HLCM. Additional reference documents circulated included the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) methodology, discussion of its impact, and policy implementation strategy.

50. Over the course of the IASMN's discussions, UNDSS/FSS clarified the following points: (1) the Air Travel Policy and related Operational Guidelines are expected to be rolled out within four months of being promulgated, with the development of tools and training materials being the most time-intensive component; training will be customized by content and user types and delivered online; (2) the current *modus operandi* remains in effect until the new policy is rolled out; (3) once the new policy is promulgated, UNDSS/FSS and, specifically, its Aviation Risk Management Office (ARMO), will communicate its features and requirements to UNSMS stakeholders, as well as the confidential nature of UN information.

51. Multiple members expressed support for the latest revisions to the Air Travel Policy and Air Travel Operational Guidelines and endorsed them without reservation. One member stated his intention to endorse the two documents, although he first requested clarification with

respect to paragraph 6 of the Air Travel Policy and paragraphs 33 and 34 with respect to the Air Travel Operational Guidelines, which appear to use the terms "may" and "must" interchangeably with regard to use of the Risk Management Tool (RMT). The member stated that only the term "may" should be used, in line with the understanding that individual organizations will decide whether use of RMT the RMT is necessary in this context. Another member requested clarification with respect to the number of Air Travel Focal Points (ATFP) required, noting that Annex of the Air Travel Policy were not in line with the Operational Guidelines.

52. Clarification with respect to charter flights and whether an organization can arrange a charter flight with an airline that is categorized as "Unrestricted," with no further requirements or authorization. Clarification was also requested with respect to donated flights, noting that the definition of a donated flight in the policy is one that has "no cost" to the UN. A situation whereby a donated flight may entail a nominal cost to the UN was noted (e.g., organization being provided with one or more empty seats, if available). In this regard, UNDSS/FSS responded that chartered and donated flights are uniquely different and that such situations are best addressed through the organizations' Air Operational Guidelines, adding that payments of any monetary amount could be defined as a procurement action.

53. Clarification was also requested with regard to ICAO's methodology, with one member stating that it is important to have a "legally defensible" methodology in place. UNDSS/FSS advised that ICAO, as the owner of the methodology, is best positioned to describe the indicators used to drive airline categorizations and how such categorizations are validated. UNDSS/FSS noted that it had already circulated an ICAO document detailing its methodology and would reach out to ICAO for further information, if requested by the IASMN.

54. Two members expressed concern over the operationalization of the Air Travel Policy and Air Travel Operational Guidelines. One member stated that the new policy could complicate the approval of some flights (e.g., every airline in a given country may be deemed "Restricted"). In this regard, UNDSS/FSS noted that any airline deemed Restricted would be in accordance with ICAO's methodology, as endorsed by the IASMN. Concern was also expressed that the Risk Management Tool (RMT) required information that could not be provided in a reasonable amount of time, particularly for urgent requests, and that the process may become too complicated and administrative in its approach. Specifically, the member objected to having to submit very high-risk *and* high-risk classifications to USG, UNDSS for approval. In this regard, USG, UNDSS concurred with the member, adding that the responsibility for approving a high-risk classification should be delegated to the relevant DO/SMT on the ground.

55. Finally, concern over the policy's requirement that a security professional conduct the RMT was also voiced. A member noted that his organization's ATFP is not a security professional. UNDSS/FSS responded that this footnote can be modified to incorporate non-security professionals who are properly trained to conduct a RMT. The member also took issue with

why a risk assessment was still required for those airlines deemed "Conditional" if "Unrestricted" airlines are not available. In such cases, the member questioned whether the assessment would be used to support or not support the use of Conditional airlines. UNDSS/FSS responded by noting that the decision to use Conditional airlines in such circumstances (i.e., when Unrestricted airlines are not available) is one best made by the individual organization, in accordance with its own operational guidelines. USG, UNDSS added that some organizations will have a larger tolerance for risk than others; however, the three categorizations (i.e., Unrestricted, Conditional, and Restricted) are linked to ICAO's methodology and thus cannot be reduced to simply two. Lastly, the member questioned whether reputational risk had been considered when devising these three categorizations, particularly in the context of classifying government-owned airlines as either Conditional or Restricted. UNDSS/FSS responded by noting that such categorizations were in accordance with ICAO's methodology, which has already been endorsed.

RECOMMENDATION:

56. **The Air Travel Policy, as presented to the 21st session of the IASMN was endorsed based on the following understanding: (1) the Risk Management Tool (RMT) and the Air Travel Operational Guidelines will address the concerns raised by two IASMN members; (2) assurances have been provided by USG, UNDSS that the Air Travel Policy, as presented and endorsed by the 21st session of the IASMN, will be subject to revision if it impacts the day-to-day operations of UNSMS organizations and, in particular, inhibits the delivery of their programmes or mandates; and (3) any revision of the Air Travel Policy shall only be undertaken in consultation with all relevant stakeholders.**

J. Safety and Security Incident Recording System (SSIRS) (CRP 3)

57. A member of the Security Incident Recording Working Group (SIRWG) provided an update to IASMN members as to the status of the Safety and Security Incident Recording System (SSIRS). The member noted that all changes requested by the IASMN at its 20th session, held in Montreux in June 2014, have been addressed, including arrangements for the simultaneous translation of the SSIRS Policy into French. With regard to the scope of SSIRS, the member noted that certain "super-users" called for including safety and security incidents that do not directly impact UNSMS organizations, coupled with "near-misses," so as to strengthen situational awareness. Provision will be made to use SSIRS to record these with a "soft switch" to distinguish between input for recording UN related incidents and those which are purely for situational awareness. Moreover, the member informed the IASMN that the SIRWG had reverted back to categorizing all types of sexual assault under one category as directed by the IASMN in Montreux.

58. More broadly, the member of the SIRWG noted that any field within SSIRS can be revised or updated at any time, with the time and date stamp of the initial entry and any subsequent revision or update clearly indicated. He emphasized that SSIRS is not intended to replace flash reporting systems already in place. With regard to ownership, the member confirmed

that UNDSS had agreed to take ownership of SSIRS as it is best positioned to supervise the recording of safety and security incidents in the field. SSIRS is expected to "go live" by 1 July 2015, upon which the member called for disbanding the SIRWG, with the understanding that its objectives will have been met. Once SSIRS becomes fully functional, the member recommended ending UNDSS' Quarterly Incident Reports (QIRs) because the information contained in such reports would be among the categories of information captured by SSIRS. The Chair endorsed this recommendation.

59. Upon the conclusion of the update, one IASMN member called for correcting the classification of burglary as an act that cannot occur in the context of a vehicle break-in. In this regard, IASMN members agreed that the classification of burglary is one reserved for premises.

RECOMMENDATION:

60. **The IASMN endorsed the SSIRS Policy and the SSIRS User Manual, whereby it was confirmed that SSIRS could be used to record incidents that do not impact the UN in order to enhance situational awareness and that SSIRS would not record incidents involving members of military contingents or formed police units, in line with the Applicability section of the UNSMS'** *Security Policy Manual*. **The IASMN also endorsed the SSIRS roll-out plan, as detailed in Annex C, and use of the Safety and Security Incident Recording Form, as found in Annex D.**

61. **Given its endorsement, the IASMN requested that SSIRS be launched by 1 April 2015, upon which a three-month trial and evaluation period will begin. If the launch is successful, as determined by the SIRWG, UNDSS will become responsible for housing and implementing SSIRS as of 1 July 2015.**

62. **The IASMN requested the IASMN Secretariat to transmit all documents related to SSIRS to HLCM, whereby HLCM would be requested to take note of the IASMN's endorsement of SSIRS.**

RECOMMENDATION:

K. Arming of Security Professionals (CRP 16)

63. UNDSS/PPCU began a discussion on the need to draft a UNSMS policy on arming security professionals in the field. The IASMN Steering Group in Dakar had discussed the issue of arming of security professionals in a comprehensive manner (i.e., vulnerability, cost, impact, legal and policy implications, image, and security culture) and had called for a UNSMS-wide policy addressing this issue. Multiple members expressed support for UNDSS' existing *Manual of Instruction on the Use of Force Equipment, including Firearms*, revised in May 2014. Multiple members emphasized that its content already addresses the operational guidelines with respect to how and when security professionals may be armed, but that a

policy is required to outline the framework under which the manual would apply. In this regard, one member noted that the existing Use of Force Policy fails to outline a proper framework under which security professionals may be armed following appropriate training and certification, thus necessitating a new UNSMS policy specifically addressing this issue.

64. With regard to who exactly should be armed, multiple members expressed strong reservations to arming security *professionals* (e.g., security *managers* or security *advisers*) whereby a distinction was made between such individuals and security *officers*. It was argued that security professionals cannot effectively manage or advise if they are also armed and thus only security *officers* should be armed. In this regard, such reservations were tied to reputational risk as well as the blurring of roles and responsibilities. One member referenced the paramilitary security culture that has emerged in some duty stations over recent years, whereby he voiced concern that arming security professionals would only strengthen this culture. The member called on IASMN members to curb this trend and work to enhance the level of professionalism across the network. Another member made clear that his organization would not arm its security professionals under any circumstances and would explore drafting its own policy with respect to firearms in general. Reflecting the diversity of views and current practices on the ground, two IASMN members noted that they already arm their security professionals, on an exceptional basis, in some duty stations. On this point, a third member expressed concern over the fact that some UNSMS organizations were already arming their security professionals in a manner de-linked from a formal SRA or SMT decision, which, according to the member, underlined the need for a UNSMS policy on this particular issue.

65. USG, UNDSS stated that any decision to arm security professionals must be made objectively and be intelligence-led as well as risk-based, with the legal basis to arm security professionals in-country fully clarified.

RECOMMENDATION:

66. **The IASMN called for the development of a UNSMS policy on the arming of security professionals, in recognition of the fact that there are certain situations in which arming security professionals may be appropriate and that the UNSMS' Use of Force Policy does not adequately address such situations. In this regard, the IASMN recognized the fact that USG, UNDSS has delegated authority, from the Secretary-General to authorize the carriage of firearms, types of firearms systems, ammunitions and weapons for use by United Nations Security Officials, with support provided by the Weapons Committee.**

67. **The IASMN agreed that the proposed policy require that a robust process whereby any decision to arm security professionals be preceded by an objective, threat and risk-based analysis. The proposed policy should also address the legal basis for arming security professionals and the need to ensure that an adequate training and certification process is in place. Finally, the IASMN agreed that the *Manual of Instruction on the Use of Force Equipment, including Firearms*, while subject to revision, should serve as the UNSMS**

operational guidelines to the proposed policy. Both the new policy and operational guidelines should be submitted to the next IASMN Steering Group meeting in May 2015.

L. IASMN Steering Group and VTC TORs and UNSMS Policy Development (CRP 13)

68. UNDSS/PPCU sought to address certain administrative matters pertaining to the IASMN, including whether there is a need for IASMN Steering Group and Video Teleconference (VTC) Terms of Reference (TORs), in addition to the need for further UNSMS policy development, with greater consultation from the field.

69. With regard to the IASMN Steering Group in particular, multiple members expressed support for the drafting of TORs, which would confirm existing IASMN Steering Group members on an annual basis, while expanding membership to include two, additional UNSMS members on a rotating, two-year basis so as to keep the size of the Steering Group relatively small, yet allow all UNSMS organizations, regardless of their size or resources, an opportunity to join the group. Multiple members also expressed support for requiring all Steering Group members to actively take part in IASMN working groups.

RECOMMENDATION:

70. **The IASMN agreed to limit the size of its Steering Group to its current membership and two additional members to be selected on a two-year rotating basis. In this regard, IASMN members were requested to submit their request for membership, in writing, to USG, UNDSS by the end of March 2015. The IASMN also agreed that all Steering Group members would be required to participate in at least one IASMN working group. The IASMN called on UNDSS to draft Terms of Reference (TORs), reflecting these points, for presentation at the next Steering Group session in May 2015.**

71. **With regard to the IASMN VTC, the IASMN reaffirmed that the VTC should continue to be conducted in an informal setting, thus requiring no TORs at this time. The IASMN also reaffirmed that the VTC should continue to focus on operational matters and cross-cutting issues impacting various UNSMS organizations.**

72. **With regard to UNSMS policy development, the IASMN reaffirmed that the transition from the UN *Field Security Handbook* to the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual* is a priority. Separately, the IASMN called for establishing a "college" of experienced security professionals in the field with a strong interest in policy development. Such professionals should be invited to provide advice on IASMN policies and participate in IASMN working groups.**

M. Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG) (CRP 9)

73. UNDSS/FSS provided an update on the latest progress made by the Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG), including the latest revision of the draft Management of Stress and Critical Incident Stress (MSCIS) Policy.

74. One member expressed satisfaction that the draft policy had undergone substantive revisions and had been substantially reduced in length. The member called for further clarifying the roles of security professionals in a more concise manner. A second member echoed similar sentiments, noting that the development of a contingency psychosocial plan was beyond the remit of Security Advisers (SAs).

RECOMMENDATION:

75. **The IASMN took note of the latest draft of the Management of Stress and Critical Incident Stress (MSCIS) Policy while calling for the draft policy to be finalized prior to the next Steering Group session in May 2015.**

N. Gender Considerations in Security Management Working Group (WFP)

76. The Chair of the Gender Considerations in Security Management Working Group provided an update on the working group's progress. He noted that the working group intends to review existing UNSMS policies, including Security Risk Management (RSM), Residential Security Measures (RSM), Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS), Host Government and Framework of Accountability policies, in order to identify policy gaps with respect to gender. The working group is also reviewing existing operational guidelines corresponding to these policies, with a particular interest in understanding whether gender-related security incidents and concerns are being identified and addressed. In this regard, the working group may decide to develop its own guidelines on this particular issue, whereby threats and risks in specific duty stations would be fed into the SRA, which would allow UNSMS organizations to begin mapping the threats and risks as well as actual incidents related to gender.

77. The working group is currently finalizing its Terms of Reference (TORs) and mission statement. It is also working to identify gender experts within the UN system, adding that there is a need for stronger advocacy on the topic by senior UN officials at the headquarters and field level, including with respect to the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) personnel, particularly in countries where one's sexual orientation or health status may subject them to harassment or prosecution. Finally, the member emphasized the role of security professionals in responding to victims of gender-related security incidents. In this regard, the working group intends to draft guidelines for how to respond to such incidents in the field.

78. One member stressed that supporting the victim should always be the first prerogative while investigating the gender-related security incident should be second. In this regard, it would be prudent to have female security professionals take the lead on various training

courses, particularly those delivered to female security professionals, whereby specific, gender-related issues can be discussed without reservation. Another member agreed with this approach, but cautioned that security professionals should not also be required to formally provide victim support. A third member noted that his organization recently required all of its personnel to undergo general, gender-related online training that has been produced by UN Women ("I Know Gender"), which may prove useful to other UNSMS organizations. Another member echoed similar sentiments, noting the need to train all personnel on this topic, not simply security professionals. Another member called for exploring ways of creating a threat descriptor for a specific programme, factoring into account gender and sexual orientation, within the context of the new SRM process. Finally, another member noted that his organization is currently working to address not only gender concerns, but also age and diversity concerns within all of their policies. More broadly, the member noted that his organization is also seeking to address security risks resulting from "sensitive profiles" (e.g., race, ethnicity, religion), as perceived in-country, noting that perhaps the UNSMS should begin focusing on specific risks posed to personnel with sensitive profiles in-country, particularly locally-recruited personnel, and consider practical mitigation measures in response.

RECOMMENDATION:

79. **The IASMN took note of the progress made by the recently established Gender Considerations in Security Management Working Group, including the development of draft Terms of Reference (TORs) and the identification of gaps within existing UNSMS policies with respect to gender. The IASMN noted that it looked forward to receiving an update from the working group at the next Steering Group session in May 2015.**

   O. Security Training Working Group (STWG) (CRP 10)

80. UNDSS/FSS provided an update on the progress made by the Security Training Working Group (STWG) following its latest meeting in New York in September 2014. The update highlighted ten items that the IASMN was requested to consider and endorse. With regard to the first item, which called for endorsing the "concept" that core, specialist and general training programmes should be available to all UNSMS members, with twenty-percent enrollment reserved for AFPO from outside the sponsoring organization, one member requested that the term "concept" be replaced with "principle" as such a statement is aspirational. More broadly, the member noted that while Training of the Trainers (ToT) programmes have been successful, many lessons learned had yet to be incorporated into ToT and other trainings. The member also called on the STWG to move further away from a one-size-fits-all approach while simultaneously emphasizing core competencies (i.e., adoption of a competency-based learning model). Another member agreed, noting the training programmes for Local Security Assistants (LSAs).

81. With regard to the use of the Security Awareness Induction Training (SAIT) programme in Iraq, whose delivery by a commercial provider is set to end at the end of July 2015, one

member expressed concern over the fact that the DO/SMT will subsequently have an opportunity to evaluate training options, instead of calling for the implementation of the Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) training course, as currently implemented across all other duty stations. The member added that one day of additional, specialized training with respect to the security environment in Iraq may be necessary, but there is a need to implement one SSAFE training programme worldwide so as to avoid problems in the context of Temporary Duty Assignment (TDY), surge deployments and official visits. In response, UNDSS/FSS stated that it was currently working on addressing this issue. The member continued on to call for the development of two new courses: (1) practitioner course aimed at Field Service (FS) grade officers, with the understanding that FS-5 to FS-7 grades would still be required to complete the Security Certification Programme (SCP); and (2) "soft-skills" course aimed at all security professionals, covering a wide-range of topics, ranging from how to respond to allegations of sexual assault to how to dress. Multiple members expressed support for the development of a soft-skills course. On a separate note, one member noted that his organization was in the final stages of developing a road safety training programme and would share the programme with IASMN members as soon as it is rolled out (i.e., summer 2015).

82. Another member emphasized the need to prioritize the development of various training programmes, with a shift to a joint-venture model. The need to prioritize the development of trainings was supported by multiple IASMN members, with one member adding that UNDSS' Training and Development Section (TDS) is constantly reacting to IASMN requests for additional trainings and has little, if any, time to review existing trainings and approaches from a strategic perspective. In response, USG, UNDSS called on the STWG to engage in a stock-taking exercise and prioritize the development of its trainings at its next meeting in Budapest based upon efficiency and effectiveness. He also called on the STWG to adopt a competency-based approach when developing new trainings in order to ensure all security professionals exhibit core competencies and maintain up-to-date certifications relevant to their deployment.

RECOMMENDATION:

83. **The IASMN endorsed the recommendations from the September 2014 meeting, as found in CRP 10, with one language modification to the first recommendation.**

84. **The IASMN emphasized the need to prioritize the outstanding requests for training deliverables. In order to do so, the IASMN called on the STWG to undertake a stock-taking exercise with respect to the status of training deliverables, resources required to complete such deliverables and an expected timeline for their respective completion.**

85. **Separately, the IASMN identified the need to develop a training course for Field Service (FS) grade officers, with the understanding that FS-5 to FS-7 grades would still be required to complete the Security Certification Programme (SCP), as well as a training course on "soft-skills" for all security professionals.**

P. Unarmed Private Security Companies (CRP 6)

86. UNDSS/PPCU provided an overview of the report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, which was transmitted to the 69th session of the General Assembly. In light of the report, which focused on both armed and unarmed private security companies by the Organization, USG, UNDSS stressed the need to view the two categories as a single category requiring proper vetting. While taking issue with the report's use of the term "security guards" to refer to a wide range of personnel, including security professionals, USG, UNDSS stated that he clarified to the Working Group the circumstances under which the Organization contracts with unarmed and armed private security companies (i.e., as a last resort and through a formalized process) and vetting procedures already in place. Such transparency has helped to assuage concerns related to the use of armed and unarmed private security companies. However, one member noted that some critics are concerned that some companies are seeking credibility through their association with the UN.

87. One member stated that it may be helpful to distinguish between armed and unarmed private security companies as the two are contracted for different purposes. The member stated that unarmed private security personnel essentially function as "control access" personnel and rarely, if ever, function in a capacity where violations, ranging from human rights abuses to illegal detentions to trafficking to sexual assaults, are likely to occur.

RECOMMENDATION:

88. **Recognizing the importance of further clarifying the UN's guidance regarding the use of unarmed private security companies, the IASMN endorsed the establishment of a working group on unarmed private security companies, led by DPKO-DFS and composed of OHCHR, UNDP, UNDSS/DRO/Peacekeeping Operations Support Section, UNDSS/PPCU, UNHCR, World Bank as well as DFS/Office of the Director/Field Procurement Liaison Team, DM/Office of Central Support Services/Procurement Division, UNDP/Procurement Support Office and a UNDSS Chief Security Adviser (CSA) to be determined.**

Q. Any Other Business (AOB)

a. Budgetary matters: Jointly Financed Activities (JFA)

89. USG, UNDSS provided an overview of the budget for the biennium 2016-2017, stressing that no growth has been forecasted for this period, apart from any increases due to re-costing methods employed by the Controller. USG, UNDSS noted that there had been an internal, budget-neutral reallocation of resources, primarily aimed at strengthening physical security, threat and risk analysis, policy development and training capacities. USG, UNDSS noted that such a reallocation of resources is linked to the recommendations put forth in the

Department's Strategic Review and will allow UNDSS to meet the existing and future demands of the UNSMS.

90. Multiple members recalled the amount for 2014-2015 biennium ($218 million) and the difference between the initial figure and the amount billed to AFPs. USG, UNDSS noted that the final figure was linked to re-costing methods. Re-costing is impacted by various factors, including the use of vacancy rates and fluctuations in currency exchange rates, among others. One member noted that it had yet to be informed as to what serious consequences, if any, would have resulted if the initial figure (i.e., $218 million) remained unchanged. On a separate note, the member stated that his organization had hoped that UNDSS' Strategic Review would have analyzed what is being delivered from a budgetary perspective and highlighted the comparative advantage of individual UNSMS organizations. In this regard, USG, UNDSS clarified that the Strategic Review articulated what is being delivered from a services perspective, adding that individual UNSMS organizations were best positioned to analyze the value-added of specific services delivered. Finally, another member noted that his organization would not be able to support a similar, substantial increase in the proposed 2016-2017 biennium budget due to re-costing methods subsequently employed by the Controller. IASMN members agreed to revert back to the FBN for further clarification regarding exact figures and the re-costing methods employed by the Controller.

RECOMMENDATION:

91. **The IASMN supported UNDSS' budget orientations with respect to Jointly Financed Activities (JFA) for the biennium 2016-2017**.

b. Blast assessments

92. One member called for developing a training programme on how to conduct a basic blast assessment. The programme would be aimed at security professionals and would allow them to conduct a basic vulnerability assessment as well as recognize the limits of their assessment, in lieu of a comprehensive assessment conducted by a qualified blast engineer. The member confirmed that UNHCR and WFP, two agencies with qualified blast engineers serving as security advisers, have agreed to coordinate in developing such a training programme. Multiple members expressed interest in such a programme. In the interim, IASMN members supported the development and distribution of a list of blast engineers employed or contracted by UNSMS organizations.

RECOMMENDATION:

93. **The IASMN supported the development and distribution of a list of blast engineers employed or contracted by UNSMS organizations.**

c. Convergence of physical and information security

94. One member discussed his organization's determination to converge and consolidate physical security with state-of-the-art iCT security systems and functions. The member noted that his organization is preparing a project to integrate identity management and user authentication technologies through the use of biometrics and smart cards, among other physical security technologies and equipment, with the goal to manage a single, consolidated and centralized access control system for both physical and logical assets. The member noted that such technologies could be applied at headquarter and field levels while remaining sensitive to privacy concerns. The member's organization sought coordination and feedback, via an e-mail questionnaire, from other HLCM - Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Network and IASMN members on the following points: (1) access standards of UNSMS organizations and any major business challenges in merging access standards, including privacy issues; (2) future plans; and (3) interest in developing a UN-wide approach to access with the eventual goal of "one UN system Smart Card Identity". Another member noted that the consolidation of physical and information security extends beyond access control in a manner that impacts the physical security of logical data, assets and personnel. Therefore, such efforts should not be viewed solely in the context of security.

RECOMMENDATION:

95. **The IASMN took note of the presentation on the determination to converge and consolidate physical security with state-of-the-art iCT security systems and functions, and its coordination efforts with HLCM's ICT Network and the IASMN.**

d. IASMN calendar of meetings

96. The IASMN discussed the length, venue and dates for upcoming IASMN Steering Group and IASMN sessions.

RECOMMENDATION:

97. **The IASMN agreed to limit IASMN Steering Group sessions to two days and IASMN sessions to three days in length. With regard to venue and dates, the IASMN approved the following calendar:**

- **12-13 May 2015:** IASMN Steering Group Session in Bogota, Colombia
  - Host: UNDP
- **23-25 June 2015:** 22nd IASMN Session in Montreux, Switzerland
- **11-12 November 2015:** IASMN Steering Group Session in Arusha, Tanzania
- **2-5 February 2016:** 23rd IASMN Session in New York, United States of America

Revised Agenda

Tuesday, 3 February 2015: *Strategic Priorities and Vision for the UNSMS*

0830 – 0900	Welcome, Safety and Security Briefings (ADB Security; SA, UNDSS)
0900 – 0930	Opening Remarks, Adoption of the Agenda (ADB VP; USG, UNDSS)
0930 – 1030	Global Security Environment (USG, UNDSS)
1030 – 1100	*Break*
1100 – 1200	HLCM Working Group on Duty of Care (PPCU)
1200 – 1300	*Lunch*
1300 – 1500	UNDSS Strategic Review (USG, UNDSS)
1500 – 1530	*Break*
1530 – 1630	Joint Inspection Unit (DPKO-DFS)
1630 – 1730	Ending Impunity for those who commit Serious Crimes and Acts of Violence against UN personnel (PPCU)
1730	*End of Day (followed by a cocktail hosted by ADB)*

Wednesday, 4 February 2015: *UNSMS Policies*

0830 – 0900	Residential Security Measures (PPCU)
0900 – 1100	Security Risk Management (SRM) (OCHA, FSS)
1100 – 1130	*Break*
1130 – 1230	Air Travel (FSS)
1230 – 1330	*Lunch*
1330 – 1500	Safety and Security Incident Recording System (SSIRS) (DPKO-DFS)
1500 – 1530	*Break*
1530 – 1630	Arming of Security Professionals (PPCU)
1630 – 1730	IASMN Steering Group and VTC TORs and UNSMS Policy Development (PPCU)
1730	*End of Day*

Thursday, 5 February 2015: *Updates on IASMN Working Groups*

0830 – 0930	Critical Incident Stress Management Working Group (FSS)
0930 – 1030	Gender Considerations in Security Management Working Group (WFP)
1030 – 1100	*Break*
1100 – 1200	Security Training Working Group (STWG) (FSS)
1200 – 1330	*Lunch*
1330 – 1430	Unarmed Private Security Companies (PPCU)
1430 – 1630	Any Other Business (AOB)

- Budgetary Matters: Jointly Financed Activities (JFA)
- Blast Assessment Review (UNHCR)
- Convergence of Physical and Information Security (ITU)
- IASMN: Calendar of meetings

1630	*Close of Session (followed by an IASMN Dinner)*

List of Participants

Chair, Co-Chair and Secretary

Chair	**Mr. Peter Drennan (USG, UNDSS)**
Co-Chair	**Mr. Drew Donovan (ITU)**
Secretary	**Ms. Florence Poussin (UNDSS/PPCU)**

Agencies, Funds and Programmes and Other Entities of the United Nations Security Management System

Asian Development Bank (ADB)	**Mr. Andrew Clinton**
	Mr. GP Marin
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	**Mr. Alan Drew**
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	**Mr. Phillippe Franzkowiak**
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	**Mr. John Ahlert**
International Criminal Court (ICC)	**Mr. Lassi Kuusinen**
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	**Mr. Saidou Guindo**
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	**Ms. Claudia Fiori**
International Labour Organization (ILO)	**Mr. Jean-Louis Dominguez**
International Money Fund (IMF)	**Mr. Warren Young**
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	**Mr. William Wairoa-Harrison**
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)	**Mr. Drew Donovan**

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Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	**Mr. Timothy Collins**
UNAIDS	**Mr. Peter Koopmans**
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	**Mr. Luc Vandamme**
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	**Ms. Mary Moné**
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	**Mr. Michael Dell'Amico**
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	**Mr. Terry Davis**
United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON)	**Mr. Peter Marshall**
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	**Mr. Arve Skog**
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)	**Mr. Neil Ashcroft** **Mr. Mark Gibb**
United Nations Women (UN Women)	**Mr. Paul O'Hanlon**
The World Bank (WB)	**Mr. Jeffrey Culver** **Mr. Derek Erkkila** **Ms. Vikki Hollingsworth** **Mr. Bryson Keenan**
World Food Programme (WFP)	**Mr. Steve Gluning**
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	**Mr. John Shabatura**

Departments and Offices of the United Nations Secretariat

Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
Department of Field Support (DPKO-DFS)   **Mr. Craig Harrison**

Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) **Mr. Peter Drennan (USG, UNDSS)**
                                               Ms. Florence Poussin
                                               Mr. Andre Dehondt
                                               Ms. Tamara Anderson
                                               Mr. George Dunn
                                               Mr. Kent Harrington
                                               Ms. Tanya Mohan
                                               Mr. Samer Budeir

Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)   **Mr. Simon Butt**

Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR)   **Mr. Abraham Mathai**

Observers

United Nations Medical Director's
Working Group (UNMDWG)   **Dr. Teoliza Almendras**

Coordinating Committee of International
Staff Unions and Associations of the
United Nations System (CCISUA)   **Mr. Guy Avognon**

IASMN Recommendations

1. **Global Security Environment**
   Taking into consideration the dynamic and challenging global security environment, the IASMN supported:
   a. The development of a UNSMS common messaging on the global security environment's impact on UN programmes and mandates;
   b. The need for the UNSMS to remain forward-focused, with the ability to anticipate future challenges through increased threat and risk analysis;
   c. The need for proactive security risk mitigation measures; and
   d. The promotion of a global security culture.

   The UNSMS common messaging on the global security environment, including the five points below, should be communicated to the Executive Heads of UNSMS organizations:
   a. The current global security environment in which the United Nations delivers its programmes and mandates is complex, dynamic and challenging. There is no indication that such an environment is likely to improve over the coming decade.
   b. In order to address this complexity, the UNSMS must be able to effectively and efficiently identify and manage risk. The UNSMS must also be creative, flexible, agile and proactive when responding to changes within the environment.
   c. In order to facilitate these goals, the IASMN reminds all managers in the United Nations Missions, Agencies, Funds and Programmes to incorporate and budget for safety and security within their respective programme planning at the earliest stage possible.
   d. Furthermore, the IASMN calls on all managers to ensure that their acceptance of risk is commensurate with the criticality of their programme activity and calls on all UNSMS organizations to ensure that their respective managers have been trained and equipped to make such a decision.
   e. Finally, the IASMN calls on all relevant stakeholders to ensure that all UNSMS personnel and eligible family members, impacted by the acceptance of risk, are provided with adequate care and support by their respective organization.

2. **HLCM Working Group on Duty of Care**
   The IASMN took note of the progress of the HLCM Working Group on Duty of Care while recognizing that the scope of its work is limited to key duty of care issues in high-risk environments. In this regard, the IASMN stated that it looked forward to the Working Group's expected output, including the identification of key duty of care issues in five high-

risk environments (Afghanistan, Ebola-impacted countries, Haiti, Mali/Somalia and Syria) and the development of guidance notes for managers in the field.

Separately, the IASMN emphasized that the duty of care entails not only safety and security considerations, but also administrative, human resources and legal considerations, among others. Therefore, the duty of care, as a whole, is best addressed by the Executive Heads of UNSMS organizations (i.e., CEB level).

Recognizing the need to address duty of care issues with respect to locally-recruited personnel in particular, the IASMN agreed that interested organizations should produce a white paper on outstanding duty of care issues with respect to locally-recruited personnel, as necessary, with a view toward submission to HLCM.

3. **UNDSS Strategic Review**
The IASMN expressed support for UNDSS' Strategic Review and endorsed its recommendations, including its outcomes and its identification of immediate priorities. The IASMN also expressed support for a global review of the UNSMS and whether it is the most efficient and effective way to deliver safety and security services in the current environment.

4. **Joint Inspection Unit (JIU)**
The IASMN took note of the update on the Joint Inspection Unit's (JIU) review of safety and security across the UN system and looks forward to the final report, scheduled to be released in September 2015.

5. **Ending Impunity for those who commit Serious Crimes and Acts of Violence against UN Personnel**
The IASMN took note of the update on efforts to end impunity for those who commit serious crimes and acts of violence against UN personnel, including the development of a database to follow-up on such incidents. The IASMN looks forward to receiving an update on the working group's status at the 22nd session of the IASMN.

6. **Residential Security Measures (RSM)**
The IASMN identified the need to submit the Residential Security Measures (RSM) Policy to HLCM for approval as a priority and, in this regard, called on the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) Technical Working Group (TWG) to address the recent input provided by individual UNSMS organizations, through the Human Resources Network (HRN). The IASMN also called on the MORSS TWG to draft operational guidelines for implementing the RSM Policy, with a view to submitting a finalized draft to the IASMN Steering Group in May 2015 for review. The working group should also develop an awareness tool for personnel (i.e., online training course or video or other social media) specifically with respect to residential security.

Separately, the IASMN called for the establishment of a new working group to identify residential security risks in the context of locally-recruited personnel, in recognition of the fact that the RSM Policy applies only to internationally-recruited or internationally-deployed personnel and their eligible family members, as noted under its Applicability section. The new working group will be chaired by UNICEF, with IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, UN Women and WFP serving as members. CCIUSA will participate as an observer. As a first step, the working group should draft TORs and conduct a scoping exercise to identify residential security risks to locally-recruited personnel, including risks resulting from their contractual status with a UNSMS organization.

7. **Security Risk Management (SRM)**
The IASMN approved the amended Terms of Reference (TORs) and projected work plan presented by the Security Risk Management Implementation Working Group (SRMIWG).

The IASMN approved the latest draft of the SRM Policy, SRM Manual as ready for field testing and agreed to provide any further input to the Chair of the SRMIWG by the end of February 2015.

Finally, the IASMN expressed deep appreciation for the work of the SRMIWG thus far and recognized the fundamental importance of SRM process to the work of UNSMS security professionals.

8. **Air Travel**
The Air Travel Policy, as presented to the 21st session of the IASMN was endorsed based on the following understanding: (1) the Risk Management Tool (RMT) and the Air Travel Operational Guidelines will address the concerns raised by two IASMN members; (2) assurances have been provided by USG, UNDSS that the Air Travel Policy, as presented and endorsed by the 21st session of the IASMN, will be subject to revision if it impacts the day-to-day operations of UNSMS organizations and, in particular, inhibits the delivery of their programmes or mandates; and (3) any revision of the Air Travel Policy shall only be undertaken in consultation with all relevant stakeholders.

9. **Safety and Security Incident Recording System (SSIRS)**
The IASMN endorsed the SSIRS Policy and the SSIRS User Manual, whereby it was confirmed that SSIRS could be used to record incidents that do not impact the UN in order to enhance situational awareness and that SSIRS would not record incidents involving members of military contingents or formed police units, in line with the Applicability section of the UNSMS' *Security Policy Manual*. The IASMN also endorsed the SSIRS roll-out plan, as detailed in Annex C, and use of the Safety and Security Incident Recording Form, as found in Annex D.

Given its endorsement, the IASMN requested that SSIRS be launched by 1 April 2015, upon which a three-month trial and evaluation period will begin. If the launch is successful, as

determined by the SIRWG, UNDSS will become responsible for housing and implementing SSIRS as of 1 July 2015.

The IASMN requested the IASMN Secretariat to transmit all documents related to SSIRS to HLCM, whereby HLCM would be requested to take note of the IASMN's endorsement of SSIRS.

10. **Arming of Security Professionals**

The IASMN called for the development of a UNSMS policy on the arming of security professionals, in recognition of the fact that there are certain situations in which arming security professionals may be appropriate and that the UNSMS' Use of Force Policy does not adequately address such situations. In this regard, the IASMN recognized the fact that USG, UNDSS has delegated authority, from the Secretary-General to authorize the carriage of firearms, types of firearms systems, ammunitions and weapons for use by United Nations Security Officials, with support provided by the Weapons Committee.

The IASMN agreed that the proposed policy require that a robust process whereby any decision to arm security professionals be preceded by an objective, threat and risk-based analysis. The proposed policy should also address the legal basis for arming security professionals and the need to ensure that an adequate training and certification process is in place. Finally, the IASMN agreed that the *Manual of Instruction on the Use of Force Equipment, including Firearms*, while subject to revision, should serve as the UNSMS operational guidelines to the proposed policy. Both the new policy and operational guidelines should be submitted to the next IASMN Steering Group meeting in May 2015.

11. **IASMN Steering Group and VTC TORs and UNSMS Policy Development**

The IASMN agreed to limit the size of its Steering Group to its current membership and two additional members to be selected on a two-year rotating basis. In this regard, IASMN members were requested to submit their request for membership, in writing, to USG, UNDSS by the end of March 2015. The IASMN also agreed that all Steering Group members would be required to participate in at least one IASMN working group. The IASMN called on UNDSS to draft Terms of Reference (TORs), reflecting these points, for presentation at the next Steering Group session in May 2015.

With regard to the IASMN VTC, the IASMN reaffirmed that the VTC should continue to be conducted in an informal setting, thus requiring no TORs at this time. The IASMN also reaffirmed that the VTC should continue to focus on operational matters and cross-cutting issues impacting various UNSMS organizations.

With regard to UNSMS policy development, the IASMN reaffirmed that the transition from the UN *Field Security Handbook* to the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual* is a priority. Separately, the IASMN called for establishing a "college" of experienced security professionals in the field with a strong interest in policy development. Such professionals

should be invited to provide advice on IASMN policies and participate in IASMN working groups.

12. **Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG)**
The IASMN took note of the latest draft of the Management of Stress and Critical Incident Stress (MSCIS) Policy while calling for the draft policy to be finalized prior to the next Steering Group session in May 2015.

13. **Gender Considerations in Security Management Working Group**
The IASMN took note of the progress made by the recently established Gender Considerations in Security Management Working Group, including the development of draft Terms of Reference (TORs) and the identification of gaps within existing UNSMS policies with respect to gender. The IASMN noted that it looked forward to receiving an update from the working group at the next Steering Group session in May 2015.

14. **Security Training Working Group (STWG)**
The IASMN endorsed the recommendations from the September 2014 meeting, as found in CRP 10, with one language modification to the first recommendation.

The IASMN emphasized the need to prioritize the outstanding requests for training deliverables. In order to do so, the IASMN called on the STWG to undertake a stock-taking exercise with respect to the status of training deliverables, resources required to complete such deliverables and an expected timeline for their respective completion.

Separately, the IASMN identified the need to develop a training course for Field Service (FS) grade officers, with the understanding that FS-5 to FS-7 grades would still be required to complete the Security Certification Programme (SCP), as well as a training course on "soft-skills" for all security professionals.

15. **Unarmed Private Security Companies**
Recognizing the importance of further clarifying the UN's guidance regarding the use of unarmed private security companies, the IASMN endorsed the establishment of a working group on unarmed private security companies, led by DPKO-DFS and composed of OHCHR, UNDP, UNDSS/DRO/Peacekeeping Operations Support Section, UNDSS/PPCU, UNHCR, World Bank as well as DFS/Office of the Director/Field Procurement Liaison Team, DM/Office of Central Support Services/Procurement Division, UNDP/Procurement Support Office and a UNDSS Chief Security Adviser (CSA) to be determined.

16. **Any Other Business (AOB)**

    a. **Budgetary matters: Jointly Financed Activities (JFA)**
    The IASMN supported UNDSS' budget orientations with respect to Jointly Financed Activities (JFA) for the biennium 2016-2017.

b. Blast assessments

The IASMN supported the development and distribution of a list of blast engineers employed or contracted by UNSMS organizations.

c. Convergence of physical and information security

The IASMN took note of the presentation and organization's determination to converge and consolidate physical security with state-of-the-art iCT security systems and functions, and its coordination efforts with the HLCM - ICT Network and the IASMN on these matters. .

d. IASMN calendar of meetings

The IASMN agreed to limit IASMN Steering Group sessions to two days and IASMN sessions to three days in length. With regard to venue and dates, the IASMN approved the following calendar:

- **12-13 May 2015:** IASMN Steering Group Session in Bogota, Colombia
  - Host: UNDP
- **23-25 June 2015:** 22nd IASMN Session in Montreux, Switzerland
- **11-12 November 2015:** IASMN Steering Group Session in Arusha, Tanzania
- **2-5 February 2016:** 23rd IASMN Session in New York, United States of America